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Introduction  
The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 produced both external and internal 
implications for the international system. Among other things, it put an end to the Mutually 
Assured Destruction System, the East-West conflict and a division of the world into two 
political and ideological camps. Internally, fifteen new states emerged out of its 
disintegration, putting an end to their 200 year old common existence within the Russian 
Empire and the Soviet Union. This process however also produced challenges and difficulties, 
part of which had been inherited from the late Soviet period. The new states faced difficulties 
as state-building, corruption, immaturity of political elites and power struggles, economic 
decline, dangerous ethnic nationalisms and ethno-territorial conflicts. As a result, within a 
short period of time the post-Soviet space turned into an arena of global attention in the form 
of great power rivalry, conflict stalemate and political disturbances. 
Nowhere else in the post-Soviet space are the above-mentioned phenomena as conspicuous as 
in the South Caucasus. The collapse of the Soviet Union on the one hand pushed the three 
societies to establish new institutions, and pursue state-building projects, but on the other 
hand, to tackle the ethnic and political grievances left from the late Soviet era, for which their 
respective elites had no maturity or experience.1 Despite 70 years of co-existence, relations 
between the title nations and minorities suddenly deteriorated to an unprecedented level, 
culminating in brutal wars and ultimately ending in secessionism. Ethnic and political 
relations aggravated on the one hand between Baku and the largely Armenian populated 
enclave of Mountainous Karabakh in Azerbaijan, and on the other hand between Tbilisi and 
its autonomous regions in late 1980s, becoming an important factor of instability in the 
region. All three regions declared their independence from their parent states on the eve of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and ever since have existed as de facto states in the region. The 
picture became more complicated when all three conflicts developed regional dynamics, to be 
linked to the interests and policies of the regional hegemon-Russia.  
Russia has declared the South Caucasus a region of its strategic interests. It has been the 
primary peacekeeper and peace-maker in all three conflicts, it has enjoyed political and 
military presence in the region and has been sensitive to any development there. Meanwhile, 
Russia has also been accused by the conflict parties of contributing to the continuing conflict 
dynamics in the region, and of destabilising the region for its own ends. The Russian 
authorities have naturalised the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, recognised both 
                                                 
1 The South Caucasus states had briefly been independent in 1918-1920, but this period was largely insufficient 
for establishing functioning institutions of statehood. Therefore, there was not much of institutional and poltical 
continuity or inheritance in 1991, except for certain ideologies. 
12
regions’ independence, but have come to hold a more neutral stance towards the Mountainous 
Karabakh conflict. Russia has seemingly become interested in the survival of the post-
violence status-quo in the region, which is a challenge to the state and nation-building process 
of Georgia. Policymakers in the Kremlin explain their policies as aimed at guaranteeing 
stability in the region and stress their domestic security interests here, whereas the reality is, 
Russia is intent on guaranteeing the survival of the secessionist authorities for its own ends.   
The central aim of this thesis is to examine Russia’s policies towards the three conflicts in the 
region in the context of its strategic interests in the South Caucasus. In particular it seeks to 
answer the following research questions: To what extent does Russia support the secessionist 
regions in the South Caucasus and what are the incentives of its policies. What are the 
strategic interests that act as the driving force behind its policies? The exploration of Russia’s 
engagement in all three conflicts also sheds light on a number of correlations as Russia’s 
bilateral relations with the states in the region, its engagement with the West, as well as its 
capacity and leeway to resolve the conflicts. In particular, an underlying question is the 
impact of Russia’s bilateral relations with the South Caucasus states on its policies towards 
the conflicts. Further, it is assessed whether Russia’s policies of engagement in the 
secessionist regions are aimed at retaining the status-quo for power-political ends or its 
domestic security concerns in the North Caucasus. This raises the question over Russia’s 
capacity to resolve the conflicts. It explores the significance of the South Caucasus to Russia’s 
domestic security and power-political interests and defines which one acts as the causal 
variable in its engagement in the region. It elucidates the nature of Russia’s great power status 
and hegemony in the post-soviet space and their correlation with its policies towards the 
conflicts.  
The thesis further assesses if international relations theory can be useful in explaining 
Russia’s policies towards the three conflicts. It utilises the regional security complex theory to 
explain the security interconnectedness in the Caucasus. Further, it assesses to what extent 
various accounts of the realist tradition of state behaviour can explain the phenomenon raised 
in this thesis. Exploring the nature of Russian hegemony in the CIS and its overall position, a 
concept of relevant power is suggested. The study also sheds light (albeit limited) on the 
importance of geopolitics as a discourse in Russian foreign policy. Although some scholars 
have written on Russia’s policies towards the South Caucasus region, this study is original in 
a way that it examines systematically Russia’s behaviour towards the conflicts in its periphery 
for the whole post-Soviet period.   
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Methodology and sources 
This study is largely qualitative, with very limited quantitative data, combined with document 
analysis. The primary method to answer the research question is content analysis and 
qualitative interviews, although elements of other methods and sources can also be found.2 
The qualitative interviews have acted not as a primary research method, but only 
supplementary to the discourse analysis. Therefore, the qualitative interviews are limited in 
number. The principal sources systematically consulted for information are newspapers, 
journals, statements, and communiqués from 1991 to 2008. Various Russian, Armenian, 
Azerbaijani, Georgian and English language news reports have been examined. The Russian, 
Georgian and Azerbaijani news reports were examined during the research stay in the relevant 
countries. The primary sources used for the study include Russia’s successive foreign and 
security concepts, military doctrines, speeches of successive Russian presidents and other 
officials, bulletins of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as statements and 
communiqués by the officials of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Moreover, research 
reports of think tanks as the Centre for European Policy Studies, Centre for international 
Studies at Oxford University, Carnegie Foundation, German Foreign Policy Council, 
International Crisis Group, International Institute for Strategic Studies have also been 
examined for the purposes of this study. The secondary sources include scholarly books and 
journal articles in the field of international relations theory and social sciences as well as the 
empirical questions of the study. 
Causality 
Causality in social sciences is often explained by linking an independent variable to a 
dependent variable in a process of defining causal effect and causal mechanism. The causal 
effect of an independent variable is, according to Bennett ‘the change in probability or value 
of the dependent variable that would have occurred if the independent variable had assumed a 
different value’.3 A causal mechanism includes the ‘causal processes or intervening variables 
through which causal or explanatory variables produce causal effects’. In other words, the 
above-mentioned concepts reflect a process of defining what causes a particular outcome and 
why and how. Establishing causal effect rather than the causal mechanism is particularly 
                                                 
2 It would be more appropriate to define the methodology of this study as triangulation. Triangulation is the ‘use 
of more than one approach to the investigation of the research question in order to enhance confidence in the 
ensuing findings’. There can be both within method and between method triangulation and this study has used 
within method triangulation. For triangulation, see Alan Bryman Social research methods (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001); Alan Bryman, Quantity and quality in social research (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 
131-132. 
3 See Alexander L. George, Andrew Bennett, Case studies and theory development in the social sciences, 
(Cambridge, Mas.: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2004), p. 138.  
14
dominant in studies that include a large number of statistical data, but most social science 
research today is aimed at generating knowledge on how the process works. As Andrew Sayer 
puts it, ‘…merely knowing that C has generally been followed by E is not enough, we want to 
know the continuous process by which C produces E’.4 
There is distinction in social sciences between understanding and explaining a phenomenon.5 
According to Ngaire Woods, explaining is by identifying what caused a particular 
phenomenon, generating and testing hypotheses. Under such a scheme, causal variables are 
defined as x, y, z and their correlation is tested.6 This study aims more to understand, rather 
than explain in the strict sense of the word. The complex nature of the social reality makes it 
nearly impossible to identify a single causal variable or testing falsifiable hypotheses on the 
causal correlations of this study.7 It does not attempt to test a set of falsifiable hypotheses on 
causal relationships or aim to provide a single definitive account of the social reality in the 
positivist sense of the thought. It instead attempts to shed understanding on how certain causal 
factors may account to explain why Russia’s policies have been aimed more at the retention 
of status-quo rather than conflict resolution in the South Caucasus.  
Case studies method  
Case studies method involves a detailed investigation of a phenomenon which reflects the 
operation of an established theoretic concept. The method allows the researcher to establish 
the mechanism by which a particular outcome is produced, by observing and comparing 
similar or identical cases much more in detail than any other method.8 Case study methods are 
based upon John Stuart Mill’s methods of agreement and difference. The method of 
agreement implies that if several cases have a similar outcome on the dependent variable and 
similar values on the independent variable, then the cause of the outcome is easy to establish. 
Such a method allows the researcher to identify one single variable that produces the outcome 
                                                 
4 Andrew Sayer, Method in Social Science, (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 106. 
5 Certain scholars have argued that explaining cannot be separated from understanding an actor’s behaviour, 
because if explaining is about determining the causal factors, it cannot be established without an understanding 
of the endogenous and exogenous factors about the actor. For the explaining versus understanding, see Martin 
Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding international relations, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991). For an opposite view, see Emanuel Adler, ‘Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World 
Politics’, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 3, issue 3, 1997, pp. 319-363.  
6 Ngaire Woods, ‘The use of theory in the study of international relations’ in Explaining international relations 
since 1945, ed. Ngaire Woods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 11. 
7 This position is widely criticised by positivist social scientists who argue that any social system is as complex 
as the theory developed to study it and no social phenomenon can be outside the control of the researcher. See 
Nils Peter Gledditsch, ‘Armed conflict and the environment: A critique of the literature’, Journal of Peace 
Research, vol. 35, no 3, 1998, pp. 381-400. 
8 See Howard Rose, ‘Case studies’, in Graham A. Allan, Chris Skinner, eds, Handbook for research students in 
the social sciences, (London: Falmer, 1991), p. 190-203. For the weaknesses and strengths of the case study 
method, see Stephen Van Evera, Guide to methods for students of political science, (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1997), pp. 51-55; Robert K. Yin, Case study research: Design and Methods, (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 
1994), pp. 13, 18-23.  
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in all cases. Such an approach offers a monocausal explanation of the social reality, which is 
very critically perceived in modern social science today. The method of difference in contrast 
selects cases with different outcomes in the dependent variable and aspires to identify the 
variance in the independent variable. The method assumes that if two cases have divergent 
outcomes on the dependent variable, but identical values on the independent variable, the 
independent variable per se cannot be sufficient to have caused the outcome.9 The factors in 
both cases of agreement and disagreement are deterministic regularities, which leave little 
space for multiple causality and manoeuvre of the researcher in cases where the outcome is 
produced by more than one factor that varies to certain degrees in various cases. In 
compliment to case studies, process-tracing method has been developed and used by most 
qualitative research today. Process tracing for case studies enables the researcher to examine 
the process of how ‘certain conditions are translated into case outcomes’, focusing on the 
intervening variables in detail. The process-tracing method according to George and Bennett, 
‘attempts to identify the intervening causal process between an independent variable and a 
dependent variable’.10   
Case selection 
According to Van Evera, case studies can serve 5 main purposes: ‘testing theories, creating 
theories, identifying antecedent conditions and testing their importance, and explaining cases 
of intrinsic importance’.11 The current study meets the last purpose and is organised around 
three case studies with similarities and differences on the dependent variables, hence the level 
of Russia’s engagement in and support for secessionist regions. Each case reflects both 
similarities and differences of Russia’s engagement. The differences on the dependent 
variables are of direct relevance to the purpose of the study and have implications for the key 
causal factor of Russia’s behaviour in the secessionist entities.  All three cases share the same 
phenomenon, yet offer different insights on the research question. The cases vary in particular 
with regard to Russia’s engagement, capacity to act and impact of its bilateral relations. There 
is also time-wise variance between the cases: Russia’s engagement has varied over time. 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Mountainous Karabakh conflicts were chosen because in each of 
them Russia’s policies had become a further complicating factor and each offers a different 
insight for understanding the motivation of Russia’s behaviour. In each of them three features 
                                                 
9 See Charles Ragin, The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies, 
(Berkeley: University of California, 1987), p. 39. 
10 See Alexander L. George, Andrew Bennett, op. cit., p. 206; Stephen Van Evera, op. cit., p. 64; Alexander L. 
George, ‘Case studies and theory development: The method of structured, focused comparison’, in Paul Gordon 
Lauren, ed. Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy, (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 18-
19.  
11 Ibid., p. 55.  
16
contribute to understanding the causality of the phenomenon: Russia’s domestic security 
interests in the Caucasus, bilateral relations with the parent states and the West, and its 
broader geopolitical interests. Competing theories make divergent predictions about the cases, 
all three cases are very relevant to current policy-problem cases, and the cases are good for 
replicating previous tests and have variance in values on the IV, DV and IV.12 
Delimitation of the research  
The study is largely empirical and aims to establish an understanding of the complex social 
phenomenon in investigation. Since there is at least one theory to test, the research is not 
aimed at theory-generation or theoretic contribution. In terms of theory, the study in question 
is largely deductive, rather than inductive. Although, it covers a timeframe of 1991 to 2008, 
the study is not a purely historic account of the events.  
Level of analysis 
The level of analysis of the study is unit level; it concentrates on an actor’s, hence Russia’s 
policies towards a particular group of states, while treating the former as a black box. 
Therefore, the study does not aim to explain the identity related dimension of the Russian 
political elite as an explanatory variable for its policies towards the conflicts in the South 
Caucasus. Economic interests and energy issues are also largely left out in the examination of 
Russia’s behaviour towards the conflicts, since this would be the scope of another study. 
Issues and models of conflict transformation and conflict settlement would also be the subject 
of another research. Nor is the research aimed at establishing the causes of the emergence of 
ethno-territorial conflicts in the South Caucasus. The second chapter is therefore largely 
descriptive and aims to give background information on the domestic level of conflict 
dynamics, in order to avoid confusion at the regional level. It tries to cover all possible factors 
that could, further in the study account for understanding, and to a certain extent explaining 
Russia’s behaviour vis-à-vis the secessionist conflicts in the South Caucasus. The chapter 
includes some parts on the causes of the conflicts, and does shed light on the internal 
dynamics, basing it largely on the already established research. Although the level of analysis 
of this study is not the conflicts per se, but rather Russia’s engagement in them, a broader 
approach to the introduction of the ethno-territorial conflicts is undertaken in Chapter II. This 
has been necessitated by the linkage and interconnectedness of the local and regional levels of 
conflict dynamics in the region. Abkhazia’s dependence on Russia for example, or Russia’s 
leeway in South Ossetia does require a more elaborate examining of the internal dynamics of 
the ethno-territorial conflicts.  
                                                 
12 Such a selection meets most of the criteria for case selection in social science inquiry as established by Van 
Evera, see Stephen Van Evera, op. cit., pp. 77-88. 
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Methodological challenges 
The primary challenge to this study is imperfect information that any social scientist faces. 
This factor is more conspicuous in the case of Russia since much parallel and confusing data 
on the same issue is available. Clarification of certain questions required access to the very 
top level of decision-making. I undertook field research in Moscow in March to April 2008, 
during which I examined the earlier editions of certain Russian newspapers and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs bulletins. The limited nature of financial resources and time available for the 
field research was a further constraint. In Moscow, I arranged some 10 qualitative interviews 
with mostly government officials and academics. These included semi-structured interviews, 
as some of them became largely flexible and explorative in the course of the process, when 
the interviewee would go beyond the asked question. Interviews acted only supplementary, 
thus held in those areas of the study where information was insufficient and at the end I had to 
compare the interview findings with the newspaper and document data. There were certain 
challenges with the interviews as well. Some interviews represented the official policy line 
and therefore were not entirely helpful or innovative. There were few interviews from which I 
could distil innovative data. Since it was rather difficult to gain access to certain government 
agencies, most interviews took place in a private or informal setting. However, my overall 
fieldwork in Russia was useful in terms of getting a broader picture over the state of affairs 
and gaining access to data. 
As to intended field research in the conflict regions, there were both technical and financial 
difficulties in gaining access to Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Mountainous Karabakh. As a 
national of Azerbaijan, I needed special permission from both Azerbaijani and Armenian 
Governments for visiting Mountainous Karabakh. Time restraints and the costs of visiting the 
regions made it impossible for me to visit them. Moreover, field research in the regions could 
shed light on certain questions in this study, but were considered not so vital to the central aim 
of this study. Finally my frequent visits to Azerbaijan and Georgia were an asset for me, since 
I had an opportunity to access both academics and high level officials in both countries.  
Structure of the thesis 
The research is organised around five chapters. The next chapter accommodates the research 
phenomenon within the broader theoretic discussion, and assesses if international relations 
theory is useful to explain Russia’s policies towards the conflicts in the South Caucasus. The 
discussion builds on the realist account of state behaviour, regional security complex theory  
and hegemonic stability theory. 
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A shift to the empirical main text starts with Chapter II, which describes the three ethno-
territorial conflicts, their causes, escalation and current state of affairs in detail. The chapter 
offers insight on the complex dynamics of each conflict. It is argued that an ethnic security 
dilemma should not be considered as the major cause of the escalation of the three conflicts in 
the region, and that the conflict spiral has developed in a rather coincidental way. To avoid 
confusion on the level of analysis question, it should be mentioned that the chapter is only of 
supportive character to the central research question of this study and is in no way original 
research on its own. This study aims to focus on the regional level, rather than on the micro 
level of conflict dynamics in the South Caucasus. Such a chapter is necessary though, for 
understanding the regional level and overall the research question.  
Chapter III discusses Russia’s strategic interests in the South Caucasus since 1991. First, the 
context of Russia’s foreign policy evolution in the post-Soviet period is discussed, trying to 
answer the question why the Euro-Atlantic trend in Russian foreign policy did not last long 
and what implications sustenance of Euratlantism in Russia might have had for Russia’s 
policies towards the region. Russian-Western relations are treated as an intervening variable 
in Russia’s policies towards the region. Russia’s perception of the West, NATO and the US 
and their potential presence in the South Caucasus are examined in detail. The importance 
given in Russia to its great power status and NATO enlargement are discussed, because both 
have direct implications for the central research question. Further, the outline assesses 
Russia’s domestic security (interconnection of the South and North Caucasus) interests and 
power political interests in the region and tries to accommodate the resulting policies within 
them. The spill-over potential of all three conflicts and their relevance to Russia’s domestic 
security are elaborated. 
The next chapter assesses Russia’s policies towards the three conflicts in the post-Soviet 
period under successive Russian presidents. It aims to establish the level of Russia’s 
engagement in all three conflicts, and also sheds light on Russia’s capacity and leeway to 
resolve the conflicts. The section on the Georgian-Ossetian conflict sheds light on the 2008 
Russian-Georgian crisis, its causes and implications. The chapter also establishes the 
differences in the dependent variables. 
Finally, Chapter V discusses the impact of Russia’s bilateral relations with Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia on it policies towards the conflicts. Comparative analysis is carried 
out between Russia’s bilateral relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia and their impact on the 
conflict dynamics in MK and Russia’s bilateral relations with Georgia and their impact on the 
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conflict dynamics in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In the conclusion, the findings of the 
research are discussed.   
 
Chapter 1  
Discourse in international relations: realism, regional security complex 
theory and hegemony 
This chapter is an attempt to accommodate Russia’s policies towards the ethno-territorial 
conflicts in the South Caucasus within the broader discussion of international relations 
theories. Realism and regional security complex theory are employed to understand Russia’s 
geopolitical interests in the region. Initially, geopolitics as a concept is explored in the context 
of its original and contemporary implication. The question to what extent, Russia’s policies 
and interests have been geopolitically motivated is briefly examined. It is argued that 
geopolitics with reference to the heartland concept obviously had a significant impact upon 
the Russian elite’s political thinking in the preliminary period, but the concept of ‘New Great 
Game’ often used in a geopolitical context is no longer useful or of explanatory value in 
understanding Russia’s policies towards the three conflicts. Geopolitics is currently used in 
Russia to refer to realpoltik. This necessitates exploring the realist paradigm and its 
predictions of state behaviour. Trying to operationalise the paradigm, its hypotheses are tested 
with regard to Russia’s policies towards the three conflicts. It is argued that overall Russia’s 
strategy towards the conflict regions is compatible with the explanation of the theory, but its 
tactics falls short in certain predictions. Further, regional security complex theory developed 
by Buzan and Waever is employed to explain the security interconnectedness of the North and 
South Caucasus. The theory views the Caucasus as a set of states, including Russia, bound 
together whose security concerns are tightly interconnected. The nature and structure of the 
security complex as well as possible alternative complexes are briefly discussed. The overlay 
element of the approach leads to the question of the nature of Russian hegemony in the region 
and its implications for the ethno-territorial conflicts.     
1.1 Legacy of geopolitics 
 
Geopolitics is the spatial study of international politics, a study ‘of the relationships among 
states and implications of these relationships for the morphology of the political map as a 
whole’.13 It focuses on the security-political implications of geography, hence the relationship 
                                                 
13 Geoffrey Parker, ‘Political geography and geopolitics’, in A.J.R. Groom and Margot Light, eds., 
Contemporary International relations: A guide to theory, (London: Pinter, 1994), p.170.  
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between security politics and material conditions. Its core point, geographic determinism 
asserts that the geographic conditions of a state determine its foreign policy interests and its 
power.14 Geopolitical theory first emerged in the form of naturalism (natural material 
environments determine the differences between human societies) and then evolved into what 
is global geopolitics in early 20th century. Although geography and its importance for foreign 
policy can be found in the writings of ancient thinkers, it was in early twentieth century that 
geographic concepts of heartland, rimland and buffer zones were developed to refer to 
strategic zones in the world political map. Global materialist geopolitics focused, in addition 
to the material constraints given by nature, on the technological changes brought about by the 
industrial revolution, in particular the relationship of power and security with the geographical 
features of world politics.15 The concept of geopolitics was coined by the Swedish political 
scientist Kjellen, who referred to great powers as ‘sensual rational organisms’, but was further 
theoretised by Halford Mackinder, Alfred Mahan, Nicholas Spykman, Friedrich Ratzel and 
others.16  
Mackinder’s heartland theory among other concepts, has mostly contributed to the idea of 
geographic determinism, and is relevant to the contemporary debate of the importance of 
geographic determinism for foreign policy. The theory divided the world’s surface into a 
world island, determined a heartland to act as the pivot area of world politics. Accordingly, 
any power who controls Eurasia commands the heartland, and who rules the heartland 
commands the world island, which counts for more than half of the world’s resources. So, 
Eurasia, namely the area controlled by the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union, was 
assumed to be the heartland.17 Mackinder referred to Eurasia as the pivot of history, control of 
which would enable an ultimate control of the world island.  
Overall emergence of global geopolitics as a theory turned out to coincide with imperialism 
and great power rivalries. The theory originally tried to promote an imperialist agenda, 
supporting the superiority of the European civilisation and its economic, social and political 
                                                 
14 In a critical view Simon Dalby defines geopolitics as ‘the politics of the geographic specification of politics’, 
see Simon Dalby, ‘Critical Geopolitics: Discourse, Difference and Dissent’, Environment and Planning D: 
Security and Space 9, 1991, p. 274.   
15 See Daniel Deudney, ‘Geopolitics as theory: historic security materialism’, European Journal of International 
Relations, vol. 6, issue 1, 2000, pp. 77-107. 
16 See Geoffrey Parker, Western geopolitical thought in the twentieth century, (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 
p.55  
17 See Halford Mackinder Democratic ideals and reality: A study in the politics of reconstruction, (New York: 
Holt, 1942), p. 150. See also Halford Mackinder, ‘The round world and the winning of the peace’, Foreign 
Affairs, vol. 21, 1943, p. 598. For a more detailed account of the Eurasian heartland thesis, see Saul Bernard 
Cohen, Geopolitics of the world system, (Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), p.65.     
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systems as a justification for the advancement of imperialism. Development of a powerful and 
efficient empire was considered as a necessary condition of being a world power.18 
Geopolitics has allegedly not been a neutral discipline, but one influenced by national 
biases.19 It was discredited in the post World War II period, due to its association with the 
Nazi Germany and allegations of war causality as a foreign policy ideology.20 The concept 
had become a popular ideological tool for the Nazi regime based upon German geographers 
Friedrich Ratzel and Karl Haushofer’s arguments that the state is a living organism and 
therefore cannot be contained within its limits.21 Accordingly, in a competitive struggle for 
existence every great state needed space to advance its civilisation, a need described as 
lebensraum.  
In the post-war period, international relations theory, mainly through the contributions of 
structural realism, distanced itself from geopolitics. The term was not reintroduced until 
Henry Kissinger revived it in 1970s as a synonym for balance of power politics in the 
geographic map. During the Cold War, it was widely used by both Soviet and US leaders 
synonymously with international strategic rivalry and balance of power politics. In the last 
two decades, geopolitics has been widely referred to great power rivalry and especially a new 
Great Game in Eurasia.22 Overall, geopolitics in the last two decades has been a popular 
concept, widely used in policy analyses and academic papers. As O’Tuathail notes, the 
concept has been popularly used by academics and foreign policy experts, its popularity 
owing to ‘a comprehensive vision of the world political map’ and a promise of ‘an unusual 
insight into the future direction of international affairs’.23  
Geopolitics has arguably been a part of any realist thinking and has often been coined as 
‘realist geopolitics’.24 However, structural realism dismissed geographic determinism, and the 
concept was only recently integrated into international relations theory by the writings of 
Jervis, Walt, Mearsheimer, Buzan and Waever. It has, in various theoretic discussions, been 
argued that geographic features can influence the perceptions of decision-makers and mitigate 
or exacerbate the effects of anarchy. Geographic features have largely been treated as an 
                                                 
18 See Gearoid O Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 37-48.  
19 See Peter J. Taylor, Political Geography: World economy, Nation-State and Locality, (New York: Longman, 
1993), p. 63. 
20 See Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: a very short introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.31.  
21 See John Agnew, Geopolitics: re-visioning world politics, (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 98.    
22 For the 19th century ‘Great Game’, see Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Power in Central 
Asia, (New York: Kodansha International, 1990).  
23 Gearoid O Tuathail, ‘Thinking critically about geopolitics’, in Gearoid O Tuathail, Simon Dlaby and Paul 
Routledge,  The geopolitics reader, (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 1.  
24 See Jonathan Haslam, No virtue like necessity: Realist thought in international relations since Machiavelli, 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 4. 
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intervening variable in security-political analysis.25 The linkage between geography and 
power was further revived by the end of the Cold War. This was necessitated by the need to 
integrate structural realism with theories of foreign policy, and by the deconstruction of the 
overemphasis of the structural level over the unit one. As Jakub Grygiel puts it ‘if the 
disappearance of geography was indicative of the rift between theory and policy, the revival 
of geography is a sign of the desire to bridge that gap’.26 Meanwhile, scholars as Walt and 
Jervis have argued for the opposite of what geopolitical thinkers had predicted in the early 
twentieth century and kept the role of geography to a minimum. In particular, despite treating 
geographic adjacency as a variable, Walt’s balance of threat theory rejects Mackinder’s 
heartland thesis. According to this suggestion, Walt has argued ‘the outcome of the II World 
War should have established the Soviet rather than US hegemony’. Occupation of heartland 
according to the balance of threat theory had greatly increased the number of enemies.27  
The primary challenge of geopolitics as a concept in the post-war period has been its 
ambiguity. As O’Tuathail notes, the term is vague and ‘has had shifting and unstable 
meanings from the day of its emergence’.28 In an attempt to modify the concept, non-material 
post-modern critical geopolitics has emerged to suggest that geographic determinism has 
changed both with the modification of the world’s political map and with technological 
advancements. The emerging discipline of critical geopolitics today argues that the perception 
of ‘a world ordered geographically into a more or less fixed hierarchy of states, cores, and 
peripheries, spheres of influence, flashpoints, buffer zones, and strategic relations’ has 
changed due to changes in the world political map.29 Claiming that classical geopolitics is 
more an ideology rather than a theoretic platform, critical geopolitics has associated 
geographic space with leaders’ perceptions and intellectuals’ discourse and rejected the causal 
relations between geographic space and international politics.     
 
 
                                                 
25 Stephen Walt for example uses geographic distance as a variable in his balance of threat theory. Walt argues 
that crude power is not enough to explain the balancing strategies of states and, establishes that power and 
distance are interrelated. See Stephen Walt, Origins of alliances, (New York: Cornell Univeristy Press, 1987) p. 
23. Robert Jervis equally sets geography as a mediating variable in distinguishing offence from defence in a 
security dilemma. He argues that geographic features as location or accessability of states can act as factors in 
mitigating a security dilemma and in balace of power politics. See Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the 
Security Dilemma’, World Politics, vol. 40, no 1, 1978, p. 214.   
26 Jakub J. Grygiel, Great powers and geopolitical change, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2006), 
p.15. 
27 Stephen M. Walt, The origins of alliances, (New York, Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 277. 
28 See Gearoid O’ Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 64.  
29 John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, Mastering space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political 
Economy, (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 5. 
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1.1.1. Geopolitics in Russia’s approach to the South Caucasus  
As mentioned earlier, the concept of geopolitics with reference to Mackinder’s heartland 
theory was an important ideological consideration within the Russian Empire and the Soviet 
Union. Russia’s geographic location has had an ultimate impact on its foreign policy in the 
last 200 years. Due to its continental isolation, the Russian Empire sought warm-water ports 
to be used throughout the year.30  
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, during Russia’s short-lived cosmopolitism, 
the country’s foreign policy elite initially did not seem to embrace classical geopolitical 
thinking. At the time of the dominance of Liberal Westernism in Russian foreign policy, it 
was even argued that geographic determinism was not crucial and Russia should seek 
orientation towards Europe and the US no matter how far it could be. Concentrating on 
economic and political modernisation, with an objective of becoming a member of the 
European or Western international society, geopolitics and security-military power was less a 
concern then. With a return to Eurasianism in late 1992, geopolitics once again became a 
major ideological tool and policy basis in Russia.31 It provided a theoretic foundation for 
explaining international politics during the mid 1990s, in particular when the West began 
penetrating the CIS and refused to recognise Russia’s great power status.32 Analysts and 
policymakers both in the West and Russia continuously referred to a new ‘Great Game’ when 
speaking about the conflicts and alignment efforts of the states in theCIS.33 It was argued that 
Russia’s geopolitical interests should be aimed at impeding the resolution of the conflicts in 
the South Caucasus, and overall restoring the Russian Empire over the heartland. The South 
Caucasus was depicted by leading academics and policy makers as the epicentre of this 
geopolitical rivalry.34 
                                                 
30 See Geoffrey Parker, The geopolitics of domination, (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 83. For the impact of 
geopoltical relaities on Russian foreign policy, see Robert H. Donaldson, Joseph L. Nogee, The foreign policy of 
Russia: changing systems, enduring interests, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), pp. 17-27.  
31 In fact Eurasianism was identified with geopolitics, and both were used in Russia to describe a strong state and 
ideological revival. See Elgiz Pozdnyakov, ‘Russia is a great power’, International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 39, no 
1, 1993, pp. 3-13. 
32 A prominent ideologue of Eurasianism was Sergei Stankevich, who argued for a modified Eurasianism, 
entailing a balance of Western and Eastern relations. His point was that Russia’s geographic separation from 
Europe would mean that Russia has to turn to the East, but since it was also Europeanised, extreme Eurasianism 
would not be useful either. He argued more in favour of realpolitik, rather than ideological foreign policy. See 
Sergei Stankevich, ‘Derzhava v poiskax sebya’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 28th March, 1992. 
33 See Zbigniev Brzezinski, The grand Chessboard: American primacy and its geostrategic imperatives, (New 
York: Basic Books, 1998), p. 123. See also David Kerr, ‘The New Eurasianism: The Rise of Geopolitcs in 
Russia’s foreign policy’, Europe-Asia Studies, volume 47, issue 6, 1995, pp. 977-988; Clarles Clover, ‘Dreams 
of the Eurasian Heartland’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, No 2, pp. 9-13.  
34 See Zbigniew Brzezinski, ‘The premature partnerhsip’, Foreign Affairs vol. 73, issue 2, March/April 1994, pp. 
72-73. 
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Geopolitics in Russian political thinking was to a large extent based on Mackinder’s theoretic 
legacy. The heartland theory was adopted by Russian foreign policy thinkers, who believed 
that Russia had a special geopolitical mission. Influential thinkers as Dugin suggested that 
Russia should do its best to maintain its control over the heartland because this would enable 
it to possess an efficient means to command world politics, by maintaining the geopolitical 
balance of power in the world.35 They believed that Russia occupies the main part of the 
heartland and should do its best to maintain that position by all available means.36 The direct 
implications of this perception for the South Caucasus and the broader CIS were maintaining 
control by all means, including manipulation of the conflicts. 
Certain changes in Russia’s capacity and capabilities within the last few years have made the 
ideological foundation of its foreign policy more sophisticated and the heartland theory is 
seemingly no longer the same central theme in Russia as it was. Certain interests dominant in 
the Yeltsin period are still valid today, but others are no longer an issue. Fro example Russia 
no longer views Turkey and Iran as geopolitical rivals, but it is still more interested in 
enhancing its bilateral relations with the CIS states and strengthening the relative autonomy of 
the CIS for its great power status. In this context, a systemic approach is perhaps more useful 
in explaining Russia’s complicated policies towards the region rather than geopolitics per se. 
1.2. Realist account of Russia’s policies 
1.2.1. Classical realism 
Classical realism has found accommodation within the works of St. Agustine, Machiavelli, 
Thycidides, Hobbes, Rousseau, Carr, Niebuhr, Spinoza, and many others, but it has been 
largely Morgenthau who laid down an analytical framework of the concept. Realism is 
primarily based upon the concepts of power, national interest and competitive nature of 
politics among nations. The raison d’être of the state in international politics is to pursue 
egoistically its national interest, mostly by accumulating power. Power under realism explains 
everything and everything in state behaviour is correlated with it. As Morgenthau puts it with 
reference to the foreign policies of states, ‘all nations want to either keep power, to increase 
power or to demonstrate power’.37 Power is treated by realism both as an end and means to all 
other ends in international politics and a fundamental feature of international politics.38 
Politics is a struggle for power, nations strive to protect their national interests, and the power 
                                                 
35 Alexander Dugin, ‘Osnovy Yevraziistva’, (Moscow: Arktogeya Tsentr, 2002). See also Andrew H. Dawson 
and Rick Fawn, The changing geopolitics of Eastern Europe, (London: Frank Cass), p.145. 
36 For a critic of the overemphasis on geopolitics, see Paul Goble, ‘In Moscow, Geopolitics is the Scientific 
Communism of Today’, RFE/RL, 11 Aug, 2005. 
37 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among nations, 3rd ed., (New York, Knopf, 1960), p. 39. 
38 See Robert Gilpin, ‘No one loves a political realist’, Security Studies, vol. 5, no 3, Spring 1996, pp. 7-8. 
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of a nation could be most effectively limited by the power of another nation.39 Power is the 
essential feature of international politics, and the nature of international politics is essentially 
conflictual. Power is relative, therefore states are concerned about relative distribution of 
power.40 As John Vasquez notes ‘realist logic of power is not simply an assumption that 
strategic thinking occurs in states’ interactions, but that states are engaged in a constant life 
and death struggle to get and keep power’.41 In another reformulation, one could put it, ‘in a 
world where power counts, no nation pursuing a rational policy have a choice between 
renouncing and wanting power’.42  
Under such a pessimistic world outlook, the only means of avoiding conflict is balance of 
power politics. Realism asserts that international security is supported by balance of power, 
while a state’s security depends on its components of power as well as the quality of its 
government and societal legitimisation. Balance of power policies include measures 
undertaken by governments whose interests and security are threatened to enhance their 
power by whatever means are available. The commonly used form of balance of power is 
alliancing, but it can also manifest itself in military build up, intervention in other countries or 
even war. It is basically a strategy of using power to curtail the power of either a genuine or 
potential adversary. 
Realism makes a strict distinction between domestic and international politics in the struggle 
for power, treating the former as hierarchy.43 Domestic politics plays a role in Morgenthau’s 
analysis, but the theory overemphasises the importance of power in international politics as an 
explanatory variable. For realists the state is the main actor in international politics, and 
sovereignty is its main feature.44 Domestically, the state has superior authority and the 
problem of order and security is solved through the state’s monopoly over legitimate physical 
violence. The initial goal of the state is to organise power domestically and the second goal to 
accumulate power internationally.  
                                                 
39 See Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 33. 
40 Joseph Grieco, ‘Anarchy and the limits of cooperation’, in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 127. 
41 John Vasquez, ‘Kuhn versus Lakatos? The case for multiple frames in appraising international relations 
theory’, in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., Progress in international relations theory: appraising 
the field, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003), p.447 
42 Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific man vs. Power Politics, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 192.  
43 See Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 27, 38-39. 
44 Realism has also been applied to non-state actors. On state-centrism of classical realism, certain scholars have 
argued that it is not necessarily the state per se that realism focuses on, but rather the self-interest of actors. 
Accordingly, classical realism does not argue that states are the only significant actors in international politics. 
See Steven Forde, ‘International realism and the science of politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli and Neorealism’, 
International Studies Quarterly, volume 39, issue 2, June 1995, pp. 144-145.  
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Under realism, the concept of national interest is rational and objectively defined in terms of 
retaining and enhancing power within the international system.45 National interest is clear, 
given and to an extent permanent, rather than subject to interpretations or to be constructed in 
a discourse. This is well captured in the famous phrase of Lard Palmerston, that ‘England has 
neither permanent friends, nor permanent enemies, she has permanent interests’.46 Realist 
approach to national interest is explained by Ernst Haas even more elaborately:  
‘Usually it is contended that the national interest includes all those features of state aspirations which bear a 
relation to the permanent and enduring needs of the state….The national interest concept acquires the sanctity of 
a fixed historic law for each state, immutable over long periods and always properly understood by intelligent 
and imaginative statesmen, misunderstood and bungled by those who did not really appreciate the position and 
interests of their country in world affairs’.47  
Thus, decision-making and policy-making are rational; statesmen make their decisions on a 
consideration of their country’s interests and of the structure of international politics. A 
peculiar feature of international politics is that no authority exists above the states, states and 
statesmen ‘act in terms of interest defined as power’ and the struggle for influence and power 
is the central core of international politics.48 Pursuing a rational foreign policy, the state will 
attempt to minimise the risks and maximise the benefits in order to increase its power. 
Cooperation between states is possible, but most states as rational actors will seek to 
maximise their benefits that serve their national interests.  
Realism has a pessimistic philosophical insight; it treats human nature as the causal variable 
of all conflict in international politics. It sees power-politics as a law of human behaviour, and 
the behaviour of the state is understood to be merely a reflection of the characteristics of the 
people who comprise. As Morgenthau notes, ‘politics like society in general, is governed by 
objective laws that have their roots in human nature’.49 It is, thus, human nature that makes 
international politics power politics. Cause of war is found in the nature and behaviour of men 
and therefore its elimination could be possible by the enlightenment of men, by changing men 
in their moral intellectual or social behaviour. War is seen to derive from the premise that men 
are led not by reason and rationality only, but by passion.50   
                                                 
45 Forde equally argues that for classical realism, especially Machiavelli and Thucydides rationality is not a 
necessary condition, see Forde, op. cit., p. 144.  
46 Quoted in Stephen M. Walt, ‘Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Order’, in The perils of anarchy: 
contemporary realism and international security, Michael Edward Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. 
Miller eds., (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), p. 224.  
47 Ernst B. Haas, ‘The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept and Propaganda’, World Politics 5, No 4, July, 
1953, p. 380. 
48 Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 5 
49 Ibid, p. 4.  
50 See Kenneth Waltz, Man, the state and war, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 14, 162. 
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Taking into consideration that realism emerged as a reaction to the misguidance of idealism 
that allegedly caused the I World War, it was set to not only describe how leaders are likely to 
behave, but also offer prescriptions for action with policy implications. Classical realists 
criticised the misguidance of idealists by their trust in the goodness of human nature, and 
warned such a mistake could lead to catastrophic results.51  
Explaining the contradiction that the same human nature acting for peace can act for war, 
classical realists as Niebuhr and Morgenthau often made a distinction between the morality of 
the individual and that of the collective.52 Niebuhr in particular argued that ‘human nature is 
so complex that it justifies almost every assumption and prejudice with which either a 
scientific investigation or an ordinary human contact is initiated’.53 Therefore, classical 
realists take collectivity as the primary unit of social life, and in international relations the 
only collective actor is considered the state. In this context, according to Waltz, Morgenthau 
hints to the structural cause of conflict in international politics as a secondary variable, 
recognising that ‘given competition for scarce goods with no-one to serve as arbiter, a 
struggle for power will ensue among the competitors and this can be explained without 
reference to the evil born in men’.54  
Overall realism is an old school of thought based upon the concept of power. It can offer a 
plausible account of state behaviour only under certain conditions when for example state 
interest is given, clear and permanent, decision-making is coherent and state behaviour is 
strategically consistent. 55 Such a picture of national interest would be difficult to find in states 
whose state-building and interest formation are still in process. As Haas claims,  
‘National interest to one may well be national lack of interest to another. In fact, it may be concluded that the 
conception of national interest which prevails at any one time is no more than an amalgam than varying policy 
motivations which tend to pass for a ‘national’ interest as long as the groups holding these opinions continue to 
rule’.56 
                                                 
51 For realist critique of idealism, see Edward Hallett Carr, Michael Cox, The twenty Years’ crisis, 1919-1939: 
An introduction to the study of international relations, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 11-22. See also Jack 
Donelly, Realism and international relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.9-10. 
52 See Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and immoral society, (New York: Scribner, 1960), p. 21. See also Herbert 
Butterfield, ‘Global Good and Evil’, in Kenneth Thompson and Robert J. Myers, Truth and Tragedy (New 
Brunswick: Transaction books, 1984). 
53 Reinhold Niebuhr, Christianity and Power Politics, (New York: Scribner, 1940), p. 157.   
54 Waltz, p. 34. 
55 The permanence or pre-determined nature of national interest is even difficult to observe in those states whose 
statehood is advanced. For an account of the formation of national interests in international relations, see M. 
Kimura, D.W. Welch, ‘Specifying interests: Japan’s claim to the Northern Territories and its implications for 
international relations theory’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 42, no 2, 1998, pp. 213-244. For a 
constructivist approach to national interest, see Jutta Weldes, Constructing national interests, (Minneopolis: 
Minnesota Univeristy Press, 1997).   
56 Ernst B. Haas, ‘The Balance of Power as a Guide to policy-making’, Journal of Politics, August 1953, p. 383, 
quoted in Ronald Grigor Suny, ‘Living in the Hood: Russia, Empire, and Old and New Neighbors’, in Russian 
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Realism, in particular structural realism does not take into consideration other important 
variables of state behaviour in the international system or the process through which state 
interests are shaped.57 It has been critiqued to have become a partial ethno-centrist ideology 
rather than an impartial theory to explain, and has been accused of adapting the reality into the 
theory rather than vice-versa. For this reason, a large number of scholars accept realist 
account of state behaviour in international affairs as an incomplete analysis of state behaviour.  
1.2.2. Structural realism 
Structural realism distanced itself from human nature as a causal variable and concentrated on 
the international system instead. Like Rousseau and Durkheim, Waltz argued that human 
nature as a causal factor of state behaviour in international politics is flawed, shifting attention 
towards institutions. Accordingly, Waltz claimed that ‘the assumption of a fixed human 
nature…… itself helps shift attitude away from human nature because human nature,…. 
cannot be changed, whereas socio-political institutions can be’.58 Waltz developed his theory 
of international politics, in which he laid his main emphasis on the international system, 
treating it as an autonomous causal factor. Whereas anarchy in classical realism is only a 
permissive condition, by which other causal factors trigger a conflict in international politics, 
in structural realism anarchy plays a central role and nearly everything is explained by it. 
Anarchy itself explains why states balance, compete for power and security and end up in 
conflict. Another distinction from classical realism, was that structural realism divorced itself 
from foreign policy, arguing that it is not an autonomous realm.  
Structural realism is a theoretic framework to understanding international relations, and 
claims to be more scientifically plausible than realism. It draws on the premises of classical 
realism, but in a more systematic way, adding levels of analysis and testable hypotheses to the 
paradigm. Borrowing from positivism, strucural realism entails not only a claim about the 
nature of international relations, but a claim to know objectively the reality of international 
relations. Its core assumptions include rationality of actors, scarcity of social and material 
resources and the causal value of the distribution of material capabilities. Structural variables 
as anarchy and the relative distribution of power are the primary determinants of foreign 
policy and international outcomes.59 States with the greatest material capabilities are the ones 
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to survive in the international system. Such a system causes competition on a global scale by 
the most powerful states.  
Structural realism argues that international politics is a system with structural properties, the 
ordering principles of which are anarchy and distribution of power. The international system 
as an entity and whole is treated unevenly and more important than its individuals, ‘the 
system itself is its own entity’.60 As Jervis notes, ‘the whole might be symmetric in spite of its 
parts being asymmetric, the whole might be unstable in spite of its parts being stable in 
itself’.61 Interstate relations are shaped on the one hand by the relations between the units and 
on the other hand on the system itself. Anarchy produces insecurity and leaves states with 
self-help measures. Whereas the organisational structure of domestic politics is hierarchic, the 
structure of international politics is anarchic. Under anarchy states have to look after 
themselves to ensure their survival. In an anarchic system, ‘each unit’s incentive is to put 
itself in a position to be able to take care of itself, since no one else can be counted on to do 
so’.62 States that fail to look after themselves risk at best loss of power, at worst loss of 
sovereignty and existence.63 Under anarchy the raison d’être of the state is survival and states 
that are powerful stand better chances of surviving. Survival is the fundamental interest of all 
states, and all other interests are linked to it. Relative security is the major motivation of state 
behaviour. The anarchical international system imposes competition between states for power 
and security, which makes agreement on universal rules hard to achieve. As Gilpin puts it, 
‘world politics is still characterized by the struggle of political entities for power, prestige, 
and wealth in a condition of global anarchy’.64  
However, anarchy in the international system does not equal chaos and disorder in the 
national system.65 It is not used with reference to domestic disorder and chaos, but is rather an 
ordering principle, implying that there is no government of governments to enforce rules and 
punish perpetrators. In the Hobbesian condition of nature, anarchy means absence of all 
government, thus resulting in chaos, in internal and external threats to human society.  At the 
international system level, anarchy does not imply absence of all government and is not 
therefore as negative as at the domestic level. Anarchy of the international system means 
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absence of central authority over the sovereign units of the international system. Therefore, it 
would be incorrect to describe anarchy as chaos, and order as a unitary world federation. 
Anarchy and the sovereignty of units are ‘two sides of a single coin’, complementing each 
other.66 Government at the international system resides in the units of the system. The claim 
of the units for sovereignty makes them ultimate sources of authority, which automatically 
denies recognition of any higher political authority. Therefore, system of sovereign states 
equals anarchy at the international level. The international system is in fact a decentralised 
form of political authority since authority lies primarily within states and indirectly within 
institutions.  
a) Statism 
Structural realism sees the state as the fundamental actor of international politics. There can 
be no security in the absence of the state. Security of citizens is identified with the state and 
therefore relations between states are strategic. State is the subject of security and anarchy the 
eternal condition of international life. It recognises the functional similarity of all states and 
their rational character, arguing that in a self-help system all states will recognise and pursue 
the imperatives of survival and security.67 States act in a coherent, determined fashion in the 
pursuit of their national interests, dominated by power and military security concerns. States 
are treated as unitary actors with similar external preferences and decision-making 
mechanisms, and foreign policy is a response to the international systemic changes.68 All 
foreign policy outcomes derive from systemic constraint and changes in available power 
capabilities, not from domestic change or considerations. Causal variables of state behaviour 
in international politics are thus all at the systemic level.  
The functional differences between states have no impact upon their foreign policies, since all 
foreign policy action is about survival. Waltz asserts that ‘differences between states are on 
capabilities, not functions’.69 In other words, ‘every state arrives at policies and decides on 
actions according to its own internal processes, but its decisions are shaped by the very 
presence of other states as well as by interactions with them’.70 States perform or try to 
perform tasks most of which are common to all of them. Under such an agenda, the 
predicaments of the international political system provide a sufficient basis for interpreting 
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state behaviour in the international system. As Waltz argues, ‘state behaviour varies more 
with differences of power than with difference in ideology, in internal structure of property 
relations or in governmental form’.71 He therefore does not consider other variables of state 
behaviour, and takes state interests as given, ignoring the process by which they are formed.  
However, Waltz confesses, that ‘beyond the survival motive, the aims of states may be 
endlessly varied’.72 
b) Self-help 
In an anarchic international system, states act according to the logic of self-help seeking their 
own interests. As Steven Walt puts it, ‘the existence of several states in an anarchy renders the 
security of each one problematic and encourages them to compete with each other for power 
and security’.73 Waltz argues that the crucial distinction between domestic and international 
politics lies in their structures. In domestic politics, people do not have to defend themselves; 
in the international system, there is no such high authority to prevent and contain the use of 
force. States cannot rely on others to provide their own security as citizens in the domestic 
system do. Security can only be reached by self-help. Therefore, in an anarchic structure, self-
help is the necessary principle of action.74 However, in the course of providing one’s own 
security, the state in question will automatically be fuelling the insecurity of others and this 
will lead to a security dilemma.  
Security dilemma 
Security dilemma is one of the well-researched concepts in international relations theory. It is 
an issue to be found in the writing of almost every structural realist international relations 
scholar and there is unanimity on its importance. First developed by Butterfield and Herz, it 
has been contributed to by Jervis, Glaser, Posen, Waltz, Kaufman, Roe, etc. In general terms, 
a security dilemma is used to describe a situation in which the measures taken by a state to 
enhance its security are counterproductive, hence produce insecurity and conflict. The 
definition made by Booth and Wheeler suggest that  
‘A security dilemma exists when the military preparations of one state create an unresolvable uncertainty in the 
mind of another as to whether those preparations are for defensive purposes only (to enhance its security in an 
uncertain world) or whether they are for offensive purposes (to change the status-quo to its advantage)’.75  
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The essence of security dilemma is that conflict occurs between parties who are desperate to 
avoid it, but coincidentally cause it by their own activities.76 Thus, war can occur without the 
involvement of a revisionist state seeking to change the status-quo.77 The primary cause of a 
security dilemma is uncertainty that causes fear and suspicion in states with regard to each 
other. This uncertainty is coined by Jervis as the indistinguishability between offence and 
defence, i.e. status-quo state (security seeker) or revisionist state (power seeker).78 The 
resources and measures that seem sufficient for one state’s defence will seem offensive to its 
neighbours. Such an uncertainty causes action-reaction dynamics of armament and may end 
up in conflict.  
A security dilemma emerges between two or more states because of lack of information about 
the intentions of each of them, but in reality all of them are benign. Benign intentions are a 
vital component of a security dilemma. This is explained by Herz as  
[I]t is one of the tragic implications of the security dilemma that mutual fear of what initially may never have existed may 
subsequently bring about exactly that which is feared most.79  
 
The causality of the security dilemma is debated at three levels: individual, state and 
international system level. Those arguing (Niebuhr, Morgenthau, Butterfield) that the security 
dilemma is caused by Hobbesian fear, i.e. human nature, suggested that politics among 
nations was defined by a flawed human nature characterised by the will to power.80 Later on, 
structural realists argued that security dilemma was ultimately caused by the anarchical 
structure of the international system. Absence of a world government to legislate and execute 
laws that would provide for security for all states, makes security the first concern of states. 
The self-help behaviour promoted by inter-state anarchy implies that states must look after 
their own security. It can be otherwise only if states did not care about their survival. 
Insecurity is thereby caused not by greedy actors, but by the inescapable self-help nature of 
the system.81 The idea of security dilemma suggests, a state will be insecure if it does not act 
and still insecure if it does act. Thus, there is always a glimpse of mutual mistrust in interstate 
relations which makes cooperation difficult to achieve. This situation is best explained by 
Rousseau’s stag hunt and Hobbes’s Leviathan, each indicating that a social contract between 
states is not possible.  
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Herz, who is considered to have articulated the term, concluded ‘it was a structural notion in 
which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs, tend regardless of 
intention to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as 
defensive and the measures of others potentially threatening’.82 This view indicated that in a 
self-help environment states are faced with an irresolvable uncertainty about the military 
preparations made by others and this will result in an action-reaction cycle.  
Security dilemma is particularly acute if offence has advantage over defence. If offensive 
operations are more effective than defensive, states may choose the offensive for surviving. A 
preventive war for security reasons is a good example. Whether the presence of an 
offensive/expansionist state still qualifies as a security dilemma is a matter of contention.  
Randal Schweller, critiquing the attachment of neo-realism to security versus power, claimed 
that if all states seek survival only, then there is no possibility for conflict to emerge. 
Therefore, the ultimate goal of not all states is security maximisation, but can also be 
expansionism: 
If states are arming for something other than security, that is if aggressors do in fact exist then it is no longer a security 
dilemma, but rather an example of a state or coalition mobilizing for the purpose of expansion and the targets of that 
aggression responding by acquiring arms and forming alliances to defend themselves.83  
The idea formulated above is that a security dilemma cannot exist in a situation where there is 
a revisionist state. Security dilemma is therefore a tragedy because it causes a deterioration in 
relations between status-quo states which both have benign intentions; thus it is made a 
tragedy by the benign intentions. As Herz mentions it, not all conflicts are caused by a 
security dilemma, conflicts can also be caused by the expansionist appetite of states.84  
This distinction between realism and structural realism is clearly depicted by Jervis in his 
formulation that too much emphasis on the security dilemma can lead to the false conclusion 
that ‘security rather than expansion is the prime goal of most states’.85 In contrast to 
Schweller, Jervis differentiates two models of security dilemma-spiral and deterrence models 
based upon the intentions of the adversaries. Spiral model equals the classical security 
dilemma and the action-reaction mechanism, whereas in the deterrence model the adversary’s 
intentions are not benign, but malign. Jervis claims that in his deterrence model the state has 
expansionist intentions for security reasons. Like Jervis, Glaser and Roe argue that not all 
security seekers are indeed status-quo actors and state security can sometimes require hostile 
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actions for security reasons.86 Certain states may become revisionist not for gaining territory, 
but rather for their own security or that of its ethnic kin; Turkey’s involvement in Cyprus is an 
example.87 However, others, especially great or medium powers expand exactly for strategic 
and economic purposes of their national interests. The inclusion of revisionist states in the 
security dilemma basket generates the trouble of defining whether a state pursues offensive 
policies for security or expansionist reasons.     
Whether security dilemma can be abolished, ameliorated or escaped is a matter of debate 
between scholars of international relations. One would find it difficult today to argue that the 
classical security dilemma is universal and unchangeable, applicable for all states, including 
the post-modern states in Europe. Security dilemma can be mitigated or escaped if the factors 
causing it are reduced. This firstly concerns uncertainty in the relations between states which 
is most clear in the distinguishability of offence from defence. According to Jervis, 
[t]he differentiation between offensive and defensive systems permits a way out of the security dilemma … There is no 
reason for a status quo power to be tempted to procure offensive forces, and aggressors give notice of their intentions by the 
posture they adopt.88 
 
Jervis includes geographic features in his analysis of international relations and argues that it 
can be an important variable in mitigating or exacerbating the security dilemma. The security 
dilemma of a geographically isolated state will be less severe than that of geographically 
vulnerable ones. It can reduce the insecurity of actors, and states then would spend fewer 
efforts to build up for security and threaten others. According to Jervis, geography could 
soften the security dilemma by influencing the offense-defence dilemma. When there are 
natural barriers, the defence has the advantage, but when such factors are absent the security 
dilemma might become more acute. Accordingly, ‘if all sates were self-sufficient islands, 
anarchy would be much less a problem. A small investment in shore defences and a small 
army would be sufficient to repel invasion’.89  
Trust-building for states is achievable by cooperation only because cooperation can change 
the circumstances in which the states act. This point is taken up by Wendt who claims that 
states can construct the circumstances in which they exist; thus these circumstances can be 
favourable for a security community or a security dilemma. According to Wendt, the identity 
of states and construction of interests as well as perceptions of statesmen can have an impact 
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on inter-state relations.90 Amelioration of benign intentions, deconstruction of hatreds and the 
overall identity of the state has a definitive impact on the security dilemma. Why an arms 
increase in the US does not cause a security dilemma in Canada, or that between Britain and 
Ireland, is because defence in these countries is clearly distinguishable from offence and 
mutual perceptions are positive. Amelioration of security dilemma is firstly subject to the 
perceptions of states of each other.  
c) Mature anarchy  
Mature anarchy is a highly ordered and stable system in which states enjoy a great deal of 
security deriving both from their own inner strength and maturity, and from the strength of 
institutionalised norms regulating relations among them.91 The term mature anarchy coined by 
Barry Buzan, implies that states’ level of understanding allows to resolve their differences 
peacefully, but they have also managed to quench the security dilemma, i.e. all fears 
regarding their military and political relations and force is not considered an option for 
settling disputes. States in a mature anarchy have come to recognise the intense dangers of 
continuing to compete and the power-security dilemma is minimal or null. States in such an 
arrangement still have their national interests and national security concerns, but they are tied 
to the international or regional level. Buzan argues that such an evolutionary process for 
international society is likely to be slow and uneven in its achievements.92 In the EU for 
example, the states no longer consider using violence or coercion to resolve their differences 
and thus form a security community. Use of force is very unlikely, if not unimaginable. The 
individual nation-state has not disappeared, but shared interests and identities allow an arena 
of post-sovereign politics to emerge. Mature anarchy is a consequence of the recognition by 
states of their security interdependence and it is an argument against the security dilemma. 
d) Balancing and alliances 
It was mentioned above that under conditions of anarchy, states are left with self-help, which 
can occur in two forms: military build up to provide relative security with only benign 
intentions. A second strategy is alignment and alliance formation under which self-help is 
partially suspended as states recognise the need to pool their capabilities together to deter a 
threatening state or a group of states. Competition between them is only suspended, not 
eradicated.93  
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Alliance is a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation. Structural realists 
distinguish two forms of alignment strategies: balancing and bandwagoning. Balancing of 
power occurs when states join in alliances to protect themselves from states or coalitions 
whose superior capabilities could pose a threat. Waltz argues that alliances are intended to 
balance power, so that no single state in the international system is in a position to dominate 
the others, and third states will generally align with the weaker state against the stronger 
one.94 If a state significantly increases its relative power, its neighbours have no choice but to 
balance against it, because the more powerful it is, the greater its ability to harm the others. 
For both Waltz and Morgenthau, the most powerful state in the international system is always 
a potential threat to other states no matter whether it is recognised a threat explicitly. For 
example, in the aftermath of the Soviet demise, Waltz argued that other states will balance the 
US in the post-cold war era for the simple reason it is too powerful.95 Another reason for 
balancing strategy is states join in forces to form alliances in order to share the burden of 
fighting or deterring an aggressor.  
Balancing and external assistance are particularly relevant to small states. In order to ensure 
their survival, the weaker states will continuously join in forces and form coalitions in order 
to block potential aggressive ambitions of the strong. Structural realism suggests that small 
states traditionally band together or turn to the great powers in order to protect themselves 
against the greatest threat to their survival.96 Accordingly, small states have to appeal to 
outside help to resolve their security problems. As Morgenthau noted ‘the small nation must 
look for the protection of its rights to the assistance of powerful friends’.97  
In contrast, Stephen Walt in his balance of threat theory argues otherwise. Walt argues that 
states seek a balance of threat instead of balance of power, i.e. states balance against threats 
rather than crude power alone. States, when making security judgements about the behaviour 
of other states, consider not only questions of physical and material might, but also the 
threatening behaviour. So, states’ alliance behaviour is determined by the threat they perceive 
from other states and they will align with the weaker state against the stronger one only if it is 
perceived by the third party as a threat. To elaborate the theory, Walt identifies four variables 
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by which states perceive the potential threat posed by another state: aggregate power, 
offensive capabilities, aggressive intentions and geographic proximity.  
In balance of power theory states balance against those states whose power is rising whereas 
balance of threat theory claims that power alone cannot explain or predict the behaviour of 
states. Walt suggests that power does not have the same effect everywhere, states do not 
balance in a random order and balance only when they feel insecure. States will not balance 
against those states whose power has no offensive character, so they would not act on the 
basis of an international hierarchy of relative power, but seem to act according to particular 
criteria. Threats are mainly perceived by whether the perceived intentions of other states are 
aggressive or not. This approach according to Grygiel is a return to the initial realism that 
‘states do not act within an abstract anarchical system, but within the world’.98 The theory 
also gives way to historic experience that could play a role in the process of forming one 
state’s perceptions of the intentions of another. This assumption allows the conclusion that 
threats may be different if perceptions of threat are produced by something other than 
differences in the distribution of material capability. According to Barnett for example, 
among Arab states, it is their construction of identity, and not shift in material capabilities that 
shapes alliance behaviour.99  
Balance of threat theory suggests that distance affects the perception of threat: the closer two 
states are, the more likely they will perceive each other as a threat; ‘……because the ability to 
project power declines with distance, states that are nearby pose a greater threat than states 
that are far away’.100 They balance against their proximate threats, and neighbouring states are 
more likely to balance than bandwagon. According to Walt, ‘the US is geographically 
isolated, but politically popular, whereas the Soviet Union was politically isolated as a 
consequence of its geographic proximity to states’.101 The theory is an important refinement 
of structural realism, but also an indicator of the emergence of a constructivist debate, because 
it claims anarchy is not equally dangerous in all parts of the world.  
A second alignment strategy is bandwagoning. Bandwagoning is the opposite of balancing 
and means ‘joining up with the aggressive power to appease it or gain favourable treatment 
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from it’.102 The strategy of bandwagoning occurs when states have no better chances of 
building alliances and hope to profit from bandwagoning.103 According to Schweller, 
balancing and bandwagoning are not limited to the survival and security of the state. When 
security concerns are less intense, bandwagoning can be for material profits only.104  
In realist scheme, bandwagoning is not a favourite option, and only states with limited 
capacities prefer it. It is usually applied when there is no balancing option and even then it is 
not always a good strategy.105 On this point, the offensive realist Mearhseimer argues that 
bandwagoning is nearly always a bad idea because it almost equals capitulation to the 
stronger state. Only very weak states without the prospect of resisting the aggressor choose 
this strategy. He instead suggests a more preferable buck-passing strategy, which would allow 
other states to balance the power of strong states. A buck-passing strategy implies passing the 
burden of deterring an aggressor to another state. It can be however a dangerous strategy if 
failed; the buck-catching state may fail to deter the aggressor and leave the buck-passing state 
to the rival power alone with fewer available alliance options. 106  
1.2.3. Offensive realism 
Offensive realism developed largely by Mearsheimer’s contributions, asserts that the ultimate 
goal of all states is to achieve a hegemonic position in the international system and that the 
structure of the international system compels states to maximise their relative power.107 States 
opt for the security strategies that best guarantee their long-term survival; they constantly seek 
more power, and will change the existing distribution of power to achieve a hegemonic 
position in the international system, even though such action might threaten their own 
security.  
A hegemon is defined by Mearsheimer as ‘a state that is so powerful that it dominates all the 
other states in the system’.108 Mearsheimer suggests that since global hegemony is difficult to 
achieve states focus more on achieving regional hegemony. Great powers aim to build the 
largest military in the region and intervene in their near abroads whenever necessary. In 
                                                 
102 The concept of bandwagoning was initially introduced by Stephen Van Evera. See Waltz, Theory of 
international politics, p. 126.  
103 See Walt, ‘Alliance formation and the balance of power’, International Security, vol.9, no. 4, 1985, pp. 29-31; 
Stephen Walt, ‘Alliances, Threats and US Grand Strategy: A reply to Kaufman and Labs’, Security Studies, vol. 
1, issue 3, September 1992, pp. 450-451.  
104 See Randall Schweller, ‘Bandwagoning for profit: bringing the revisionist state back’, International Security, 
vol. 19, no.1, (1994), pp.72-107. 
105 See Kenneth Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, International Security, vol. 25, no 1, 2000, p. 
38.  
106 See John Mearsheimer, The tragedy of great power politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), pp. 157-162. 
107 This summary is based upon John Mearsheimer, The tragedy of great power politics (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2001). 
108 Mearsheimer, The tragedy of great power politics, p. 40. 
39
particular, states strive to have superior armed forces since this is seen as the most important 
means of conquering and controlling land. 
The anarchic international system encourages expansion, and states would seek expansion 
whenever the right conditions are there and where aggression is the only way to make their 
state secure.109 Thereby every state is a security and power maximiser, and in an anarchic 
world, security is the major driver of state behaviour. Thus, states seek hegemony for security 
and ‘given the difficulty of determining how much power is enough for today or tomorrow, 
great powers recognise that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, 
eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another power. Only, a misguided state would 
pass the opportunity to become a hegemon in the international system because it thought it 
already had sufficient power to survive’. 110 In anarchy, no state can ever be sure of each 
other’s intentions, and no state can be sure that other states will not use their military 
capabilities to attack it. Benign intentions can quickly change into malign intentions and even 
defensive weapons can be used for offensive purposes. Therefore, there are in reality no 
status-quo states, all states search for opportunities to gain power at the expense of others. In 
other words, even status-quo powers might still exhibit high levels of competitive behaviour 
and pursue expansionist policies. International institutions merely reflect the power of states 
and can hardly restrain states in most cases.111 
Mearsheimer’s approach is different from that of Waltz and other defensive realists by his 
overemphasis on the competition for power and security. He sees power as flowing from 
anarchy and the need for security.112 Therefore, offensive realism does not need to invoke 
domestic variables to explain expansionist behaviour.113  Arguing that the anarchical structure 
forces states to behave aggressively, Mearsheimer makes the nature of international politics 
malign, whereas Waltz has a benign picture of international politics. In contrast, defensive 
realists argue that states have security as their principal interest and seek the necessary 
amount of power for their survival. States are defensive status-quo actors and will not risk 
their own security. The ultimate concern of states is not power, but security. Waltz asserts that 
outbreak of conflict between states is caused not by an intended aggression, but rather a 
miscalculation by states with defensive motives, which are involved in a security dilemma. 
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Waltz’s realism, often coined as defensive realism was based upon the premise that 
international anarchy causes states to worry about their security rather than power 
maiximisation and expansion. Defensive realism emphasises the offense-defence balance in 
the security considerations of states.114 Defensive realists argue that a balance exists between 
offensive and defensive weapons and the two can be distinguished. They see aggressive 
behaviour self-defeating. As Grieco argues, ‘states are mostly concerned with maintaining 
their relative position of power and not increasing it. It is not rational for states to seek 
strategies that would disturb status-quo’.115  
1.2.4. Neo-classical realism   
Neoclassical realism emerged in the post-cold war period as a response to the critique on 
structural realism, and as an effort to revive the theory. The peaceful end of the Cold War had 
brought about a number of challenges for overall systemic theories, but particularly for 
structural realism. The premises on which the theory had rested in the last 50 years seemed to 
change, and scholars both within and outside the paradigm began to question its plausibility 
for all times.116 It was argued that structural realism as a theory that emphasised the 
distribution of material capabilities, bipolar great power politics, nuclear deterrence and 
dominance of the existential threat on the structure in the form of the Mutually Assured 
Destruction System was tailored for a particular time-frame, a so called zeitgeist.117 Another 
critique was that realism as a research programme had degenerated. Moravscik and Lergo 
argued that ‘the category of “realist” theory had been broadened to the point that it signifies 
little more than a generic commitment to rational state behavior in anarchy, that is, ‘minimal 
realism’’.118 Whereas during the Cold War almost every conflict was linked to the structural 
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or systemic level, the new era has been dominated by intra-state conflicts, non-military 
threats, deepened regionalisation, non-state actors and non-material based policies as 
humanitarian intervention. So, understanding foreign policy and the dynamics of the 
international system became a challenge for international relations scholars. In response, 
structural realists on the one hand tried to adapt the theory to explain the self-help dynamics 
within states such as intrastate security dilemma, by focusing on the relative distribution of 
material capabilities within the state, but on the other hand argued for the enduring relevance 
of the paradigm for the new period.119 Meanwhile, realists as Stephen Walt, Gideon Rose, 
Randall Schweller, William Wohlforth tried to reshuffle the theory by adding the ‘missing’ 
non-structural variables that were vital for understanding and explaining action in 
international politics of post Cold War period.120 In particular much effort was made to 
incorporate foreign policy analysis into realism.121 However, these developments have also 
received a negative response from certain scholars.122    
As mentioned elsewhere in this chapter, realism offers an insufficient theoretic framework of 
how states perceive threats and distribution of power in the international system. Claiming 
that actors always perceive the distribution of material capabilities correctly and respond to it 
accordingly, realism misses the point that these threat perceptions are often defined by the 
level of one’s own material capabilities. Structural realism does not predict how individual 
states will react to systemic pressures, and does not explain foreign policy per se. In the post-
cold war international system of non-balance of power unipolarity, structural realism has had 
a weakened explanatory potential, and foreign policy theories have come to offer more in 
understanding international relations.123 As Fareed Zakaria notes, ‘a theory of international 
politics per se cannot explain the motives of nations. By contrast a theory of foreign policy 
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explains why different states or the same state at different historic moments, have different 
intentions, goals and preferences towards the outside world’.124 Moreover, correlation of 
foreign and domestic policies required the need to consider domestic variables.  
The role of perceptions in international relations had previously been theorised by Robert 
Jervis in his Perception and Misperception of international politics. Jervis argued that 
misperception is a part of the state’s decision-making process, and decision-makers can only 
hope to minimize the risk of misperception as much as possible.125 Jervis’ research had shed 
light not only on the external dynamics, but also the internal setting of the decision-making 
process, and neoclassical realism further elaborated that approach in a more systematic way. 
In a similar fashion, neo-classical realism focuses on the international structure and the 
relative positions of states within it, and elucidates the state’s perception of the international 
system. It takes the distribution of power as an independent variable and links it to security 
dilemma in international behaviour. Foreign policy is treated as the result of states’ response 
to systemic changes in the distribution of material capabilities.  
Neoclassical realism examines the relative position of the actor in the system and its self-
perception. It treats the international system anarchic, and emphasises distribution of power 
and the importance of security. In a bid to return to the origin of realist tradition, but also 
retain the riches of structural realism, neoclassical realists pay less attention to the systemic 
features in explaining concrete foreign policy decisions. The approach deals with the 
perception of relative power and threats in international relations and is built upon Stephen 
Walt’s analysis of the role of perceptions in alignment. It argues that since ‘….there is no 
immediate or perfect transmission belt linking material capabilities to foreign policy 
behaviour’, there must be a further level to mediate between the two.126 According to Walt, 
neoclassical realism ‘places domestic politics as an intervening variable between the 
distribution of power and foreign policy behaviour’.127 The approach introduces domestic 
politics variables into the analysis and argues that any analysis of foreign policy must take 
into consideration how power is perceived by decision-makers. As Gideon Rose notes, ‘it 
aims to analyse how systemic pressures are translated through domestic level intervening 
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variables such as decision-making’.128 Thus, the leaders and how they perceive the 
international distribution of power acts as an intervening variable.129 
Neoclassical realism attempts to bring foreign policy dynamics into international relations 
theory. According to Gideon Rose, foreign policy analysis is associated with the neo-classical 
realism, which is to explain the process through which the pressures of the international 
system are translated into specific foreign policy actions.130 Foreign policy decision-making is 
treated as a two level process. Distribution of power in the international system is taken as an 
independent variable and foreign policy decision-making as a dependent variable. While 
structural realists suggest that all states have similar interests, neo-classical realists argue 
otherwise. They emphasise that relative power capabilities in the international system and the 
actions of states and their foreign policies are not directly linked. Moreover, they argue that 
state actors can misinterpret or misunderstand the international structure, which in turn can 
produce foreign policy responses not compatible with realist predictions. For example, as 
Jonathan Monten argues ‘a neoclassical line of realist argumentation contends that the 
mechanism by which the effects of relative power are translated into state behaviour are not as 
smooth or determined as structural realists assume, and must be supplemented with unit-
level’.131 
Thus, neo-classical realism asserts that perceptions of decision-makers can be of crucial 
relevance to states’ reaction to the system. An actor’s behaviour is determined by the 
subjective interpretation of the outside world. Interpreting the actions of the other states in the 
system is limited by the subjectivity of the political elites, and this is particularly relevant to 
the distribution of power. Perceptions of the distribution of power shape the state’s view of 
the international system and actors form their foreign policies on the basis of these relative 
material power distributions. In determining the strategic behaviour of a state, its perception 
of power and threat matter more than the given existence of power or threat. Neoclassical 
realism suggests withdrawing from polarity back towards classical realism because polarity 
missed out too much and had failed to achieve any definitional consensus.132   
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Neoclassical realism has been critiqued for departing from the original realist thought in a 
way that it can no longer be called realism.133 It has been argued that its certain predictions 
have not been deduced from the logic of power, and bearing in mind that the new variables 
have been borrowed from other paradigms, it is questionable how much realist it is. Vasquez 
has argued that realism focuses solely on power and ‘when one tries to shift to other variables, 
then one may be borrowing the logic of other paradigms’ and it is no longer a realist thought 
then.134 But on the other hand, it is equally questionable if today’s international relations can 
be explained by a single paradigm or rather a single variable of a paradigm. As Legro and 
Moravscik formulate ‘is it realistic to maintain that patterns of important, complex events in 
world politics are the result of a single factor?’.135 Arguing that a multi-paradigmatic 
synthesis is the future of international relations theory, Legro and Moravscik have advocated 
in favour of theory-synthesis to fill the gaps of international relations theory and foreign 
policy analysis. Neo-classical realism with a realist foundation, emphasizing relative material 
power and meanwhile offering a consideration of unit-level variables and a focus on the role 
of perceptions is clearly an example of such a theory-synthesis.  
1.2.5. Realist account of Russia’s policies towards the conflicts in the South Caucasus  
This section revolves around three major questions to be explored: whether Russia’s 
behaviour towards the conflicts is compatible with the deductive assumptions and prediction 
of realism on international relations? What hypotheses does realism offer in explaining 
Russia’s policies towards the three conflicts? How rational is it in terms of cost and benefit; 
what has caused the balancing efforts of the states in the South Caucasus and why have they 
largely failed, and whether bandwagoning would be an optimal strategy; to what extent is 
Russia’s behaviour autonomous from the international system and what variables at the neo-
classical system and domestic level cause its behaviour.  
a) Compatibility with realism 
Realism, in particular structural realism treats the state as a black box. It assumes that the state 
is a coherent rational actor and national interest is given and clear. States join their 
capabilities and direct them towards the achievement of their national interests. In explaining 
Russia’s policies towards the conflicts, in particular during the Yeltsin era, this assumption 
may be challenged, since several bureaucracies pursued divergent agendas and this sometimes 
produced unpleasant results for Russia’s strategic interests in the region. For example, the 
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presence of Russian military in the Khojaly massacre in 1992 led to the ousting of the pro-
Russian president Mutallibov in Azerbaijan and consequently election of a pro-Turkish 
government that became a headache for Moscow. Much of the Yeltsin period was noted by 
the weakness of the executive and general disorder in Russian politics. This was noticeable 
during the 1994 signing of the oil contract in Azerbaijan with the Western transnational 
companies for the exploration of the offshore oil fields in the Caspian Sea, the legal status of 
which had not been settled yet, and was strongly contested by the Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Whereas the Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested against the move and announced 
the treaty contradictory to international law, the Ministry of Energy and the Oil Consortium of 
Lukoil took part in the conference and acquired a share in the deal. Russia experienced state 
weakness to a level that certain analysts raised concern over it becoming a failing state.136  
Realism, does not explain state weakness and incoherence in the case of Russia, but it 
explains Russia’s strategy of retaining its hegemony in the near abroad and resisting external 
powers’ penetration by all means.137 The broad strategy reached on the basis of consensus 
between various bureaucracies in 1993 that Russia should recover its great power status and 
enhance the autonomy of the CIS by all available means is compatible with a realist 
prediction of state behaviour.138 This was a result of Russia’s adaptation to the international 
system and its external environment. Russia’s treatment by the West and its overall stance 
before the West and NATO, as a militarily and economically comparatively weak state 
explain to a large extent why Russia sought to maintain its strength at least in the former-
Soviet space.139 Its insistence on Georgia’s and Azerbaijan’s membership of the CIS and the 
Collective Security Treaty and establishment of physical presence along the external 
boundaries of the South Caucasus states all served its hegemonic ambitions and power-
political interests. Taking into consideration that it has been largely the CIS and Russia’s 
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relative autonomy here that has validated Russia’s claim for a great power status at times of 
economic and political uncertainty, its interests to impede external power penetration into the 
region are perfectly within the explanatory realm of realism. Moreover, it did not want any 
outside actor here because this region is one of its domestic security concerns as well; and the 
fact that the region hosted ethnic conflicts, border problems and uncontrolled criminality all 
justify Russia’s presence here. According to realism, Russia’s involvement in the CIS is an 
attempt to prevent any third state from taking advantage of the new states’ instability and 
weakness. And the distribution of power in favour of Russia makes it easier for the latter to 
assert its control over the other states.      
In a broader picture, Russia’s resistance to NATO presence in the CIS, overall NATO 
enlargement and US hegemony are conditioned by balance of power policies. In this respect, 
Russia’s behaviour is no different from that of other great powers, and it has used various 
resources at its disposal, including soft power of authoritarianism and ethno-territorial 
conflicts. How these objectives have been achieved has changed from time to time. There 
were periods when Russia used carrots, but at other times sticks vis-a-vis the CIS states, and 
in Russian perception sticks seem to have been more efficient.140 To balance the US, Russia 
has aligned with states that are exempt from cooperation with the US, like Iran and 
Venezuela. The US plans for missile defence shield in Eastern Europe, support for potential 
NATO enlargement to include Ukraine and Georgia and Russia’s response in its withdrawal 
from the CFE Treaty or retaliation in the South Ossetian crisis (to a certain extent only) are all 
associated with balance of power policies.  
As to the tactics, an accommodation of Russia’s policies within realist paradigm would be the 
justification that it lacked resources and capacity in early 1990s to use as leverage to maintain 
its power over the South Caucasus; given the shortage of resources to offer the states in the 
South Caucasus, Russian leaders saw the conflicts as leverage against the potentially 
unfriendly states. These were used to pressure those states to join the CIS and Collective 
Security Treaty Organisation and to host Russian military bases in the region. Its involvement 
in the region was also motivated by its domestic security concerns, given the vulnerability of 
spill-over of conflict into the North Caucasus.141 For that reason, Russia has since 
independence firmly stated that its unchanging and eternal interest in the region is security 
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and absence of violent conflict in the South Caucasus. Such a scenario matches Waltz’s 
defensive realism. That being said, Russia instead of stabilising the region in accordance with 
its long-term security interests has pursued a policy of strengthening status-quo in both 
Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts and to a lesser extent in Mountainous 
Karabakh. Its tacit support to the secessionist regions was supposed to be its short term tactics 
in 1994 which would get replaced by alternative resources. However, as Trenin notes, what 
seemed to be short-term tactics became a long-term strategy.142 As a long-term strategy, 
Russia’s policies of controlled instability in the South Caucasus can have negative effects. Its 
inaction particularly in South Ossetia, which for a while was not far from a settlement, arms 
deliveries to Armenia and illicit support to Abkhazia raised the question as to what Russian 
foreign policy strategy towards the South is aimed at. So, overall Russia’s policies match its 
short-term interests in the region, but not long-term interests of stability and cooperative 
hegemony.  
The link between Russia’s policies and the international system is weak. On the one hand, 
Russia’s relative capabilities in the system have increased, as a result, it has more resources 
and a bigger capacity for its interests today. On the other hand, Russia still sticks to its 
coercive rather than cooperative hegemony, and its increased capabilities at the systemic level 
have limited impact upon its autonomous policies towards the conflicts in the region.  
The nature of the international system also adds a causal value to understanding Russia’s 
policies. NATO’s and Western penetration into the region is seen in Russia as an attempt to 
deprive it of its legitimate historic legacy.143 Russian foreign policy thinkers view US policies 
in many parts of the world as an endproduct of the anarchical structure of the international 
system, in which it needs to balance the US power before it is too late for Russia as a great 
power.  
b) Rationality 
Rationality implies cost and benefit calculation of state interests. The term rationality can be 
problematic when applied to state behaviour, since not all state behaviour is precisely 
calculated. State behaviour is marked by a calculation of maximisation of state interests, but 
whether a state succeeds in achieving the anticipated goals or not is another question. Thus, 
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states have rational interests, but these interests are not necessarily interpreted into rational 
results at all times. As Waltz puts it, ‘states try to maintain their position in the international 
system. That is an axiom. There is nothing in anybody’s theory that says you will succeed’.144 
However, in the case of Russia, the rationality of its strategic interests vis-à-vis the conflicts 
in its South, in particular in the light of its long-term interests is not clear. As it became 
evident during the South Ossetia crisis, its engagement in the secessionist conflicts in Georgia 
has so far served its short-term interests unexpectedly well. Until the recent South Ossetia 
crisis the widespread belief was that Russia’s tactics towards the region is not plausible with 
rational-choice theories because it is largely irrational.145 Its tactics had led to the balancing of 
certain states in the CIS, and ultimately enabled the penetration of external powers into the 
region. In contrast, the recent South Ossetia crisis showed how efficient in the short run this 
tactics can be for deterring great power penetration into the region and strengthening its 
coercive hegemony. It proved maximal for the short run, as it achieved all the objectives the 
Kremlin had set for itself, but again as mentioned above, it is only tactical as it is not clear 
what implications they will have for its long-term interests. However, it is not clear what 
implications this will have for Russia’s long-term interests. Russia is interested in 
strengthening the relative autonomy of the CIS and maintaining its hegemony, but its policies 
have come to undermine both its long-term security interests in the Caucasus and its bilateral 
relations with Georgia, but also with other states as the Ukraine and Moldova. Russia could 
not acquire the required support from the Central Asian states and China after the recognition 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s independence.  
c) Balancing 
An ultimate result of Russia’s policies towards the conflicts was balancing and bandwagoning 
strategies adopted by the relevant states. In the South Caucasus, bandwagoning occurred in 
the first decade of the post-soviet period, because first the states in question were weak and 
had no alternative second regional power with whom they could align. Armenia from the very 
onset of its sovereignty found a way of accommodating its interests with those of Russia due 
to increased warfare in Mountainous Karabakh conflict. Moreover, from 1992 Azerbaijan’s 
efforts to distance itself from Russia eased Armenia’s rapprochement with Russia. After a 
period of adventures and sovereignty seeking, both Georgia and Azerbaijan tried to 
bandwagon with Russia throughout the 90s. Upon joining the CIS, Georgia agreed to host 
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Russian military bases and border guards for a 25 year period; it also cooperated with Russia 
during the I Russian-Chechen war. Tbilisi reciprocally expected Moscow to assist it restore 
sovereignty over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In response, Russia applied sanctions on 
Abkhazia and hardened its stance on South Ossetia, but these measures did not produce any 
results due to the incapacity in Russia itself on the one hand to impose peace upon Abkhazia, 
but on the other hand, the internal incoherence within Russia, and defiance of the sanctions by 
certain authorities. Further, certain political circles in Russia still shared the conviction that 
the status-quo would be more profitable for it than long-term peace. This led to Russia’s 
growing inaction in all three conflicts, and gradually grew to a policy of maintaining and 
strengthening the status-quo.  
Convinced that bandwagoning with Russia would not produce any positive implications for 
their security problems, starting from 1996 Georgia and Azerbaijan tried to balance Russia’s 
power by alignment with the US and EU. GUUAM was established in 1997 as an attempt to 
offer a joint platform for all those states of the CIS discontent with Russia.146 It originally 
included Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Moldova and was later joined by Uzbekistan. At 
the initial stages of its existence, it also included cooperation in the transportation of energy 
resources from the Caspian Sea to European markets, but this agenda died out in recent 
years.147 Being discontent with Russia’s policies of coercive hegemony, both Georgia and 
Azerbaijan left the CSTO in 1999, and Georgia applied for NATO membership.  
Balancing in the South Caucasus was not historicly predicated, but rather born out of 
necessity. In contrast, for example Mark Weber argues that the shared Soviet past has 
influenced foreign policy priorities of the successor states, and this was the cause of the 
mistrust of Russia in the CIS.148 This is more relevant for the other successor states as 
Uzbekistan and Ukraine rather than the South Caucasus and perceptions played a limited role 
in the case of the South Caucasus. For example, Georgia’s resistance identity or Armenia’s 
loyalty to Russia played a certain role in their perceptions of Russia. However, Georgia’s and 
Azerbaijan’s balancing efforts were largely a product of Russia’s own policies and increasing 
sympathy with the secessionist regimes in the region. It was not a random balancing aimed to 
balance the most powerful state, but rather aimed at balancing the one which both states 
perceived as an ultimate threat. Russia’s role in the Mountainous Karabakh, Georgian-Abkhaz 
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and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts was the necessity to balance Russia. In the case of 
Azerbaijan, Baku believed that only through increased economic interests of Western oil 
companies in the region, would the West offer protection to it against the strategic Russia-
Armenia alliance. The decision to construct oil and gas pipelines from Baku to the Turkish 
port of Jeyhan to bypass Russia was a result of the balancing strategy of both Georgia and 
Azerbaijan. At the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999 Georgia, backed by the West demanded 
the withdrawal of Russian military bases from its territory. Russia’s policies of active 
engagement in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Putin came to power led to Georgia’s 
refusal to cooperate with Russia on border control during the Chechen crisis.  
Relevant versus relative power 
Russian hegemony in the CIS has not seriously been challenged since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. This has largely been due to the unavailability of balancing options. To the 
surprise of many analysts, balancing largely failed to produce the expected results. This was 
due to a number of factors. First and foremost is Russia’s relative power in the CIS. Although 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s position in the international distribution of 
material capabilities declined, this was less true for its position in the CIS region. Here, the 
shift in Russia’s systemic position and capabilities has been less relevant, mainly because of 
the power (economic, material and certain socio-political capabilities) asymmetry between 
Russia and the other Soviet states. Its manoeuvre potential in the South Caucasus is not 
comparable to that of any other great power. Russia can influence the security-political 
settings in the region, it has had the leeway to stabilise or destabilise the region through its 
involvements in the secessionist conflicts. It can even generate disturbance in all three states 
due to the existence of ethnic and political vulnerabilities and its own geographic location. It 
is, hence, the relevant power in the South Caucasus, whereas the US is a relative power.149 
The US superiority in international system is not directly relevant to this region, here the 
superior power is Russia and therefore alignment with the US could not seriously affect the 
security-political questions in the region. Economic projects related to the transportation of 
energy from the Caspian and regime change in Georgia were all successful due to US 
backing. However, in terms of balancing Russia’s power and manoeuvre capacity in all three 
conflicts, alignment with the US has not been very useful. This has led to Azerbaijan to take a 
more balanced and tiered towards Russia position, which is now evolving into a renewed 
bandwagoning strategy of the leadership.   
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Secondly, Russia would not be prepared to give up its control and power over the region as it 
did in the Baltic due to Western pressure. Russia has viable domestic security interests in the 
South Caucasus due to its linkage to the North Caucasus and has securitised its physical 
presence in the region to an unprecedented level. Thirdly, the linkage between the global 
system and the region is weak because the region is not a priority for the superpower. The 
importance of the Caucasus region has been overestimated by scholars. The energy resources 
and the location of the region are unlike the Middle East not so vital for US national interests. 
The US support for the BTJ pipeline served more its hegemonic superpower interests in the 
international system, rather than economic interests. As a superpower the US is interested in 
extering influence all over the globe and has supported balancing the hegemonic aspirations 
of Russia. The Baltic states in comparison, managed to succeed in balancing strategies 
because of the unilateral support of the US and EU and their pressure on Russia from the early 
days of their independence. The same level of pressure by the West has been absent, so the 
region is not strongly linked to the global system, it is more likely to depend on regional 
rather than global dynamics. Institutions as NATO and the EU are unlikely to expand into the 
South Caucasus the way it has happened in the Baltic. Partly because this would seriously 
undermine relations with Russia, but also these institutions, in particular the EU does not view 
the Caucasus as a part of the European family as it views the Baltic states, Bulgaria or 
Romania. Moreover, the existence of political problems in the states and regional instability in 
the Caucasus would make it difficult for both NATO and EU to expand into this region.    
Why balancing did not function in the lager CIS was due to two major factors: weak 
statehood and immaturity of elites as well as plurality of interests. Realism asserts that weak 
states because of domestic problems such as illegitimate governments, lack of welfare as a 
source of legitimacy, institutional weakness etc. tend to bandwagon, rather than balance.150  
The crude power of Russia was never perceived as a threat to Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan. 
Uzbekistan had joined GUAM at a time of Russia’s economic hardships and uncertainty over 
its future, but within the last few years, its leadership has found a better accommodation of its 
interests with Russia rather than with the US.  
The weak statehood observed in most CIS states implied that the fragile governments often 
viewed Russia in terms of their clan interests, rather than state interests, or were too weak to 
choose a balancing strategy.151 The domestic weakness and unpopularity of the regime, rather 
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than its foreign policy weaknesses were often the reason behind a failed balancing strategy 
against Russia. States in the CIS have not been effective foreign policy actors and this has had 
its impact on balancing. In this context, the causes of failed balancing and bandwagoning in 
the CIS cannot be exclusively searched for at the third image level and must be examined in 
the context of both internal and external variables. To this is added, the plurality of interests 
and individualist strategies. The existing GUAM platform has been too small in members and 
weak in terms of the members’ capacities to create any balance against Russia’s power. 
Azerbaijan is now seeking a position between balancing and bandwagoning, but more 
inclined towards the latter, having seen the potential and dangers of balancing in the case of 
Georgia. Accordingly the Azerbaijan government has since the crisis tried to accommodate its 
interests with those of Moscow in both security-political and economic issues.  
d) Offensive realism 
Offensive realism would probably have more to offer in explaining Russia’s behaviour, 
particularly after the South Ossetia crisis than defensive realism. As argued in Chapter V, 
although Russia had legitimate domestic security concerns in both regions and the larger 
North Caucasus, its intrusion and in particular recognition of the regions’ independence was 
more power politically motivated. Russia in this context agreed to the changing of boundaries 
in the post-Soviet space since 1991 and became de facto a revisionist state.152 There are no 
doubt over Russia’s domestic security concerns in the North Caucasus, but it is not those 
security concerns that act as the major driving force behind Russia’s policies. If Russian 
engagement in all three conflicts were aimed purely to serve its domestic security interests 
only, then it would be plausible with defensive realism, but the conclusion of this thesis places 
the emphasis more on power-political considerations in Russia’s policies towards the three 
conflicts.   
e) Role of perceptions in Russia’s behaviour: neo-classical realism 
Certain scholars have rejected the overemphasis on systemic variables of structural realism in 
explaining foreign policy outcomes and changes, and argued instead that much of Russian 
foreign policy, including the shift in Russia in early 1993 in favour of Eurasianism was not 
systemically determined, but was rather conditioned by Russia’s domestic policies.153 When 
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taking foreign policy decisions, Russian foreign minister and president had to take into 
account the domestic opposition’s position and the domestic weakness of the state. That being 
said, Russian foreign policy also retained certain autonomy during the years of institutional 
weakness in Russia and on most occasions acted much better than what would be attributed to 
a weak state. The foreign policy under both Kozyrev and Primakov focused on Russia’s 
national interests and was less ideological (during the latter period of Kozyrev’s tenure) than 
it was expected. It would not be completely correct to assert that Russian foreign policy under 
Yeltsin was shaped by the domestic political forces, since the systemic level also had its 
effect. Russian policymakers realised Russia’s international position and carefully watched 
the reaction of the G7 to some of their policies in the near abroad.154 At times when the 
domestic opposition in Russia demanded more sharpening of relations with the US and a 
more balancing position, the foreign policy elite followed a different path.  
Russia’s perceptions of the international system and of the West have played a significant role 
in its policies towards the CIS states.155 Its elite have largely viewed the West, particularly 
NATO and the US in Cold War context.156 The dominant perception has been that diplomacy 
and international institutions are insufficient in international politics and the international 
system is anarchic. This perception was particularly strengthened in 1993, when Russia’s 
leaders experimented that the West was not intent on treating it as an equal great power. 
Russia’s political elite have largely seen the US as intent on unilateral hegemony in the world 
and on minimising its role as a great power. Since Russia is more a regional great power, 
weakening its relative power in the CIS would be a first and easy step in that direction. The 
Russian leadership even perceived the unilateral support for Georgia’s territorial integrity by 
the West following the Georgian-Russian crisis in South Ossetia as a sign in that direction.  
The culpability of the formation of a hostile perception of the West lies partly in US 
unilateralist policies as intervention in Iraq, abandoning the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 
recognition of Kosovo’s sovereingty and ignorance of Russia as a great power overall. The 
US rejected Russia’s proposals to make the OSCE core of European security, where Russia 
might have had a cooperative role. Moreover, NATO enlargement to include those states of 
Eastern Europe which had largely seen Russia as their primary security threat exacerbated 
Russia’s perceptions of NATO. That being said, the West’s approach to Russia was also 
influenced by Russia’s policies towards the CIS states. Russia’s assertive behaviour in the 
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CIS has been a source of tension in the Russian Western relations.157 The Russian political 
elite have refused to acknowledge the coercive character of their hegemony in the CIS, and 
have failed to recognise the balancing efforts of separate states as a result of the Kremlin’s 
own policies towards the region.158 In particular, the West’s refusal to accept the legitimacy of 
Russia’s hegemony in the region is related to the grievances certain CIS states have had 
against Russia. Moreover, as Iver Neuman notes, a substantial rational behind the West’s 
refusal to refcognise Russia as an equal great power and ally was its failure to modernise and 
liberalise both in domestic politics and its foreign policy.159  
1.3 Regional security complex theory 
The end of the Cold War marked changes not only in the international system, but also in the 
analysis of the international system. The US led intervention in Iraq during the Gulf War had 
created the impression that the post Cold War era would be one of security management at the 
global level through a more competently functioning United Nations system.160 This did not 
prove viable. The UN did not have the right mechanism for security management in the 
Middle East and Africa, leading world powers expressed signs of reluctance for costly 
humanitarian interventions in regions free of their strategic interests. Instead of global level, 
regional level of security management proved viable and dominant.  
Regional level of security has become more autonomous in international relations since 
decolonisation, and the ending of the bipolarity has made the regional level more 
prominent.161 Since the end of the Cold War, conflicts have tended to remain regional rather 
than global, and the withdrawal of the superpowers from distant regions as South East Asia 
and Africa has enabled regional structures to evolve. Whereas the Cold war linked national 
security to the global level, the new era witnessed a return of concentration of security from 
the global level to the regional one. It has been argued by various scholars that the global 
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system in its one + four format is not as global as it was during the Cold War.162 The linkage 
of many regions to the superpower is weaker than that to the regional power, and many 
regions are linked to regional rather than global security dynamics. A number of regions have 
not been prioritised in the national interest concept of the superpower. New security 
regionalisation has occurred in many regions of the world, where withdrawal of superpowers 
has been accompanied by increased institutionalisation of security cooperation.  
Because security is relational and relative, one cannot understand national security without 
reference to the subsystemic or systemic security interdependence.163 The unit level is not 
sufficient to carry out security analysis. Therefore, Buzan has suggested an intermediate level 
of analysis between the unit and international system, called subsystem or regional security 
complex that mediates the interaction between the two levels.  He has introduced the regional 
subsystem as an object of security ‘to highlight the relative autonomy of regional security 
relations’.164  
Regional security complex theory developed by Buzan and Waever is a meta-theory of 
international security which is designed to analyse regional security. The theory evolved at a 
period when the dominance of the global level in security analysis was about to drop in 
salience to the regional level. The Cold War period witnessed the security interconnectedness 
of the national and international levels; national security concerns in many states were linked 
to the superpowers. As mentioned already, the linkage of the national level to the global one 
has not been that high in the new era. A number of regions on world map are not today that 
important for the national security interests of the superpower (or global powers) and 
therefore not linked. RSCT does not reject international and national security, but argues that 
the regional level is at least as important as the two other levels and aims to mediate between 
them. If the top level of security is interdependence at system level and the bottom is the one 
at state level, RSCT suggests an analytical framework to interplay between the two levels. In 
this context, the concept’s major premise is that the international system consists of several 
regional security complexes. It suggests that adjacency produces more security interaction (in 
the military, political and environmental sectors) among neighbouring states than among 
states in different regions.         
A regional security complex is defined as a ‘set of units whose major processes of 
securitisation, desecuritisation or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot 
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reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another’.165 An RSC is defined by the 
‘degree of security interdependence’ which should be ‘sufficient enough both to establish 
them as a linked set and to differentiate them from surrounding security regions’.166 Regional 
security complex theory is designed to describe and analyse security interdependence and 
interaction between actors in a region. The notion of a security complex implies that there 
exist a ‘distinct and significant subsystem of security relations’ among the neighbouring 
states, but there are also patterns of amity and enmity. 
The regional dynamics of security complexes have a substantial degree of autonomy from the 
patterns set by global powers. It distinguishes between the system level interplay of global 
powers and the subsystem level interplay of the lesser powers whose main security 
environment is their local region. The criterion for qualifying for an RSC is security 
interdependence; because RSCs have external boundaries, the interdependence must be high 
enough to differentiate the region from the surrounding ones.167 Because threats are more 
intense between shorter distances, security interaction between neighbours has priority.168 
1.3.1. Components of regional security complexes 
RSCs are defined by two components: power distribution and patterns of amity/enmity. 
Security complexes emphasise the interdependence of rivalry as well as that of shared 
interests. An RSC is generated by a bottom-up process in which the fears and concerns 
generated within the region produce it. The standard for RSC is a pattern of rivalry, balance of 
power and alliance patterns among the main powers in the region. Thus, at system level 
security complexes are caused by anarchy, at regional level by amity/enmity.  
The theory breaks apart from structural realism by rejecting to link regional security to system 
level changes solely. Structural realism has a tendency to regard security at the global level, 
and defines security by distribution of power. The advantage of RSCT is it tries to bring back 
security analysis from the global level to its local level and to apply constructivism. The 
argument is that since overlay (heavy superpower penetration into regions) was a matter of 
the past, and the international system comprises one superpower only, conflicts and peace 
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would remain at a regional level.169 It builds on the securitisation concept, treating amity and 
enmity and intraregional distribution of power as independent variables.  
RSC theory contains two major characteristics of realism: structural and power distribution. 
RSCs are substructures in the anarchically structured international system, so they are a part 
of the larger structure. A second feature of structural realism in RSCT is its emphasis on the 
distribution of power in a region. Distribution of power in a region produces the polarity of 
RSCs-bipolar, unipolar or multipolar and is the major link of RSCs to the global system. The 
global system can influence or even determine the power relations within a region. That 
depends on the level of linkage of RSCs to the global system and how vulnerable the region is 
to external penetration. All the existing RSCs are anarchical, not hierarchical in character.  
RSCT approach adds to the causal variable of RSCs, a constructivist element, patterns of 
amity and enmity. Patterns of amity and enmity make RSCs dependent on the actions and 
interpretations of actors, besides distribution of power. Amity includes relationships ranging 
from genuine friendship to expectation of protection and support. Amity and enmity can also 
be structural, of historic character or shaped by a common cultural area, border disputes or 
ethnically related populations.170 Amity and enmity are socially constructed, and act as 
independent variables. They can be transformed independent of systemic changes, e.g. the 
relations between Israel and Palestine, India and Pakistan remained unaffected by the end of 
the Cold War. Patterns of rivalry or amity are not imported from the system level, but 
generated internally. The dominant patterns of enmity and amity can change due to a number 
of factors as war-weariness, ideological transformation, changes of leadership, etc. Enmity is 
particularly difficult to change when it has acquired a historic character, or is subject to a 
political process. This factor is even stronger in authoritarian societies where change of 
ideology, rather than leadership is required to transform the stereotype of enmity, since 
leaderships can be limited in their will to change structural hatreds. This would become more 
acute when the state in question is a weak state.  
Thus, the essential structure of a RSC according to Buzan and Waever is: 
1. Boundary which differentiates the RSC from its neighbours; 
2. anarchic structure which means the RSC must be composed of two or more 
autonomous units; 
3. polarity which covers the distribution of power among the units ranging from uni to bi 
or multipolar; 
4. social construction which includes the patterns of amity and enmity ranging from 
conflict formation through security regime to security community;171  
                                                 
169 See Buzan, People, states and fear, pp. 219-21. 
170 See Buzan and Waever, Regions and Power, pp.45-47. 
171 Ibid. p.53 
58
 
1.3.2. Types of regional security complexes 
Security complexes emphasise the interdependence of both rivalry and shared interests. So, 
they can emerge as either a positive or negative interdependence. Most security complexes are 
towards the conflict formation end of the spectrum. Regional security complexes can be 
standard and centred. Standard RSCs can be bipolar, unipolar or multipolar and form either 
conflict formations or security regimes, in other words ‘standard form for a RSC is a pattern 
of rivalry, balance of power and alliance patterns among the main powers within the region’, 
which can be added by ‘the effects of penetrating external powers’.172 A standard complex has 
a military-security agenda, with a pattern of rivalry and balance of power. In contrast, a 
centred complex is unipolar or the power concerned is a global power, and it is this 
characteristic that makes it centred. The regional pole is asymmetrically dominant so that it 
can largely disregard the other units in the complex. The important feature of a centred 
complex is that it is unipolar and no other power will have sufficient weight to define another 
pole. Unipolar complexes tend to be more stable and can easily manage negative security 
developments. A centred complex can also be a region integrated by institutions, rather than 
by a single power. In that case actors stop treating each other as security problems. There can 
be still competition between them, but they do not deal with problems as threats needing 
extraordinary measures. A centred complex may be one of hegemony, where the units in the 
complex either accept the dominance or try to balance the pole. It is still an RSC as the other 
units of the complex are each other’s main security concern. The consequence of an intra-
regional hegemony is that the security dynamics of the region are suppressed, because the 
hegemon intervenes and manipulates the dynamics to meet its own needs. An RSC can also 
form a pluralistic security community when the socially constructed line of amity grows.  
1.3.3. Great power engagement in a security complex and overlay 
The mechanism by which external powers influence regional security complexes is 
‘penetration’ which ‘occurs when outside powers make security alignments with states within 
an RSC’.173 This usually happens through the alignment of one or more states of the region 
with the hegemon or extraregional great power to balance the regional power. The penetration 
of external powers can redefine the power structure in a region by supporting the states 
militarily or economically and in this way shape the power distribution. Like Cantori and 
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Spiegel, Buzan argues that in general, intrusion of external powers has tended to impose 
conflict than cooperation upon members of a subordinate system.174  
Geographically distant powers are not included in the RSCT on the grounds that ‘most threats 
travel more easily over short distances than over longer ones’ and therefore ‘security 
interdependencies are normally patterned into regionally based clusters’.175 Inclusion of 
geographically distant powers also contradicts the authors’ efforts to separate the region from 
the global level. The point is ‘both the security of the separate units and the process of global 
power intervention can be grasped only through understanding the regional security 
dynamics’.176  
In contrast, Lake and Morgan argue differently with regard to the presence of external powers 
in a region: since great powers have the ability to project force over distance, they should be 
considered members of the regional security complex.177 Criticising Buzan’s geographic 
limitation, Morgan and Lake argue that great powers operating within a region cannot be 
outside that regional complex, since on certain occasions their security interaction with some 
members of the RSC can be stronger than that between the original members themselves. As 
Morgan puts it, ‘…..the location is where the security relationships of consequence exist; the members are 
states that participate profoundly in those relationships. The participants see their security as much more closely 
bound up with some or all of the other members, and with their interactions in that geographical area, than with 
states that are not participants in those interactions’. 178   
Overlay 
The anarchical maturity of a region defines its vulnerability to external penetration; the more 
anarchically immature a region, the more vulnerable it is to outside influence. This can 
impede the evolution of regional security dynamics in the region. A stronger form of external 
power involvement is overlay, which implies the direct presence of outside powers in a region 
to an extent that it suppresses the local dynamics of security among the states. A security 
region is overlaid when extra-regional powers penetrate the region ‘so heavily that the local 
pattern of security relations virtually ceases to operate’.179 Overlay may either take the form 
of imperialism or of unequal alliances, in which case ‘local security concerns are subordinated 
to the security orientation of the dominant power and this orientation is reinforced by the 
                                                 
174 L. J. Cantori and S. L. Spiegel, The international politics of regions: a comparative approach, 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 30–31. 
175 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, pp. 4, 12.  
176 Ibid, p. 43  
177 See David Lake and Patrick Morgan, ‘The New Regionalism in Security Affairs’ in Regional orders: building 
security in a new world, ed. David Lake and Patrick Morgan (University Park: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1997) p. 12. 
178 Patrick Morgan, ‘Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders’, in Regional orders, ed. David Lake 
and Patrick Morgan, p.30.  
179 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, p. 61. 
60
stationing of that power’s military forces directly in that complex’.180 In the case of overlay 
the security of the region is defined by outsiders. Overlay subordinates it to the larger pattern 
of great power rivalries and this subordination can be positive if it suppresses national 
conflicts. Outside penetration by great powers would not enhance structural divisions in case 
of overlay by one power. It occurs in two forms: by stationing of armed forces and by 
occupation. The primary difference between heavy penetration by great powers and overlay 
is, in penetration, it is still the local powers that shape the main security dynamics, whereas in 
overlay, outside powers have substantial military forces in the region. Overlay was most 
obvious in the Cold War period, during which intense competition and concerns for reputation 
caused minor interests of the superpower to become major interests. The conflicts got fed and 
expanded by external actors. The end of the Cold War also put an end to superpower overlay 
so that there is no example of overlay today. However, other forms of overlay can evolve in 
the future, or at least certain concepts in international relations literature can be found today 
that are very close to overlay.  
Regional security complexes are to be differentiated from regional security systems. An RSC  
can be both positive, based upon amity, and negative, the major criteria being interaction no 
matter by peace or by conflict. It is not a matter of choice for states which security complexes 
they belong to. A state can belong to more than one security complex. Thus, security 
complexes arise naturally, they are a matter of destiny, without negotiation. There is hardly 
any region today where there is no security complex. Security systems in contrast are artificial 
and negotiated. Security complexes are often determined by geography, whereas security 
systems are a matter of choice. A security complex does not necessarily have to be or lead to a 
security system, e.g. there is no security system for the Middle Eastern security complex. 
However, security complexes can accelerate the formation of a security system. Thus, a 
security system is an institutionalised cooperation network between a group of states for the 
purpose of reducing threats against its members.181 Security systems are motivated by the 
existence of a common external threat. States can belong to the same security system, but 
different security complexes (Italy and US by NATO). A security system therefore cannot 
evolve if there are unresolved conflicts in a region. Security systems can also be imposed 
upon a group of states by a great power or superpower. Whether the security system is 
effective depends to a larger extent on the involvement of the great power.  
1.3.4. The Caucasus as a regional security complex  
                                                 
180 Ibid, p.220. 
181 See Mehdi Mozaffari, Security politics in the Commonwealth of independent states: Southern Belt, (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997). 
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The CIS as a security complex includes three subregions due to the level of security 
interaction: Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Western belt (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova) and 
is centred around a great power.182 The structural features of the post-soviet security complex 
are above all its relative autonomy from the international system and Russian hegemony. 
Most, if not all security interaction of the region includes Russia and together with it the 
Caucasus makes a mini security complex. The three obvious elements of the Caucasus mini-
complex all include a regional level: the ethno-territorial conflicts in Georgia, the 
Mountainous Karabakh conflict and potential spill-over of conflict between the North and 
South Caucasus. The level of security interconnectedness in the Caucasus is high; any change 
in Armenian security immediately affects Azerbaijan and the other way round. The national 
securities of the two states are tied to each other, so that their primary security problems 
cannot be analysed exclusively. Any acquisition of weapons by one party, joining in alliances 
or international organisations, economic and population growth causes concerns in either of 
the sides. Shift in the balance of power between the parties is also relevant and sensitive to 
Russia, although it has no viable domestic security interests in the Karabakh conflict.  
Taking into consideration that both Abkhazia and South Ossetia are largely populated by 
Russian nationals and are economically, socially and militarily tied to the Russian North 
Caucasus, Georgia’s security interaction is primarily with Russia. Any Georgian intervention 
into South Ossetia or Abkhazia will have implications for the Russian North Caucasus 
because of the ethnic relations. Emergence of conflict in Georgia has implications both for 
Azerbaijan’s and Armenia’s security, too. Now that Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan and 
Turkey is closed, Georgia is the only gateway of Armenia to Russia. Azerbaijan too, depends 
on Georgia for the transportation of its energy resources to Western markets. Moreover, both 
Armenia and Azerbaijan have substantial minorities in Georgia. Any serious disturbance in 
both regions is likely to cause tension. The potential of tension in Georgian-Azerbaijani 
relations is for a number of reasons not as high as that in Armenian-Georgian relations. Due to 
the oil and gas pipelines, Azerbaijan’s economic recovery is dependent on Georgian stability 
and the two states have enjoyed good relations throughout the 20th century.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
182 For the Caucasus as an RSC, see Jonathan Aves, ‘The Caucasus states: the Regional Security Complex’, in 
Security dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia, Roy Allison, Christoph Bluth, op. cit.   
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Figure 1: Caucasus mini-complex 
 
 
Table 1: Lines of amity and enmity in the South Caucasus  
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one of which is Lezgins.183 This would have a spill-over effect to Azerbaijan through the large 
Lezgin population in the north of Azerbaijan, who had already once attempted to challenge 
Azerbaijani statehood by secessionism.184 However, Azerbaijan is not likely to support any 
separatism in the North Caucasus that would pose a threat to Russia. The only threat to 
Russian security concerns in the North Caucasus is the possible Georgian intervention into 
South Ossetia or Abkhazia which could have a spill-over effect to North Ossetia and 
destabilise North Caucasus.  
A further feature of the CIS complex is the penetration of external powers, in particular the 
US and Europe. Penetration of external poles into the South Caucasus has been treated with 
more sensitivity by the regional pole because of its objective security concerns here. 
Moreover, the CIS complex is important to Russia for its great power position and identity, as 
Buzan and Waever note, ‘…the ‘near abroad’ is such an important part of the security agenda 
partly for specific reasons, partly for strategic ones. … The strategic threat is as a bottom line 
interpretation that if Russia is to remain a great power both able to defend itself and able to 
assert some influence globally, it needs to retain its sphere of influence among the current CIS 
countries’.185 External penetration of the US and EU in the South Caucasus has been by 
conflict mediation, presence of the transnational companies in the energy sector and various 
political, economic and humanitarian projects. The lack of legitimacy of the centredness of 
the complex has led to alignment efforts of Georgia and Azerbaijan to balance Russia’s 
hegemony. This has seriously disturbed Russian leaders, who have largely seen external 
power penetration aimed at limiting Russia’s role in the region or creating a second pole. 
Nevertheless, external power penetration in the CIS, and particularly the South Caucasus has 
not been as heavy as to transform or cause the erosion of the complex.186 Russia has heavy 
military presence in all three conflicts in the region, has monopolised peacekeeping, and in 
addition has a large number of important economic assets in Armenia. In this context, its 
leeway for manoeuvre in this region is larger than that of any other great power.  
The Caucasus mini complex can have a transformation in a number of ways. The easiest 
change would occur when the three conflicts could be peacefully resolved and the centre 
                                                 
183 Lezgins are an ethnic group, half of which lives in the North of Azerbaijan. See Robert Bruce and Enver 
Kisriev, ‘Ethnic Parity and Democratic Pluralism in Dagestan: A Consociational Approach’, Europe-Asia 
Studies, vol.53, no 1, 2001. 
184 Lezghins numbered 200,000 in the 1989 census. Elizabeth Fuller, ‘Azerbaijan rediscovers its vanished 
minorities’, RFE/RL Report on the USSR 2, no 52, December 28, 1990, p. 20. For Lezgi problem in Azerbaijan 
in 1990s see Elizabeth Fuller, ‘Caucasus: The Lezghin campaign for autonomy’, RFE/RL Research Bulletin, 16 
October, 1992, p. 30.  
185 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers, p. 409-410. 
186 For an opposite view see Bertil Nygren, The Rebuilding of Greater Russia: Putin’s foreign policy towards the 
CIS countries (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 12.   
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changed its policies towards the region. This would gain the centredness of the subcomplex 
legitimacy by all three states. A transformation at micro level would include transformation of 
the socially constructed lines of enmity between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Georgia versus 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Such a scenario might lead to a security regime or even 
regionalisation.  
Regional security complex theory is a useful analytical framework to frame Russia’s security 
interests in the South Caucasus. However, the findings of Chapter V argue that Russia’s 
behaviour towards the three conflicts in the region is not driven by its domestic security 
interests only. In fact, it is power-political interests that act as the core driving force behind its 
policies. Russia is a member of the complex, but meanwhile, it is a great power with regional 
hegemonic aspirations and therefore it is not clear how overlay or heavy penetration by 
intrusive powers explains Russia’s policies. Heavy military and political presence of the 
Russian Federation in the South Caucasus does not equal overlay since Russia is an actor of 
the complex. Thus, the approach by Buzan and Waever explains only one phenomenon-
Russia’s security interests.    
1.4. Nature of Russia’s hegemony  
According to Keohane, a hegemon is ‘a state that is powerful enough to maintain the essential 
rules governing intersate relations and is willing to do so’.187 Most literature on hegemony 
stresses its cooperative character and suggests that hegemony often fosters stability, because 
‘cooperation may be fostered by hegemony, and hegemons require cooperation to make and 
enforce rules’.188 Weaker states for the sake of security and protection seek accommodation 
with a hegemon. Presence of a single dominant state in the international system generates 
stability for all others, and all states benefit from it. As Gilpin claims, the international order 
is a public good benefitting subordinate states, and the presence of a hegemonic power is 
central to the preservation of stability and peace in the international system. Distribution of 
power among states enables the dominant state ‘to establish and enforce the basic rules and 
rights that influence their own behaviour and that of the lesser states’.189 The dominant power 
not only provides the good, it is able to extract contributions from the subordinate states 
towards the good. Therefore, the absence of a hegemon is equalled by Gilpin to disorder in 
international system. The authority of the dominant power makes sure that the lesser states 
obey it; there is also rational reason why they do so, because ‘dominant states supply goods 
                                                 
187 Robert O. Keohane, After hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 44. R. O. Keohane and J. S. Nye, Power and interdependence: world 
politics in transition (Boston: Little Brown, 1977) p. 44. 
188 Keohane, After hegemony, p. 46.  
189 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 30.  
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that give other states an interest in following their lead’.190 In this context, the hegemonic 
power constitutes a quasi government by providing public goods and taxing other states to 
pay for them.191 If the subordinate states receive net benefits they may recognise hegemonic 
power legitimate and reinforce its performance.192 As Duncan Snidal notes quoting Gilpin, 
‘subordinate states will accept their exploitation as long as the costs of being exploited are 
less than the costs of overthrowing the hegemonic order’.193 
However, scholars as Robert Gilpin, Duncan Snidal and Stephen Krasner have drawn 
attention to the point that hegemony is not always benevolent or profitable for all, it can also 
take a coercive form. According to Krasner, hegemonic power can structure the system to 
meet its own advantage, and under such a scheme strong states enjoying the rules of the order 
would not allow smaller ones to exit the system even if they wanted to.194 Gilpin too, asserts 
that a dominant power may not only provide the goods, it is also capable of extracting 
contributions from the subordinate states. Under such a scheme, hegemonic states provide an 
international order that furthers their own self-interest.195  
Snidal makes a distinction between benevolent and coercive forms of hegemony. The 
coercive model is distinguished by the ability to ‘force subordinate states to make 
contributions, and this ability rests primarily on the relative power of states’.196 In contrast, 
the benevolent model is distinguished by the interest of the hegemon to provide the public 
good, which meanwhile produces the capability. Because a hegemonic state has a dominant 
interest in a cooperative outcome, it has the capacity to ensure its emergence. The coercive 
form of hegemony emphasises the capability, rather than interest, supposing that interest in 
providing the public good follows from the distribution of capabilities. Such a model lacks 
legitimacy because the subordinate states are forced to contribute without getting any benefit. 
In other words, the military power of a hegemonic state which ‘gives it the capacity to enforce 
an international order also gives it an interest in providing a generally beneficial order so as to 
lower the costs of maintaining that order and perhaps to facilitate its ability to extract 
contributions from other states’.197 In this context, Snidal draws attention to a correlation 
between interest and capability.   
                                                 
190 Ibid, p.34. 
191 See Duncan Snidal, ‘Limits of hegemonic stability theory’, International Organization, vol. 39, no 4, 1985, 
p.587.  
192 Gilpin, War and change in world politics, p. 34. 
193 Snidal, ‘Limits of hegemonic stability theory’, p. 588. 
194 Stephen Krasner, ‘State power and the structure of international trade’, World Politics, vol. 28, 1976.  
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In the case of Russia, it is the predominant power in the CIS in terms of its GDP and military 
capabilities vis-à-vis the other states. Russia’s historic legacy and ability to influence the 
leaders and political elites of most CIS states in what Roy Allison calls ‘legacy or presence of 
Russian regional hegemonic influence’ has also contributed to maintaining its hegemony.198 
Hegemonic stability theory presumes hegemonic capacity, and this largely failed during the 
first decade of Russia’s independence. Thus contrary to Keohane, the hegemon must be not 
only willing, but also able to provide the essential rules. Russian state experienced financial 
crisis, indebtedness to Western governments, structural corruption and weak control over the 
state institutions, including the armed forces. State functions in Russia in mid 1990s, 
according to MacFarlane, at best included ‘a modest capacity to secure public revenue 
through taxation’.199 Under these circumstances, it would be hard to match Russia with the 
definition of hegemon in international relations literature. However, since the CIS from the 
very beginning has enjoyed relative autonomy from the international system, it has made it 
easier for Russia to maintain its hegemony. So, Russia’s hegemony and great power position 
is only relative in this region. 
Table 2: Defence budget and GDP, 2007-2009 
Country Defence 
budget in 
USD 2007 
Number in 
armed forces 
2009 
GDP in USD 
billions as of 
2007 
Population in 
millions as of 
2007 
Military 
expenditure 
in % of GDP 
as of 2007 
Russia 36.35 bn 
(2009)  
1, 027,000  1290 142,10 3,90 
Armenia 296 mn  42,000 9.2 3.0 3,13 
Azerbaijan 936 mn 67,000 31 8.6 2,96 
Georgia 573 mn 21,000 10.2 4.4 5,60 
Source: IISS military balance 2009; World Bank Country Report. 
As to the essential rules, Russia has set them in a coercive manner without offering the states 
in the region, in particular the South Caucasus any benefits.200 This is in tension with Andrew 
Hurrel’s definition that a hegemon in decline will be inclined to create common cooperation 
mechanisms for a region, because these might compensate for a decline in overall influence 
and structural predominance.201 Instability in a hegemonic region can only rule when there is 
insufficient engagement of the hegemon or its inability to maintain sufficient essential rules. 
                                                 
198 Roy Allison, ‘Regionalism, regional structures and security management in Central Asia’, 
International Affairs, vol. 80, no. 3, 2004. 
199 S. Neil MacFarlane, ‘Factors constraining the success of the CIS’, in Promoting institutional responses to the 
challenges in the Caucasus, Favorita Papers, 01/2001, p. 84. 
200 For a source of Russia’s policies towards the CIS, see ‘Ukaz prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ob 
utverzhdenie strategicheskogo kursa Rossiyskoy Federatsii s gosudarstavmi uchastnikami Sodruzhestvo 
Nezavisimikh Gosudarstv’, No 940, 14th September, 1995, Segodnya, 22 September, 1995.  
201 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Regionalism in theoretical perspective’, in Regionalism in World Politics: regional 
organization and international order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 52. 
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The conclusion of this thesis is that Russia has the capability to maintain the public good, but 
no interest. Its capability is limited though, but is sufficient to gain legitimacy from the 
subordinate states for its hegemony. Whereas Russia lacked both capacity and strategy to 
maintain its hegemony in the CIS in the Yeltsin period, under Putin, and in particular under 
Medvedev Russia has had the capacity, but has lacked the strategy.   
 
Chapter 2  
 
Ethno-territorial conflicts in the South Caucasus after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union: causes and consequences of the conflict spiral 
 
This chapter focuses on the three ethno-territorial conflicts in the South Caucasus that 
escalated in late 1980s. Primary attention is paid to the local level of conflict dynamics and its 
complexity. This is required for a broader understanding of the regional level, in particular for 
examining Russia’s capacity for influencing the insecurity settings in the region. 
All three conflicts in the region are ethno-territorial in character.202 They have largely been 
referred to as frozen conflicts, but this definition is confusing, since, as many analysts confirm 
the conflicts have never been frozen, it is the mechanism of resolution that is frozen. And 
apparently in the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the mechanism became the solution 
itself.203 Among the three conflicts, differentiation should be made between the minority 
seeking genuine self-determination and agreeing to cultural or any other kind of autonomy 
and minority agreeing to nothing less than independence as well as irredentism. Whereas 
South Ossetia was more inclined towards the minority seeking genuine self-determination, 
both Abkhazia and Mountainous Karabkah have tended towards the latter end of the 
spectrum.  
2.1. The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict 
Abkhazia is an autonomous republic within Georgia on the Black Sea coast making up 9% of 
the Georgian territory and nearly half of its coastline. Out of a pre-war population of 525,000, 
                                                 
202 Usual cause of minority conflicts is the factual or alleged discrimination against the minority, and once a 
window of opportunity emerges the minority takes advantage of it. Ethnic security dilemma, insufficient chances 
to maintain ethnic identity, arbitrary delimitation of boundaries, nationalities policies, etc. are all causes of ethnic 
conflict. There are further intensifying factors as historic grievances, ethnic mobilisation, deficiency of 
democratic institutions, miscommunication. Ethno-territorial conflicts are classified into two different groups: 
conflicts of interests and conflicts of identity. Identity conflicts in contrast to conflicts of interests are 
distinguished for their complexity, intractability and irrationality of the conflict parties. See Peter Waldman, 
Ethnischer radikalismus, (VS Verlag für Sozial Wissenschaften, 1989), pp. 17-25. 
203 See Dov Lynch, Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and de Facto States, 
(Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004); Brian Fall, ‘Conflict in the South Caucasus’, Asian 
Affairs, 2006, vol. 37, no 2, p. 198-209. 
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Abkhazia has today approximately 200,000 people.204 Fromerly known as the Soviet Riviera, 
Abkhazia is rich in minerals and has a number of attractive assets; it lies 30 km away from the 
Russian resort city of Sochi, the ice and wind free port in Sukhumi is strategically important 
for the Russian Black Sea Fleet and is only comparable to the one Russia leases in Sevastopol, 
the Ukraine. Moreover, the military airport in Gudauta can host military planes at all weather 
conditions.205  
The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict is a territorial dispute that contains ethno-social, political and 
economic elements. Its escalation was triggered by a complexity of factors as past grievances 
and (mis)perceptions, cultural differences and their institutionalisation, as well as the special 
circumstances of perestroika and the immediate post-Soviet era. Although the conflict broke 
out in 1988 and turned into a full-scale war in 1992-1993, causing over 10,000 casualties, the 
roots of the conflict date back to the earlier periods of the twentieth century.206   
The relations between Georgia and Abkhazia had a certain level of tension throughout the 
Soviet period and nearly every decade following the establishment of Soviet rule in Abkhazia, 
requests were made by the Abkhaz officials to the centre for changing the Autonomous 
Republic’s status. In 1956, 1967 and in 1978 Abkhaz intellectuals and communist party 
leaders appealed to Moscow to transfer Abkhazia into the Russian SSR. That said, 
Abkhazians and Georgians had peacefully coexisted within a common state for centuries, and 
only in the 20th century had the inter-community relations deteriorated to an unprecedented 
extent. It would be interesting to note that there had not been any historic enmity between the 
Abkhaz and Georgians in the Middle Ages, on the contrary Abkhazian and Georgian 
aristocracy had enjoyed a certain level of integration.207 It was in the 20th century primarily 
that the political ideals of Georgians and Abkhazians separated, although daily life and 
traditions remained largely similar. What caused the outbreak of an ethno-territorial conflict 
between the two communities, and what challenges the peace process has faced, will be 
explored below.  
2.1.1. Causes of the conflict   
The current conflict has an ethnic character, but ethnic and cultural differences alone could 
not have generated an armed conflict per se, it was far more complex. Its potential owed to 
                                                 
204 International Crisis Group, Europe Report N 176, Abkhazia today, Brussels, 2006, p. 4. 
205 ‘Kavkazskoe Kosovo: Abkhazia gotova razmestit u sebya Rossiyskie voennie bazi’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 
March 14, 2008. For Abkhazia’s economic importance for Russia, see Dmitry Trenin, ‘Russian peacemaking in 
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207 See Ghia Nodia, Causes and visions of conflict in Abkhazia, (Working Paper, Berkeley Programme in Soviet 
and Post Soviet Studies, 1997), p. 21. 
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some extent to the demographic situation of the Abkhazians, to both communities’ mutual 
perceptions of each other and immaturity of the political elites. It was on the one hand, 
immaturity of Georgian nationalism and political elite, and on the other an ethno-national and 
exclusive definition of the state and its people by both Abkhaz and Georgian political elites.208  
a) Role of perceptions  
Georgian perceptions 
The approach of the Georgian national movement in early 90s disturbed the minority elites; 
the minorities’ rights not only to enjoy constitutionally protected autonomy, but to be 
physically in Georgia were questioned.209 The Georgian nationhood was presented in ethnic 
terms leading to minorities being described as ‘guests on our soil’.210 It was quite popular to 
discuss demographic issues, birth rate among the ethnic Georgians, which was lower than that 
                                                 
208 Most scholars take the Soviet nationalities policy as a causal variable in the emergence of ethno-territorial 
conflicts in the South Caucasus. As Dov Lynch argues, ‘in the Soviet Union ethnicity was territorialised and 
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among the Armenian and Azeri minorities. The Georgian media and certain intellectuals 
asked the Government to encourage the resettling of ethnic Georgians in the minority 
populated areas in order to change the ethnic balance in the country. One of the central 
newspapers even suggested to put restrictions on non-Georgian families to have no more than 
two kids.211 Slogans were raised at mass rallies that the minorities are either assimilated or 
ousted.212  
Perception of the Abkhaz in Georgian collective identity was that they should be grateful to 
Tbilisi for the latter’s delegation of so many rights.213 The Georgian perception was largely 
seen through Georgia’s relations with Russia. Every time the Abkhaz appealed to Moscow 
with grievances, the conviction was strengthened in Tbilisi that the Abkhaz were a pawn used 
by Russia as a part of the latter’s divide et impera strategy. Many Georgians believed that 
political autonomy had been granted to the minorities in Georgia for their support to 
Bolsheviks during the occupation of Georgia in 1920s. In this context, throughout the conflict 
period, most Georgians tended to see the conflict as either instigated or manipulated by 
Russia, dismissing the Abkhaz concerns.  
A radical fraction of the Georgian national movement even saw the Abkhaz as a minority 
rather than the indigenous ethnic community of Abkhazia. A group of literature historians in 
Georgia in 1989 wrote in an open letter referring to the Abkhaz that ‘taking advantage of our 
hundred year kindness, the Adygee tribes came to us. The newcomers are now trying to obtain 
our land’.214 Numerous statements were made by public organisations including the Union of 
Writers, indicating the preparedness of the Georgian public ‘to force the newcomers to go 
back to where they came from’215. They argued in favour of restricting the Abkhaz autonomy 
to cultural autonomy only and applying democratic traditions, which would imply 
proportionate allocation of resources for the 17.8% Abkhaz population of Abkhazia. There 
was consensus in the Georgian national movement that the political privileges that were given 
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to the Abkhaz in Soviet times were exaggerated considering the proportion of the Abkhaz 
population of Abkhazia.  
The thesis that the Abkhaz were newcomers to Abkhazia was also well-founded in Georgian 
literature and academic debates.216 In 1954, the literary historian Ingorokva published a book 
on the origins of the people inhabiting Abkhazia, in which he denied that the Abkhazian 
community was indigenous to the region.217 His thesis claimed that the current Abkhaz had 
migrated to Abkhazia from the North Caucasus in the 17th century and taken over the name 
Abkhazians, while the real Abkhazians in ancient sources were Georgians. The thesis 
appeared when most Abkhaz grievances from Stalin’s period were still fresh in memories, and 
had quite a resentful effect. In 1978, Abkhaz historians G.Dzidzaria and Z. Anchabadze 
presented a study to the Georgian Communist Party, claiming that no less than 32 
publications, most of them scientific, had included and developed Ingorokva’s thesis.218 This 
triggered Abkhz intellectuals to petition a letter to Moscow in 1957 requesting the transfer of 
the province into the Russian SSR.219 As Coppieters notes with reference to Hewitt, 
Ingorokva’s thesis was taken so seriously that it might have provided the grounds for the 
forced removal of Abkhazians from Abkhazia.220 During the national movement in Georgia in 
the late 1980s, Ingorokva’s thesis was often invoked to legitimise a theory of ‘hosts and 
guests’, and it was adopted by influential intellectuals and public figures including President 
Gamsakhurdia.221 Initially, Gamsakhurdia, too, called the Abkhaz Adygeans belonging to the 
North Caucasus.  
Abkhaz perceptions  
Abkhaz claim for political sovereignty is partly based upon reference to the Abkhaz kingdom 
that existed in the 9th and 10th centuries.222 Abkhaz scholars in late 1980s argued that 
Abkhazia had existed as an independent state for more than a thousand years and not always 
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been part of the Georgian political space. Abkhazia’s history of statehood preceded its union 
with Georgia, whereas Georgian scholars claimed that Abkhazia had always been a part of the 
Georgian political space. Further, Abkhaz historians have claimed that in the Soviet period 
there were many instances of oppression by Tbilisi. They have tended to see Tbilisi and 
Georgians, rather than the Soviet Union as the major perpetrator of their demographic 
problems, regarding the immigration waves of Armenians, Georgians and Russians as 
Georgian colonialism.  
 
Map 2 Abkhazia  
 
 
Source: International Crisis Group, Europe Report N 176, Abkhazia today, (Brussels), 2006.  
 
b) demographic situation 
The issue of Abkhazians’ extinction was a central point in their collective identity and is still 
one of the major challenges to the peace process today. Both Abkhaz society and the political 
elite have unilaterally blamed their demographic plight on Tbilisi’s perceived intentions to 
Georgianise the region. This fear became more explicit during the Georgian national 
movement. 
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Abkhazia’s first demographic shifts had occurred in the 19th century under the Russian Tsar. 
In 1783, Georgia, through the treaty of Giorgievsk joined Russia, accepting its patronage. The 
Abkhaz principality came under the Russian protection in 1810 independently of Georgia, and 
retained its principal autonomy until 1864, when Russia managed to break the Abkhaz 
resistance and abolish its political autonomy by sending the Abkhaz prince to exile. Between 
1864 and 1878 (following the Russo-Turkish war) a large number of Abkhaz were deported to 
the Ottoman Empire.223 According to Kaufman, 32,000 out of 78,000 Abkhaz were deported 
in 1878 alone.224 As a result, the number of Abkhaz had decreased substantially, and 
Abkhazia was populated by Russians, Armenians and Georgians. According to the Russian 
census data of 1897, the Sukhum Okrug had 58, 697 Abkhazians and 25,873 Kartvelians, 
mostly comprising Mingrelians. The next source is the 1926 Great Soviet Encyclopedia which 
set Abkhazians at 48.1% and Georgians at 18.4%.225 According to a census of 1989, of the 
525.000 population of Abkhazia, Georgians made up 45.7 %, Abkhaz 17.8 %, Armenians 
14.6 %, Russians 14.3%, Greeks 2.8%, Byelorussians, Jews, Ossetians, Tatars and Azeris 
each making between 0.4 and 0.1%. 226 
c) Abkhazia’s status prior to the conflict  
Abkhazians’ primary integration occurred with the peoples of the north Caucasus, with whom 
they also sought political union. Following the Russian revolution of 1917, Abkhazia 
proclaimed independence, and on 8th November 1917, elections were held to the Abkhaz 
National Council, which adopted a constitution. As early as May 1918 Abkhazia was 
incorporated into the North Caucasian Republic of Mountain Peoples (which included 
Dagestan, Chechnya, Ossetia, Kabarda and Abkhazia, Karachay-Balkaria and Adygea). 
Abkhazia, at the time of the proclamation of the Georgian Democratic Republic on May 26th, 
1918 was outside the borders of the GDR, but was occupied by its armed forces in June 1918. 
The province subsequently remained a part of the Georgian Democratic Republic until the 
establishment of Bolshevik authority in Georgia in 1921.227  
In 1921 Bolshevik authority was first established in Abkhazia and after its extension into 
Georgia, Abkhazia signed a treaty of union with the latter on 16th December 1921 on 
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conditions of full sovereignty (ratified by the I Congress of Abkhazian Soviets of 1922).228 In 
official documents and in literature, Abkhazia between 1921 and 1936 is referred to as a 
treaty republic unified with Georgia. The accordingly adopted constitution of Abkhazia of 
1925 proclaimed Abkhazia as a sovereign Soviet Socialist Republic independent of any other 
authority. Meanwhile, Article 3 of the constitution stipulated that Abkhazia joined the 
Transcaucasus Socialist Federal Soviet Republic through its special treaty with Georgia, and 
is represented in the USSR through membership of the TSFSR. The Soviet constitution of 
1924 Article 15 already mentioned Abkhazia as an autonomous Republic.229   
Substantial change to Abkhazia’s status only occurred in 1931, when Abkhazia 
unambiguously became an autonomous republic of Georgia. The demotion of Abkhazia to an 
autonomous Republic must have been decided by the centre and imposed involuntarily; 
following the announcement of the decision, a national rally gathered in Abkhazia to protest 
the decision.230 The region’s status as an autonomous republic was also confirmed in the 1937 
Constitution of Abkhazia.   
d) Abkhaz grievances 
1930s should be viewed as the starting point of Abkhaz grievances against Georgia and the 
construction of a feindbild of Georgians in Abkhazia.231 All the policies of this era were 
conceived as a demographic and cultural expansion of Georgia. Following the alleged murder 
of the Abkhaz Communist Party leader Nestr Lakoba in 1936, Abkhazia underwent massive 
resettlement of Mingrelians and Georgianisation.232 The policies carried out in Abkhazia 
included replacement of the Abkhaz script with Cyrillic script, abolition of Abkhaz language 
at secondary and nursery schools and replacement of Abkhaz proper names with Georgian 
ones.233 All this generated a myth in the Abkhaz social consciousness that the region because 
of the malicious intent of its neighbours-Georgians, was fraudently deprived of the status of a 
sovereign republic and artificially turned into an autonomous republic. The myth was added 
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by the fact that both Beria and Stalin were ethnic Georgians and the Communist Party Central 
Committee policies on Abkhazia were at the time aimed at the restriction of the Abkhaz 
autonomy. All these factors have made it difficult for the Abkhaz to distinguish between 
Soviet and Georgian sources of oppression.234   
Abkhaz discontent with being subordinated to Tbilisi as a centre was expressed more openly 
after Stalin’s death. In 1957, Abkhaz officials appealed to Moscow for the transfer of the 
autonomous Republic from Georgian to Russian control. Among other things, the appeal was 
based upon the claim that the Georgians impeded Abkhaz efforts to use their own language.235 
It would be worth mentioning that restriction of the Abkhaz language dated back to the 1925 
constitution of Abkhazia, Article 6 of which proclaimed Russian as the state language. In this 
context, Russian, since the establishment of Soviet authority in Abkhazia had become the 
dominant language of communication taking into consideration the mixed character of the 
region’s ethnic composition. Moreover, the 1960s and 70s had seen an increase in the number 
of Abkhaz schools in Abkhazia, the number of which had risen from 39 in 1966 to 91 in 
1978.236  
It is, indeed difficult to establish whether the alleged cultural oppression of the Abkhaz was a 
result of Tbilisi’s policies or the Soviet Union’s nationality policies.237 Regarding linguistic 
oppression, for example, it is worth noting that Russian had already become the dominant 
language of Abkhazia even before its unification with Georgia. Moreover, Georgian historians 
argue that Abkhazians enjoyed far more rights within Georgia than the autonomies in the 
North Caucasus. As Gerber puts it, ‘compared to the nations of the North Caucasus, whose 
autonomous status within the RSFSR were of a purely formal nature, the Abkhaz had 
incomparably larger opportunities to keep their language and culture. The Abkhaz, like the 
Ossetians, could doubtlessly profit from the well-built educational institutions in Georgia’.238 
There was oversensitivity observed on the Abkhaz side towards changes occurring in Tbilisi, 
followed by the widespread belief that the grievances of 1930s and 40s could come back any 
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time and exterminate the Abkhaz ethnos as a whole. Throughout the period both Abkhaz 
officials and intelligentsiya expressed concern over any publication on Abkhazia, in particular 
its history by Georgian authors. In 1977 the draft new constitution of Georgia suggested 
removing the status of the Georgian language as a state language and giving equal status to all 
languages spoken in the country. This was seen as a sign of Russification in Georgia and a 
threat to the national culture. Amidst mobilisation of Georgians in Tbilisi against the 
constitutional change, 130 Abkhaz intellectuals sent a petition to the Soviet leader Brezhnev 
accusing the Georgian authorities of Georgianising Abkhazia and requested the transfer of 
Abkhazia from Georgia to Russia, opening of an Abkhaz University and television in 
Sukhumi.239 
A number of concessions meant to appease Abkhaz demands were made in cultural and staff 
policies; Moscow was convinced that improving the material conditions would help resolve 
the discontent. Abkhaz communist party cadres represented a prominent and disproportionate 
proportion of the administrative personnel in the region, Sukhumi got its own university, TV 
station and radio.240 These measures however did not make the Abkhaz community content; 
they still saw a threat of ethnic disappearance, which could only be avoided by establishing 
state sovereignty and complete control over the institutions.     
2.1.2. Escalation of the conflict and success of secessionism 
The national independence movement of Georgia aimed at acquiring full independence was 
regarded as a threat in Abkhazia, because in Abkhaz minds it was the Soviet Union, namely 
Russia that had prevented the Georgians from taking over Abkhazia and assimilating the 
Abkhaz. The Abkhaz intelligentsiya viewed the Soviet Union as a shield against ‘imperialist 
Georgia’ and therefore the issue of Georgia’s independence was sensitive for the Abkhaz. In 
this context, as Georgia boycotted the 17 March, 1991 referendum on the preservation of the 
Soviet Union, Abkhazia’s non-Georgian population overwhelmingly voted in favour. The 
Abkhazians voted overwhelmingly to preserve the Soviet Union which they saw as the only 
guarantor of their rights.241 
The preliminary event of the 1980s that initiated the deterioration of relations became the so-
called Abkhaz letter. Inspired by the growing activity of Georgian nationalists, in June 1988 
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60 leading Abkhaz communists sent a letter to the Communist Party in Moscow requesting 
for the restoration of Abkhazia’s Union Republic status of the 1920s with special ties with 
Georgia. The authors argued that Tbilisi had pursued colonialist policies in relation to 
Abkhazia before and after the establishment of Soviet authority in Georgia, regarding both 
Georgian Democratic Republic and Soviet Georgia colonialist. In December 1988, the authors 
of the appeal established the Abkhaz Popular Forum Aidgylara (Unity), which defined two 
tasks in its charter: securing constitutionally the declaration of state sovereignty of Abkhazia 
and the building of a state governed by law.242  
Tension in the Georgian-Abkhaz relations deteriorated after the Abkhazian letter. A belief 
dominated among the Abkhaz intelligentsiya that it was in this decade namely that Abkhazia 
would finally achieve its state sovereignty and correct ‘the historic mistake’. March 1989 
witnessed a 30,000 rally of the Abkhaz in Lykhny village in Abkhazia with the participation 
of Abkhaz Party and Soviet officials. A declaration was adopted which recognised Abkhazia’s 
incorporation into Georgia illegal, and demanded return to the status of 1921.243   
Abkhaz tendencies to secede from Georgia were further strengthened by the decision of the 
Council of Ministers to open a branch of Tbilisi State University in Sukhumi. This decision 
had been made with reference to the demands of the Georgian population of Abkhazia, but it 
was largely the symbolic meaning of the decision, rather than the act itself that triggered 
anger among the Abkhaz population. Although the decision got abolished in March 1989 by 
the prosecutor general of the Soviet Union, it contributed to turmoil in Abkhazia causing the 
death of 14 people, mostly Georgians.244           
The adoption by the Georgian Parliament of a new language law in August 1989, making 
Georgian obligatory at all schools triggered an even bigger discontent in Abkhazia. The law 
required Georgian language tests for entry into higher education and was seen as a new 
attempt of Georgianisation on the eve of a national independence movement in Georgia.245  
 
                                                 
242 See Chervonnaya, op. cit., p. 80. 
243 See Chervonnaya, op. cit., p. 60. 
244 See Ronald Grigor Suny, The making of the Georgian nation, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 
p. 322. See also Alexander Iskandaryan, Alan Kasayev, ‘The North Caucasian Factor in Transcaucasian 
conflicts’, in Crisis management in the CIS: Whither Russia?, Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Anna Kreikemeyer, Andrei 
V. Zagorski, (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1995), p. 49. Stephen Jones, ‘Georgia: the trauma of statehood’, in 
Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras eds., New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 513.  
245 See Catherine Dale, ‘Abkhazia and South Ossetia: Dynamics of the Conflicts,’ in Pavel Baev and Ole 
Berthelsen, eds., Conflicts in the Caucasus, Report no. 3 (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1996), pp. 
13-24. See also Gueorgui Otyrba, ‘War in Abkhazia. The Regional Significance of the Georgian-Abkhaz 
Conflict’, in Roman Szporluk (ed.), National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, 
New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1994, p. 286. 
78
 
a) War of laws   
After certain tensions between Sukhumi and Tbilisi, the conflict proceeded in legislation. In 
July 1990, the Georgian Parliament, for the purpose of a return to the independent republic of 
1918-1921, outlawed all acts of the Soviet Period. Such a decision also annulled the treaty 
status of Abkhazia as well as its autonomous status of 1931. In response, the Abkhaz Supreme 
Soviet, at the absence of a quorum, adopted on 25th August 1990 the ‘Declaration on the state 
sovereignty of Abkhazia’ and the resolution ‘on legal guarantees for the protection of 
statehood of Abkhazia’.246 Declaring the decision void and null, the Georgian Supreme Soviet 
annulled all the legislation emanating from the above-mentioned acts. The situation remained 
paralysed until a power-sharing agreement was reached between Georgian President Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia and Abkhaz leader Ardzinba in August 1991. According to the agreement the 
45.7 % Georgian population of Abkhazia received 26 seats, the 18% Abkhaz population of 
Abkhazia 28 seats and the other groups (Russians, Armenians and Greeks) 11 seats in the 65 
seat Abkhazian Parliament. The first elections to the Abkhazian Parliament on the basis of the 
law were held in September 1991 and it seemed that the relations between Sukhumi and the 
centre were improved. The new law however was short of shedding light on the status of the 
relations between Tbilisi and Sukhumi. Moreover, both in Tbilisi and within the Georgian 
population of Abkhazia the overrepresentation of the Abkhaz was seen as a betrayal. To make 
matters worse, in February 1992 Georgia abolished the Georgian Constitution of 1978 and 
changed to the constitution of 1921, which had mentioned Abkhazia’s autonomous status, but 
not legally specified it.247 In early 1992, with the aim of finding a dialogue with the Abkhaz 
community, Abkhazian was made the second state language in the whole of Georgia.248 
Moreover, Gamsakhurdia during his late years at office expressed a more liberal approach to 
Abkhazia and the Abkhaz and even proposed a confederation of Georgia and Abkhazia with 
the latter having an equal status.249  
In June 1992, the Abkhaz leader Ardzimba proposed a new draft treaty which secured 
Georgia’s territorial integrity, but restructured the relationship in a confederative way. The 
draft treaty was immediately rejected by Georgia’s State Council, and as a response the 
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Abkhaz parliament on 3rd July, at the absence of a quorum voted to abolish the 1978 
Constitution and to restore the Constitution of 1925 according to which Abkhazia was a 
sovereign state united with Georgia on the basis of a treaty.250 The decision was accordingly 
nullified by the State Council of Georgia on 25 July 1992. Over the same period, the 
republican newspaper ‘Abkhazia’ published ‘the treaty principles of interrelations between 
the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of Georgia’, Article 2 of which suggested Georgia 
and Abkhazia as sovereign states and equal participants of international and foreign economic 
relations. The sides independently conclude treaties with other countries. Article 3 of the 
treaty stated ‘voluntary unification with Georgia’.251 The Abkhaz leader Ardzimba 
accordingly claimed that Abkhazia was not leaving Georgia, but was uniting with her on the 
basis of a new treaty on the delimitation of power.    
b) Georgian-Abkhaz war   
With the power-sharing agreement Gamsakhurdia’s approach to Abkhazia had dramatically 
changed and in the summer of 1991, he stated that there were two indigenous nations in 
Georgia: Georgians and the Abkhaz and suggested a Georgian-Abkhaz confederation of two 
equal subjects.252 However, just as there were hopes for improvement in the relations between 
Tbilisi and Abkhazia, a coup took place in Tbilisi, ousting President Gamsakhurdia and 
causing civil war in Georgia between Gamsakhurdia’s opponents and proponents. In January 
1992, President Gamsakhurdia was ousted by the commander of the National Guard Kitovani 
and leader of the paramilitary group Mkhedrioni (Georgian horsemen), the two paramilitary 
organisations that had emerged during the Georgian national movement.253 A State Council 
comprising both Kitovani and Ioseliani first run the country until the former Soviet foreign 
minister Shevardnadze was invited to lead it in March 1992.  
In May 1992, tension arose between Tbilisi and Sukhumi. The Abkhaz Parliament dismissed 
the minister of interior of Abkhazia and appointed Alexander Ankvab instead. In June, 
Abkhaz guardsmen attacked the building of Abkhazia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and the 
                                                 
250 See Constitution of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia, 1st April, 1925, in Badri Gogia and Jamal 
Gamakharia, Abkhazia-istoriceskaya oblast Gruzii. S drevneyshix vremen do 30-x XX veka, (Tbilisi: Agdgoma, 
1997).  
251 T. M. Shamba, ‘Treaty on the principles of interrelations between the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic 
of Georgia’, Abkhazia, 13 June, 1992. See also Monica Duffy Toft, The geography of ethnic violence, (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2003). p. 101.   
252 See Vladimir Arsenyev, ‘Abxaziya bez orujiya, no i bez xleba, vodi i sveta’, Izvestiya, 23rd March, 1992.  
253 For an account of Mkhedrioni see Richard Woff, ‘Armed forces of Georgia’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, July, 
1993, p. 307. For a quick view of Kitovani’s impact upon the intrusion into Abkhazia, see Dmitri Trofimov, ‘The 
conflict in Abkhazia: Roots and Main Driving Forces’, in Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Anna Kreikemeyer, Andrei V. 
Zagorski, pp. 80-81.     
80
Georgian minister Lominadze, who was refusing to resign, was beaten.254 The Georgian 
Government responded demanding the dissolution of the Abkhaz Parliament and resignation 
of the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic Government to be followed by new elections to the 
Abkhaz Supreme Soviet. Tbilisi cut electricity and telephone service to Sukhumi for several 
hours on 1st July 1992. On July 2nd, agreement was reached that all armed forces in Abkhazia 
should be subordinated to the Ministry of Defence in Tbilisi, which at the time was a nominal 
entity with no real power or resources. Meanwhile, displeased with Ardzinba’s decision to 
form an Abkhaz-only national guard, the Georgian fraction of the Abkhaz parliament had 
tried to form alternative structures and arm the loyal Georgian population of Abkhazia. 
Regional branches of Mkhedrioni were established in Sukhumi and Gagra.  
In July, Gamsakhurdia’s proponents in the West of Georgia, in Mingrelia and in the Gali 
region of Abkhazia continued to challenge the Georgian Government by taking Georgian 
officials hostage, including the Deputy Prime Minister Kavsadze and interior minister. In 
Mingrelia, Gamsakhurdia’s supporters continued sporadic attacks, blew up bridges and 
disrupted rail traffic between Georgia and Russia.255 The Abkhaz interior minister announced 
on 12th August that Georgian and Abkhaz soldiers would conduct a joint operation to release 
the hostages.256 According to the official statements, combat units under Kitovani’s command 
were only to go and free the hostages. Shevardnadze had allegedly obtained the approval of 
the Abkhaz government for a limited hot pursuit operation in Eastern Abkhazia.257 As the 
Georgian National Guard entered the Gali region on 13th August to release the Georgian 
government hostages, they went on from villages of the Gali region to the Abkhaz capital of 
Sukhumi, and after fierce fighting took the city. Kitovani marched detachments of his national 
guard into Sukhumi and opened fire on the Abkhaz Parliament building, while a draft federal 
treaty between Georgia and Abkhazia was being discussed.258 The Abkhaz Government 
withdrew to Gudauta in the North of Abkhazia. Georgian troops landing from the sea, took 
control of Leselidze and Gagra close to the Russian border.  
Georgian military intervention into Abkhazia was a huge mistake and is considered to be the 
trigger behind the escalation of a violent and intractable phase of the conflict. Kitovani’s 
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intrusion into Abkhazia had allegedly not been authorised by Shevardnadze.259 An important 
factor contributing to the outbreak of war was Shevardnadze’s inability to control the 
country’s armed formations when he became the head of state in March 1992. Real military 
power continued to be exercised by Kitovani, who retained command of the National Guard, 
and Ioseliani whose Mkhedrioni effectively became an arm of the state. The obvious strategic 
rational of Georgia’s intervention was to control the railway and road to Russia, to close the 
mountain passes to cut off Abkhazia’s supply lines and win a war against a small Abkhaz 
force.260 As soon as the war broke out, the first and paramount support that the Abkhaz 
received was from the Confederation of Mountain Peoples, of which Abkhazia was a member.  
Georgia’s intrusion into Abkhazia also had economic dimensions. Kitovani and Ioseliani after 
the coup, had established control over the arms trade and distribution of fuel in Georgia. 
According to Pavel Baev, Kitovani organised the war in Abkhazia to establish control over 
the region’s valuable tourism industry and transportation networks. His troops carried out 
extensive looting, and burnt down villages in Abkhazia.261 However, the collapse of the 
economy in Georgia made it impossible to supply the troops adequately, and led to a 
mismanagement of the military campaigns, leading finally to the defeat of Mkhedrioni and the 
National Guard. The economic assets they were fighting for were also largely destroyed.262 
The Abkhazian leadership headed by Ardzinba called for a total mobilisation and managed to 
secure the support of North Caucasian peoples, in particular the Circassians and Chechens. 
The Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, the first congress of which had been 
held in Sukhumi in August 1989, sent over 1,500 volunteers to support the Abkhaz forces.263 
Moreover, Ardzinba had also succeeded in gaining an upper hand in the ideological 
justification of fighting; the war against the Georgian forces was presented in Abkhazia as a 
national salvation struggle, with the conviction that any victory of the Georgian force would 
end up in the extermination of the Abkhaz race. The Abkhaz forces in this context had a 
higher level of fighting moral than the Georgian forces. On the contrary, Shevardnadze and 
Georgian leaders from the very onset firmly believed that the war was one between Georgia 
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and Russia, instead of Abkhazia, a conviction generated by Russian military assistance to 
Abkhazia. Within a short period of time the Abkhaz had acquired T-72 tanks, rocket 
launchers, fighter planes and other heavy equipment.264 The involvement of the Russian 
military units in the conflict was also confessed by the then Russian minister of foreign affairs 
Kozyrov in 1993.265  
Ceasefire attempts in September 1992 and May 1993 did not lead to any cessation of 
hostilities. Only in July 1993 did Georgia, Russia and Abkhazia agree upon a substantial 
ceasefire agreement in Sochi; its provisions included withdrawal of all military units from the 
combat zone, return of the legal government to the region, a joint control group to monitor the 
ceasefire and the deployment of international observers and peacekeepers under UN aegis.266 
The ceasefire became a cause of disappointment for large parts of Georgia’s population and 
finally led to the renewal of the civil war. In Mingrelia (Western Georgia), Gamsakhurdia’s 
supporters launched an attack on the government forces. The Abkhazian forces took 
advantage of the turmoil and attacked to retake Sukhumi. A large number of atrocities against 
Abkhazia’s Georgian population were reportedly committed, which later became known as 
Sukhumi massacre.267  
The war made 200,000 Georgians from Abkhazia flee their homes and become IDPs in 
Georgia and Russia. The fighting formally ended with the memorandum of understanding 
between the parties signed in Geneva on 1st December 1993, without resolving the status of 
the province. The Abkhaz forces retained control of the whole of Abkhazia except for the 
upper Kodori gorge at the Abkhaz-Georgian de-facto border, making the line of separation 
along the Inguri river.  
The trilateral negotiations continued in the first quarter of 1994 and ended up on the 10th 
February as a date to start the return of Georgian IDPs to Abkhazia. However, outbreak of 
hostilities between the parties later impeded the process. The Abkhazians accused Georgia of 
using the return of IDPs for an armed incursion into Abkhazia by guerrilla warfare. Further 
plans for the return of IDPs were cancelled when the Georgian parliament on 10th March, 
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while Shevardnadze was in the US, disbanded the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia and annulled 
all its decisions.268   
The sides agreed on a ‘Declaration on measures for a political settlement of the Georgian-
Abkhaz conflict’ on 4 April 1994, in which they rejected use of force, and promised to settle 
the conflict exclusively by peaceful means. Provision was made for the introduction of 
peacekeeping forces, presence of UN military observers and the gradual return of refugees 
and IDPs, stipulated in the ‘quadripartite agreement on the refugees’. Later on, Georgia and 
Abkhazia worked out an ‘Agreement for a cease-fire and separation of forces’ of 14 May 
1994 in Moscow.269 The sides agreed to establish a security zone of 12 km wide on each side 
of the Inguri river along the line of contact, in which there would be no armed forces. Armed 
forces and heavy military equipment belonging to the parties were prohibited inside the zone. 
The Abkhaz would pull back its artillery, tanks and heavy armament to Sukhumi and the 
Georgians to Zugdidi. In addition, the Georgians were to withdraw troops from the Kodori 
gorge, the only part of Abkhazia under Georgian control. The protocol to the Moscow 
agreement established the mandate of the CIS Peacekeeping Force. It established that its 
primary responsibility was to maintain and observe the cease-fire and prevent resumption of 
armed conflict, but it also had responsibility for disengagement in and Georgia’s withdrawal 
from the Kodori gorge. The mandate further included supervising implementation of the 
agreement with regard to the security zone and promoting the safe return of refugees and 
IDPs, especially to the formerly Georgian populated Gali region.270 In June 1994, CISKF 
were introduced into Abkhazia as a part of a joint peacekeeping force of 3000 men deployed 
along the Inguri river in the south and the lower part of the Kodori gorge. The CISPKF failed 
to provide the safe and orderly return, but also the safety and protection of the returnees. 
Georgian returnees were often subject to harassment and human rights violations by the 
Abkhaz police; an example was in March 1995, when the Abkhaz police entered the security 
zone and arrested some 200 returnees, murdering twenty of them. Some executions took place 
before the CISPKF personnel.271 The UNOMIG too, has largely failed to prevent human 
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rights violations and to create the necessary security conditions for the safe retrun of Georgian 
IDPs.272     
In the initial post-military period Sukhumi was intent on seeking compromise with Tbilisi, 
and the Abkhaz administration had allegedly agreed to a single federal state in the protocol to 
the Moscow negotiations in July 1995. The failure of genuine progress in the negotiations led 
to Abkhaz authorities hold a referendum and declare independence. The Abkhazian 
authorities claimed that until 1999 the chance of Georgia and Abkhazia uniting in a 
confederation was still there.273  
2.1.3. Peace process 
a) UN Commitment 
The peace process has been to a larger extent facilitated by the UN and CIS Peacekeeping 
Force, although Tbilisi denounces the latter of being impartial. The UN Security Council 
resolutions have all stressed Georgia’s territorial integrity, but since 2007, April 13 
Resolution (SC Resolution 1752), the UNSC has tended to regard the conflict as one between 
Georgia and Abkhazia rather than the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia.274 A United Nations 
Observer Mission (UNOMIG) was established by a SC resolution in August 1993, whose 
major task has been to observe the ceasefire reached by the Moscow Agreement of May 
1994.275 Its mandate also includes observing the CISPKF, monitoring the Georgian 
withdrawal from the Kodori valley and patrolling it. Since 2001 a UN Human Rights Office 
has been designated in Sukhumi. The Moscow agreement between the conflict parties has 
acted as a long-term cease-fire accord, which UNSC resolutions and resolutions of other 
international organisations have made reference to. At the intial phase of the conflict, amidst 
Georgian calls for an international peacekeeping force, the UN was unable to deploy a peace-
keeping force in the region, partly due to Russian objection, and because of the lack of peace-
keeping resources.276 The UN Secretary General has also designated a special representative 
for the region who is often involved in facilitating meetings between the Abkhaz and 
Georgian elites as well as preparing peace proposals. In 1993, a ‘Group of Friends of the 
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Secretary General’ was established comprising the UK, France, Russia, Germany and the US. 
In 1997 a Coordination Council was set up to coordinate the activities of the group, which 
established three working groups: on security and non-resumption of hostilities, on the return 
of IDPs and on economic and social issues.277  
In March 2003, at a meeting of Presidents Putin and Shevardnadze in Sochi a parallel 
negotiation process to the Geneva based one was established, known as the Sochi process. It 
established Georgian-Russian-Abkhaz working groups on the rehabilitation of the Inguri 
hydroelectric power station; the return of IDPS and reopening of the railway between Sochi 
and Tbilisi. Here, Tbilisi showed its readiness to accept a leading role of Russia provided that 
the latter would facilitate the peace process. The Sochi process created the perception in 
Georgia that Russia’s attitude to the conflict is subject to its bilateral relations with Russia. 
However, the deterioration of relations between Moscow and Tbilisi after the Rose 
Revolution led to the latter’s withdrawal from the Russian led process. 
b) Return of Georgian IDPs   
According to UN estimates in 1998, Abkhazia’s population had decreased from 500,000 to 
200,000 only.278 The issue of the return of IDPs to Abkhazia has been one of the major 
questions impeding the peace process. Tbilisi has prioritised the return of some 240, 000 
IDPs, and the Abkhaz leadership has been insisting on the settlement of its legal and political 
status prior to demographic shifts. Tbilisi has received international backing on the issue of 
repatriation of Georgian IDPs and their security. The OSCE Lisbon Summit recognised the 
mass exodus of Georgians from Abkhazia as ethnic cleansing.279  
The authorities in Sukhumi have tended to see the massive return of IDPs to Abkhazia as a 
threat, since such an act would shift the demographic composition of the region and put the 
Abkhaz authorities’ legitimacy under question. The Abkhaz side has not been prepared to 
accept returnees in significant numbers. The deep sense of ethnic insecurity was the cause 
behind the Abkhaz refusal to allow returnees in large numbers, because, it is not clear how the 
Abkhaz political elite would retain control over the region if Georgians returned. The 
Abkhazians’ demographic number had shrunk from the 19th century onwards, creating a fear 
of extinction. 
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The question of repatriation has concentrated on the return of Georgians to the Gali region 
where Georgians mostly lived before the outbreak of the conflict.280 As of 2006, an estimated 
40,000 out of 240,000 have returned to Abkhazia, most of whom to the Gali region.281 
However, Gali region has also been known for instability caused by Georgian guerrilla 
groups. The Abkhaz authorities’ response to the informal efforts of IDPs to return to the 
region has also been a source of tension. They have overwhelmingly rejected Georgia’s 
involvement in the security guaranteeing of the returning IDPs; Tbilisi has been concerned 
about the treatment of the returning Georgian population in Gali and raised concerns that the 
Georgians of the region are deprived of certain fundamental rights, including education in 
Georgian.282 A UNSC resolution 1716 guaranteed the property rights of the IDPs and refugees 
from Abkhazia, and on May 15th, 2008 the UNGA adopted a resolution supporting the rights 
of Georgian IDPs to return to Abkhazia.283  
c) Status of Abkhazia284 
The existence of differences between the parties on the status of Abkhazia has been another 
and possibly the major factor delaying the peace process. Since the cessation of hostilities, 
Abkhazia has insisted on confederative principles and Tbilisi on federal power-sharing. In 
1994, Sukhumi sent a proposal to Tbilisi suggesting a union of two equal sovereign units, and 
following rejection by Tbilisi, a constitution proclaiming Abkhazia as a sovereign democratic 
republic was adopted. In 1995, Tbilisi offered Abkhazia autonomy within an asymmetric 
federation within Georgia. Rejecting Tbilisi’s federal proposals, Abkhazia held a referendum 
on state independence in 1999, which the authorities in Sukhumi have used to legitimate their 
claim for absolute sovereignty. Following the referendum there was a declaration of 
independence and governmental support for the status of free associated state with Russia.285  
The status issue was hoped to be resolved through the Boden proposal in 2001, an initiative 
brought forward by the UNSG’s envoy to the conflict, Dieter Boden.286 The Boden plan 
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initially seemed to be contradictory, since it suggested political sovereignty for Abkhazia and 
territorial integrity for Georgia as compatible. Its essence proposed the reorganisation of the 
Georgian state as a loose federation, where the relations between Georgia and Abkhazia 
would resemble that of confederative units. In a federation (instead of a union as suggested by 
Abkhaz authorities) of two equal units Abkhazia would not be subordinate to Georgia and 
Georgia would not be more dominant than Abkhazia, both would have to comply with the 
federal constitutional order. In this context, Abkhazia would enjoy sovereignty within the 
federal constitutional framework.  Unlike in a confederation, change to the status of one of the 
subjects would only be possible by mutual consent.287 The draft was rejected by the Abkhaz 
authorities at an early stage categorically, on the grounds that the only solution for the 
region’s status is complete independence.  
Following the Rose Revolution in Tbilisi, new peace plans and suggestions were drafted and 
proposed to the Abkhaz authorities.288 The new Georgian Government pledged to deploy both 
hard and soft power for the resolution of the conflict. It has offered economic and cultural 
incentives. In 2004, on 26th May, day of Georgia’s national independence Saakashvili 
addressed the public in Abkhazian and Ossetian. However, following certain unsuccessful 
attempts to negotiate a federative peace plan with Abkhazia based upon the Spanish model in 
Catalonia, and in the light of deteriorating Georgian-Russian relations, Tbilisi has stated that a 
military solution to the conflict is not an exception. It has increased military expenditures and 
spoken of Georgia’s right to restore territorial sovereignty. Russia and the UN have both 
urged Tbilisi to conclude an agreement with Abkhazia on non-use of force.   
A new priority on the Georgian agenda in the negotiation process since the change of 
Government has been the desire to change the format of the peacekeepers. Since 2004 the 
Georgian Government and Parliament have sought to exclude Russia from peacekeeping in 
Abkhazia and appealed to the UN to replace the existing CISPKF with an international one. 
Tbilisi has stated that as soon as the CIS peacekeeping force leaves, it would be ready to sign 
an agreement with Abkhazia on non-use of force.289 The UN and a number of Western states 
have urged Tbilisi not to act unilaterally on the issue, since it could further deteriorate the 
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relations with Sukhumi and Moscow. The Abkhaz foreign minister has accordingly reiterated 
the Abkhaz objection to the replacement of the peacekeeping force, warning that the 
peacekeepers’ exit would urge Sukhumi to dispatch forces to the security zone. Moreover, the 
UN has not expressed any willingness to dispatch a UN peacekeeping mission to Abkhazia, 
and the UNOMIG’s activity is largely dependent upon the CIS peacekeeping force. The 
Ukraine and Baltic states have expressed willingness to contribute troops, but only if the costs 
are borne by a third party. The EU has not expressed any eagerness to undertake such a 
task.290        
d) Peace proposals of the Saakashvili Government 
Most peace proposals have been based on federal power sharing models. In April 2008 
President Saakashvili offered Abkhazia a peace plan that envisaged broad autonomy for the 
region. Under the plan, the post of Georgian vice-President would be established and given to 
an Abkhaz official who would have veto power over legislation affecting the region. 
Abkhazia would also be given control over an unspecified number of government ministries, 
and a free economic zone would be established in Gali and Ochamchire. Abkhazia would 
have its own currency and economic freedom. Abkhaz authorities despite the broad power-
sharing rejected the proposal.291 
In July 2008, a three stage plan for the resolution of the conflict was drafted by the German 
foreign minister Walter-Steinmeier. The plan did not mention Georgia’s territorial integrity or 
internationally recognised borders and referred to Abkhazia as an entity itself. The first phase 
of the plan envisaged mutual declarations on non-resumption of hostilities. Any 
internationalisation of the conflict and a possible deployment of international police force 
would be possible if the parties so agree. The first phase also enshrined a ‘general acceptance 
of the right of return of all internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees to Abkhazia’, as 
well as the obligation to safeguard the full range of their rights with no mention of a time-
frame. The second phase would be dedicated to the region’s reconstruction through an 
international donors’ conference, and in the third phase a working group would be established 
to draft the political status of Abkhazia, assisted by international parties and facilitators. The 
plan got finally rejected by the Abkhaz side on the grounds that the first phase envisaged the 
return of Georgian IDPs instead of the withdrawal of Georgian troops from Kodori Gorge; 
further, the Abkhaz authorities expressed concern over Tbilisi’s plans to launch an offensive 
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from the Kodori Gorge and stressed the need for Georgia to sign an agreement on non-use of 
force. Praising the plan as a step on the right direction, the Russian Foreign Ministry also 
reiterated its position that it is too early to speak of a repatriation of the Georgian IDPs.    
In May 2006, Sergei Bagapsh submitted the Abkhaz version of the peace plan, called ‘key to 
the future’. He firstly argued that the Georgian side should recognise its past mistakes and 
apologise to the Abkhaz people for the politics of assimilation, war and isolation, lift the 
economic blockade, sign a joint peace treaty and alludes to the international recognition of 
Abkhazia.292   
2.1.4. Crises of 1998, 2001 and 2006 
At the end of 1997 the Georgian partisan groups linked to Tbilisi (Forest brothers and White 
Legion) increased their activities in the areas where the Russian peacekeeping forces were 
operating.293 The situation in the Georgian administered Kodori gorge and Georgian 
populated Gali region has been tense in the last decade. A number of Georgian guerrilla 
groups have formed in Gali with the claim to provide self-defence for the displaced Georgian 
population in Abkhazia. Fighting broke out in 1998 in Gali region as the ethnic Georgian 
paramilitary groups crossing the cease-fire line launched an insurgency against the Abkhaz 
authorities. As a result over 20,000 Georgian IDPs who had recently returned home were 
displaced for a second time with over 1,500 recently rebuilt houses destroyed. The Abkhaz 
authorities claimed Georgian security ministries’ involvement in the crisis, although the 
Georgian Government insistently rejected any affiliation.294   
The relations further deteriorated when Chechen and Georgian forces tried to intrude to the 
Abkhaz part of the Kodori gorge in 2001. In October 2001, Georgian paramilitaries supported 
by Chechen field commander Ruslan Gelaev and a unit of 500 men crossed from the Kodori 
gorge into Abkhazia, meeting fierce resistance from the Abkhaz forces. Chechen fighters 
allegedly assisted by Georgian paramilitary groups carried out attacks on Kodori and shot 
down a UN helicopter. Russian air force jets immediately reacted bombing their positions. 
The Georgian Government denied any prior knowledge of the operation, but it was alleged to 
have known and assisted the operation. Georgian interior ministry trucks had allegedly 
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shipped armed men to the conflict zone.295 The crisis continued for a few months until finally 
Georgian troops withdrew from Kodori in February 2002. 
Kodori operation 
The negotiations between Georgia and Abkhazia got deadlocked following the deployment of 
Georgian Interior Ministry forces in July 2006 to the Georgian controlled Kodori gorge. A 
local militia leader Emzar Kvitsiani, who had led the defence of the gorge against the Abkhaz 
forces, declared his disobedience to the Saakashvili Administration as the latter decided to 
disband the militia group he was leading. Deployment of Georgian armed units in Kodori, 
hence the immediate vicinity of the conflict zone raised concern in Sukhumi and Moscow as 
well as at the UNOMIG. A UNSC (1716) resolution in 2006 October raised the issue, 
criticising Georgia’s military action in the region and recognising the operation a breach of 
the Moscow agreement of 1994. According to the Moscow agreement Kodori gorge should 
remain as a demilitarised zone free of both Abkhaz and Georgian military presence. It 
criticised Georgia for restoring control over the Kodori gorge. The Resolution further 
stipulated that the Moscow agreement should also be applied to the Kodori gorge. Meanwhile, 
Tbilisi managed to relocate the Abkhaz Government in exile from Tbilisi to Kodori, adding a 
third actor to the conflict to delegitimize the current authorities. The operation was however a 
blow on the trust-building between the sides.  
2.1.5. Challenges to reconciliation 
The primary challenge to achieving peace in the conflict has been the disagreement between 
the parties over the region’s status. Since 1999, the Abkhaz authorities have continuously 
rejected Tbilisi’s proposals for an asymmetric federation, insisting upon absolute sovereignty. 
Instead the idea of free associated state with Russia has become more outspoken. Until the 
recent years, the only solution Abkhazia agreed to, was a loose confederation of two subjects 
so that the people of the region could exercise their self-determination. However, such an 
arrangement would equal Georgia’s recognition of Abkhazia’s sovereign statehood and of its 
unilateral right to secession. For Tbilisi, Abkhazia is important because of the region’s 
strategic location on the Black Sea, its economic potential and the high number of IDPs. On 
the Abkhazian side, any compromise on the status of Abkhazia might cause internal 
discontent. 296 
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Another challenge has been the shadow economy. The de facto authorities have largely 
funded themselves through the smuggling of various products to Russia, conflict resolution 
would threaten the flow of revenue for those who run these businesses. This remained 
profitable for all sides, since under President Shevardnadze Tbilisi was also taking part in the 
smuggling. Under such circumstances, criminal groups benefitting from the status-quo in 
Abkhazia and in Russia would not have an interest in changing it. The frozen state of the 
conflict creates an excellent opportunity for illegal or tax free trade. Many border guards, 
monopolists and police forces in Abkhazia prefer the current status-quo. Therefore, 
Steinmeier’s plan envisaged this factor and offered broad economic autonomy that would not 
endanger the profit-making activities of those groups. A West Abkhaz group controls the 
shipment of oil, food and tobacco, and participates in the smuggling of drugs. In the Gali 
region, various groups control the smuggling of mandarins, hazelnuts, cigarettes and petrol. 
The smuggling takes place in a defence corridor established by Abkhazian paramilitaries who 
use it to generate some revenues through taxation.297 Thus, control over economically 
important territory and its infrastructure have been a further complicating factor for conflict 
dynamics in Abkhazia. Today, profits gained from the shadow economy of the region sustain 
an interest in maintaining the status-quo of the conflict. 
Societal challenges   
War has replaced most of the positive feelings and developments that the two communities 
had previously enjoyed. Unlike in South Ossetia, interaction between the two communities 
has been to a minimum. Even the Georgian returnees to the Gali region have not reintegrated 
with the Abkhaz community at large. The war and the peace process have both been elite 
driven. In 1995, 42% of Georgians thought that keeping Abkhazia and South Ossetia was not 
worth the sacrifices of the war.298 On other occasions, public opinion has been supportive of 
the ruling elite’s position. For example, most Georgians polled spoke in favour of granting 
Abkhazia the status of autonomous republic, whereas 87% of the population in Abkhazia 
thought that early return of IDPs would cause a renewal of war.299 Survey conducted in 
Abkhazia in 1994 by ‘Civic Initiative’ showed that 45.5% wanted Abkhazia to be an 
independent state, while another 45.5% wanted to unite with Russia. Only 6.7 % favoured 
union state with Georgia on an equal basis; Abkhazia becoming a part of Georgia found 
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support among 0.6 % of the population, all of whom made the Georgian returnees. A survey 
by the Norwegian Refugee Council has shown that 74% of Georgian refugees consider 
bringing Abkhazia back under Georgia’s jurisdiction as a precondition to return. The most 
recent opinion poll in Abkhazia (including the Georgian populated Gali region) on the 
conditions of reconciliation shows the societal challenges to the peace process even more 
explicitly.  
 
Table 3 Polls in Abkhazia on the conditions of reconciliation 
Conditions of reconciliation Total respondents in % Respondents in Gali r. in % 
By mutual pardoning 8,1 51,0 
If Georgians recognise their 
fault and offer an apology 
13,6 2,8 
If Abkhazians recognise their 
fault and offer an apology 
0,0 3,8 
Reconciliation will not be 
possible for a long period  
28,7 12,3 
Reconciliation would be pos-
sible if Georgia recognises 
Abkhazia’s independence  
40,8 6,6 
Possible if Abkhazia unites 
with Georgia 
1,0 13,2 
Possible in case of 
enforcement by outside 
forces 
2,8 7,5 
 
Opinion poll on the reasons for Abkhazia’s aspiration to independence 
Reasons Total Population in Gali Experts  
Economic prosperity 
can be achieved by 
independence  
6,7 6,6 0,0 
Abkhazians have the 
right for indepen-
dence and free will 
for their historic land 
56,6 28,3 30,0 
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Only by their own 
state can the Abkhaz 
avoid extinction  
31,5 16,0 65,0 
Difficult to answer 3,4 39,6 0,0 
Source Ekho Abkhazii, No 29, 14 July, 2004.300 
The Abkhaz movement was not externally oriented, but had its internal roots, and no matter 
which union republic it had been a part of, the movement would have taken place. What shape 
it would take would be subject to the circumstances and developments. Threats from Georgia 
to Abkhazia during Gamsakhurdia period led to the tactical goal of emancipation from 
Georgia becoming a strategic one. Therefore, the real goal of independence in the true sense 
of the word was replaced by independence from Georgia, but gradually adapted itself to 
integration with Russia. In a way, choice between independence and dependence became a 
choice between Georgia and Russia. The fact is, today the Abkhaz government has oriented 
all its resources towards another state, including its population.301 
2.2. The Georgian-South Ossetian conflict 
The emergence of an ethno-political conflict in South Ossetia owes more to radical elites and 
security dilemma, rather than a societal level of discontent.302 Ossets, unlike the Abkhaz, 
formed the majority in South Ossetia during the Soviet era: Ossets composed 66.2 % (made 
up 65000 out of the 98000), Georgians 29% and the rest consisted of Russians, Armenians 
and Jews. However, only 40 % of Ossetians in Georgia lived in South Ossetia, and before the 
outbreak of the war, there were 164,000 Ossetians in Georgia, 97,658 of them scattered all 
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over Georgia.303 Today there are 38,000 Ossetians left in Georgia proper, since most 
Ossetians have migrated to their ethnic brethren in North Ossetia.304  
In 1991-1992 a brutal war with serious atrocities on both sides was fought by Georgians and 
Ossetians causing some 600 casualties.305 The cease-fire of 1992 has left South Ossetia 
divided into Georgian and South Ossetian controlled areas, the latter being administered by a 
de facto Government led by Edward Kokoity. Another fundamental difference between 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia is, South Ossetia’s secession has pursued the goal of joining their 
600, 000 kindred in North Ossetia. 
The South Ossetian conflict has been regarded by Tbilisi as a political-territorial one with no 
ethnic element although South Ossetia’s de facto authorities have constantly attempted to add 
one. Indeed South Ossetia had no record of ethnic grievances during the Soviet period, and 
both communities had enjoyed good interrelations. It was rather the radicalisation of Georgian 
politics that enabled the once unpopular radical leaders in South Ossetia to gain in popular 
support. In this respect, the conflict was a consequence of an ethnic security dilemma caused 
by Georgia’s language law and national independence movement led by Gamsakhurdia. That 
said, at its current stage, contributed by past perceptions, in particular the 1918 clashes, and 
added by ethnically delimited boundaries, as well as South Ossetia’s integration into North 
Ossetia, the conflict does include an ethnic factor, albeit not as strict as in Abkhazia.   
2.2.1. The Georgian and South Ossetian national movements 
The South Ossetian conflict must be examined in the context of a complex of factors as the 
Georgian national movement of 1980s, Georgian national concept, Gamsakhurdia’s 
nationalistic rhetoric and an ethnic security dilemma. Initially the Georgian national 
movement in late 1980s was not directed against any minority, but it did not take it long to 
lose its original direction. Adopting a resistance identity, the national movement was 
primarily directed against Soviet/Russian influence, and strived for ‘purifying’ Georgia of all 
elements of Soviet legacy. Georgia’s return to its 1921 constitution and protection of its 
distinctiveness by ‘Georgia for Georgians’ campaign seemed at first to be a peaceful national 
self-determination of a nation fighting against colonial rule.306 However, subsequently 
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adopting an ethnic definition of the nation, the Georgian elite recognised the minorities as 
non-Georgians, second class citizens and even an anomaly in Georgia; for the national 
movement the minorities were an artificial factor created by the Soviet rule, and might 
therefore become a Soviet threat to the realisation of the independence project. In this respect, 
any sign of discontent amongst the minorities was regarded with suspicion and mistrust by the 
Georgian national movement, often linked to Russia’s impediment of Georgia’s acquisition of 
independence.307 Thus, minorities were linked to Bolsheviks, and a feindbild of both was 
generated within the national movement, both seen as an impediment to the evolution of the 
Georgian nation.308    
Gamsakhurdia’s rhetoric in late 1990s, directed already against South Ossetia, further 
alienated Ossetians from Georgia. In an infamous speech of hypernationalism309, expressing 
his anxiety about the demographic changes in Georgia, said: ‘…….Tatardom (referring to the 
muslim minority) is rearing its head there and measuring its head against Kakhetia, there are 
Laks in one place, Armenians in another, Ossetians in a third place, and they are on the point 
of swallowing up Kakhetia. That’s what these traitors, these communists have done to us. In 
another speech, Gamsakhurdia even went further saying ‘they should be chopped up, they 
should be burned out with a red-hot iron from the Georgian nation.... We will deal with all the 
traitors, hold all of them to proper account, and drive out all the evil enemies and non-
Georgians...!’.310  
As South Ossetia appealed to raise its status within Georgia, Gamsakhurdia responded by 
calling the Ossetians ‘ungrateful guests of Georgia’, supporting the claim that Ossetians’ 
homeland is in the North Caucasus, namely North Ossetia. The Ossetians, like the Abkhaz 
were accused to have benefited at Georgia’s expense from a Kremlin policy of ‘divide and 
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rule’.311 As Suny notes, ‘….the notion was widespread that the fears and aspirations of the 
non-Georgians were artificial, illegitimate and influenced by sinister forces from Moscow’.312 
This radical position is well depicted in the words of the writer Giorgi Gachechiladze: ‘a 
minority does not deserve any moral support when it is used as a blind weapon against a 
nation struggling for its freedom’.313 The Ossetians were even accused of bringing 
Bolshevism to Georgia.314  
2.2.2. Role of historic narratives 
Historic perceptions of each other played a certain role in the escalation of the conflict and 
generation of a feindbild. The Georgian position argues that Ossetian settlements in Georgia 
began mostly in the last two or three centuries.315 In contrast to Abkhazia, which Tbilisi 
recognised as the historic homeland of the Abkhaz, South Ossetia is not seen as the historic 
homeland of Ossetians. The term South Ossetia has not been widespreadly used in Georgia, 
most Georgian literature and media have referred to it as Smacheblo, meaning land of the 
Machabelo feudal family that ruled it.316  
The Ossetian interpretation is, Ossetians joined the Russian Empire in 1774 voluntarily and 
that the agreement had no clause distinguishing North and South Ossetia. After the Russian 
revolution, South Ossetia became a part of the Georgian Democratic Republic and was always 
a problematic area for the central government. Having been a traditional ally of the Russian 
Empire in the Caucasus for the last 200 years, the Ossetians sympathised with the Bolsheviks 
and Soviet Russia. Ossetians within the Georgian Democratic Republic were rebellious 
against the central government in Tbilisi and organised revolts that caused casualties. In 1920, 
a large Ossetian revolt ended by the massacre of thousands of Ossetians by the People’s 
Guard of the GDR.317 The Ossetian massacre played an important role in the generation of a 
feindbild against Georgians during the armed phase of the conflict, making Ossetian self-
perception as a victim. Interestingly enough, the negative memory of GDR was never a 
                                                 
311 See Julian Birch, ‘The Georgian/South Ossetian Territorial and Boundary Dispute’, Transcaucasian 
Boundaries, edited by John F.R. Wright, Suzanne Goldenberg and Richard Schofield,  (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1996), p. 166. 
312 Suny, The making of the Georgian nation, op. cit., p. 325.  
313 Quoted in Suny, op. cit., p. 325.  
314  For more detail on the period in question see Robert English, ‘‘Internal enemies, external enemies’: Elites, 
Identity, and the Tragedy of Post-Soviet Georgia’, in Michael Kraus and Ronald Liebowitz eds., Russia and 
Eastern Europe After Communism: The search for new political, economic and security systems (Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1996). See also, Julian Birch, ‘Ossetiya-Land of Uncertain Frontiers and Manipulative Elites’, 
Central Asian Survey, Vol. 18, No. 4, December 1999, p. 502.   
315 Ghia Nodia, ‘Political Crisis in Georgia’, Current Politics and Economics of Europe, vol.2, No. 1/2, 1992, 
p.39.    
316 See Alexei Zverev, ‘Ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus’, in Bruno Coppieters ed., Contested Borders in the 
Caucasus, (Brussels: VUB, 1996).  
317 For an account of the Ossetian revolt see David Marshall Lang, A Modern History of Georgia, (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962), p. 228. 
97
serious impediment to the peaceful coexistence and integration of Georgians and Ossetians 
during the Soviet era. Ossetians and Georgians enjoyed a high level of inter-marriages and 
community relations, and as already mentioned, a large part of the Ossetians in Georgia lived 
in Tbilisi. Also, in the post-violence phase of the conflict, the conflict was never a big 
obstacle to the communication between the two communities. Until the closure of the Ergneti 
market in 2004, the relations between the two communities were close to normalising. All 
these factors indicate that unlike Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, the Georgian-Ossetian 
conflict was largely elite-driven and caused by an ethnic security dilemma rather than a pre-
existing perceptions or myths. Unlike Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, there had not been 
serious appeals to the Communist Party on the status of the region during the Soviet period, 
which implies that the escalation of the conflict was largely spontaneous.   
2.2.3. Escalation of the conflict in 1989 
The South Ossetian secessionist movement emerged in late 1980s as a reaction to the 
independence movement in Georgia, in particular the language law of November 1988, and 
was led by the Popular Front Ademon Nykhas. It was formed in 1988 and was the major 
driving force behind the movement. Upon its founding, it enjoyed little public support in the 
South Ossetian parliament and society. In May 1989, the Ademon Nykhas issued a letter of 
support to Abkhaz people’s secession, in which it hinted at South Ossetia’s status within the 
USSR and expressed the hope that their success would set a precedent for other regions that 
wished to join Russia.318 The letter was immediately condemned by the South Ossetian Soviet 
as many Ossetians emphasised the historic friendship of Georgians and Ossets.319 It was 
however largely the programme to strengthen the position of Georgian language in South 
Ossetia that worked very much in favour of Adamon Nykhas and its ability to organise strikes 
in Tskhinvali.320    
Failing to reach a compromise with Tbilisi on the status of Georgian language, the South 
Ossetian Soviet in August 1989 voted to make Ossetian the official language in the autonomy. 
Following this, in November 1989 the South Ossetian Supreme Soviet appealed to Georgia 
and the USSR to upgrade its status to that of autonomous republic within Georgia. The appeal 
was not unconstitutional, since it was aimed at upgrading the status of the region within 
Georgia. Nevertheless, it led to increased tensions between the Georgian national movement 
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and South Ossetia; on 23rd November 30,000 demonstrators were mobilised to a protest 
demonstration in Tskhinvali, and major clashes were only avoided as the Soviet security 
forces impeded the demonstrators from entering the city.321 This was followed by talks 
between Gamsakhurdia and the South Ossetian leader Kim Tsagolov, but with no progress. 
Gamsakhurdia had allegedly demanded that Soviet flags are taken down in South Ossetia, but 
was turned own.322 As a reaction to this demonstration, the Ademon Nykhas began to form the 
first South Ossetian militia group. The cycle of events thereafter occurred in secessionist 
rhetoric and much in favour of Ademon Nykhas. The South Ossetian national movement was 
first aimed at the reunification with North Ossetia, but as North Ossetian elites followed the 
official policy line of Moscow and rejected South Ossetia’s reunion bid, the national 
movement in Tskhinvali reoriented itself towards independence.  
The August 1990 electoral law of the Georgian Parliament banned the participation of groups 
whose activities were confined to one region of Georgia only.323 Consequently both Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia boycotted the elections. Further, the South Ossetian Soviet passed a law in 
September 1990 proclaiming South Ossetia Democratic Soviet Republic and appealed to both 
centers for recognition.324 In December 1990 elections to the South Ossetian Soviet were held, 
which the newly elected Georgian Parliament recognised invalid. In response, the Georgian 
Parliament abolished the autonomous status of the region and Gamsakhurdia suggested 
reducing South Ossetia’s status to a ‘cultural autonomy’.325 In the meantime, Tbilisi 
announced a state of emergency for South Ossetia and deployed the Interior ministry Forces 
into the region. Afterwards, Tbilisi imposed an economic blockade on South Ossetia, cutting 
off electricity and gas supplies, and in January 1991 sent a 5,000 Georgian National Guard to 
Tskhinvali.326 The blockade was very fierce as it had left the region without heating and food,   
by cutting off South Ossetia from North Ossetia.327  
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In January 1991 Gorbachev issued a decree repealing both the South Ossetian Supreme 
Soviet’s decision to proclaim a sovereign republic and Georgia’s abolition of South Ossetia’s 
autonomy. In a referendum held on 19th January 1992 over 90% of those taking part voted to 
join Russia. The North Ossetian authorities disagreed with the vote.328 Opinion was divided in 
Russian political circles, but the majority was more critical of South Ossetia. Galina 
Stravoitova, adviser to President Yeltsin on the issue of nationalities and minority rights 
viewed the referendum as a precedent.329 The referendum got support from Russian hardliners 
defending the rights of the Russian-speaking minority in the near abroad.330 
2.2.4. Georgian-Ossetian war 
In April 1992, Georgian artillery started daily missile attacks on the residential quarters of 
Tskhinvali.331 On 20th May 1992, unidentified gunmen massacred a bus of Ossetian refugees 
fleeing Tskhinvali. In response, North Ossetia cut off gas supply to Georgia.332 The Russian 
Government was at this stage urged by both the hardliners in the Duma and North Caucasus 
to take action to impose a cease-fire on the sides. Moreover, the influx of 40,000 South 
Ossetian refugees in North Ossetia forced it to intervene. The North Ossetian authorities had 
to provide shelter, food and services to the refugees. Having said that, it should be borne in 
mind that the North Ossetian authorities and in particular its leader Akhsarbek Galazov 
opposed the unilateral secessionist tendency of South Ossetian leaders and expressed more 
interest in the management of the conflict. On 13 June 1992, the Confederation of Mountain 
Peoples chairman Musa Shanibov brought an Abkhaz battalion to Vladikavkaz (capital of 
North Ossetia) to send it to fight in South Ossetia. However, North Ossetian leader Galazov 
refused to let it travel to Tskhinvali, fearing a regionalisation of the conflict and overall 
destabilisation.333  
The hostilities continued until June 1992 when a cease-fire agreement was reached in 
Dagomys between South Ossetia and Tbilisi with the participation of Moscow and North 
Ossetia that led to the deployment of Joint Control Commission, Joint Peacekeeping Force 
and OSCE observers. The cease-fire agremeement prohibited the presence of military 
equipment within the conflict zone of 15 km radius around Tskhinvali. The Joint Control 
Commission comprising representatives from Georgia, South and North Ossetia, Russia and 
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the OSCE supervised the observance of the ceasefire agreement and facilitated political 
dialogue. Its mandate also included drafting and implementing conflict resolution measures, 
promoting dialogue, carrying out measures to facilitate the refugees’ return, facilitating 
economic reconstruction in the zone of conflict and monitor human rights. It has three 
working groups: military and security matters, economic rehabilitation and establishing 
conditions for the return of refugees and IDPs. The cease-fire agreement also established a 
peacekeeping force of Georgian, Russian and Ossetian units through a bilateral accord 
reached between Georgia and Russia. It included one Russian airborne regiment of 950 men 
and three Georgian-Ossetian battalions of 1100 men, while another 1000 Georgian-Ossetian 
force is held in reserve.334 The mandate of the JPF was to report and punish any violation of 
the cease-fire, but in essence it has essentially frozen the situation.335  
Some progress was reported in the peace process in mid 1990s. On 16 May 1996, the conflict 
parties signed a ‘Memorandum on measures to ensure security and reinforce mutual trust 
between the sides in the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict’ and in February 1997 ‘on the voluntary 
return of IDPs and refugees resulting from the Georgian-Ossetian conflict into their 
permanent places of residence’. In 2000, Russia and Georgia signed the ‘Intergovernmental 
agreement on economic rehabilitation in the Georgian-Ossetian zone of conflict’, according to 
which both countries were to assist the reconstruction of South Ossetia. Progress was reported 
at the OSCE Meeting of Experts in Baden On 11-13 July 2000, where the parties agreed on a 
‘Draft Intermediary Document’, which included the basic principles for the resolution of the 
conflict. These included territorial integrity of Georgia, special links between South Ossetia 
and North Ossetia, the granting of a high level of autonomy to South Ossetia, international 
security guarantees, including the presence of Russian troops in South Ossetia.336     
Like in Abkhazia, in South Ossetia too, certain groups have had no interest in the resolution 
of the conflict, benefitting from the status-quo. Thes groups benefitting from the unresolved 
character of the conflict have developed a vested interest in impeding a solution.337 Bearing in 
mind that South Ossetia does not have any strategic resources, smuggling has been the 
primary source of funding for the de facto authorities. It is beyond doubt that a resolution of 
the conflict would cut off the source of important profits gained from the trade. The 
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beneficiaries of smuggling have included the South Ossetian authorities, but also criminal 
groups and peacekeepers from both South Ossetia and North Ossetia.338 Georgia’s loss from 
customs revenues due to smuggling from South Ossetia was estimated at 1.7 billion USD in 
2001. However, the impact of smuggling in South Ossetia on the Georgian economy has been 
largely exaggerated, and products smuggled from Azerbaijan, Turkey or Armenia have had a 
bigger impact on the Georgian economy.339   
A settlement of the Ossetian conflict seemed viable under President Shevardnadze. Military 
tension was very low, and relations between Georgians and South Ossetians had become 
increasingly normalised after the cease-fire, with serious progress in trust-building.340 In 
2002, interethnic relations had improved and normal human interaction had been largely 
restored. Economic and social initiatives could continue on a pragmatic base bypassing the 
unresolved and frozen status.341 There were joint markets as well as bus connections between 
Tbilisi and Tskhinvali.   
Since the change of government in Georgia, there have been periodic exchanges of artillery 
fire, and widespread instability in the region that culminated in the August war of 2008. 
Georgian and South Ossetian forces have regularly apprehended representatives of each other. 
There was a serious of terrorist bombings in South Ossetia that the de facto leadership blamed 
on Georgian intelligence. The rift between the Georgian and Ossetian communities has been 
particularly large since the closure of the Ergneti market.  
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Map 3 South Ossetia 
 
 
Source: International Crisis Group, Policy Briefing, Europe Briefing No 38, Georgia-South 
Ossetia: Refugee return the path to peace, Tbilisi/Brussels, 19 April, 2005. 
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2.2.5. 2004 crisis and follow-up  
Change of administration in Georgia had its impact on the break-away regions, as the new 
administration set restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity a high priority. When President 
Saakashvili came to power, much emphasis was put on the resolution of the South Ossetian 
conflict, since it did not seem hopeless at all at the time. Bearing in mind the normalisation of 
inter-ethnic relations and the fact that a large number of Georgian villages existed in South 
Ossetia and were in fact administered by Tbilisi, the resolution of the conflict by either 
peaceful means or threat of force seemed not to be a distant perspective. The Saakashvili 
Government first seemed disinterested in use of force, and pledged to apply economic 
incentives to win the hearts and minds of the peoples of the break-away regions.342 Initially, 
President Saakashvili spoke of South Ossetia’s gradual reintegration ‘without any shots being 
fired’.343 However, in July, 2004 President Saakashvili raised the issue of unilateral exit from 
the Dagomys agreement of 1992, which has so far been the legal basis of regulating the 
conflict.344 Tbilisi largely presented the conflict as a criminal one and pursued policies to cut 
off the authorities’ income. President Saakashvili put effort to isolate the de facto 
government.345 Encouraged by its success in the Ajarian crisis, the Georgian administration 
was convinced that an isolation of South Ossetia’s political administration would play a 
crucial role in the resolution of the conflict. Seeing smuggling as an incentive for further 
freezing the conflict, the strategy was to cut the revenues of the de facto Kokoity Government 
by closing down the Ergneti market at the Georgian-Russian border and offering the Ossetian 
and Georgian communities of South Ossetia humanitarian assistance. 346 
The Georgian Government had allegedly also envisaged that a military intrusion into the 
province would be easy and quick to achieve, now that after the Ajaria success, Russia’s 
neutrality was secured. Moreover, Kokoity government did not enjoy high popularity at the 
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time.347 However, the Ajaria scenario had for a number of reasons been miscalculated for 
South Ossetia. Firstly, Tbilisi’s relations with Ajaria had never had an ethnic character, both 
Ajarian leadership and society always reiterated attachment to Georgia and being Georgian, 
so in this context there was never an ethnic or territorial dispute or politicisation of ethnic 
differences between the two.348 It had not declared independence from Tbilisi, neither had 
there ever been any use of violence between the two sides. It resembled more a private 
conflict between Shevardnadze and Abashidze competing for economic power and control, in 
which Abashidze had exploited the weakness of the Georgian state and refused to pay taxes to 
the centre.349 Further, over 80% of the population of South Ossetia is Russian and it borders 
on Russia as well.  
The crisis leading to the freezing of the peace-process and exacerbation of the intercommunity 
relations started with the anti-smuggling operation of Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs in 
and around South Ossetia in late 2003, which culminated in the closure of the Ergneti market. 
Ergneti had begun to flourish in the early and mid-1990s when Georgian alcohol flowed into 
Russia. In 1998, most of the 50,000 litters went to Russia via South Ossetia, giving the South 
Ossetian authorities the chance to claim ‘customs toll’ from truck drivers. 350 In spring 2004, 
under anti-smuggling operation Georgia dispatched armed units into the conflict zone, 
presumably with the aim of carrying out core anti-smuggling operations at the Georgian-
Russian border and provoking the South Ossetian authorities. Although, as asserted by the 
Georgian Government, the aim was not a military intervention, the operations were perceived 
on the Ossetian side that Tbilisi was preparing for military action.351 South Ossetia retaliated 
by deploying a 2,000 police force to the area, who were joined by mercenaries from North 
Ossetia and from the Russian Cossack community.352 Georgia’s deployment of extra police 
forces in the conflict zone was also condemned by the JCC, regarding it a violation of the 
Dagomys agreement.353 As the first civilian deaths got recorded in August, and daily fire 
exchange occurred between the South Ossetian and Georgian police forces, resumption of 
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military operations seemed probable. The JCC and JPKF were paralysed throughout the 
period so that a ‘joint’ peace-keeping seemed not to function.  
In July 2004 an accord was reached between Georgia and South Ossetia mediated and 
guaranteed by Russia on the withdrawal of the armed units from the conflict zone. The crisis 
exacerbated the Russian-Georgian relations, and undermined the confidence-building between 
the Ossetian and Georgian communities. The Georgian administration had hoped that the 
closure of the Ergneti market would raise the dissatisfaction of the Ossetian society with the 
Kokoity regime, since Kokoity prior to the crisis did not enjoy widespread support.354 
However, it just turned the other way round, that the closure of the market on the contrary 
strengthened the Kokoity regime and increased the opposition within the South Ossetian 
society against reintegration to Georgia; the market was vital for the trade of average South 
Ossetian, and it had acted as a meeting point for the Georgians and South Ossetians in the last 
15 years.  
Meanwhile, the closure of the market in June 2004 considerably increased the revenues of the 
Georgian customs, which Tbilisi had planned to spend on the humanitarian projects in the 
region. Tbilisi offered humanitarian assistance and pensions to the people of South Ossetia, 
cultural projects as Ossetian language television or restart of the Tskhinvali railway and 
accordingly allocated funds from the state budget. However, the Georgian plan to cut off the 
economic support base of the de-facto authorities in South Ossetia, to increase military 
pressure and bring the population closer to Georgia by offering an aid package all ended up in 
South Ossetia strengthening defence and getting closer to Russia.     
2.2.6. The peace process  
The peace process has been facilitated by the OSCE, and has involved North Ossetia and 
Russia actively. Since President Saakashvili came to power, the Georgian Government 
conveyed the message that it is not going to accept the status-quo, and accordingly the new 
administration, up to the South Ossetia crisis, was quite active working out peace plans. The 
potential for a resolution has been large, but a number of political obstacles have undermined 
it, and confidence building measures have been slow. Georgians have largely seen the conflict 
to be political and possibly territorial. The depiction of the conflict as political, not ethnic, and 
statements as to the non-existence of a conflict between the two communties has angered 
South Ossetians.  
Like in Abkhazia, in South Ossetia, too, the Saakashvili Government has prioritised changing  
the peace-keeping force, and tried to describe the conflict as one between Georgia and Russia. 
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Tbilisi has suggested changing the make-up of the JCC by including in it representatives of 
the OSCE. Internationalising the conflict by involving Europe and US, presenting it as a 
Georgian-Russian one and Georgia as a victim of Russian neo-imperialism and rejecting the 
exclusive role for Russia as a guarantor have been high on the Georgian agenda. The 
Georgian Parliament accordingly passed a resolution on 18 July, 2006 calling for the 
Government to arrange for the suspension of the peace-keeping operation and the withdrawal 
of Russian peace-keepers from South Ossetia.355 The decision was condemned by the de facto 
authorities of South Ossetia, as they considered Russian presence a security guarantee.356 
Meanwhile, the Georgian Government has stated its readiness to conclude an agreement on 
non-use of force once the Russian peacekeepers leave.  
The de-facto authorities’ security concerns have been exacerbated by Georgia’s investment 
into its military sector, in particular into the 100,000 strong reserve forces, at the inauguration 
of which President Saakashvili stated it was ‘a clear message to the ill-wishers who challenge 
Georgia’s territorial integrity’.357 Tbilisi has explained its military spending by bringing the 
army closer to NATO standards. The Georgian administration has meanwhile demanded a full 
demilitarisation of the conflict zone and has called the existence of a ministry of defence in 
South Ossetia a contradiction to the peace plan. At the absence of a specific agreement on 
non-use of force, South Ossetian de-facto authorities refuse to disarm their forces.    
Georgia has tried to manoeuvre the resolution of the conflict applying both hard and soft 
power and all available means, but so far without progress. Considering that the conflict is not 
as intense as the one in Abkhazia, its strategy has been to gain Ossetians by displaying an 
impressive economic development in the Georgian administered areas of South Ossetia. 
Tbilisi has attracted local investments into the area and has allocated funds from the state 
budget as high as 10 million laris (3 million Euros) for the connection of gas to the villages, 
renovation of schools and water infrastructure.358 However, Tbilisi has been reluctant to 
allocate direct funds for the renovation of the areas under the de facto authorities’ control. The 
economic rehabilitation of these areas has been possible largely due to the OSCE initiated 
Economic Rehabilitation Programme of June 2006. Apart from the EU and US, Russia has 
been a major economic donor and has renovated gas pipelines on the basis of the Russian-
Georgian agreement of economic rehabilitation in South Ossetia of 2000. In October 2006, 
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Russia initiated the construction of a gas pipeline linking North and South Ossetia, which is to 
make Tskhinvali independent of Georgian gas.359 However, Russia’s assistance has largely 
been interpreted as an attempt to buy South Ossetia’s loyalty and to intervene into Georgia’s 
internal affairs. Since a large number of South Ossetia’s population have been naturalised by 
Russia, the Kremlin refers to its rights to provide humanitarian assistance to its citizens in the 
region.  
a) Peace initiatives 
President Saakashvili initiated a three-stage peace plan when he addressed a UN General 
Assembly session in September 2004.360 The first stage called for a demilitarization of the 
conflict zone; confidence-building, greater international role for South Ossetia and socio-
economic rehabilitation measures constituted the second stage; a comprehensive political 
settlement of the conflict formed the third stage of the resolution process. Tbilisi basically 
agreed to the step-by-step settlement of the conflict, leaving the status issue to the end. Later, 
in January, 2005 Tbilisi presented another vision for the resolution of the conflict, which 
suggested a broader form of autonomy and freely and directly elected self-governance 
structures. The plan pledged to adopt a law on property restitution and to establish a special 
committee, including international organisations to deal with unresolved property issues. It 
envisaged language rights and preservation of cultural heritage, compensation for damages 
suffered during the war and South Ossetia’s representation in the central Government.361 
However, Kokoity again dismissed Saakashvili's offer on the grounds that he was ready for 
dialogue with Tbilisi ‘on equal terms’ only.  
In July 2005, Saakashvili’s administration sponsored a conference in Batumi to promote a 
peace plan, in which South Ossetia’s leaders declined to participate. Tbilisi again offered to 
provide compensation of damages suffered throughout the conflict and create a truth 
commission to investigate alleged crimes against civilians and to establish simplified border 
regimes for South Ossetians residing along the border with Russia.362 The peace plan of the 
Batumi conference evolved in 2006 to offer the widest possible autonomy within Georgia, 
one larger than that of North Ossetia and that of Soviet era South Ossetia.  
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In October 2005, Tbilisi presented its action plan on South Ossetia at the OSCE Permanent 
Council, which included enacting a law on restitution, compensation for those who suffered in 
the 1989-1992 conflict, inviting refugees to return home from North Ossetia and a needs-
assessment study to launch economic rehabilitation. Meanwhile, the de-facto president of 
South Ossetia proposed his own peace plan in December, 2005, which was quite similar to 
Tbilisi’s.363 It comprised three stages: demilitarisation, confidence-building, security-
guarantees, social-economic rehabilitation and political settlement. No progress could be 
achieved in all the peace plans due to lack of political will and incentive, militarization on 
both sides and mutual mistrust.   
South Ossetia has had an economic and social integration into North Ossetia and the Russian 
Federation. Its de facto authorities see their future unified with North Ossetia and have set it 
as their most ultimate goal. The region’s official language is Russian, its currency is rouble 
and 95% of the population are Russian nationals. Unlike in early 1990s, North Ossetia’s 
current leadership sees no alternative to the unification of the two Ossetias.364 Particularly, 
after the 2004 crisis, a lot of South Ossetians largely see their future in the Russian 
Federation. The South Ossetian administration has taken a harder position on the status of the 
region and has been firmly committed to either full independence or integration into the 
Russian Federation. On 5 June, 2004 the South Ossetian de facto Parliament appealed to the 
State Duma for its incorporation into the Russian Federation.365 The de facto ‘President’ 
Edward Kokoity, during his visit to Moscow in September, stated that ‘it was high time to 
stop dividing North and South Ossetia’.366 In December 2006, presidential elections and 
referendum on independence were held in South Ossetia, where a large majority voted for 
independence from Georgia, although civil society criticised the results of the polls.  
The primary challenge to South Ossetia’s independence is the demographic problem. The 
province has a population of 40,000 people, who are mostly oriented towards North Ossetia 
for jobs and for education. A large number of Ossetians who have migrated to North Ossetia 
are no longer willing to return to the South. 367 
b) Provisional Administration of South Ossetia 
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The ‘People of South Ossetia for Peace’, an organisation comprising ethnic Ossetians critical 
of Kokoity was founded in October 2006. In October 2006, as South Ossetian de facto 
‘president’ held presidential elections in the province, Sanokoev, the former defence and 
prime minister of South Ossetia and the leader of the organisation, organised parallel 
presidential elections and a referendum on starting negotiations with Tbilisi on a federal 
arrangement for South Ossetia. Initially the entity headed by Sanokoev was the ‘Alternative 
Government of South Ossetia’, but later in 2007 it received the status of Provisional 
Administration of South Ossetia. Sanokoev is primarily operating within the Georgian 
administered part of South Ossetia, but has claimed legitimacy for the whole of South Ossetia. 
He has stated his preparedness to integrate South Ossetia into Georgia proper under the term 
of a broad autonomy. However, South Ossetia and Russia have been opposed to expanding 
the negotiation format or internationalising the conflict.368  
2.3. The Mountainous Karabakh conflict 
The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Mountainous Karabakh is one of the most complex 
and intractable disputes in the post-soviet space. It reflects political, legal, social and historic 
factors, ranging from a clash of two norms of international law-territorial integrity versus self-
determination, contradictory narratives of history and self-perceptions, ethnic identities, past 
conflict, geopolitical engagement, to post war reconciliation and limits of international 
mediation. It acts both as an inter-state and an intra-state conflict with an ambiguous legal 
definition of the conflict parties. The conflict has now existed for almost 20 years in a state of 
‘no war, no peace’, and despite systematic active international mediation the parties are still 
not close to reaching a compromise. It has acted as a political challenge to the state- and 
nation-building processes and economic development of both countries, and has had much 
impact on the development of the whole South Caucasus region. Armenia is isolated from 
regional projects and is economically suffering from an embargo by Azerbaijan and Turkey. 
17% of Azerbaijan’s territory is under occupation, and the Azeri exclave Nakhchivan has no 
access to mainland Azerbaijan because of the closure of communication between the 
countries. The dispute has become a dominant symbol of nationhood and statehood, capable 
of harnessing tremendous emotional power.  
The current conflict first emerged during the perestroika period of the Soviet Union as a 
dispute over the status of Mountainous Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, and rapidly 
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transformed into an ethnic conflict between Azeris and Armenians. The overwhelmingly 
Armenian populated Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast within Azerbaijan appealed to 
the central authorities in the Soviet Union to be transferred to Armenia. As both Azerbaijan 
and Politburo rejected the appeal, tensions rose in the region leading to pogroms and ethnic 
cleansing in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the 
conflict evolved into a full-scale war between Azerbaijan and the separatist mountainous 
Karabakh forces supported actively by Armenia. International mediation managed to broker a 
cease-fire between Azerbaijan and Karabakh forces/ Armenia in 1994, leaving Mountainous 
Karabakh and seven regions outside the autonomy under the occupation of Karabakh 
Armenian forces. Ethnic cleansing by both sides caused a large number of IDPs and refugees, 
over 850,000 Azeris mostly from the occupied regions outside Mountainous Karabakh and 
Armenia, and over 350,000 Armenians from Baku and Ganja.369 Despite peaceful 
cohabitation for 70 years, ethnic hatred in both countries is high, and interaction between the 
communities is limited to elite-led negotiations only. Although the parties have been close to 
reaching a deal in 1996 and 2001, the peace process is fragile and Azerbaijan is insistently 
intent on retaining the right to restore sovereignty over the occupied territories by use of 
force. There is as a result diplomatic and power struggle between the countries. The conflict 
has been the most ultimate priority in the foreign policies of both Azerbaijan and Armenia and 
has acted as a driving force behind the efforts to build alliances. Both Armenia and 
Azerbaijan are heavily investing into their military sectors, and continue making statements 
threatening each other. Azerbaijan is hoping to achieve a military imbalance through its oil 
revenues, and Armenia is hoping that international norms will change or the international 
community will not indulge Azerbaijan’s resort to force. In both countries Karabakh is closely 
related to the national identity, and has virtually become a taboo not open to public 
discussion, resulting in a unilateral interpretation of events. The conflict has become a symbol 
of self-identification of Azeris and Armenians. Azerbaijan insists on its territorial integrity 
and offers Mountainous Karabakh the highest possible autonomy, whereas Karabakh 
Armenians and Armenia demand full independence or incorporation into Armenia proper on 
the grounds of the self-determination of Mountainous Karabakh Armenians.  
2.3.1. Background factors and roots of the conflict  
a) Role of history: brief history of the region 
Ancient historic claims are of no relevance to modern international law, and a nation’s history 
can in no way be used to justify change of borders or territorial claims. However, since 
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historic perceptions have been an important part of the current conflict, and both sides have 
referred to history in the negotiation process, reviewing the turning-points in the history of 
Mountainous Karabakh from both perspectives would make it easier to understand its causes. 
The main issue at stake seems to be who the indigenous people of the province were, and 
historians on both sides have developed theories to deny each other’s belonging to the 
Caucasus. Interestingly, the discourse between the historians does not focus on the twentieth 
century where most of the interethnic clashes took place, but rather on the ancient period, the 
period of Great Armenia and Caucasian Albania.370 Armenian historians on their part argue 
that Karabakh was a province (known as Artsakh) of the ancient Kingdom of Great Armenia 
in the fourth century BC, and has uninterruptedly been ruled by Armenian princes.371 They 
refer to the numerous churches in Mountainous Karabakh as an evidence of the Armenian 
origin of the area and stress the ancient roots of the Armenian population of the region. Azeri 
historians on their part claim that Karabakh was a part of Caucasian Albania, an ancient state 
in the Caucasus, which by its name is not related to Adriatic Albania. It emerged in the I 
Millennium in the area of today’s Azerbaijan and existed as an independent state until the 
Arab conquest in the IX century. Azeri historians claim that an important part of Azeris 
descend from Caucasian Albans, and the Christian churches found in Karabakh are not of 
Armenian, but rather Albanian origin, since Albanians were among the first peoples to adopt 
Christianity. Accordingly, Armenians’ appearance in the Caucasus is only in the XIX century 
and the ancient Kingdom of Armenia must have existed in Eastern Anatolia.372 Following 
Russian expansion to the Caucasus and Russian-Persian and Russian-Turkish wars, large 
numbers of Armenians were resettled in the Caucasus leading to demographic changes. 
According to the Russian census, the Armenian population of Karabakh represented 9% of the 
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total in 1823 (91 % registered as Muslims) and 35% in 1832. Only, in 1880 the Armenian 
population of mountainous Karabakh made up 53%, and even Yerevan province in 1826 had a 
large Muslim majority.373 However, numerous other sources confirm the coexistence of 
Armenian nobility in Karabakh in the Mddle Ages. Fro example, as early as the XV century, a 
German traveller Johann Schiltberger spoke of the coexistence of Armenian and Muslim 
communities in Karabakh.374  
In the XVI century Karabakh became a part of the Savafid Empire, and later in 1747 a 
Muslim ruler established the Karabakh khanate. Like the other Muslim khanates in the 
Caucasus, Karabakh khanate accepted Russian vassalage in 1805 and the treaty concluded 
between the khan and Russian Emperor is often referred to by Azeri historians as a legally 
binding document between two independent units. 375 
It was in the XX century that the first ethnic clashes between the two communities broke out 
in the Caucasus, and as Laitin und Suny note Karabakh is a twentieth century product.376 
Ethnic clashes between Armenians and Muslims (Azeris) broke out in Baku, Nakhchivan, 
Shusha and Ganja in 1905-1907 leading to the massacre of tens of thousands of Muslims and 
Armenians.377 Causes of the clashes remain largely unknown; the Armenian revolutionary 
federation Dashnaksutiun is said to have been active in the area and terrorised the Muslim 
population, whereas Armenian sources claim that the Muslims provoked the fighting leading 
to an Armenian victory.378 According to Swietochovski ‘massive eruptions of violence in the 
form of mutual intercommunal massacres began with the 1905 Russian revolution, and would 
re-emerge each time the Russian state was in a condition of crisis’.379 Equally after the 
Bolshevik revolution in Russia, violence re-emerged between Armenians and Azeris claiming 
over 20,000 deaths on both sides. Three day violence in Baku between Muslims and the 
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Bolsheviks, allegedly perpetrated by Dashnaksutiun, led to the massacre of 12,000 
Muslims.380 
In 1918 as Armenians and Azeris established two independent states they still had border 
disputes mainly in Karabakh, Nakhchivan and Zangezur. In July 1918, the First Armenian 
Assembly of Karabakh declared the region self-governing and established a National 
Council.381 The Armenians of Karabakh refused to obey the authority of the central 
Government of Azerbaijan, which had declared sovereignty over the region. After the defeat 
of the Ottoman Empire in the WW I, British troops entered Baku, and the Allied Powers 
recognised Azerbaijan’s authority over Karabakh. They confirmed the appointment of Azeri 
governor-general over the region pending a final decision.382 However, armed clashes 
continued between the two communities in Karabakh and Zangezur leading to the death of 
hundreds of people on both sides. Further fighting spread to Nakhchivan and Ganja and 
culminated in the massacre of Armenians in Shusha by the Azerbaijani Army in March 
1920.383 In spite of widespread protest, the Armenian Assembly of Karabakh accepted 
Azerbaijani rule on 22 August 1919 in an agreement that stipulated that Azerbaijan 
Republic’s rule over Karabakh would continue until the issue was finally settled by the Paris 
Peace Conference.384At the Paris Conference all three states in the South Caucasus were 
granted de facto recognition, but due to the occupation of Azerbaijan by Bolshevik Russia in 
April, 1920 its application to the League of Nations was dismissed.   
The issue of mountainous Karabakh became an agenda for the Caucasian Bureau of the Soviet 
Communist Party. A statement of the Revolutionary Committee of Soviet Azerbaijan in 
November 1920 declared the transfer of Karabakh, Zangezur and Nakhchivan to Armenia. 385 
On June 12, 1921 the National Council of the Azerbaijan SSR adopted a declaration 
proclaiming Nagorno-Karabakh a part of Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. However, the 
later developments indicate that the statement of the Azerbaijani Rev. Com. must have been 
made under intense pressure from the Russian communist party, since Azerbaijan was 
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unwilling to surrender Karabakh;386 Azerbaijan’s Rev. Com. Head Narimanov strongly 
opposed the transfer of Mountainous Karabakh to Armenia at the 4th July 1921 and other 
previous meetings of the Caucasus Bureau of the Communist Party, and the 1 December 
Declaration of the Azerbaijani Government on the establishment of Soviet Power in Armenia 
no longer used the term transfer, but instead referred to the right of Mountainous Karabakh 
for self-determination. Following many attempts by the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee 
to raise Karabakh’s status at the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian 
Communist Party, the issue was discussed in an enlarged format on the 4th and 5th of July 
1921. The first meeting made the decision to transfer Mountainous Karabakh to Armenia, but 
Narimanov’s opposition, discontent of Azerbaijani representatives, and their efforts to raise 
the issue at the Russian Communist Party urged a second meeting on the issue, which 
rescinded the previously adopted resolution. MK’s status got settled in favour of Azerbaijan 
in July 1921, leaving Karabakh within Azerbaijan. 
The text of the resolution said: 
Proceeding from the necessity of national peace between the Muslims and Armenians, and 
economic links of the upland and lowland Karabakh, its constant link with Azerbaijan, to 
leave Mountainous Karabakh within the Azerbaijan SSR, having granted it a broad regional 
autonomy with the administrative center in the town of Shusha included in the autonomous 
region.387  
The two other disputed regions, Zangezur remained a part of Armenia, and Nakhchivan, in a 
referendum voted to become an autonomous republic within Azerbaijan.388 In 1923 the 
Mountainous Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was established as an enclave in Azerbaijan with 
93% Armenian majority with clear-cut borders of 4400 square km and central city 
Stepanakert. Throughout the Soviet period, Armenians of Karabakh raised the issue of 
Karabakh’s status and appealed for the transfer of the region to Armenian SSR. In 1963, a 
petition of 2500 Karabakh Armenians was sent to Khrushchev accusing Azeri nationalism and 
their economic policies designed to force Armenians to leave. The petition included a detailed 
description of accusations of discrimination against Baku and requested for unification eith 
with Armenia or Russia. The same year there were violent clashes in Stepanakert leading to 
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18 deaths. Demonstrations in the Armenian capital Yerevan in 1965 and 1977 demanded the 
transfer of the region to Armenian control. 389   
b) Socio-economic order in Mountainous Karabakh: Alleged discrimination 
It is rather difficult to judge discrimination in the current conflict since Azerbaijan as a 
republican centre was not entirely autonomous and was equally subject to the rules of 
Moscow. Karabakh Armenians making 76% of Mountainous Karabakh complained in 1980s 
and previously that they were subject to cultural and economic discrimination by the 
Azerbaijani authorities.390 They accused Baku of discrimination in education and 
employment, and of economic neglect. The complaints were roughly on two directions: socio-
economic and demographic conditions. In particular, the Armenian population complained 
that financial resources were mainly put into the development of villages with predominant 
Azeri population, Armenian churches were closed to the public, genocide day was not 
marked, few books were published in Armenian, there was no Armenian TV in the region, the 
history of Armenia was not taught at Armenian schools, and the Azeri constitution used a 
formulation called the ‘language of the autonomous region’ rather than Armenian. In the 
political realm, decisions of MK could be revoked by the Presidium of Azerbaijan’s Supreme 
Soviet if they contradicted the law, appointments to professional positions had to be approved 
by Baku, and MK had no seat in the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan. MK’s economic 
rapprochement with Armenia was hindered and its trade with it made only 2% of the region’s 
overall trade. The only university in MK, the Pedagogic University had no courses for those 
interested to study Armenian literature and culture, which was considered to have led to the 
widespread use of Russian language. The 1963 petition to Khrushchev accused Baku; it 
regarded subordination of institutions and enterprises in Mountainous Karabakh to enterprises 
located in Aghdam or Barda regions outside the MKAO as discrimination.391 Karabakh 
Armenians complained about the demographic changes in the region as well, seeing it as a 
threat.392 The 93% Armenian majority in 1926 had decreased to 76%, and the diminution of 
the Armenian population of Nakhchivan served as an example.  
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The Azerbaijani side responded to the claim arguing that migration was a natural process, and 
it had had no impact on the migration of the Armenian population to Baku or Moscow. 
Besides, the 215,000 Armenian community of Baku was the most advantageous, having jobs 
and housing in the prestigious quarters of the city, while the urban Azeri minority in Armenia 
enjoyed far fewer rights.393 Mountainous Karabakh contained Armenian schools, cultural 
centres, and all the official writings were conducted in Armenian. MK was economically 
better off than Azerbaijan, which was amongst the poorest of the Soviet Republics. Moreover, 
the Azeri minority within MK had grievances of discrimination by the dominant Armenian 
majority.  
The Armenian community of MK might have expected that the region’s socio-economic 
grievances would disappear if it united with the economically well-off Armenia. A number of 
statements made by high level officials confirmed some of the grievances of the Armenian 
population. In a conclusion of 1989, 20th October, the Presidium of the Soviet Union stated 
that Azerbaijan must provide firm and additional guarantees of the autonomous status and 
abide the legal interests of the Armenian part of the population. The presidium further 
recommended to Azerbaijan SSR on 28th November 1989 to take legislative measures within 
a short period to improve the real status of the autonomy, provide genuine guarantees for the 
Armenian population, and work out a new law on the status of the Autonomous Oblast.394 
Gorbachev, too, in 1989 confirmed the existence of grievances, stating ‘any isolation of the 
Armenian population of Azerbaijan from Armenia in the sphere of culture, education, science, 
information and spiritual life as a whole is inconceivable’.395 That said, it is worthwhile to 
mention that half if not most of the complaints of Karabakh Armenians in late 1980s were 
identity related. Karabakh Armenians were frustrated about the disability to run the region as 
a distinctive Armenian territory, whereas Azerbaijan, viewing it as its own historic and 
judicial territory treated the region accordingly. It was this contradiction of notions of 
Karabakh that triggered the conflict. 
c) Immediate causes of the conflict 
According to the Soviet leader Gorbachev there were two major causes of the dispute: ‘on the 
one hand many mistakes committed in Karabakh itself, plus the emotional foundation, which 
sits in the Armenian people. Everything that has happened to this people in history remains 
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and so everything that worries them provokes a reaction like this.’396 As it is evident from the 
passage, although the Armenian community of the autonomy did have their grievances and 
perceptions, it was largely other more complex factors that turned them into an ethnic 
conflict. In other words, Mountainous Karabakh conflict was to a large extent disputed on 
historic grounds, and to a lesser extent on the alleged discrimination of Karabakh Armenians 
or the alleged grievances. Two different perceptions of the region, past conflict, socio-
economic grievances, state weakness, and inability to dialogue played a role in the escalation 
of the conflict. Although negative socio-economic conditions did play a role in the escalation 
of the conflict, but its outbreak owed largely to identity related factors, and the latter 
stimulated the formation of the former. As former Mountainous Karabakh movement leader 
and later Armenian President Kocharyan put it: ‘… even if it had been good in Azerbaijan, 
then these problems would have risen all the same. There is something more than good or bad 
life that people understand and that pushes those people towards independence.’397 The 
‘something’ is referred to as identity.  
Despite Karabakh’s inclusion in Azerbaijan, Armenians in Karabakh, Armenia the proper and 
Diaspora had never accepted the ‘loss’ of their historic homeland and cradle of Armenian 
culture. Armenians of Karabakh regarded the province as an exclusively Armenian entity, 
where decisions should not be dictated by the Azeri centre. The idea that Karabakh was a part 
of a state that was run by Turks (Armenians identified the neighbouring Azeris as ethnic 
Turks), or the region was dictated by non-Armenians generated hardships in collective 
identity. This is partly because the massacre of Armenians in Ottoman Turkey in 1915 left a 
deep trace on Armenian collective self-consciousness, and has had implications for their 
relations with Azerbaijan.398 In this context, tension between the two identities would rise 
everytime Azeris and Baku would regard Karabakh as their historic land, and treat it as their 
natural right. Making decisions for Karabakh aimed at emphasising the region as part of 
Azerbaijan was considered both judicially and morally completely normal in Baku and on the 
Azeri side, whereas on the Armenian side it was seen as an attempt to deprive the Armenians 
of what belonged to them. For example, in 1973, dispute arose between Baku and Stepanakert 
on the celebration format of the 50th anniversary of MKAO, as Baku reduced the number of 
guests from Moscow and Yerevan, and emphasised the region’s belonging to Azerbaijan.399 
Past conflict in the form of mutual massacres in the Caucasus also played a role in the 
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generation of a stereotype between the two communities. Thus, the historic memory of both 
peoples facilitated the rapid escalation.    
Many authors regard the decision of the Caucasian Bureau in 1921 as a cause of conflict.400 
The decision of 1921 to leave MK within Azerbaijan has been perceived by Armenians as an 
historic error committed by Stalin. In contrast, Azerbaijan has taken the decision as a judicial 
act producing legal norms and implications for statehood. Moreover, Baku has insisted that 
the decision was morally just, taking into consideration that the 200,000 Azeris in Armenia 
had not been granted any autonomy, and that the other mixed populated region Zangezur was 
incorporated into Armenia. Furthermore, when speaking about socially unjust decisions, the 
Azerbaijani authorities often refer to the resettlements of thousands of Azeris from Armenian 
SSR to Azerbaijan SSR in 1948-1953 by Stalin’s decree. 
The conflict was much contributed to by the inability of the Soviet Union to provide any 
direct negotiations between Armenians and Azeris on their grievances towards each other. 
Any claims had to be sent to Moscow, and communication between Armenia and Azerbaijan 
on the status of Karabakh went through the centre as well. This resulted in a unilateral 
interpretation of events within the authorities, intellectual elites and societies of both 
countries. As Kurkchiyan puts it, ‘poor reporting and inadequate mass communication forced 
people to rely on hearsay, while the lack of democratic means of public debate facilitated the 
rapid growth of stereotypes, prejudice, narrow vision and hostility’.401 Furthermore, it was 
during the political liberalisation of the perestroika period that a favourable moment appeared 
for the resolution of frozen problems and for raising the frozen claims.402 As Graham Smith 
notes, ‘Gorbachev’s reforms allowed political space for the genuine representation of 
ethnicity and nationalism and also stimulated elites to seek ethnic and national mobilisation 
for popular support’.403 Emergence of the conflict was therefore closely linked to 
liberalisation, and had a loosening of the centre’s control over the periphery occurred in 
1970s, the conflict would have sparked off then.404  
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Thus, the conflict was largely a result of the different and contradictory perceptions of Azeris 
and Armenians of Mountainous Karabakh, and its escalation owes more to correcting the 
historic mistake rather than improving the socio-economic grievances in the region. As 
Papazian puts it, there was a belief that ‘reunification would ... satisfy the primordial and 
instrumental needs for the population, as it would reunite the historicly Armenian territories, 
would end foreign domination and would improve the material well being of the 
population’.405   
 
 
Map 4 Mountainous Karabakh and the occupied regions 
 
Source: Modified and reproduced from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Azerbaijan. 
2.3.2. Escalation of the conflict 
As mentioned elsewhere in this chapter, the emergence of the Karabakh conflict in late 1980s 
was facilitated by the perestroika led liberalisation process in the Soviet Union. In other 
words, once Soviet rule was established in the region in 1920s, the conflict got frozen, 
suppressed by force and later by the persuasion of the ideology. Once the communist ideology 
collapsed in 1980s, it gave way to nationalism, and nationalism became dominant in the 
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elite’s ideology and perceptions. The liberalisation had for the first time in 70 years let 
national questions take precedence over the Soviet or communist ones, and this was a window 
of opportunity not to miss. In addition, the nationalistic rhetoric was complimented by a 
number of factors that contributed to the evolving conflict dynamics in a negative way. The 
mass deportation and beatings of the Azeri minority in Armenia, and the Sumgait events had 
already generated a security concern for Armenians. Thus, the 70 year old co-existence got in 
an instant undermined by the historic-nationalistic perceptions and security concerns, leading 
to ethnic hatred and finally a full-fledge war.  
Armenia and Azerbaijan had completely different and unique paths to independence. As 
Dmirti Furman notes, unlike in Georgia, ‘in Armenia the urge for independence and national 
selfhood did not take the shape of a desire to free from Moscow’s control, but resulted in an 
attempt to find historic justice in the relations with its neighbours’.406 In Azerbaijan in 
contrast, the national movement was rather confused, and largely reactive to the Karabakh 
movement. Azeris’ self consciousness was much weaker than that of Armenians and therefore 
it was rather hard to be united around one national issue. It was largely MK problem that 
strengthened the Azeri national identity.407  
The Karabakh movement started in late 1980s in the form of demonstrations in both 
Stepanakert and Yerevan demanding the transfer of the region, and was largely led by the 
Karabakh Committee.408 The first traces of the conflict became visible when in August 1987 
the Armenian Academy of Sciences appealed to the Politburo for the transfer of both 
Mountainous Karabakh and Nakhchivan to Armenian SSR, although the latter’s composition 
comprised 97% Azeri.409 As the Soviet leader Gorbachev tried to upgrade the status of 
Karabakh to that of an autonomous Republic loosely tied with Azerbaijan SSR, the then MK 
Communist Party Chairman Pogossian rejected it; it was obvious that the centre had lost its 
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control over the region.410 The situation was further complicated when in November 1987, 
Armenian academician and Gorbachev’s economic advisor Aganbekyan in an in interview to 
the French newspaper L’humanite stated that MK would soon be transferred to the Armenian 
SSR.411  
The first clash between Armenians and Azeris occurred in the Azeri populated village of 
Chardakhly in MK. In October 1987 the regional administration of the Azerbaijani town of 
Chardakhly decided to transfer land from a collective farm administered by Armenians to a 
collective farm administered by Azeris. The Armenian workforce refused to comply and the 
regional branch of the communist party dismissed the Armenian director of the collective 
farm, appointing an Azeri national instead. This caused demonstrations by Armenian farmers 
and escalated into confrontation with security forces from Baku.412 As a result, the ecological 
demonstrations in Yerevan in January 1988 easily switched to political, nationalist agendas 
and demanded the transfer of Karabakh and Nakhchivan to Armenia.413 Further protests were 
held in MK central town Stepanakert with the demand of unification (miatsum) with 
Armenian SSR. On 20 February 1988, the MK Soviet passed a resolution appealing to the 
Supreme Soviets of Armenia, Azerbaijan and USSR for the transfer of the region.414 There 
were 350,000 Armenians living in Azerbaijan and 200,000 Azeris in Armenia at the time. The 
soured relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan led to the beatings and deportation of large 
number of Azeris from Armenia in January 1988.415 
The first clash of the conflict occurred on 26th February between Azeris and Armenians 
resulting in two Azeri deaths, and large numbers of wounded.416 Following the events in MK 
and Azeris’ fleeing from Armenia, angry crowds gathered in the tiny industrial city of 
Sumgait near Baku, where 14,000 Armenians had lived. On February 27-29, Azeri refugees 
arriving in Sumgait called for revenge on Armenians leading to brutal beatings and killings, 
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burning houses and looting, known as Sumgait pogrom. The official death toll was recorded 
at 32, hence 26 Armenians and 6 Azeris. For the Armenians, Sumgait was like a reminder of 
the massacre of 1915 and it exacerbated their trust in the Soviet authorities and in Azerbaijan. 
It strengthened the resistance of Karabakh Armenians against Azerbaijan and raised 
widespread support in Yerevan for Karabakh. The events led to the migration of the 14,000 
Armenian population of Sumgait, and it strengthened the Armenian perception that there was 
no way Armenians could live with Azeris together any more.417 Before Sumgait, the dispute 
was mainly identity related, but the pogroms added a new element to it, Armenians’ security 
concerns. However, until the very latest military phase of the conflict, there was still room to 
avoid the forthcoming violent phase of the conflict and despite the Sumgait events and 
beatings of Azeris in Armenia, there were still Azeris left in Armenia and Armenians in 
Azerbaijan. 
a) War of laws 
On 23 March, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union dismissed the appeal 
of MKAO to be joined to Armenian SSR, and on 13th June, the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet 
rejected the appeal on the basis of article 78 of the USSR constitution. The Supreme Soviet’s 
decision led to the burning of 4 Azeri villages in Armenia and further deportations.418 At the 
same time a proposal was elaborated by Moscow and Baku to upgrade the region’s status to 
an autonomous republic with privileges, but it got turned down by the chairman of MK’s 
communist party at an early stage. On 15th June, following the Armenian Supreme Soviet’s 
formal consent to MK’s joining it, the Regional Soviet of MKAO passed a resolution for the 
region’s unilateral secession from Azerbaijan, and renamed the region ‘Artsakh Armenian 
Autonomous Region’.419 In response, the USSR Supreme Soviet, on 18 July 1988, operating 
on the basis of Article 78 of the Soviet Constitution once again decided to leave MKAO 
within the Azerbaijan SSR.  
Already in December 1988 hatred between the two sides was so high that even the earthquake 
in Armenia on 7th December 1988 did not produce any short-term evasion. Earthquake 
survivors still kept speaking about the conflict to the visiting Russian and international 
journalists and aid workers on the site, and some even rejected Azerbaijan’s humanitarian aid, 
suspecting the latter of sending medicine to poison them.420 By this time, there were already 
refugees from Karabakh in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
                                                 
417 See Mutafian, op. cit., p. 150, See also Kaufman op. cit., p. 55. 
418 See Cornell, ‘The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict’, p. 18. 
419 See Haig Asenbauer, Zum Selbstbestimmungsrecht des armenischen Volkes von Berg-Karabach  (Wien: 
Braumüller , 1993). See also Christoph Zürcher, The Post-Soviet wars, op. cit., p. 162. 
420 See De Waal, op. cit., p. 64. 
123
In the light of deterioration of intercommunity relations, the Soviet leadership, on 12th January 
1989, applied direct rule in MK, subordinating the region to Moscow without changing the 
status of the region.421 A Special Administration committee was established under the 
leadership of Arkady Volsky and a programme was designed to ameliorate the economic and 
social grievances that the Armenian community had raised. The programme also included 
improving economic and cultural links between MKAO and Armenia.422  The direct rule 
calmed tensions down, but in November, 1989 Moscow handed over jurisdiction back to 
Azerbaijan, which seemingly angered people in Armenia and MK. In response, in December 
1989, the Supreme Soviet of Armenia and the Soviet of MKAO took joint decision on the 
reunification of Karabakh and Armenia. Shortly afterwards, the Armenian Supreme Soviet on 
13th February 1990 adopted another resolution on ‘the recognition of the decision of the 
Caucasus Bureau of the Communist Party as of 5th July 1925 unlawful’; it instead insisted on 
the lawfulness of the 4th July 1921 decision, which had accommodated MK within Armenia. 
The decision caused anger in Azerbaijan, leading to the cleansing of Armenian villages in 
Geranboy and Khanlar districts of Azerbaijan. This was followed by anti-Armenian pogroms 
in Baku on the 13th and 14th of January 1990 by Azeri refugees from Armenia. Like in 
Sumgait, the presence of Soviet militia did not change anything, and at least 88 Armenians 
reportedly got killed, and hundreds were beaten and forced to flee the city by planes to 
Yerevan and by ferry to Turkmenistan.423 The situation only exacerbated when the Soviet 
Special Forces marched into Baku, to cause what is known as the Baku massacre. On 20th 
January 1990, 29,000 Soviet troops under the banner of preventing the pogroms, entered Baku 
killing over 400 civilians. According to Human Rights Watch military action against civilians 
in Baku had been planned before the 13th of January.424 The later statements of the Soviet 
defence minister, too, made it obvious that the troops had entered Baku in order to stop the 
Popular Front of Azerbaijan to seize power from the Communist Party, rather than protect the 
Armenian population.425  
Following the August putsch Armenia and Azerbaijan declared independence, and on 2nd 
September MKAO declared independence as well. MK’s strategy had changed from 
unification with Armenia to independence from Azerbaijan because it would put Yerevan in a 
                                                 
421 For Soviet reaction to the MK conflict, see Galina Starovoytova, ‘Gosudarstvo, obschestvo, natsiya’, Cherez 
ternii.Perestroika: glasnost, demokratiya, socialism. (Moscow: Progress, 1990), p. 366. See Graham Smith, The 
nationalities question in the Soviet Union, (London: Longman, 1991), p. 176.  
422 See Arkadiy Volsky, ‘Mir zemle Karabakha’, Pravda, 15 January, 1989. 
423 See De Waal, p. 90.   
424 See Cynthia G. Brown, Farhad Karim, ‘Playing the ‘communal card’: communal violence and human rights’, 
(New York, 1995), p. 149.  
425 See Michael Dobbs, ‘Soviets say troops used to avert coup in Baku: Nationalists said to plan seizure of 
Power’, Washington Post, 27 January 1990, p. 3. 
124
neutral position, and facilitate its support for the region’s secession. MK’s incorporation into 
the independent Armenian Republic would have caused international legal problems for the 
latter, and put it in a difficult position in a potential military confrontation with Azerbaijan. 
Following this, Baku annulled MK’s status as an autonomous oblast within Azerbaijan in 
November 1991 and MK held an independence referendum. Although the 22% Azeri 
population of the region boycotted it, the referendum turnout was 99.89 % in favour of 
independence. 426 Meanwhile, it is worth mentioning that NKAO Supreme Soviet chairman 
Grigoriy Petrossian had also sent an appeal to Moscow in late 1991 to incorporate MK into 
Russia.427  
b) War 
The armed phase of the conflict started with a joint Soviet-Azerbaijani military and police 
operation in areas adjacent to MK. The operation, codenamed ‘Operation Ring’ was supposed 
to be a passport checking exercise in Azerbaijani villages adjacent to MK where the 
Armenian paramilitary groups had been hiding and terrorising the Armenian population and 
threatening the Azeri community. The operation, which mostly involved the 4th Soviet Army 
located in Ganja and the Azerbaijani police force, was aimed at the Armenian paramilitaries 
in the region. However, it led to 30 deaths in the region and deportation of 5000 Armenians 
from 24 villages outside MK with a systematic violation of human rights.428 The events also 
led to certain change within the Karabakh Armenian movement, and on 19th June, 1991, the 
Regional Soviet passed a resolution to change the course ‘from policy of confrontation to a 
policy of negotiation’, which raised hopes for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. A 
delegation of Karabakh Armenians led by Valery Grigorian headed to Baku for negotiations 
on 20th July, but Grigorian was shot dead in Stepanakert on 10th August.429 This was a golden 
opportunity that might have prevented the violent phase of the conflict, but got spared due to 
coincidental factors.  
What followed next was a brutal war with over 25,000 deaths, fought between the Karabakh 
armed forces, assisted by Armenia’s armed forces and Azerbaijani army.430 Both sides 
received support from various international volunteers and mercenaries as well as patron 
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states. There remained a significant ex-Soviet military presence in the proximity to the 
conflict: the 127th division of the Russian army at the Armenian-Turkish border, the 366th 
Motor Rifle Regiment in Stepanakert and the 104th Airborne Division in Ganja in Azerbaijan, 
all of which were allegedly involved in the war.  
The war was rich in atrocities committed by both sides, tens of bus, underground and ferry 
explosions in Baku, massacres in Khojaly, Kalbajar, Maraghar, etc. The brutal episodes 
included the Azerbaijani Government’s shelling of Stepanakert in 1992, and the Khojaly 
massacre of 613 Azeri civilians, distinguished for its brutality against the civilian population 
comprising mostly elderly, women and children. The massacre committed by the active 
support of the 366th Motor Rifle Division in MK, is today referred to as genocide in 
Azerbaijan.431 
The war left 7 Azeri populated regions of Azerbaijan adjacent to MK occupied by the de facto 
MK forces, and caused some 650,000 IDPs within Azerbaijan.432 Mountainous Karabakh 
received land access to Armenia through the occupation of the Lachin region and ended its 70 
year enclave nature. The occupation of the regions was condemned by UN Resolutions 822, 
853, 874 and 884, which mentioned the deterioration of the relations between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, and called on the Karabakh Armenian forces namely, to release the regions. 
Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity was supported in all resolutions, and most explicitly in 
resolution 822; nevertheless, Azerbaijan was disappointed with the absence of an explicit 
recognition of Armenia as an aggressor state. In spite of condemnation by all international 
organisations and leading states, the resolutions have not been fulfilled.  
The war ended with an unlimited cease-fire brokered by Russia between Azerbaijan, Armenia 
and Karabakh Armenians, leaving the 7 regions outside MK ethnically cleansed, and in 
control of the Karabakh Armenian forces. It led to Azerbaijan’s embargo on Armenia in 1992, 
which Turkey joined in 1993 following the Karabakh Armed Forces’ occupation of large 
areas outside Mountainous Karabakh.433 The embargo produced negative implications for 
Azerbaijan, too; it led to the adoption of the 907 Section to the Freedom Support Act by the 
Congress in 1992 under the influence of the Armenian lobby, depriving Azerbaijan of any US 
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aid because of its blockade of Armenia and Mountainous Karabakh. The section’s adoption 
had partly to blame on Azerbaijan’s inability to deliver its part of the story to the West, since 
the text of the Section had clear misjudgement and misinformation errors.434 It was waived by 
President Bush in 2002, due to Azerbaijan’s cooperation in the war on terror. As Armenia 
became the second largest per capita beneficiary of US aid, Azerbaijan received no aid from 
the US during the war. Azerbaijan suffered from coups, bus and underground explosions in 
Baku, government changes and political instabilities throughout the war.435 
The conflict produced an economic, humanitarian and political catastrophe for both countries. 
Azerbaijan with its vast number of internally displaced people until the recent years seemed to 
live through a humanitarian crisis. Most of the IDPs from the occupied regions outside MK 
lived in run down tents, train wagons or mud houses short of basic human needs. There are on 
both sides younger and elderly generations of refugee and IDP children still waiting in 
temporary premises to return to their homes. The blockade of Azerbaijan and Turkey on 
Armenia had catastrophic consequences for Yerevan in the immediate aftermath of gaining 
independence, and still impedes Armenia from participating in regional projects.436 A World 
Bank study in 2003 concluded that the lifting of the embargo would let Armenian GDP rise 
by 30%.437 Both countries are formally in a state of war and are spending vast resources on 
their military sectors, and have in the past continuously threatened each other with a 
resumption of military operations.  
c) Definition of the conflict parties 
As Köhler acknowledged, ‘the question of a starting point in space and time for the conflict 
became as disputed as the question of what the conflict is over and who is fighting’.438 The 
formal conflict parties recognised in the UNSC resolutions include Azerbaijan and Karabakh 
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Armenian Forces, but in reality Armenia has from the very onset acted as a crucial force 
behind. Due to a number of factors, the wording of the UNSC Resolutions avoided defining 
the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but mentioned the deteriorating relations 
between the two in the context of the Karabakh conflict. The armed forces of the Republic of 
Armenia took an active and crucial part in the military operations, and Armenian soldiers 
were involved in the war on non-voluntary basis.439 Moreover, a number of attacks on 
Nakhchivan (which had no land border with MK) and a number of other regions were 
launched from Armenia. As put by the Human Rights Watch, ‘as a matter of law, Armenian 
troop involvement in Azerbaijan makes Armenia a party to the conflict, and makes the war an 
international armed conflict’.440 The conflict transformed its nature from an internal to an 
internationalised armed conflict at a very early stage.441   
In the post war period, Karabakh and Armenia have even been more actively integrated. The 
role of Karabakh in Armenian domestic politics even increased partly due to the fact that 
since 1998 the leading posts in Armenia have been occupied by Karabakh Armenians. 
Moreover, MK issue is a link between Armenia and the Diaspora. Armenia and Karabakh 
have a common budget, and both act as a single economic and financial entity. In 1994, over 
60% of MK’s budget was compensated by Armenia.442 In terms of security, Yerevan has 
made it clear that in case Azerbaijan tries to restore sovereignty over MK, including the 
occupied regions, the former will find itself in war with Armenia. Moreover, Armenian 
presidents and politicians have often stated that the future of MK is only with Armenia and 
there is no way to split the two. Although, Armenia has not recognised MK’s independence, 
in a number of sessions of administrative character, the Armenian Government has referred to 
MK as an administrative region. Consequently, certain international organisations today 
regard Armenia as a secondary conflict party and the conflict being of inter-state character.443   
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2.3.3. The peace process and challenges 
The peace process, facilitated by the OSCE has been uninterrupted, systematic and closed to 
the public. International involvement has been larger than in both Abkhaz and South Ossetian 
conflicts, and has included both state and non-state actors. The parties have received at least 
four proposals for a settlement and have been close to reaching a deal, but a number of 
obstacles have braked the process. Lack of compromise and political will, identity related 
challenges, state weakness, and absence of democratic institutions in both countries, and last 
but not least, geopolitical constellations in the region have undermined the peace process. 
Both parties have used various international platforms as the Council of Europe, OSCE 
parliamentary Assembly and UN to discredit each other, and prove their narratives. Both sides 
are influenced by any development in each other. Armenia is concerned about the oil and gas 
revenues of Azerbaijan and its economic development, considering it a threat. Azerbaijan is 
concerned about the armament in Armenia, and reacts by increasing its military spending. 
Since the cease-fire Armenia has been hoping for changes in international norms that would 
legitimise the fait accompli, and Azerbaijan has hoped for the oil revenues to strengthen 
Baku’s position in the process. This has in MacFarlane and Minear’s words led to lack of 
urgency in the peace process.444 It is currently the status of MK and Lachin regions that have 
caused a deadlock in the peace process.   
a) OSCE mediation efforts 
After unsuccessful mediation attempts by Iran, Kazakhstan and Russia in the early period of 
the conflict, the cease-fire got finally achieved in 1994 by Russian mediation. Since March 
1992, the CSCE mediation process was to be the first ever international organisation’s effort 
to resolve a military conflict in the former Soviet Union. The CSCE Council meeting in 
March 1992 called for a peace conference to be held in Minsk once a political agreement is 
achieved between the parties. The Minsk conference has not up to date been held because 
such an agreement has never been reached, but a Minsk group has been the major mediator of 
the conflict.445 The Minsk group currently comprises 13 states: Russia, France, the US, 
Belarus, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Turkey, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. The Budapest Summit of the OSCE in 1994 established a co-chairmanship for the 
Minsk group represented by Russia as a permanent co-chairman and Finland as a rotating one. 
Previously, the OSCE efforts were not welcomed by Russia and consequently there were dual 
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track of negotiations, which got resolved by the designation of Minsk group permanent co-
chairmanship.446 The cease-fire was actually negotiated by Russia as the OSCE 
representatives were still visiting the region. The group was first dominated by Finland, Italy 
and Sweden, those states with no strategic interests in the region, and acting as genuine 
mediators, but meanwhile no means to influence the conflict parties.447 In 1997, as France 
became a permanent co-chair, it caused discontent in Azerbaijan for the latter’s alleged pro-
Armenian position, and therefore the US had to be added as a permanent co-chair. The 
Budapest Summit also resolved the issue of peace-keeping in Mountainous Karabakh. Russia 
had insisted on the composition of the peace-keeping contingent of Russian or CIS only 
troops, which Azerbaijan and Western countries rejected. Finally, compromise was reached 
that the peace-keeping force should comprise 3,000 men with no country providing more than 
30%.448 At Russia’s insistence, it was agreed that the force would only be deployed after a 
political settlement is reached, making the deployment practically impossible. 
The OSCE’s preliminary peace efforts were aimed at the reconciliation of the two principles-
Azerbaijan’s territorial sovereignty and the right for self-determination of the Armenian 
population of Karabakh. The OSCE Lisbon Summit in 1996 called for a settlement of the 
conflict based on Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and the highest degree of self-government 
for Karabakh within Azerbaijan added by security guarantees for Karabakh’s population. The 
proposal was supported by all OSCE member states, but finally Armenia vetoed it, so the 
proposal became an OSCE Chairman in Office Statement. Refusing to recognise Azerbaijan’s 
territorial integrity, Armenia argued, ‘the proposal predetermined the status of Nagorno-
Karabakh, contradicting the decision of the OSCE Ministerial Council of 1992, which 
referred this issue to the competence of the OSCE Minsk Conference, to be convened after the 
conclusion of a political agreement’.449 The preliminary negotiations had set Azerbaijan’s 
territorial sovereignty as primary criteria, i.e. MK would be de iure within Azerbaijan, but de 
facto independent;450 however the situation changed after the Armenian political crisis in 
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1997, leading to the resignation of the liberal Ter-Petrossian, and election of Karabakh’s 
former President Robert Kocharyan as the president of Armenia.451 Since the political shift in 
Armenian politics in 1998, the right for the self-determination of the Armenian population of 
MK has been prioritised; this became visible in the push of the international community for 
the status of the region to be defined in a referendum, which Azerbaijan has continuously 
rejected. The negotiations shifted to concentrate on non-hierarchical relations between 
Azerbaijan and MK.  
The OSCE has made three peace proposals: step-by-step approach (1993-1997), package 
solution (1997-2003) and finally the common state proposal (1998). The step-by-step 
approach envisaged two agendas: firstly, ending the conflict, Armenia’s troop withdrawals 
from 6 occupied regions outside MK, leaving Lachin corridor under international observation, 
opening of communication lines as well as lifting the embargo on Armenia, deployment of 
peacekeepers in MK, return of the displaced population and security guarantees; at a 
secondary stage, it would focus on Karabakh’s final status and return of IDPs to MK itself.452 
The proposal was accepted by the Armenian President Ter-Petrossian in 1997, but rejected by 
MK de facto authorities and finally by Armenia’s new administration on the grounds that 
MK’s political status and independence be secured first.453 The plan implied withdrawal from 
the occupied regions first before proceeding to the status of the region, thus postponing an 
agreement on the final status of MK to the indefinite future, addressing all other issues 
instead. MK would be given an interim status, and the question of Lachin corridor linking 
Armenia and MK was moved to the second phase. Armenia was recognized a guarantor of the 
security of the population of Mountainous Karabakh, and as such assumed a range of 
important obligations: to facilitate the deployment of peacekeeping forces, the return of IDPs , 
ensuring the reopening of communication routes, and economic cooperation. Under the 
current scheme Armenia would lose its main bargaining chip-the buffer zone, would postpone 
an agreement on the final status of Mountainous-Karabakh to the indefinite future and focus 
instead on a peace agreement addressing all other issues without defining the political status 
of the region.454 
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The package proposal suggested settling all issues at stake, including the final status of MK in 
a single comprehensive agreement. The scheme implied MK would become de jure part of 
Azerbaijan, de facto independent. Karabakh would become fully self-governing and a free 
economic zone with a right to its own currency, budget and tax-raising. A provision of the 
proposal defined Karabakh as ‘a state and a territorial formation within the confines of 
Azerbaijan’, but provided unprecedented privileges. It would have its own constitution, its 
own flag, anthem and would independently form its own legislative, executive and judicial 
bodies, enjoy the right to maintain direct relations with foreign states and international 
organisations on economic and humanitarian matters. It would have the right to have its own 
police force and national guard, and Azerbaijani law would be valid in MK as long as it did 
not contradict the latter’s constitution and laws. The Azerbaijani security forces would only 
be allowed to enter the region by the latter’s prior authorisation. The proposal in spite of all 
the privileges was rejected by MK Armenians on the grounds that it was based upon the 
Lisbon principles.455 
In 1998 the OSCE Minsk Group’s next proposal suggested a common state. It was in fact a 
modification of the package approach, suggesting a looser de jure association of MK with 
Azerbaijan. It proposed an abstract common state of Azerbaijan and MK, suggesting 
horizontal relations between the two. The text stated, ‘Nagorno-Karabakh is a state and 
territorial entity in the form of a Republic, which constitutes a common state with Azerbaijan 
within its internationally recognized borders’.456 The proposal included less privileges than 
the package deal, was nevertheless warmly accepted in MK and Armenia, but rejected by 
Azerbaijan on the grounds it violated its territorial integrity.  
b) Land swap 
The land swap proposal was first proposed by Paul Goble in 1990s and later revived during 
direct talks between the Armenian and Azeri Presidents in 2000.457 The essence of the deal is 
the exchange of Karabakh and Lachin corridor for the Meghri region of Armenia which 
connects Azerbaijan to its exclave Nakhchivan. The plan would not only resolve the conflict, 
but also remove the risk of future conflict and was easy to carry out in technical terms. The 
proposal was dismissed both in Azerbaijan and Armenia, the latter disinterested because such 
a swap would deprive Armenia of its border on the strategic neighbour of Iran. It also led to 
                                                 
455 Ibid., p. 79-81.; See also the speech of former Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian at the 
parliamentary hearings in Yerevan, Armenpress, March 29, 2005.  
456 Ibid., p. 82. 
457 Paul Goble, ‘Coping with Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis’, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs,  
vol. 6, no 2, Summer 1992. 
132
the resignation of four key positions in Azerbaijan as a sign of protest, including the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs.458  
The current peace process is a mixture of both step-by-step and package approaches. The 
confidentiality was broken in June, 2006 when the US co-chairman of the Minsk Group 
Matthew Bryza stated that the peace process included ‘the phased redeployment of Armenian 
troops from Azerbaijani territories around MK, with special modalities for Kalbajar and 
Lachin followed by a demilitarisation of the territories and deployment of an international 
peace-keeping force. A referendum or popular vote would be agreed on to determine the final 
legal status of NK at an unspecified future date’.459  
c) MK’s and Armenia’s position 
MK de facto authorities have reiterated that they would not accept any vertical relationship 
with Azerbaijan, and might initially seek de facto independence rather than de jure.460 
Accordingly, the starting point of the negotiations must be two independent states in the 
territory of the former Azerbaijan Soviet Republic.461 Switzerland and Liechteinstein have 
been suggested as models. MK authorities’ true position however, is dubious. On the one 
hand, it demands de jure recognition as a subject of international law, and on the other hand, 
the authorities speak of unification with Armenia as the long-term strategy.462 Although 
Armenia has not recognised MK’s independence, various statements have been made by 
senior Armenian senior politicians and MK ‘de facto president’ unification as a long-term 
solution to the problem.463  
Until President Petrossian’s resignation in 1997, Armenia’s position could be coined as land 
for peace, hence withdrawing from the occupied regions around MK for any deal that would 
give the region self-rule and security guarantees.464 In 1997, there was a serious dissent 
between Armenia and the MK authority, due to the latter’s compromising position in the 
peace process. Then, President Petrossian publicly stated Armenia was no longer in a position 
to resist the OSCE Lisbon principles and retain MK and the occupied regions. Referring to 
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Armenia’s economic plight and international pressure, he had agreed to the step-by-step plan 
for the MK conflict.465 His statement raised allegations both within his cabinet and in the 
public that he was betraying Karabakh.The political crisis got resolved through the election of 
Karabakh’s former President and the then Armenian Prime Minister Robert Kocharyan as the 
president of Armenia. During President Kocharyan’s term, Armenia’s and MK’s position 
have been identical and tended to dissent on minor issues. Both have held the so called 
territory for status position, offering to withdraw from the buffer zone in exchange for 
Azerbaijan’s granting of independence to MK. The reluctance to withdraw from the buffer 
zone before the region’s status is defined, is explained by Karabakh Armenians’ security 
concerns: Azerbaijan, returning the regions adjacent to Karabakh will have an upper hand, 
and might resort to use of force later. This belief has strengthened as a result of Azerbaijan’s 
militaristic rhetoric and insistence on granting Karabakh internal self-rule instead of 
independence.  
Armenia’s position became even clearer during the latter years of President Kocharyan’s 
term. During the Paris, Key West and Florida meetings of Azerbaijanii and Armenian 
presidents, the Armenian Parliament put forward three principles reflecting the country’s 
position: 1) no subordination of MK to the central Azerbaijani Government; 2) ‘no 
enclavisation’-that is establishment of a permanent territorial corridor between MK and 
Armenian through the Lachin corridor; 3) internationally guaranteed rights for Karabakh 
Armenians which would include the right of Armenia to intervene militarily if necessary.466 
Concerning the status of the region, the Armenian Foreign Minister stated in October 2004 
that there could be no compromise on the independence status of MK, since ‘every inch of 
Armenia is priceless, including Karabakh’.467 Armenia considers its readiness to return 5 of 
the 7 regions adjacent to MK as compromise, and expects understanding from Azerbaijan on 
the status of the region. Yerevan and MK authorities consider the buffer zone as an important 
guarantee for the military and political security of MK, and therefore any demilitarisation is 
rejected before the political status of the region is secured. In addition, both Armenia and MK 
consider Lachin to be part of Karabakh, and insist it should not be subject to negotiation, 
although the region was not included in the MKAO, and was largely settled by Azeris before 
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the conflict.468 In 2006, the Armenian Foreign Minister stated that the problem can only be 
resolved by the self-determination of the MK people, which is to be achieved either by 
unification with Armenia or by MK’s independence.469 Armenia has continuously rejected the 
Azeri proposal for the highest autonomy for MK within Azerbaijan, stating that autonomy is 
‘a stage which is over’ for Karabakh Armenians, since Azerbaijan through the war, has lost its 
moral right over the region.470  
d) Azerbaijan’s position 
In the negotiation process, Azerbaijan’s position is mainly based upon its international legal 
right of territorial sovereignty and any form of solution based on that. Baku has offered MK 
the highest autonomy in the form of less than independence, but more than autonomy that 
would pledge the region de facto independence. In fact, Azerbaijan’s consent to the package 
solution of the OSCE showed that Baku was considering granting the region an 
unprecedented level of self-rule.471 It is mainly the issue of its territorial sovereignty rather 
than the rule of MK that concerns Azerbaijan, and the issue is seen to be vital for Azerbaijan’s 
statehood. Azerbaijan refuses to recognise MK’s independence or any form of confederation 
of two independent subjects, and has often referred to the practice of the Aland isles rather 
than Bosnia for a solution. Azerbaijan’s position is roughly, first the demilitarisation of the 
occupied territories, trust-building and then status definition. Baku insists on the withdrawal 
of Armenian forces from the occupied regions, to be followed by repatriation of Azeri IDPs, 
opening of communications and development of economic integration. And only in 15-20 
years’ time should the status of MK be settled. Meanwhile, Baku under Article 51 of UN 
Charter often refers to a military option to free the occupied territories. This has also had 
domestic political implications: any government that would abandon the military rhetoric 
while the occupation continues with large numbers of IDPs would be deemed to have 
domestic instability.  
Baku has argued that Karabakh Armenians’ status in the negotiations cannot equal that of 
Minsk Group participating states, and therefore it should treat MK Armenians as an interested 
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party, rather than a conflict party in the negotiations.472 It refuses to recognise MK as a 
conflict party because that could legitimise the Mountainous Karabakh Armenians’ claim to 
independent statehood and the mono-ethnic composition of Mountainous Karabakh achieved 
by ethnic cleansing. Moreover, bilateral talks with MK could allow Armenia to withdraw 
from the peace process and avoid responsibility, while still supporting the self-proclaimed 
Karabakh Armenian authorities. Azerbaijan argues it will not hold direct negotiations with 
MK Armenians as long as the occupation of its territory continues, and Armenia is involved. 
Baku demands an equal status for the MK’s Azeri community and treats the de facto 
authorities as MK Armenian community only. As Armenia has defended the right of MK 
Armenians for self-determination, Azerbaijan has paralleled the same right for the Azeri 
community of MK.  
Karabakh de facto authorities are still present in all negotiations, but only as an interested 
party and not the official conflict party.473 Such a format of negotiations complicated the 
peace process during President Petrossian’s term. That said, since 1998 key Armenian posts 
have been held by former officials of MK authorities, so MK is de facto represented in the 
process. Nevertheless, Karabakh de facto authorities stress the existence of dissent in the 
positions of Mountainous Karabakh and Armenia and direct negotiations could fasten the 
process.474 As a matter of fact, between 1993 and 1997 Stepanakert took part in the 
negotiations, but after direct negotiations between the two presidents, its participation was 
barred. 
In the current stage of negotiations, it is the issues of Armenia’s withdrawal from Lachin and 
Kelbajar and referendum to define the region’s status that have driven both parties to a 
deadlock. Armenia demands a referendum to be held in MK only in a specified period of 
time, whereas Azerbaijan is keen on a referendum in the whole of Azerbaijan on the status of 
MK and desires to postpone the issue to an unspecified period.  
e) Buffer zone and Lachin corridor 
                                                 
472 Armenia and Azerbaijan have been treated as the principal parties in the negotiations, while the Armenian and 
Azerbaijani communities of MK are the interested parties. Such a definiton of the conflict parties was first 
suggested by US Secretary of State James Baker in 1992 as a compromise to the negotiation format and was 
widely accepted by the international community today. See Adil Baguirov, ‘Nagorno-Karabakh: Basis and 
Reality of Soviet-era Legal and Economic Claims Used to Justify the Armenia-Azerbaijan War’, Caucasian 
Review of International Affairs, vol. 2, issue 1, pp. 19-20.    
473 See ‘The limits of leadership. Elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process, p.39; See also Liz 
Fuller, ‘Armenia/Azerbaijan: Karabakh President demands to be included in settlement talks’, RFE/RL, 18th 
February, 2006. 
474 ‘Mi polnostyu informirovani o khode peregovornogo processa po uregulirovaniyu nagorno-karabaxskogo 
konflikta’, zayavil segodnya jurnalistam v Yerevane prezident NKR Arkadiy Gukasyan ‘, Arminfo, 12th March, 
2007. 
136
Lachin and Kelbajar are the two of the 7 regions from which Armenia is reluctant to withdraw 
before any political settlement is reached on the status. In the words of the ICG, ‘Yerevan’s 
main concern is that once Azerbaijan regains control over Kelbajar, it might not proceed with 
the referendum. A crucial bargaining chip would thus be lost, and Nagorno-Karabakh would 
be militarily disadvantaged’.475 Armenia argues that once Azerbaijan regains control of 
Lachin and Kelbajar, which would cut MK off the Armenian mainland, Armenia would be in 
a weaker position to defend the region if Azerbaijan attacked. However, Azerbaijan has 
pledged to renounce use of force and deploy peace-keepers in the region once the occupied 
regions are freed. Moreover, the deployment of peace-keepers in the region would make use 
of force practically impossible.476 However, it is the issue of Lachin rather than Kelbajar that 
has driven the parties to a deadlock. The Lachin corridor is essential to any political solution 
because without it MK would become an enclave again. It is therefore vital for MK’s security, 
since it is the only access to Armenia. It is one of the issues causing stalemate in the 
negotiations: Stepanakert and Yerevan do not agree to MK’s enclavisation, and Baku does not 
agree to any territorial revision. Azerbaijan has offered a joint use of the corridor to be 
observed by international peacekeepers on condition that it remains under Azerbaijan’s 
jurisdiction. MK and Armenia consider Lachin for all purposes part of Mountainous Karabakh 
and emphasize that the very existence of MK is dependent upon Lachin. Therefore, the de 
facto authorities have carried on with measures to make the return of the Azeri population 
impossible; the demographic structure of Lachin has changed, 10,000 Armenians have been 
resettled in the region.477 As one Karabakh Armenian official stated, ‘Whatever happens to 
the occupied territories, the Lachin Corridor stays with us. The sooner reconstruction 
proceeds there, the sooner the Azeris will accept it’.478  
Another issue that has deepened the mistrust between the parties is the buffer zone of 6 (plus 
Lachin) regions around MK. Armenia refuses to withdraw from the occupied regions for 
security and political reasons: as long as the military rhetoric continues in Azerbaijan and 
Baku refuses to grant MK independence, Yerevan deems it necessary to retain the regions as a 
security zone; the buffer zone is also used as a guarantee of MK’s political status. Azerbaijan 
has raised grievances on the destruction process, systematic fires and resettlements in the 
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occupied regions. Various voices within Armenia and MK have in the past called for retaining 
the buffer zone, regarding them as ‘historic Armenian land’ and have accordingly encouraged 
settlements there. The fact-finding mission of the OSCE visited the areas and concluded that 
between 9,000 and 12,000 people had been settled, that the MK authorities had created 
various incentives to settle: providing homes, infrastructure, tax exemptions and free utilities. 
Settlers are attracted from the diaspora, being offered loans, credits and other financial aid.479 
Regarding the return of Azeri IDPs to MK, mainly to Shusha, Yerevan has stated their return 
must be held equal to the return of Armenians to Azerbaijan and can only be regulated in the 
last stage of the conflict, after confidence building is completed.480     
f) Identity related challenges  
Identity related challenges to the peace process are observed both within the negotiating elites 
and within the societies. It should be taken into consideration that there is no reconciliation 
process between the societies going on. Given the confidentiality of the peace process and 
absence of communication between the societies, unilateral interpretation of events is strong 
in both societies. Throughout the peace process, at least two peace initiatives were accepted 
by the presidents, but rejected by their cabinets. The ultimate result of an isolated peace 
process is hatred towards each other, and nationalism is still very high in both societies and 
even political circles. In 2004, a young Armenian officer attending NATO courses in 
Budapest was killed by his Azerbaijani counterpart, the latter being publicly defended and 
supported in Azerbaijan as a hero. In 2003, during his speech at Moscow State University 
Armenian President referring to the relations, spoke of an ethnic incompatibility.481 The 
mutual feindbild was even more obvious when the Armenian speaker proudly stated ‘we 
killed 25,000 Azeris in the Karabakh war’.482 Equally Azeri politicians and society 
continuously see the conflict as a part of the plan to restore the Great Armenia of ancient 
times, while Armenians refer to their Azeri counterparts as inspired by Pan-Turkish goals.483 
The mutual sufferings in each other’s hands have been the focus of contemporary nationalist 
narratives of Armenian cruelty versus Turkish savagery. Both sides have rejectionist 
positions, rejecting each other’s rights and historic presence. Azeris see Armenians as late 
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comers to the Caucasus, settled in Azeri lands by the Russian Empire and desperate to restore 
Great Armenia. Armenians on the other hand, see Azeris as a new phenomenon as a nation. 
Most Armenian patriotic ideology is built upon the notion that Azeris are not indigenous to 
the region and had been there only three or four centuries. In February 1988, the Armenian 
writer Zori Balayan pointed out: ‘We can understand the terms Georgia, Russia, Armenia, but 
not Azerbaijan. By using such term we confirm the existence of such country’.484 According 
to Gahramanova, ‘the logic of the statement is widely reflected in the public opinion in 
Armenia that Azerbaijanis as recent creature have fewer historic rights’.485  
The conflict has become a problem of self-identification of Azeris and Armenians and both 
sides share the belief that being without MK equals having an incomplete national identity, a 
wounded state and nationhood. Both sides think that any concession would endanger their 
security, sense of identity and survival. There is a widespread belief in Azerbaijan that 
conceding MK to Armenia will bring about new demands in the face of Nakhchivan, as the 
province is still commemorated in Armenia and the diaspora as ‘historic Armenian land’. As 
polls suggest, Azerbaijani grievances against Armenians are associated with territorial issues, 
with the fact of occupation of their lands by Armenians, which prevents them from returning 
home. Armenian grievances are more associated with the ‘ancient hatred’ factor. Azerbaijani 
IDPs agree to live next to Armenians despite the personal risks and the experienced horrors of 
the war.486  
Karabakh means different things for Armenian and Azeri national identities. Azeris regard 
MK as their cultural and historic centre, the birthplace of poets and composers, while their 
primary association is with Shusha, the historic centre of Karabakh, where 91% of Karabakh 
Azeris lived before the conflict.487 As Emirbayov writes, ‘The return of the Shusha region to 
Azerbaijani control could contribute greatly to Azerbaijanis’ willingness to accept certain 
concessions as part of a comprehensive peace settlement’.488 For Armenians, Karabakh is a 
part of their national and religious heritage to an unprecedented level. A group of Armenian 
historians even think that while Armenians and Armenian culture in other regions were 
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assimilated, it was in Mountainous Karabakh that they preserved their identity.489 From the 
very onset of the conflict, ideological factors have had a heavier weight on the Armenian side, 
which also explained the high motivation of the army during the war. The importance of 
Karabakh in Armenian national identity was obvious in the 1997 political crisis in Armenia 
leading to the resignation of President Ter-Petrossian.490 Statement by Karabakh’s de facto 
‘President’ Gukassian demonstrated the preference in Armenian politics of identity related 
interests to welfare related ones: ‘however badly the people live, there are holy things, there 
are positions that they will never surrender under any circumstances’. 491  
There are still identity related real and virtual security concerns for Armenians. Most 
Armenians still see Turkey as a real threat and equate Azeris with Turks; interpreting Azeri 
hatred and nationalism as Pan-Turkism, Armenians ignore the Karabakh factor’s causality of 
hatred in Azerbaijan. As defence minister Sarkissian puts it, ‘the issues of genocide of 
Armenians and Karabakh are associated so that the security preconditions of Karabakh 
emanate from the historic memory of the Armenian people’.492 Armenians have cultivated a 
victim complex, and the fear of further victimisation is used to justify the control of MK and 
hatred of Azeris.493 Thus, the problem starts with the Armenians’ equation of Azeris to the 
Ottoman Turks, and the Azeris’ refusal to recognise Armenians’ security concerns emanating 
from history. As the ICG report puts it, ‘where Armenians claim that the main goal of Turks 
and Azeris is to exterminate them as a people, Azeris believe that Armenians aim to take more 
of their land’. 494 Within both scoieties there is very little glimpse of dialogue or tendency to 
communication with each other. This may differ outside the societies; Armenians and Azeris 
living and working together in Georgia and Russia enjoy normal relations, a factor which has 
been referred to as an antithesis to the etnic incompatibility of the two peoples.495  
Identity related emotional factors are very firm in the conflict and have many times become a 
major obstacle to the peace process. The conflict parties have at least twice been close to 
reaching a breakthrough, but on all occasions pressure within the society and the ruling elite 
has restrained the respective presidents. In various periods, the readiness to reach a 
compromise has been accompanied by identity related political instabilities in both countries. 
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the Caucasus’, The Economist, 3rd June, 2000. 
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At least twice, has identity related opposition impeded reaching an agreement; in 1997 as 
President Petrossian agreed to a modus vivendi basically, this ended up in his resignation in 
February 1998; and in 1999 when the Azerbaijani and Armenian elites (Armenian 
Parliamentary speaker Vazghen Sarkisian) were close to agreement, it ended up in shootings 
in the Armenian Parliament and finally killing of the parliamentary speaker.496 A further 
complicating factor in Armenia is the role of diaspora, which has often taken a harsher 
position than the Armenian Government and at times refused to consider the hardships in 
Armenia emanating from lack of resolution.  
2.3.4. De facto ‘statehood’ in Mountainous Karabakh 
Mountainous Karabakh de facto independence has not been recognised by any state or 
international organisation. Moreover, there have been condemnations by the Council of 
Europe, the OSCE, the UN and a number of states on the conduction of elections, adoption of 
a constitution, etc. The position of the international community vis-à-vis the conflict is 
straightforward: MK is recognised within the territorial sovereignty of Azerbaijan and both 
Armenia and MK are condemned for the attempt to change boundaries by use of force.497 In 
April 2007, a US State Department’s Report on the region emphasised the occupation of MK 
and adjacent regions by Armenia.498 Equally, all UNSC permanent members have refused to 
recognise the region’s independence and reiterated Azerbaijan’s territorial sovereignty over 
the region. Such a position derives from the four UNSC Resolutions supporting Azerbaijan’s 
territorial integrity and the existing international legal order. The fact that the de facto 
authorities have undertaken reconstruction projects in the region and demonstrated effective 
government has not produced any political or legal implications for the international 
community yet. The international legal doctrine ex iniuria ius non oritur (illegal acts cannot 
produce legal results), reflected in UN resolutions, makes all the passed laws in the region 
invalid. The de facto authorities have initiated long-term settlement and land distribution in 
Shusha and Lachin, reconstruction projects. In particular, land privatisation in Lachin is 
legally contradictory, since Lachin was not included in the Mountainous Karabakh 
Autonomous Oblast and was populated by Azeris. Since 2000, over 5,300 families have been 
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resettled in MK, and a massive population resettlement programme is supposed to ensure a 
demographic increase of 300,000 by 2010.499 The real population of MK today, including the 
occupied regions does not exceed 60,000 people.   
Among all the secessionist provinces in the region MK has the most advanced de facto 
statehood. The region adopted its own constitution in 2006 and has held two presidential 
elections and is currently pursuing the policy of democratisation for recognition. Although, 
the de facto Government in the 18 years of existence has proven effective governance  over 
the region, it is still highly dependent on Armenia for its military security and economic 
survival: over half its army are believed to be Armenia citizens, and Yerevan covers 50% of 
the budget through an interstate loan, which is interest free and unlikely to be paid pack.500 
Due to its better relations with the diaspora, and descent of Armenian president and prime 
minister both from MK, the latter has more leverage over Armenia and can impose its 
decisions on Yerevan, rather than the other way round. Karabakh Armenians have, from the 
very onset demonstrated political autonomy vis-à-vis Yerevan and never agreed to any 
political subordination. As Edmund Herzig elucidates it, ‘[I]f Yerevan and Stepanakert are 
parts of the same animal, it is clearly the Karabagh tail that has been wagging the Armenian 
dog’.501 Even today, there is still dissent in Stepanakert for unification with Armenia.502 
Dissent exists with Yerevan on minor issues in the negotiations, relating to the referendum to 
be held and Lachin corridor, but in de facto ‘President’ Gukassian’s words, ‘they are issues 
within the internal kitchen’.503         
Concluding remarks  
As already mentioned escalation of ethno-territorial conflicts in the South Caucasus was 
facilitated by the perestroika reforms of late 1980s. Perestroika created a platform and 
opportunities for the historic perceptions and grievances of Armenians in Mountainous 
Karabakh and Abkhazians that had remained frozen under the Soviet nationalities policies 
since 1920s. Most of the grievances of the early 20th century had failed to be discussed or 
come to terms with between the conflict parties. Instead, like in all colonial territories, the 
ethno-territorial questions had been settled by the centre and to a certain extent arbitrarily. So, 
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in this context, Mountainous Karabakh and Abkhazia were the irrational explosions of 
accumulated grievances and negative energy. That said, it should be taken into consideration 
that perestroika per se or Moscow were not the source of conflict. At least in the Georgian-
Abkhaz relations and in the Armenian-Azeri relations did there exist certain conflict potential. 
This potential had tacitly risen throughout the 70 year Soviet rule, but had been largely 
suppressed by communist ideology and coercive power.  
A primary factor for the deterioration of inter-community relations in Georgia was the 
Georgian national movement, in particular the minorities’ perceptions of it. Abkhazia’s 
grievances during the Stalin era had already generated a prejudice in Abkhaz society towards 
Tbilisi so that Georgia’s independence movement in late 1980s was perceived as a threat to 
the ethnic and cultural survival of the Abkhaz. The objective factor of fear of extinction as a 
separate ethnic community was complicated by further factors. Thus, in the case of Abkhazia 
the grievances against Georgians left from 1930s were only aggravated by the Georgian 
national movement. Such a scenario was less acute in the case of South Ossetia, where 
conflict emerged basically out of an ethnic security dilemma. The South Ossetian conflict 
grew largely due to the incapacity of the Georgian national movement to handle it. As to the 
MK conflict, it was the identity related perceptions or rather misperceptions that triggered the 
escalation of the conflict. Here, too past perceptions and grievances from Soviet era were 
added by inter-community violence such as the Sumgait events. And as the conflict went on, 
both societies changed dramatically and the conflict got tied up to societal identity, making a 
resolution intractable. 
Unlike Abkhazia and Mountainous Karabakh, South Ossetia during the Soviet period had 
never expressed the desire for separation from Georgia, and even in the preliminary period of 
the conflict its de facto authorities did not set independence as the end goal. In other words, 
the conflict first started as a political one, aimed at guaranteeing the cultural and territorial 
security of the region. However, in the years to come South Ossetia’s economic isolation from 
Georgia proper and integration into the economic space of the Russian North Caucasus as 
well as slow trust-building measures have added an ethnic element to it. An Ossetian ethnic 
identity based upon Alania (a unified South and North Ossetia) has developed and reduced the 
potential for the region’s return to a status within Georgia.  
All three conflicts, at least their violent phases might have been avoided, or at least today’s 
fait accompli might have been otherwise. Political immaturity of elites, irrational behaviour 
on the side of both conflict parties, maximalist positions all drew the room for modus vivendi 
narrower and narrower. Both Azerbaijan’s and Armenia’s positions were closer in early 1990s 
143
than now, but this failed to produce any political implications for the peace process. Equally, 
no matter how much the Abkhaz disliked and blamed Georgians, initially they did not insist 
on full independence. They insisted on their security concerns, in particular the fear of 
extinction. The picture was even more optimistic for the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, chances 
for a modus vivendi for whom were realistic until the 2008 Georgian-Ossetian crisis. Thus, in 
all three conflicts, the escalation of the conflicts into violent phases was often caused by 
coincidental factors such as the murder of an influential leader, decisions made by immature 
ministers, lack of experience in state apparatus or weak statehood.  
Another point worth mentioning and that is directly linked to the research question of this 
study is Russia’s role in the emergence of these conflicts. There is no evidence at all to blame 
to emergence of the three conflicts on Russia. When these conflicts arose in late 1980s, the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party was largely surprised and confused over how to 
react. Therfore, the didivde and rule accusation against Russia is not well-founded. Russia got 
involved in the conflicts, in particular its manipulation started at a lot later stage. In the 
Georgian-Ossetian conflict, Russia’s involvement in the very initial stages of the conflict 
caused a deterrence of large scale violence. Moreover, the attempt to describe the minorities 
as a pawn of Russia has been a further complicating factor for the conflict resolution period. 
For a rather long period, the Georgian Government has described both conflicts as instigated 
and enlivened by Russia. What is more, both conflicts at this current stage, in particular the 
Georgian-Abkhaz one would not be resolved automatically if Russia left the region.  
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Chapter 3  
Russia’s strategic interests in the South Caucasus since 1991 
3. 1. Evolution of Russian foreign policy after 1991 and implications for the South 
Caucasus 
One of the consequences of the disintegration of the Soviet Union for Russian foreign policy 
has been defining its strategy and tactics from scratch towards those states that had nearly 
uninterruptedly existed under Russian rule for the last 200 years. Lacking in experience and 
strategy of dealing with an independent South Caucasus, Russian policies have been subject 
to much confusion and contradiction. Its political elite has unanimously shared the general 
perception that the South Caucasus is of relevance to Russia’s security and larger geopolitical 
interests, but meanwhile has failed to define strategically what those interests would be, and 
gone ahead with their own agendas undermining some of the proclaimed interests of the state. 
As a consequence, certain policies of the preliminary period (1991-1993) were occasionally 
either at odds with the official position or contradictory to Russia’s proclaimed strategic 
interests. This phenomenon was a product of a number of factors: weakness of state 
institutions and foreign policy decision-making and competing bureaucracies.504 The general 
political uncertainty at the preliminary period (1991-1992) had implications for Russia’s 
foreign policy towards its south, too. Therefore, the incoherence in foreign policy decision-
making in the preliminary period requires an evaluation of the broader processes of foreign 
policy formation in Russia in 1990s. Further evolution of Russian foreign policy towards the 
South Caucasus has been closely connected to Russia’s self-perception and view of the larger 
international system. Russia’s perception of itself as a great power and its perception of the 
West and NATO, in particular have had a correlation with its interests towards the near 
abroad, and therefore require elaboration. 
This chapter is an attempt to identify Russia’s interests towards the South Caucasus region 
throughout the 1991-2008 period. It starts by examining the evolution of Russian foreign 
policy in the early 1990s and the relevance of the South Caucasus region to Russia’s strategic 
interests. It tries to answer the question what strategic interests of Russia have acted as the 
driving force behind its complex policies towards the secessionist conflicts and whether the 
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policies have matched the interests. Whether there is a continuity of interests throughout the 
1991-2008 period is explored further. 
3. 2. Russian identity crisis and formation of Russian foreign policy 
The ultimate result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union for Russia, among other things, 
was the identity crisis at the political circles and the according inconsistency that had its 
impact upon the country’s foreign policy.505 Under the new circumstances it was not clear 
who the Russians would be or what kind of state Russia would become after two years of 
imperial and 70 years of a uniform collective identity. The crisis was partly to blame on the 
fact that Russia was a not a nation-state; 506 in fact, the nation had almost never been defined 
explicitly in Russia and the state had always been identified with the nation. Russia’s identity 
and statehood had since the times of Peter the Great developed with its empire 
simultaneously, and now what remained out of it, was according to Hosking, the ‘bleeding 
hulk of an empire’.507 Russian imperial identity had largely been inclusive amongst the Slavic 
population, making no distinction between Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians.508 It was 
therefore not clear what kind of state Russia would be building, whether it would be a civic 
multinational state in the form of derzhava or an ethnic nation-state; the kind of multinational 
state and where its boundaries would lie were far from clear either.509 Its ruling elite and 
society were put before a task of transforming their self-perception once Russia had suddenly 
overnight gone back to its pre-Petrine borders. For all these reasons, in domestic Russian 
political discourse, there was at least six groups of defining Russia’s identity as a state, each 
with implications for the country’s foreign policy with the near abroad:510 1. Russia would be 
defined linguistically to include all Russian speakers of the Former Soviet Union .2. Russia 
would be defined ethnic to include ethnic Russians only. This would imply hierarchical 
relations with the non-Russians or transformation of the boundaries. 3. Russia would become 
a Slavic entity to include northern Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine only. 4. Russia would be 
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an imperial union with a mission. This was identical to Russia’s medieval mission as Third 
Rome, but required a redefining of the Russian idea.511 And finally, civic state based upon the 
concept of Rossiyskiy rather than Russkiy. All the above-mentioned factors had implications 
for the foreign policy priorities of the country.  
Involvement of a large number of actors in the already uncertain decision-making process, 
and weakness of state institutions were the factors that produced the foreign policy 
incoherence.512 There was therefore no broad consensus on what Russia’s national interests 
should be. 513 For a period of time in early 1991, there appeared roughly two opposite camps 
of thought on Russia’s foreign policy, the Atlanticists and Eurasianists.514 The Atlanticists 
argued that Russia’s priority task should be integration to the countries of the West, or in 
Yeltsin’s words join in forming ‘a strategic community from Vancouver to Vladivostok’.515 
They advocated close relations with Euroatlantic institutions as NATO and EU, spoke in 
favour of Russia abandoning its historic great power traditions and its special role in the 
CIS.516 They treated the international system as benign and Russia as a liberal state, their 
world outlook quite peaceful, cosmopolitan, anti-hegemonic with firm beliefs in cooperation 
and respect for international institutions.517 They were advocating secondary relations with 
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the former Soviet states, based upon nothing more than good neighbourliness and non-
intervention in domestic affairs. In contrast, Eurasianists, which included pragmatic and 
fundamental nationalists, argued that Russia’s primary concern should be nearer home, within 
the Former Soviet Union. It should focus on the pieces of what had been the Russian empire 
and Soviet Union and worry about reconstructing its position among and within these new 
states on its borders. Pragmatic nationalists on most issues pursued a rather different tactics 
than strategy from the Atlanticists.518 They did not oppose market economy or democracy per 
se, but emphasised Russia’s great power status and re-establishing its regional hegemony.519 
In fact, the identity crisis had deeper historic background, dating back to at least the 19th 
century, when the division had manifested itself in Russian political thinking as a debate 
between the Slavophiles and Westernisers over the belonging of Russia, and every time the 
Russian state experienced transformation, this question arose.520  
Early Russian foreign policy was based on transatlantic or liberal orientation.521 Russia's 
perception of her own identity and interests departed from imperialism and communist 
ideology. Accordingly, President Yeltsin had acquired Gorbachev’s ‘common house of 
Europe’ and the ‘New Thinking’ paradigm.522 He and foreign minister Kozyrev both 
supported the liberal internationalist trend in foreign policy, rejecting Marxist-Leninist class 
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model as an explanation of international relations and declaring their readiness to integrate 
Russia into the democratic West.523 In autumn 1991, Kozyrev formulated this position, 
declaring that ‘Russia should be transformed from the sick and dangerous giant of Eurasia 
into the participant of the Western sphere of co-prosperity’.524 This implied fundamental 
changes not only in the foreign policy, but also in the almost 200 year old system of values.525  
Abandanoning imperialism and geopolitics, and prioritising free market economy and 
individual liberty were advocated to serve the purpose of bringing Russia in pace with the 
advanced modern states of the West.526  
The CIS was not a priority, and was even seen as an obstacle to Russia’s prosperity and 
Westernisation. The Former Soviet Union was recognised to have been a burden on Russia, as 
Russia had had to subsidize it mostly. The Soviet experience was not treated as something 
positive.527 However, although the CIS was not a priority in the intial period, it was never 
wiped off the political agenda either, and Russia was not prepared to break off all of its 
relations. It was widely expected that the common history and values would make these states 
quite friendly and supportive of Russia. Under the new agenda, Russia was to undertake as 
little responsibility as possible, in one analyst’s words, ‘it was committed to reducing the 
imperial burden’.528 This meant reducing the subsidies to the FSU countries and preferring 
multilateralism in conflict management. However, Russia kept on mediating between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, Tbilisi and Abkhazia as well as the latter and South Ossetia. The 
dominance of Atlanticism in Russian foreign policy did not genuinely end the securitisation of 
the South Caucasus in Russia, largely for the reason because of Russia’s domestic security 
concerns in the region.    
Russia committed itself to cuts in defence spending and nuclear arms on the grounds that 
neither the US, nor NATO posed a threat any more. In December 1991, Kozyrev stated that 
Russia ‘does not regard NATO as an aggressive military bloc, but as one of the mechanisms 
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for stability in Europe and in the world as a whole’.529 Presumably, Kozyrev’s initial idea was 
Russia’s economic, political and even military integration to the West.530 President Yeltsin 
sent a letter to the leaders of NATO states, declaring Russia’s NATO membership as a long 
term goal.531 At the Oslo Summit in June 1992, Russia did not oppose the intention of NATO 
to become a major pan-European security institution under Chapter VIII of UN Charter. 
Moreover, the Russian elite were convinced that Russia should think less about military 
power, and instead focus on modernising its economy and political system. An important part 
of Russia’s political elite had adhered to the thrust that the country’s future lay in Europe and 
it should do its best to adapt to that system. According to Yeltsin’s foreign policy advisor 
Gennady Burbulus, the Kremlin believed that ‘none of the pressing domestic problems of the 
Russian Federation would be solved without learning from the European experience’.532 In his 
address to the UNSC in January 1992, Yeltsin even went further than Gorbachev’s ‘New 
thinking’, stating that he regarded the Western powers not just as partners, but as allies, 
‘Moscow shares the main Western values, which are the primacy of human rights, freedom, 
rule of law and high morality’.533 Russia supported UNSC sanctions against Iraq, Libya, even 
Serbia, and made unilateral concessions to the US on arms control and reduction.534 Russia 
seemed to start its foreign policy from scratch, forgetting its 200 year old geopolitical 
rivalries, allies and spheres of influence. 
3.2.1. End of romanticism: Russia’s return to geopolitics and neo-imperialism 
However, the period of Western romanticism in Russian foreign policy could for obvious 
reasons not last long, and as early as late 1992 Russian president and foreign minister were 
making statements contrary to their liberal rhetoric in early 90s. The government’s pro-
Western policy came increasingly to be seen as humiliating unilateral concessions for very 
little reason.535 The unsuccessful privatisation of public assets, which made a few rich, the 
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country’s economic failure, indebtedness, deterioration of living standards, corruption and 
Chechen crisis all raised the substantiality of the Western liberal democracy and free market 
economy trend; this resulted in calls in the Russian political circles and society for Russia’s 
return to its previous ideologies as centralisation policy vis-à-vis its regions and balance of 
power policies vis-à-vis the West.536 The West, too, had failed to embrace Russia and give it a 
special role, causing disillusionment in the Russian political elite. Most Western powers had 
expressed readiness to stop considering Russia as an enemy, but rejected ambitious appeals to 
become instant allies.537 Russia’s desire to turn the CSCE into a major regional security 
organisation, where it would have a major responsibility was turned down.538 As the victor of 
the Cold War, the US political elite perceived their country to be the sole power centre in 
Eurasia and the international system. It refused to recognise Russia as an equal great power 
and was more intent on reinforcing unipolar hegemony. Moreover, mistrust of certain post-
Soviet states of Russia’s intentions had cast doubts over the legitimacy of its desire for an 
exclusive role in the post-Soviet space.539 The uncertainty in the West about Russia’s future 
further prevented the US from recognising Russia’s claim. Russia did not succeed to become 
a member of G7, and NATO seemed disinterested in consulting Russia before taking action in 
the Balkans. Moreover, Russia was given a seat in the Partnership for Peace Programme of 
NATO on the same level as Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. The failure of the West to give Russia a 
special role supported most of the foreign policy thinking’s shift towards statism and 
assertiveness, assuming that respect and recognition can emanate from strength and power 
only.540 As Margot Light acknowledges, once it soon became clear that accession to free 
market economy would not be accompanied by free access to Western markets and economic 
assistance to Russia, and Russia would not be treated at least a regional great power in Euro-
Atlantic security institutions, a large number of adherents of Atlanticist trend in the foreign 
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policy debate joined the pragmatic nationalists.541 In the subsequent years up to the South 
Ossetia crisis the more Russia was isolated and ignored, the more its leadership got obsessed 
in realpolitik perception of the international system. This has mainly manifested itself in 
balancing strategy vis-a-vis the West, which has often included the South Caucasus as a 
testing ground.   
It is meanwhile difficult to judge whether the West’s recognition of Russia as a great power 
and its treatment as a coequal ally would have impeded Russia’s return to geopolitics and neo-
imperial thinking. There were many other direct reasons why Russia should gradually 
abandon the liberal trend in its foreign policy.542 Firstly, Russia had never ceased its great 
power rhetoric, and Atlanticism had never been a goal or strategy on its own. It was rather a 
tactics of achieving certain national interests, such as welfare and international recognition. 
Even Kozyrev and most liberals had stressed that Russia is and should remain a great power 
and it should be the dominat force in the CIS.543  
Moreover, liberal Westernism in Russia had never been firmly established, it was only a 
project in the minds of certain romantics as Kozyrev and Gaidar, who themselves were far 
from being certain about their visions.544 In fact, the period of liberal Westernism in Russia 
was very brief, and temporary to replace the ideology vacuum. After 70 years of mistrust and 
over 200 years of empire-building, an important portion of the Russian elite unanimously 
believed that Russia’s ultimate future would be in geopolitics and great power politics. It 
would not be easy to change the historic legacy and symbolic memory in Russia’s self-
perception and in its relations with the near abroad.545 It was rather difficult for many Russian 
circles to accept the divorce of Russia from the other republics, some of which were 
continuously seen as Russia’s historic legacy. As Mark Weber puts it, in the post-communist 
period, ‘the historic legacy of Soviet and Russian imperial rule has shaped Russia’s foreign 
policies, and the very fact that Russia refers to the CIS as its near abroad implied that 
Russians still considered it as a legitimate sphere of influence’.546 Another factor that made it 
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easy for the failure of the liberal project was the fact that the indentity crisis was going on, 
with questions on where Russia should belong.547  
However, as mentioned already the shift in Russian foreign policy thinking was not 
revolutionary, and only gradually came to effect. In contrast to most perceptions that Koyzrev 
was a pure Western liberal and Primakov a Eurasian, there was much continuity between 
Kozyrev’s and Primakov’s tenures, and it would not be completely correct to argue that the 
latter’s period was dramatically revolutionary or realist in terms of foreign policy strategy. 
Russia still prioritised cooperation with the West and recognised its financial and know-how 
dependence on it.548 For a number of factors that formed a trade-off, Russia in all its policies, 
including its opposition to NATO enlargement and Kosovo crisis was careful not to spoil its 
relations with the West. This also included Russia’s policies in the Former Soviet Union, and 
as Andranik Migranyan notes, under Koyzrev’s tenure, it was widely believed that Russia’s 
violation of certain international norms in the conflicts in the CIS and its overall hegemonic 
behaviour would have implications for Russia’s relations with the West.549 Equally on the 
issue of NATO enlargement, although it was widely argued that enlargement was not desired, 
it was widely believed that any confrontation with the NATO states would not be in Russia’s 
national interests.550 Thus, as Allen Lynch puts it, the objeticve of Russian foreign policy at 
the period was ‘to craft Russian policy in such a way that Russia need not have to choose 
between its parallel claims to strategic partnership with the West on the one hand, and to the 
say and weight appropriate to a great power on the other’.551 
                                                 
547 See Vladimir Baranovsky, ‘Russia: Insider or Outsider?’, International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 46, no. 3, July 
2000, pp. 443-445. 
548 On the importance of relations between Russia and the West, see Allen Lynch, ‘The realism of Russian 
foreign policy’, Europe-Asia Studies, volume 53, no 1, 2001, pp. 7-31.  
549 See Andranik Migranyan, ‘Blizhnee Zarubezhye’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 January, 1994. 
550 See ‘Strategiya dlya Rossii’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 27 May, 1994; ‘Poltika Natsionalnoy bezaposnosti 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 May, 1996.  
551 Allen Lynch, op. cit., p. 15.  
153
 
3.2.2. Implications for the South Caucasus 
As to the implications of the shift for the South Caucasus region, the region had never 
disappeared from the rhetoric of the liberal Westernisers. As mentioned already, the CIS and 
also the South Caucasus was not a priority for Russia, compared to its relations with the West. 
However, this never meant Russia’s retreat from the region either. Throughout 1992, Kozyrev 
repeatedly stressed that the Caucasus is a traditional sphere of Russian interests and Russia 
was not going to leave it. Initially, he accentuated Russia’s security concerns in the region, 
concentrating on peace efforts and conflict management only. He advocated that Russia 
should remain, strengthen its influence there not by use of force, coercion or imperial 
methods, but rather by the peace efforts of a great democratic power.552  However, as the 
foreign policy shift enlarged, Kozyrev concentrated more on broader geopolitical concerns 
including the rights of these states to enjoy sovereign relations with Western states, in 
particular in the sphere of oil and gas production and transport, and military presence in the 
CIS.553 
Russia’s policies in the post-Soviet space, especially in the South Caucasus enjoyed certain 
autonomy from its engagement at the systemic level, so it is not entirely clear how a possible 
engagement of Russia by the West would have had implications for its south. Its policies 
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towards the secessionist conflicts in 1990s were caused by factors as weak statehood, 
competing bureaucracies, absence of a clear strategy, will for physical presence in the South 
Caucasus and shortage of resources.  And it was largely on the issue of weak statehood that 
the West did not press Russia to observe important international norms in the South Caucasus 
or in any other area of its foreign policy, with the purpose of not alienating Russia and 
sustaining its engagement. 
3.2.3. Foreign policy concepts 
The shift in Russian foreign policy in favour of Eurasianism manifested itself in both official 
policy guidelines and in declaratory statements. In less than two years later, joining the West 
and establishing indivisible security system to unite Eurasia and the Euro-Atlantic had 
silenced, and instead Yeltsin stressed Russia’s ‘need to strike a balance in the foreign policy 
relations with the West’.554 Starting from late 1992, Yeltsin’s foreign policy agenda was 
dominated by the problem of maintaining or re-establishing Moscow’s influence and 
hegemony over the post-Soviet region. Foreign minister Kozyrev at the CSCE Stockholm 
Summit in December 1992 denounced Western interference in the Baltic states, telling the 
organisation to keep out of the CIS, demanding an end to UNSC sanctions against Serbia, and 
stating that Belgrade could count on full military support from Russia. He shocked the 
conference participants stating that the ‘territory of the FSU cannot be considered a zone in 
which the CSCE norms are wholly applicable’. He further stated ‘……it was in essence a 
post-imperial area in which Russia had to protect its own interests by use of all available 
means, including military and economic’.555  Although, he later came up to say that he had 
only pretended to be a hardliner to demonstrate what would happen if Yeltsin were defeated 
by the domestic opposition, but as Adomeit notes, ‘Kozyrev throughout 1993 and 1994 
repeated such statements in all seriousness’.556 In October 1993, Kozyrev’s rhetoric was 
geopolitically motivated, when he spoke about conflict management in the Former Soviet 
Union: ‘…we need to establish effective peacepkeeping and Russia must be the dominat force 
in the international efforts to support peace. Our incapacity to pursue a rapid peace operation 
creates a vacuum which can be filled out by terrorists, as it happened in Abkhazia. Moreover, 
there is the threat of losing the geopolitical positions which it took us centuries to gain. We 
have a few neighbours in Asia, which would be prepared to inject fighters and weapons into 
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the FSU under the banner of peacekeeping. As soon as we leave these areas, the ensuing 
vacuum will immediately be filled by other forces, possibly not always friendly and perhaps 
even hostile to Russian interests. These states, and not the US as our patriots claim, have the 
goal to wipe off Russia from the region and limit its influence’. Kozyrev’s interview exposed 
among other things that Russia’s interest in the effective management of regional conflicts 
stemmed from the desire not to ‘lose geopolitical positions that took centuries to conquer’.557  
Thus, by 1993 in terms of conceptual approach, the Russian establishment had arrived at 
broad consensus that Russian foreign policy should be based on a geopolitical calculation of 
national interests. This meant assertiveness in the former Soviet space and guaranteeing the 
country’s status as an equal great power. To a lesser extent, was cooperation with the West 
prioritised, but the consensus was that Moscow should avoid any confrontation with the US; 
although, its hegemonic assertiveness in the CIS and global great power ambitions were in 
tension with the former. By early 1993 Russia had managed to establish its foreign policy 
concept (in fact successive concepts), indicating that differences between various groups were 
becoming narrow on the issues of its strategic interests. 558 The consensus reached was that 
near abroad should be top priority and that Russia should not pull back to its own borders, but 
maintain the old Soviet borders in the Caucasus and Central Asia.559 Draft of the foreign 
ministry ‘concerning the basic points of the concept of foreign policy of the Russian 
Federation’, submitted to the Russian Duma, was approved in October 1992 and published in 
early 1993.560 Another concept was developed by the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy 
and published in August 1992.561 The final concept entitled ‘basic principles of a foreign 
policy concept of the Russian federation’ published in April 1993 acted as the final official 
strategy.562 All three concepts emphasised Russia’s great power status and the priority of its 
presence in the CIS. Major principles included creation of an effective system of collective 
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defence, protecting the rights of the 25 million Russian speaking minority, ensuring the status 
of Russia as the single nuclear power in the CIS, strengthening of the external borders of the 
CIS, establishing military security for its members and promoting the integration of the CIS. 
Cross-border smuggling and criminality as well as spread of ideologies were also stressed. 
The military doctrine warned Russia of the potential that the external powers could take 
advantage of Russia’s weakness and inattentiveness to establish strategic positions at the 
disadvantage of Russia.563  
a) Exclsuive role in the CIS 
Exclusive role for Russia as a peacekeeper and a UN mandate for it were among priorities as 
well. Kozyrev and Yeltsin accordingly tried to get recognition from international 
organisations for Russia as the chief responsible for the CIS. He appealed in March 1993 to 
the UN and CSCE to grant Russia special powers as guarantor of peace and stability in the 
FSU, claiming exclusive rights and obligations. The Russian President had however also 
formally invited the West to participate in peacekeeping in the CIS. Such a stance is 
ambiguous because at the time Russia obviously had no intention to internationalise 
peacekeeping in the CIS. The fact that the Foreign Policy Concept of April, 1993 and the draft 
military doctrine had rejected foreign troops’ involvement in the conflicts in the CIS implies 
that Russia was more instrumentalising the idea of Western presence in peace support in the 
CIS.564 Russia’s position according to Zagorski, was ‘either the Russian troops have to be the 
crucial element of peacekeeping in the CIS or Russia should admit international institutions 
only after its capabilities have exhausted’.565 The later developments also show that Russia 
had no intention of letting outside mediation and foreign troops into the CIS.566 As one 
analyst noted, Russia’s position henceforth was that ‘no international body except the CIS can 
carry out effective peacepkeeping operation and no peacekeeping operation will be a success 
without Russia participating in it’.567 Another reason, as was the case in the CSCE 1994 
Budapest Summit decision on peacekeeping in Mountainous Karabakh conflict, was that the 
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conflicting sides often preferred an international peacekeeping format rather than Russian 
only.568 In March 1993, Kozyrev presented the UNGA with a document outlining the need for 
a regional peacekeeping mechanism in the CIS. The proposal was immediately rejected by the 
Ukraine, Baltic states and Moldova on the grounds that Russia’s intentions were imperialistic 
rather than humanitarian.569 Western leaders too were worried at the time that Russian leaders 
might see peacekeeping as a tool of neo-imperialism.570 
Trying to preclude third party presence in the former soviet space, the Russian political elite 
argued that Russia should develop its own Monroe doctrine to protect its vital interests in the 
near abroad.571 Throughout 1993, Russia made it clear that it not only prioritised relations 
with the former Soviet states, but also desired for exclusive military and political presence. 
This was reflected in the 3rd March 1993 ‘conceptual principles’ on foreign policy issued by 
the Russian Security Council, which emphasised Russia’s security interest in maintaining 
peace within the borders of the SU, but added special emphasis to defending the external 
borders of the CIS, warning that Russia will actively oppose any attempts to increase the 
military-political presence of third states in the countries contiguous with Russia.572 The 
rhetoric used by the Russian President and foreign and defence ministries echoed the desire to 
view the post-Soviet space as a sphere of influence, and called for a possible reintegration of 
the independent republics into a structure where Russia would play a special role.573  
In May 1996, a paper of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy set domestic stability and 
relations with the near abroad as the strategic interests of Russia.574 Later, at the March 1997 
CIS Summit, President Yeltsin reiterated Russia’s concerns, saying that ‘we have no interest 
in seeing the former Soviet Union’s territory dominated by anyone, particularly in the 
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military-political sphere or in seeing any country playing the role of buffer against Russia’.575 
The position was more straightforwardly put by the then chairman of the Duma CIS Affairs 
Committee Zatulin, ‘…with all due respect for these states, many of them are doomed to 
become our satellites or die. I see their territorial integrity in precisely these terms.’576  
President Yeltsin stated that his ultimate goal would be the integration of the near abroad with 
Russia in either a confederation or even a new union.577 In June 1994 he proposed a CIS 
military structure similar to NATO, and a decree of September, 1995 ‘on approving the 
Russian federation’s strategic course in relations with CIS member states’ called for a defence 
union based on common interests and military political goals. The latter defined the basic task 
of Russia’s relations with the CIS as the strengthening of Russia. The decree also claimed a 
right by Russia to limit external engagement in the CIS.578 The Russian government urged 
that more attention should be paid to ensuring security and developing military cooperation in 
view of unceasing attempts to establish power-centres in the post-soviet space, and that the 
consolidation of anti-Russian tendencies is absolutely unacceptable.579  
 
3.2.4. Russia’s great power status 
Although there is scarcely consensus in international relations as to the definition of great 
powers, it is widely accepted that a great power meets two criteria: material capabilities and 
formal recognition of that status by others.580 Beyond that broad definition, the one given by 
Buzan and Waever is more relevant to explaining Russia’s interests. The relevant criterion of 
a great power is the polarity in the regional security complex, so that a great power should be 
the only pole in its regional security complex.581 Any alliance which produces new poles 
would alter the status of the great power. That attitude was taken up by the Russian Foreign 
Ministry as early as 1992, when official guidelines viewed the modified international system 
as one of regional-power centre tendencies, necessitating Russia to dominate in its regional 
‘shell’ and reinforce its regional hegemony.582 For that reason, the Kremlin took on measures 
to deepen the relative autonomy of the CIS regional security complex and insisted that it 
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should be the dominant international legal regime for resolving disputes and regulating 
relations in the post soviet space. It has constantly reacted with irritation to the balancing 
efforts of CIS states and emergence of potential new poles.  
Russia’s great power status is the one issue that has been part of any foreign policy, national 
security or military concept of the country. The idea has also received widespread support 
among the public.583 The idea of great power was also a quick solution to the identity crisis in 
Russia both in its foreign and domestic politics.584 Ever since its return to Eurasianism, Russia 
has tried to act as a great power, but also expected itself to be recognised as a great power. 
Yeltsin’s statement in early 90s ‘Russia is rightfully a great power by virtue of its history, of 
its place in the world, and of its material and spiritual potential’ exposed the Kremlin’s 
resistance to admit that Russia lacked economic, technological and human resources to be a 
great power.585 The essence of the argument was, even though Russia is underdeveloped 
according to Western standards, it is the relevant and metropolitan power of the CIS and 
Eurasia. In his state of the nation address in 1995, President Yeltsin referred to some external 
forces interested in undermining and undercutting Russia’s international role and argued for a 
new integration in the CIS.586 There were also forces in Russia interested in identifying 
Russia’s great power status with neo-imperialism and derzhava. In 1992, vice President 
Alexandr Rutskoi claimed that ‘the historic consciousness of the Russians will not allow 
anybody to equate mechanically Russia’s borders with those of the Russian federation and to 
take away what constituted the glorious pages of Russian history.587  
Great power status and insistence upon multilateralism in international affairs became a 
priority of Primakov’s foreign policy. His concept of recovering Russia as a great power 
revolved around balancing the US unipolarism by a strategic concert of states (mainly China 
and India) and more integration within the CIS.588 He declared that Russia would reject both 
the antiwesternism of the Soviet Union and the early romanticism, in favour of Russia’s status 
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as great power and an equal partnership with both the US and Europe.589 Primakov’s stress on 
geopolitics in Russian foreign policy implied more Russian control over the CIS, in particular 
guaranteeing military-political and economic presence there and Russia’s subsidisation of 
integration within the CIS. During Putin’s term, Russia’s great power status was even held 
equal to the survival of the state. In his 2003 message to the Federal Council the then 
President Putin stated that ‘such a country as Russia can survive and develop within the 
existing borders only if it stays as a great power. During all of its times of weakness Russia 
was invariably confronted with the threat of disintegration’.590  
In the last decades, Russia’s foreign policy has been dominated by its efforts to free itself 
from the decline of late 1980s and 1990s and create internal and external resources for 
returning to its real great power status of the last century. The desire to restore influence over 
the former Soviet states and prevent the intrusion of external powers, and control the 
developments in the region that may have negative implications for Russia itself has been a 
constant issue in Russian politics. It is to limit further losses and promote conditions that 
would enable Russia to re-emerge as a great power in the international system. The 2000 
foreign policy concept emphasised this as well: 
‘Ensuring reliable security of the country and preserving and strengthening its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity and its strong and authoritative position in the world community, as would to the greatest extent 
promote the interests of the Russian Federation as a great power, and one of the most influential centres in the 
modern world, is necessary to the growth of its political, economic, intellectual, and spiritual potential’.591  
 
Although Russia’s great power status has been mostly regional, Moscow has refused to limit 
itself to a regional great power only.592 Moscow has emphasised its responsibilities for the 
management of the international system and this has mostly emerged in the form of 
opposition to the uni-polarism of the US. Being a permanent member of the UNSC, Russia 
has stressed the importance of the UNSC in the management of international affairs.593  
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Since the last few years, Russia’s attachment to multi-polarism has manifested itself in the 
form of balancing the US.594 The 1997 national security concept characterised the 
international political system as multipolar and warned against ‘attempts to create a structure 
of international relations based upon unilateral solutions of the key problems of world 
politics’.595 This referred to perceived American ambitions to create a unipolar world. The 
2000 national security concept equally defined the attempts of other states to hinder the 
strengthening of Russia as a centre of influence in the multi-polar world as a threat and again 
warned against ‘unipolar structure of the world with US economic and military 
domination’.596 Again the reference was made to the US and its perceived weakening of 
Russia’s positions in the CIS. The 2000 foreign policy concept identified the systemic 
tendency towards unipolarity and US unilateralism as significant threats to Russia and 
declared that ‘Russia shall seek to achieve a multi-polar system of international relations’.597 
In his March 2007 speech at the 43rd Security Conference in Munich, President Putin 
criticised not only the US unilateral use of force and anti-missile shield in Eastern Europe, but 
also the eastward enlargement of the EU.598 Russia increasingly adopted a self-perception of 
an international actor struggling to restore its great power status of the last decade.   
At least until very recently, Russia has not been recognised as an equal great power by the 
West, and has to a large extent been ignored in a number of important decisions. Having lost 
its empire, and its influence over Eastern Europe, having been ignored in decisions on the 
Balkans and on NATO enlargement, the Russian elite has become increasingly obsessed. As 
MacFarlane puts it, ‘the gap between Russia’s self-image as a coequal great power and the 
apparent reality that others did not treat it as an equal partner produced a condition akin to 
resentment’.599  
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Every time Russia has attempted to secure its great power status in its interaction with the 
West, this has had implications for the South Caucasus region. Prioritisation of its interests in 
the ‘near abroad’ coincided with the emphasis of Russian political forces on the country’s 
great power status. In fact, Russian perception of its great power status made up at least one of 
the factors that acted as the driving force behind its geopolitical interests in the South 
Caucasus. Thus, throughout the post-soviet period, great power status has been linked on the 
one hand to Russia’s influence and hegemony over the CIS, and on the other hand the ability 
to promote multilateralism. Its core strategy for the CIS has been preventing any outside actor 
from undermining Russian interests.600 While strengthening its positions in the international 
system, Russia has intended to save its backyard from unauthorised interference.   
3.2.5. NATO Enlargement 
Although NATO enlargement had been a potential source of tension between Russia and 
NATO even during the early period of Atlanticism, the Kremlin never prioritised the issue 
until mid 1990s.601 Initially, as Russia desecuritised the Cold War image of NATO, it did not 
come to consider the issue of enlargement seriously.602 Russia did not either oppose to or 
encourage the eastward enlargement of NATO at the time of its liberal Westernist foreign 
policy. Enlargement became an issue of concern only when it got clear that NATO and the 
West were not intent on treating Russia as a coequal or giving it the special role it was 
requesting at the CSCE. Moreover, Russia had in the course of 1991 and 1992 reiterated the 
need for a special relationship between NATO and Russia, that would be much heavier than 
that between the former and Eastern European countries, which would also take into 
consideration Russia’s great power status. In this context, enlargement became a concern in 
Russian foreign policy in 1993, with the reorientation of Russian foreign policy towards the 
Eurasianist trend, but even then, Russia did not immediately oppose the issue. President 
Yeltsin throughout 1992 and 1993 endorsed his acquiesce to Poland’s membership of 
NATO.603 A detailed examination of Russia’s position at the period implies that Moscow had 
set certain conditions to be fulfilled before Poland would join NATO, but was not principally 
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opposed to it. In early September, 1993, the Russian foreign ministry proclaimed its position 
on the enlargement issue, saying that although the former Warsaw Pact members had the right 
to join NATO, it was opposed against a rapid enlargement. Further, the Minisitry of Foreign 
Affairs argued that the CSCE and North Atlantic Cooperation Council should be 
strengthened, and Russia’s relationship with NATO as a great power or continuing 
superpower should be clarfied before any enlargement could take place. The minsitry had 
previously expressed its opposition of NATO’s treatment of Russia in a similar status to that 
of Armenia or Bulgaria, and was hoping for a ‘special status’ that would take into 
consideration explicitly Russia’s great power status.604  
An important concern for Russia with regard to NATO enlargement in 1990s was Russia’s 
isolation as a great power. The enlargement was seen as a threat to Russia’s global position, 
since a pan European organisation would emerge that would in charge of European security, 
from which Russia would be isolated. Koyzrev emphasised that any enlargement should take 
into account Russia’s special status as a nuclear great power.605  
Beginning from late 1993, once it became apparent how serious East European and Baltic 
states were intent on joining NATO and that the West was not prepared to give Russia a 
special role at least in the CSCE, did Russia express its dismay and opposition to the process. 
A shift in Yeltsin’s position was also partly due to the pressure of the Russian military and of 
the hardliners, as well as certain moderates.606 Back in mid 1993, a report prepared by the 
Foreign Intelligent Service under the leadership of Primakov, called ‘Perspectives on the 
Enlargement of NATO and Russian interests’ argued that in terms of Russian interests in the 
CIS, enlargement would be viewed as extending NATO’s zone of responsibility towards the 
borders of the Russian Federation, internationalising local conflicts in the CIS and potentially 
undermining the Collective Security Treaty.607 The military doctrine of November, 1993, too, 
determined the expansion of military alliances to the detriment of Russia’s security interests 
as a basic threat.608 As a result, President Yeltsin in his subsequent statements and guidelines, 
distanced himself from his early position on NATO enlargement, and by stressing the 
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importance of indivisibility of security in Europe, expressed the risk of isolating Russia.609 In 
the Summer of 1993, Russia vetoed the arms embargo on Bosnia in the UNSC in a strategy to 
balance the US presence in the region, and became a member of the Contact Group on 
Yugoslavia, with the major interest of reassuring its great power position. In 1994, President 
Yeltsin declared that with the eastward enlargement of NATO, there was the risk of ‘plunging 
into a Cold Peace’.610 In 1995, Kozyrev speaking to the Federation Council, had stressed that 
Russia was making efforts to fight the tendency by some CIS states to join NATO.611 In 
November 1995, defence minister Grachev warned that NATO enlargement would compel 
Russia to seek allies outside the CIS.612 Further in 1995, the decision by NATO to deploy a 
Rapid Reaction Force in Bosnia following air raid on Bosnian Serb weapons depot caused 
anger in both the Duma and the Kremlin for the failure to consult Russia in advance.613 In 
1997, Russia without much alternative reluctantly signed the final act accepting the Czech 
Republic’s, Hungary’s and Poland’s entry to NATO.614  
The decision to expand NATO excluding Russia from the process strengthened Russia’s 
perception of the West as playing power games and attempting to take advantage of Russia’s 
temporary weakness.615 Most of the enlargement sensitive to Russia took place at a time when 
Russian statehood was still vulnerable.616 Since NATO was seen by the new members, 
especially the Baltic States as a guarantee against Russia, that factor contributed to the 
exacerbation of Russia’s mistrust and growing belief in realpolitik. Russia’s feindbild of 
NATO further deteriorated through its acting without UN mandate in Kosovo.617 
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Subsequently, the Russian elite treated every step of NATO and Western engagement in the 
post-Soviet space as aimed at containing Russian influence or driving Russia into a corner.618 
The sense of rivalry and mistrust were deepened by the adoption of NATO’s New Strategic 
Concept in March 1999, which proclaimed the alliance’s willingness to ‘intervene anywhere 
in Europe in order to uphold stability and human rights’.619 The Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs defined NATO’s right to wage military operations outside its traditional responsibility 
zone and under conditions without seeking a UN SC authorisation a major security threat. 
Such a position was conditioned by the fact that Russia being excluded from NATO, felt 
isolated, and this was immediately linked to the efforts to undermine Russia as a global force. 
Secondly, this was a blow to Russia’s campaigning for multipolarism in international affairs. 
As a senior diplomat following the Kosovo crisis put it referring to the shift in NATO 
Strategy,  
The developments in Kosovo has demonstrated how this  will be applied in practice: a group of states will use 
force at their own will and without limitations to destroy the economic potentials and cultural values of any 
country….the only world leader has appropriated the right to pass judgement and interfere into domestic affairs. 
It seems that it is expected to resolve all crises by force.620 
In an influential article in the Financial Times, the Russian Government’s oppsotion to NATO 
enlargement and the new new strategy manifested itself in Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov’s 
opposition to a NATO centred world.621  
According to the 1997 national security concept ‘the threat of large-scale aggression against 
Russia is virtually absent in the foreseeable future’.622 Instead, NATO eastward enlargement 
was presented as a primary threat. This was also reflected in the 2000 military doctrine of 
Russia, which defined the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of 
military security of Russia as a basic threat.623 The 2000 national security concept was more 
direct, stating ‘NATO’s eastward expansion and the possible emergence of foreign military 
bases and major military presences in the immediate proximity of Russian borders’ as 
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fundamental national security threats.624 It further identified a new military threat arising from 
NATO’s use of military force outside its zone of responsibility and without UNSC resolution. 
A defence ministry study in October 2003 left no doubt that the US and NATO are still 
perceived as enemy. This was reflected in public opinion as well.625  
3.2.6. Russian-US détente after 9/11 
Hopes arose for détente between Russia and the West following the 9/11 attacks. Following 
the terror attacks, Russia supported the US led military operations in Afghanistan and acted as 
a new ally of Washington.626 President Putin did not raise objections to US military presence 
in the CIS either.627 Russia for a second time since the end of the Cold War hoped to regain its 
great power status through active engagement and cooperation with the West.628 Its political 
elite firstly expressed solidarity with the US, identifying terrorism a common phenomenon for 
both states.629 President Putin hoped that the common interest of fighting terrorism would 
curtail Russia’s differences with the US. And it was expected that on this common ground, 
intense cooperation would continue helping Russia achieve its objectives. According to the 
Russian political elite, the right moment had now emerged for Russia’s turn; Moscow had 
seemingly hoped that through an active engagement, it would get recognition of a great power 
status by the US, and Washington would finally give up a unipolar approach to the 
international system and come down to the multi-polarism that Russia has been insisting on 
for years. In particular, the Kremlin anticipated softening of the West’s stance on Russia’s 
demarche to Chechnya, agreement on security issues (ABM treaty and Ballistic missile 
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defence) and a possible postponement of NATO enlargement towards the east.630 Above all, it 
was the recognition of Russia’s exclusive hegemony for the CIS that it was mostly concerned 
about. However, for subjective and objective reasons, hopes in the Kremlin did not approve. 
Following US unilateralism in Iraq and its withdrawal from the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile 
Treaty in December 2001, Russian policy makers got convinced that the US was intent on 
unilateral hegemony in the world, and supporting the US, Russia would only give up its 
weight in the international system. Meanwhile, it became clear that NATO enlargement 
would take place to include the Baltic States. By deploying military experts to Georgia, the 
US refused to recognise the CIS as Russia’s exclusive zone of responsibility. Since the 
collapse of the SU, US administrations had encouraged actor pluralism in the former Soviet 
space and supported the CIS states’ consolidation of their sovereignties. The US had become 
an alternative great power by which certain CIS states tried to balance Russia’s power in the 
region. And now Russia was asking the United States to coordinate its presence in the CIS, so 
that security questions lie outside Western engagement.631 Moreover, the US as a superpower 
would not be interested in limiting its influence over any region at all. Apart from that, 
Russia’s hegemony in the last few years had allegedly only provided negative implications for 
certain CIS states, which were desperate to delegitimise it. Taking into consideration all the 
above-mentioned factors, it would be incomprehensible that the US would limit its presence 
in the CIS. The US position was well elucidated in the interview of the Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice, who claimed that ‘the US has legitimate interests in the CIS and it is intent 
to carry on with its own interaction with these states, even if they had once been a part of the 
SU. 632    
Thus, President Putin’s foreign policy agenda had initially combined both pragmatic 
nationalism and to a certain extent liberal Westernism, but over time as hopes for a Russian-
US partnership faded and the rift between the West and Russia grew over a number of 
security-political issues, the Russian leadership gave more weight to pragmatic nationalism.633 
In a speech in 2002, Putin emphasised his commitment to realpolitik and statism by stressing 
that the norm of the international community and the modern world is a tough competition.634 
Russia’s policies of nuclear cooperation with Iran despite Western protest, its decision to sell 
anti-aircraft missiles to Tehran and its hosting of Palestine’s Hamas Government in Moscow 
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when the US and EU had included it in the list of terrorist organisations all indicate that 
Russia is struggling to re-emerge not only as a major global power, but as an alternative to the 
US.635 In other words, Russia’s political elite is now trying to present it as an alternative to the 
West, to both CIS states and those states which are discontent with US policies. Russia is 
trying to align with Venezuela, Middle Eastern and those African states that are opposed to 
the US. This has two objectives: to undermine unipolar hegemony and reassert its great power 
status, and not just a great power, but an alternative to the US. A further objective, in 
particular in its relations with Venezuela is to revenge the US for intruding into its backyard.  
3.2.7. Spheres of interest  
In the aftermath of the South Ossetian crisis in August 2008, the Russian President Dmitry 
Medvedev laid down principles that would guide Russian foreign policy in the future. The 
rhetoric implied that Russian foreign policy following the crisis and international reaction to 
Russia, would be more assertive and intransigent. The principles acted like a more explicit 
reiteration of the previously established foreign policy priorities. Reference was made to the 
primacy of international law, but meanwhile it was argued that Georgia’s attack on South 
Ossetia in August put off Russia’s commitments to international law, and required that it 
defends its citizens there. The major point of the document that caused controversy was the 
Kremlin’s desire to establish geographic spheres ‘of privileged interest’ on or near its borders. 
President Medvedev stated that ‘Russia, just like other countries in the world, has regions 
where it has privileged interests’. Another controversial point of the principles argued that 
Russia would protect its citizens ‘wherever they are’, which sent mixed signals to the 
Ukraine, Kazakhstan and other states in the CIS with large Russian minorities because it 
argued that.636 The document also shed light on Russia’s relations with the West and sent a 
warning message that Russia should not be treaded upon: ‘….as regards the future, it depends 
not just on us. It also depends on our friends, our partners in the international community. 
They have a choice’. Thus, the essence of Medvedev’s principles is an end to hegemonic 
international system and return to spheres of influence.   
3.3. Russia’s regional interests in the South Caucasus 
The South Caucasus has been a region of vital importance to Russia since the 17th century. 
Through its expansion and incorporation of the South Caucasus in the 18th century, Russia 
established a buffer zone against its muslim rivals Turkey and Iran. The region gained in 
economic importance after oil reserves were discovered in Baku, but its primary importance 
remained largely geopolitical. The South Caucasus had also an identity based importance for 
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Russia featuring in its literature far more than the Baltic or Ukraine.637 In the 19th century as 
the colonisation of the Caucasus by Russia was completed, Moscow undertook power 
consolidation in the region. It employed military-political means as well as instruments of soft 
power such as the dissemination of the values of European enlightenment. Russian language 
and literature were preached as a means of communication with the enlightened Europe and 
later once communism was established, Russia was the centre of the right political ideology 
for these states. In the post-indpendence period, Russia has been disinterested in leaving the 
South Caucasus and has linked its physical presence in the region to Russia’s national security 
and strategic interests.638 
3.3.1. Security interests  
a) Interconnection of threats in the Caucasus  
The Caucasus region is a security complex in a sense that ethnicity and security are both 
interconnected and conflict in the South Caucasus can easily spill-over to the North Caucasus 
because of the ethnic relations and geographic proximity.639 The spill-over potential of the 
Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhaz conflicts into the North Caucasus was substantial 
during the armed phase of both conflicts. Russia was, at the time, suffering from weak 
statehood, regionalisation of its policies and inability to control the borders. Both Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia are ethnically and politically related to the North Caucasus (Abkhazia to 
Adygee and South Ossetia to North Ossetia), and throughout the armed phase, both regions 
received large numbers of volunteers from various regions of the North. In early 1990s, most 
regional elites all over the North Caucasus enabled the mobilisation of the volunteers from the 
North Caucasus to fight in Abkhazia and in South Ossetia.640  
Ossetians in North Ossetia have been much concerned about the suffering of their kin in 
South Ossetia, but also anxious that renewed large-scale hostilities could result in new waves 
of refugees. During the armed phase of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, North Ossetia 
received large numbers of refugees from South Ossetia and other parts of Georgia. The 
Ossetian refugees in their turn were drawn into another conflict, the Ingush-Ossetian conflict 
over Prigarodniy rayon, which culminated in the withdrawal of the Ingush from the disputed 
Prigorodniy district of North Ossetia and some minor casualties. Dispute over Prigarodniy 
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raion resembled the conflicts in the South Caucasus in a way that it was also about historic 
resettlements. In 1944, the region populated largely by Ingush, was transferred to North 
Ossetia following the deportation of almost the entire Ingush people to Central Asia, and in 
1991 the Ingush claimed their rights to the district by virtue of the Soviet law of 26th April 
1991 on territorial rehabilitation of repressed people.641 The conflict evolved into a brief 
ethnic war in 1992 between the Ingush and Ossetian paramilitary units, ending up in 600 
Ingush casualties and expulsion of 50,000 Ingush.642  
Both conflicts strengthened the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus (that 
included all 7 Peoples of the North Caucasus), whose political loyalty to Russia was very 
much in doubt at the time. The CMPC’s initial project was to integrate the North Caucasus 
including Abkhazia and South Ossetia and subsequently establish a union that would not be 
subordinated to Russia or Georgia. The idea that the territories of the Mountain Peoples of the 
Caucasus were annexed by Russia and Georgia was stated at the first Assembly in Sukhumi, 
Abkhazia in August 1989.643  
Being a Caucasian state itself, Russia has had security interests in this region since the break 
up of the Soviet Union. From the very onset the Russian elite was alarmingly concerned about 
the ethno-territorial conflicts in Russia’s vicinity and their spill-over potential into the North 
Caucasus. The first of the two foreign policy ‘guidelines’ in December 1992, established that 
‘the most important foreign policy tasks, requiring the coordinated and constant efforts of all 
state structures are curtailing and regulating armed conflicts around Russia, preventing their 
spread to our territory and guaranteeing strict observation in the near abroad of human and 
minority rights, particularly of Russians and Russian speaking population’.644 Export of 
separatism from the South Caucasus and spill-over of instability, and subsequent 
destabilisation of the Russian North Caucasus was a major concern of the Yeltsin 
administration. Both the foreign policy concept and the military doctrine of 1993 stressed the 
threat of ethnic conflicts in the vicinity of Russian borders and their potential spill-over. In his 
1993 speech to the National Security Council, Yeltsin suggested that Russia should be granted 
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special rights and privileges to stop ethnic conflicts in the Former Soviet Union.645 Yeltsin’s 
deputy prime minister for nationalities and federal affairs observed that the civil war in 
Georgia ‘must be regarded as a direct challenge to the vital interests of Russian security’.646 In 
this context, Russia’s unilateral support for Georgia’s territorial integrity, and status-quo in 
the region was interrelated with separatism in the North Caucasus. This view gradually 
changed after the second Chechen campaign, and Russian leaders today no longer see any link 
between secessionism in the South Caucasus and Chechnya. Russia’s subordination of 
Chechnya has obviously created extra resources for the Kremlin’s policies towards the 
secessionist conflicts in the South Caucasus.  
Russia’s position that there should be no armed conflict in its vicinity has remained 
unchanged under successive Russian governments, and its leaders see this as the country’s 
legitimate security interest, which every other state has. The 2000 National Security Concept 
defined ethnic conflicts close to Russian borders as a national security threat. For this reason, 
Russia has alluded to Georgia and Azerbaijan that any military solution to the conflicts in the 
region should be out of question.647 Russia has been oversensitive to any change of military 
balance in the region and has expressed a vested interest in preserving the current status-quo. 
In 2004, as Georgian soldiers concentrated on Georgia’s internal border with South Ossetia, 
allegedly for large scale intervention, Russia warned Tbilisi against attempts to intervene into 
South Ossetia by use of force. The Russian Government argued that many inhabitants of 
South Ossetia had acquired Russian citizenship and Russia would not remain indifferent if 
their lives were threatened.648 Granting citizenship to an overwhelming majority of the 
residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Kremlin has acquired a disputed right for 
humanitarian intervention and has accordingly continuously referred to it in declaratory 
statements and policies. The Kremlin’s message became even more obvious during the 2008 
August crisis in South Ossetia through which Russia basically made it clear to Azerbaijan as 
well, that any military rhetoric in the South Caucasus is deemed to fail.649 Recognising both 
regions’ independence, foreign minister Lavrov stated, ‘we can no longer allow ourselves, as 
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we did in the past, simply to wait for the beginning of another blitzkrieg by Tbilisi against 
South Ossetia or Abkhazia’.650 The Russian MFA has largely seen its peacekeeping forces in 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia as a guarantee of non-resumption of hostilities, therefore it has 
continuously rejected the Georgian calls for their withdrawal.651 It has accordingly expressed 
its interest in a binding treaty on non-resumption of military operations by Tbilisi.  
b) Spill-over effect 
Both the 2004 and the 2008 crises in South Ossetia demonstrated that any conflict in this 
region would raise concern in the North Caucasus and produce instability for Russia’s 
domestic politics. Taking into consideration the sensitivity of the South Ossetian conflict to 
North Ossetia it is obvious that no Russian leader could ignore the fate of the South Ossetians. 
It has therefore been beyond doubt that in case of military intervention by Tbilisi, Russia 
would provide all the necessary political and military support.  
Having said that, spill-over effect is no longer the focal point of Russia’s concerns for the 
South Caucasus, and it has to a large extent been instrumentalised. Russia has become a 
centralised state where consistent foreign policy decisions are taken in the Kremlin, and not in 
the North Caucasus. Besides, Russia has more than once taken decisions that might have hurt 
the regional elites in the North Caucasus. There were several cases in 1990s when Moscow 
either defied the opinion of the regional elites on certain decisions or, on the contrary the 
regional elites were reluctant to get involved in the conflicts.652 In 1994 and 1996 Russia 
applied land and marine blockade on Abkhazia cutting off the telephone lines and refusing to 
recognise Abkhaz passports.653 The same scenario was repeated in 2004 during the 
presidential elections in Abkhazia, when Russia irritated by the election results, closed the 
border through the Psou river.       
Whereas in the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia’s security concerns can be linked 
to the potential spill-over of conflict, that in the case of Mountainous Karabakh conflict is 
clearly absent. The only spill-over that Karabakh conflict might have produced by now was 
Turkey’s involvement in early 1990s, which today is out of question.  
c) Controlled instability 
Although Russia is explicitly not interested in the existence of any armed conflict in its south, 
it is, meanwhile not interested in the immediate resolution of these conflicts either. It sees no 
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urgency in disturbing the status-quo. It is instead interested in retaining the status-quo and a 
form of controlled instability. Moscow has for various reasons seen the conflicts in its south 
as a lever against the parent states and a guarantee of its political and physical presence in the 
region. The conflicts have, in particular since the West’s active engagement in the region and 
Kosovo’s independence, served as a stake in Russia’s interaction with the West and its control 
over the South Caucasus. An assessment of 1997 concluded that ‘any stable political 
arrangement for… Abkhazia would weaken Russia’s position, reduce its influence on future 
developments and call into question the rational for its military presence’ is still valid 
today.654  
Russia’s policies towards both Abkhazia and South Ossetia should be viewed in two contexts: 
in the context of Russian-Georgian bilateral relations, related to Russia’s geopolitical 
interests; and in the context of Russia’s domestic security interests. Policies within the 
bilateral relations spectre are closely linked to Russia’s great power interests: certain Russian 
policies towards the conflicts under Putin and Medvedev have been the result of deteriorating 
Georgian-Russian relations and Georgia’s efforts to integrate to NATO and align with the US. 
Russian policymakers have argued that these efforts will only exacerbate the conflict 
resolution processes in Georgia.655 The Georgian Government on its turn has argued that 
previous alignment with Russia did not give Tbilisi anything, and currently, too, 
bandwagoning does not promise Georgia anything. Russia’s inaction in both Georgian 
conflicts was to a certain extent to blame on Russia’s incapacity as a state during Yeltsin’s 
term. One of the central arguments of the Russian Government during Putin’s term has been 
that had Georgia tried to accommodate Russia’s interests and gain its trust, this would have 
had positive implications for the peace process at least in South Ossetia. Since, Russia’s 
consolidation of statehood and capacity coincided with a deterioration of the bilateral 
relations, it is rather difficult to judge the likelihood of such a scenario. The second context, 
Russia’s security interests are independent of the bilateral relations.   
All three conflicts (including Mountainous Karabakh) in the region have served Russian 
interest of hegemony and control in the post-soviet decade. In the preliminary period of 
Russian foreign policy, the secessionist conflicts happened to be important resources for a 
Kremlin short of policy instruments to provide its interests in the region. This was especially 
true for early and mid 90s, when crisis-stricken Russia did not have the serious resources to 
compete in the economic sphere with the West in the region and viewed the conflicts as the 
only sources of leverage over the region. Back in October 1992, Sergei Karaganov, an 
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influential member of the Presidential Council, introduced the term post-imperial policy. 
Russia, he argued, ‘is compelled to play an active post- imperial role... Russia must return to 
its traditional role, bribe local princes, send troops to save someone, and so on. It is an 
ungrateful job, but it is our history and we partially ourselves led us to it’.656  
Thus, for both domestic security and boader power-political reasons Russia will not agree to 
leave South Ossetia or Abkhazia. Leaving this region could imply instability in the whole 
Caucasus. In other words, it has domestic security interests in this region, but it is not security 
that acts as the driving force behind its policies, but rather its boader power-political interests. 
The disinterest to see armed conflict in its south reflects its domestic security interest, whereas 
the disinterest to assist the resolution of these conflicts by either activating its efforts or 
ceasing creating incentives for the secessionist entities reflects its power-political interests. 
The resolution of the conflicts in Georgia depends to a large extent as mentioned above on 
Russian-Georgian bilateral relations. It is by virtue of these conflicts Russia has secured that 
Georgia does not become a NATO member state, since most NATO states would be reluctant 
to accept troubled Georgia into NATO. Both conflicts guarantee Russia’s political and 
military presence in the region, now that Russia has no military presence in Georgia. Russia’s 
long term interest in the South Caucasus is above all security and peace, and as indicated in 
the Stability Pact for the Caucasus, any economic prosperity in the south would have 
implications for the North Caucasus.657 Thus, controlled instability is in no way an interest 
itself, but just a policy instrument.  
3.3.2. Broader Geo-political interests 
The Kremlin’s perceived strategic interests here since 1991 have included exclusive political 
and military presence, exclusive peacekeeping, deployment of border guards on the external 
borders of the three states, monopolisation of the production and transport of Caspian 
hydrocarbon resources, and securing relative autonomy from the international system. 
Further, like in the 19th century, for Russia, the South Caucasus was perceived to be important 
in terms of control over the North Caucasus.   
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a) Political and military presence  
The interest in exclusive political and military presence was expressed in early 90s as 
containing the influence of the regional actors of Turkey and Iran to secure Russia’s exclusive 
hegemony in the region. Russia had waged a tripolar contest with Turkey and Iran over 
influence in the Caucasus since the 16th century and had only managed to establish its nearly 
uninterrupted control over the region in the 19th century. Turkey in particular through its 
ethnic and linguistic similarity to Azerbaijan was viewed as a potential actor to fill the power 
vacuum if Russia were to leave.658 There existed the potential of Turkey’s involvement in the 
Mountainous Karabakh conflict in early 1992 following the Khojaly massacre, and once 
Nakhchivan became subject to a short-term assault by Armenia, Turkey raised its obligations 
under the Kars treaty of providing the exclave’s security.659 Russia saw Turkey as a rival in 
the Balkans, too, since Turkey lobbied the interests of Bosnian muslims at Euro-Atlantic 
institutions, and above all Turkey was a NATO ally. Turkey’s restrictions on the passing of 
large tankers through the straits and its historic role in the Caucasus and the Balkans had 
contributed to the generation of a rival perception of Ankara in Moscow. In this context, 
Russia pressed hard to strengthen the relative autonomy of the South Caucasus region and 
warned against any Western or Turkish presence in the region. To prevent any potential 
Turkish opportunism at the preliminary period, head of the joint armed forces of the CIS 
Marshal Shaposhnikov warned of a third world war if Turkey were to interfere in the 
Mountainous Karabakh conflict.660 In March 1993, defence minister Grachev made Russia’s 
own military cooperation with Turkey conditional on Ankara’s neutral position in the MK 
conflict.661  
Throughout the Post-Soviet period Russia developed a vested interest in political and in 
military presence in the region. This involved both Russia’s security interests in the Caucasus 
and the desire not to let the region off control. The Kremlin implemented its potential control 
via military bases in the region, peace-keeping forces and border guards to guard the external 
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borders of the CIS. The latter interest was conditioned by effective border control in the CIS 
to safeguard Russia’s own borders and prevent drug trafficking. Soviet borders were properly 
demarcated, equipped and manned, whereas Russia’s new borders in the south were not. 
Moreover, Russia’s presence on Armenia’s and Georgia’s border with Turkey, and Armenia’s 
and Azerbaijan’s border with Iran would also symbolise Russia’s physical presence. At a joint 
meeting of foreign and defense ministers of the CIS states in 1994, Kozyrev argued that 
‘Russia has an historic duty to guard the border because it is a frontier of the CIS’.662 
b) Military bases 
Russia’s military presence in the region has primarily served its interest of physical presence 
and ability to influence the region politically. The desire for military presence in Armenia 
produced a stable strategic alliance between the latter and Russia, making Yerevan Russia’s 
most loyal partner in the CIS. In Azerbaijan, Russia’s push for border guards or military bases 
was continuously rejected on the grounds that Russian presence, like in the case of Georgia, 
would not bring any favour to the country’s ailing problems. Improvement of relations in 
2002 led to Azerbaijan’s lease of the Gabala radar station to Russia for a 10 year period. In 
the case of Georgia, Russian military presence was secured through the four military bases in 
Batumi, Akhalkalaki, Vaziani, Gudauta and peacekeeping missions in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. Interest in military presence in Georgia was more pressing in early 1990s. By early 
1993 Grachev affirmed that, ‘Georgia’s Black Sea Coast is an area of strategic importance for 
the Russian army. We must take every measure to ensure that our troops remain there, 
otherwise we shall lose the Black Sea’.663 He also referred to Abkhazia as the only warm 
water port that Russia could use. Having secured its presence in Abkhazia, Russia since the 
last few years no longer considers the military bases in mainland Georgia to be as important 
as before. In 2005, President Putin reacted to Georgia’s request for the withdrawal of military 
bases, saying ‘from the standpoint of our security and strategic interests, [these bases] do not 
present any particular interest’. Although the bases had a symbolic meaning and their 
withdrawal upon Georgia’s insistence and pressure by all available means did have a negative 
impact upon Georgian-Rusian relations. As President Putin put it, ‘Is it a good thing or a bad 
thing that we’re leaving Georgia? Politically speaking is it good or bad? I believe it is not very 
good because it means our military presence is no longer desired by our neighbors and I don’t 
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see anything good in this’. 664 Meanwhile, Russia insisted that its withdrawal should not be 
accompanied by the deployment of the military bases of other states, in particular the US.665  
c) Peacekeeping forces 
Peacekeeping became a central issue in the 1993 military doctrine, which allowed for the 
legal use of armed forces in peacekeeping operations within the former Soviet space.666 This 
was also confirmed by the defence minister Grachev, who saw peacekeeping operations as a 
primary task of the Russian military amidst threats coming from the armed conflicts in the 
post-Soviet states.667 Russia was also concerned that unless it has strong peacekeeping 
presence in the region, the vacuum will be filled by others. Since 1993, Russian policymakers 
have expressed the view that Russia should be the sole peacekeeper in the CIS.668 Presence in 
the form of peace-keeping forces in all three conflicts has been equally important for Russia. 
In the case of Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts, peacekeeping has served both security 
and geopolitical interests, in the case of Mountainous Karabakh conflict, future potential 
peacekeeping would serve only geopolitical interests since MK was never a domestic security 
threat to Russia the way Abkhazia and South Ossetia were. Although Russian peace-keeping 
in Georgia has been partial and at times ineffective, it has generally managed to prevent the 
outbreak of large-scale armed conflict with a spill-over potential.669  
Russia has made it clear to both the EU and NATO that peace-keeping in this region cannot 
be shared.670 Obviously, the Kremlin has seen sharing peacekeeping as an indicator of 
Russia’s incapacity and weakness as a great power to resolve problems in its own regional 
shell. Moreover, it has seen Western attempts to internationalise the peacekeeping in Georgia 
as a sign of attempt to intrude into the CIS and undermine Russia’s hegemony there.  
Therefore, throughout 2006-2008 Georgia’s attempts to internationalise the peacekeeping in 
its territory was perceived by Russian policymakers as aimed at replacing Russia by NATO, 
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although the latter had never expressed readiness to commit itself to such a task.671 An 
internationalisation of peacekeeping in Abkhazia or South Ossetia might have accelerated the 
peace processes, it would also improve Georgia’s trust of Russia as a mediator. Russia for a 
number of reasons is not prepared to share peacekeeping or internationalise mediation process 
in Georgia’s secessionist conflicts. This is because it has its own agendas in the region, which 
can be disturbed by a shift to peacekeeping: its political and military presence in the South 
Caucasus is guaranteed through its presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as peacekeepers, 
and an internationalisation would in Russian perception undermine Russia’s mediating 
capacity. Moreover, Moscow has seen internationalisation of peacekeeping largely in power-
political terms, as if it would be targeted at limiting Russia’s role in the region. Certain 
Russian policymakers have raised the argument that overall the goal of Georgia and the West 
is US presence near Russia’s southern borders allegedly for the purpose of destabilising 
Russian North Caucasus. Last, but not least, an internationalisation of peacekeeping would 
make it harder for Russia to carry on with its policies of tacit support to the regions, and 
would undermine its policy of controlled instability.  
To secure exclusivity, foreign minister Kozyrev undertook efforts in 1993 to get Russia 
recognised as the sole peace-keeper in the CIS in an institutionalised form. Both Russia’s 
desire for unlimited peace-keeping and its involvement in the Abkhaz conflict undermined its 
appeal, and at the Prague CSCE Summit in 1994, the organisation accepted the idea of its 
peacekeeping subject to two conditions: that all sides should agree and peace-keeping forces 
should have a timeframe.672 Equally in the case of the Mountainous Karabakh conflict, Russia 
initially was reluctant to indulge its internationalisation, and got reconciled to the idea of 
permanent Minsk Group members only after it was guaranteed a co-chair status. Its mediation 
efforts were accompanied by the request for the return of Russian troops to Azerbaijan, who 
had left at Baku’s insistence in 1992.  
d) Resistance to US presence 
Russian policymakers have been increasingly concerned about Western engagement in the 
South Caucasus, in particular since the 1994 oil contract. The Kremlin has seen US 
engagement in the region as a blow to its global and regional position and as an attempt to 
decrease Russia’s influence in the CIS. Since the deterioration of Russian-US relations, US 
presence has largely been seen to be at the cost of Russia’s restriction from the region. The 
1994 oil contract, the Istanbul Summit oil and gas pipeline deals, agreement to close its 
military bases in Georgia, the emergence of US train and equip programme in Georgia, 
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Georgia’s NATO application were all seen as Western efforts to weaken Russia’s position in 
the CIS and the international system. Back in 1998, Stanislav Cherniavski from Russian MFA 
stated that ‘the Transcaucasus is turning into a US sphere of strategic interests’.673 In other 
words, since Russia’s hegemony is limited and since disturbing its hegemony is desired by 
certain CIS states, Russia’s policymakers blame all those processes of perceived erosion of 
power on the US and the West. Policymakers in the Kremlin refuse to see the above-
mentioned processes as an outcome of their own policies towards the region. Instead, they 
argue traditionally that it is not politically or economically profitable for those CIS states to 
seek alternative alignments.674  
Russia’s interest to keep NATO and the West out of its regional shell is related to its self-
image as a great power. Speaking at the influential Russian think-tank the Council on Foreign 
and Defence Policy in 2007, the Russian minister of foreign affairs Lavrov accused the United 
States of ‘playing games’ in the CIS, saying, ‘one should inform our Western partners that 
attempts to contain Russia in her regional ‘shell’ are hopeless’.675 The Kremlin insists that the 
states to its south should coordinate their foreign policies, with respect to the West, with it. In 
particular, it has expressed its interest in a neutral Georgia to its south and has tried to 
persuade the Georgian administration to give up its application for NATO.676 In 2004 in the 
course of the negotiations between Georgia and Russia, on the withdrawal of Russian military 
bases from Georgia, Russia demanded guarantees from Georgia that its withdrawal will not be 
accompanied by the presence of a third state’s military presence.  
International presence near Russia’s borders is also associated with instability in the North 
Caucasus.677 In 2004, during the Beslan crisis Putin stated that ‘there are certain people who 
want us to be focused on our internal problems and they pull strings here so that we don’t 
raise our heads internationally’.678 The message outspokenly indicated the dominant 
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perception in the Kremlin that the West is intent on eliminating Russia as an international 
force by disturbing its hegemony in the CIS and destabilising the North Caucasus. During the 
South Ossetia crisis too, certain policymakers were of the view that if Russia does not 
respond, the next step will be Russia’s North Caucasus.  
e) Erosion of values and Russia’s soft power679 
Russia was antipathetic to the coloured revolutions in the CIS seeing them as greater 
international engagement in its backyard and a threat to its soft power.680 With the rose 
revolution, Russia observed a shift of values and an end to the Soviet bureaucracies in the 
relevant countries. The coloured revolutions brought to power younger elites looking to the 
West with hope and admiration, for whom Western model of political and economic 
management was a preference.681  
The revolutions and democratisations in the CIS were seen as a challenge to Russia both 
internally and externally. In 2005, in an interview the then defence minister Sergei Ivanov 
described Russia’s two major challenges as interference in Russia’s internal affairs by foreign 
states, through the structures they support, and violent assault on the constitutional order of 
some post-Soviet states.682 The external challenge was Russia’s perception that the West 
through democratisation is intervening into Moscow’s exclusive zone. The coloured 
revolutions were therefore seen to have been manufactured by the West externally.683 In 2007, 
the then President Putin stated that Moscow would continue to influence affairs in former 
Soviet states, despite Western attempts to produce democracy in what it considers to be its 
own strategic backyard.684  
For a while, Russia seemed to have no soft power to offer the CIS states, but within a short 
period, it realised that its policies in the region suffered from ideological vacuum and skilfully 
developed its own alternative, called ‘sovereign democracy’.685 The concept of ‘sovereign 
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democracy’ has been suitable for most CIS states, due to their political nature. It revolves 
around two main ideas: the West’s non-interference in the domestic affairs of the post-soviet 
states and a post-soviet interpretation of democracy emanating from the region’s historic 
experience.686 The coloured revolutions were seen by the Kremlin to be externally 
orchestrated, aimed at alienating the relevant states from Russia and preaching them certain 
values for their own ends.687 Russian political elite accordingly argued that the West’s 
democratisation and human rights preaching was only a pretext for its geopolitical interests, 
and post-soviet states, due to their specific historic experiences, should evolve their own paths 
of democratisation.  
The concept of sovereign democracy soon after its presentation became an attractive 
alternative for the authoritarian regimes in the region. Moreover, Russian version of 
governance following the coloured revolutions became an important model, and Russia a 
value partner for most CIS states. Prioritising non-intervention in domestic affairs and 
stability, sovereign democracy became a popular concept used all over the SU to curtail limits 
on individual liberties, to censor newspapers and NGOs.688  
Concluding remarks  
Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia defined the South Caucasus region 
to be strategically important to both its domestic security interests and its broader geopolitical 
interests in the CIS. It has had a vested interest in non-resumption of hostilities in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, linking conflict in both regions to stability in the North Caucasus. Until the 
restoration of its rule in Chechnya, most Russian policymakers were of the view that control 
over the North Caucasus first requires control over the South. Control mover the region has 
largely been seen as physical presence in the form of peacekeeping or military bases. This 
however has not always been welcomed by the parent states and at times both Azerbaijan and 
Georgia had found difficult to comply with Russian demands without getting much benefit. 
Paradoxically most of these states’ balancing (less valid for Azerbaijan currently) efforts have 
been caused by Russia’s own policies.  
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A peculiar feature of Russia’s interests in the South Caucasus is that their linkage to both 
Russia’s domestic politics and foreign policy. For example, changing the format of 
peacekeepers in Georgia has been perceived in Russia to be harmful for its domestic security 
concerns in the South Caucasus that once it leaves the situation can deteriorate to a serious 
extent to destabilise the Russian North Caucasus. Meanwhile, the issue has also been seen as 
an tempt of the West to undermine Russia’s great power status via Georgia. Russia has from 
the onset been opposed tot eh internationalisation of peacekeeping and mediation in the 
conflicts in the near abroad. The Kremlin has been convinced that there should be no poles in 
the CIS and more international involvement alludes to Russia’s incapacity as a regional power 
to manage the conflicts. In the Georgian case, Russia’s opposition to the internationalisation 
of peacekeeping in the region is also stipulated by Russia’s disinterest in the resolution of 
both conflicts.  
Growing deterioration of Russian-Western relations over NATO enlargement to include 
Russia unfriendly states, US unilateralism in Iraq, Western criticism over Russia’s de marche 
into Chechnya as well its engagement in the conflicts in the region, Western view of Russia’s 
policies towards the South Caucasus in the context of neo-imperialism have only harshened 
Russia’s stance on the security problems in the South Caucasus. This has led to the formation 
of a perception in that most Western engagement in the region occurs in the context of power-
politics, and emergence of NATO OR US military bases in its vicinity can generate extra 
problems for its domestic security as well. Thus, the decreasing trust of Russia in diplomacy 
and international institutions as a means of regulating inter-state behaviour has implications 
for its engagement in the South Caucasus region.  
Although Russia’s long-term interests in the South Caucasus are stability and resolution of the 
conflicts, this is slightly different in terms of its short term interests. At present, Russia does 
not seem to be interested in a long-term resolution or modus vivendi in the conflicts in 
Georgia. Its policies are therefore rendered to meet its short-term interests, not long-term 
interests. Russia’s short term interests are instead satisfied with non-resumption of hostilities, 
which seemingly suits Russia’s both domestic security concerns and broader geopolitical 
interests.   
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Chapter 4  
Russia’s policies towards the ethno-territorial conflicts in the South 
Caucasus 
4.1. Russia’s engagement in the South Caucasus in the post-communist period 
Russia’s policies towards the South Caucasus under successive Russian Governments have 
been marked by inconsistence, confusion, contradictions, pragmatism, shortage and 
overestimation of resources. Russia has from the very onset, for its domestic security concerns 
and broader geopolitical interests been crucially involved in all three secessionist conflicts in 
the region and acted both as a mediator and peacekeeper, and a tacit supporter of the status-
quo favourable to the secessionists. Its peacekeeping in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia has 
been national interest based and has tended to safeguard the breakaway regions’ survival.689 
Its peacekeeping has not met standard norms of peacekeeping.690 Peacekeepers in both 
regions have allowed the secessionist elites to pursue state-building projects, while impeding 
the parent states from attempting to regain control of the regions by use of force. Russia has at 
times imposed economic embargoes on the secessionist regions and endorsed confederative 
solutions, but at other times manipulated the situation for its own strategic ends. It has until 
recently acted as a status-quo power in the South Caucasus, disinterested in instability near its 
borders, but at the same time has expressed the desire for stabilising the current power 
balances in the region and preserving the deadlocks. As Baev puts it, Russia’s policies are ‘an 
extraordinary complex and incoherent combination of unsustainable aspirations, incompatible 
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interests and uncoordinated activities’.691 It has had a dubious attitude to conflict resolution; 
while stability has been declared as the main goal, there are serious concerns that a long-term 
peace could erode Russia’s influence in the region and leave it with only symbolic leverage. It 
has therefore until recently preferred a situation, where recognising Georgia’s territorial 
integrity, in fact tacitly supported the survival of the separatist entities and enjoyed the 
privilege of being the sole peace-keeper. 
 
4.1.1. Policy incoherence: multiplicity of actors 
The inconsistency of Russia’s policies towards the region has been partly caused by the 
multiple actors involved in the conflicts and their incompatible interests, and partly by a 
shortage of resources and weakness of state institutions. During the Yeltsin administration, 
the multiplicity of actors in the South Caucasus included the Russian President, MFA, the 
military and successive Russian Parliaments. The Russian military was very influential in 
deciding Russia’s policies towards the near abroad in early 90s and dominated most of the 
decisions made towards the Caucasus.692 The collapse of the SU had led to a loosening of the 
central state in Russia, resulting in civilian officials and military commanders of all ranks 
taking a more independent stance and serving their own individual interests.693 The defence 
minister made decisions on a wide range of issues relating to the situation in the Caucasus 
without consulting the president. Often various actors pursued policies contrary to the 
Kremlin’s official stance, making the impression that either Russia’s real policies have been 
contrary to its official statements, or it is not controlling the situation. For example, at a time 
when the Russian MFA fully supported Georgia’s territorial integrity during Yeltsin’s term, 
the Duma and certain Russian politicians as the Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov still retained 
their earlier positions of sympathy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia and acted 
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accordingly.694 Nevertheless, the multiplicity of actors in Russia’s policies towards the South 
Caucasus would in no case imply that Russia’s policies were only executed by private groups, 
and that as a state it had no conscious involvement in the region. Quite the contrary, there 
were several occasions in all three conflicts where the involvement of the Russian military on 
either side of the conflict parties seemed to suit Russia’s hegemonic aspirations.695      
4.1.2. Shortage of resources 
Another problem that Russia faced in the South Caucasus was shortage of resources. The 
identity crisis, weakness of state institutions and immaturity of foreign policy towards the 
FSU, the Chechen crisis and last, but not least economic difficulties were all related to a 
shortage of resources and overall incapacity. At such a time, the conflicts in its south seemed 
to be potential points of leverage, some of which today still serve Russia’s perceived strategic 
interests in the region. It is widely believed that for much of the Yeltsin period, Russian 
policy-makers were attached to the view that persistence of conflict gave Russia leverage over 
the region’s affairs and its governments. Russia was too weak in 1990s to become a point of 
attraction for its neighbours and did not have the resources to offer them.696 The most efficient 
way to maintain influence in the Caucasus appeared to be through the manipulation of the 
ongoing conflicts, so this became the main direction of its policy in the region. The view was 
further strengthened once the West began to penetrate the region, and at the OSCE Istanbul 
Summit, amidst surprising, and to some, humiliating consent of Russia to Western demands 
on the Caucasus, the conflicts seemed to be a major policy resource.697  
Until recently, Russian foreign policy was considered not to have much leeway potential due 
to the shortage of resources. This was documented in the 2000 Foreign Policy Concept of the 
Russian Federation, which stated that the top priority was to ‘create favourable external 
conditions for a steady development of Russia, for improving its economy’.698 The picture 
changed gradually during Putin’s term in office. Under Putin the Russian foreign policy 
obtained continuity, the political system got internally centralised and externally readapted to 
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great power politics. Consolidation of the presidential administration helped overcome 
competing bureaucracies and resulting policy incoherence. Putin forced tycoons to 
demonstrate loyalty to the state, made the Duma and Federation Council more dependent 
upon the president, suppressed the private media of the oligarchs and brought security staff 
into Kremlin. On the issues in the South Caucasus, the Putin Administration ended the two 
Russias, that of the President and MFA versus the Duma, military and the regional elites. 
Russian foreign policy under Putin became more coherent than under his predecessor and 
consequently easier to analyse and assess.699  
The evolution of a single Russian foreign policy line vis-à-vis the South Caucasus region was 
conditioned by a number of factors. Firstly, during the early years of his presidency, Putin 
managed to centralise the power and decision-making mechanism of the Kremlin, and limited 
the free will of the regional elites including those in the North Caucasus. Putin pressed hard to 
establish the strong hand of the Kremlin over all structures of the state, filling civilian 
positions with security staff (siloviki).700 Secondly, when Putin came to power, the Kremlin 
had no option but to pursue a consistent policy for the South Caucasus, as from 1994 the West 
driven by its economic interests had started to penetrate the region and compete for 
influence.701 Certain analysts were convinced that Russia’s policies and its weakening 
security presence in the region as well as its domestic problems would end up in ‘strategic 
retreat’ from the Caucasus.702 At the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999, Russia had had to close 
two of its military bases and negotiate on the two other in Georgia which would end up its 
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military presence there (except for peacekeepers) and agree to the construction of a rival 
pipeline to transport Caspian hydrocarbon resources to Western markets bypassing Russia. 
Moreover, Putin came to the Kremlin after a serious defeat of Russian foreign policy, the 
military intervention in Kosovo notwithstanding Russia’s veto at the UNSC.703  
Today, Russia no longer experiences a shortage of resources for its interests in the South 
Caucasus. Spill-over of secessionism from the south is no longer a concern; the Chechen 
crisis that limited Russia’s ability for manoeuvre in the South Caucasus was put off. 
Previously, separatism in the South Caucasus was seen to have spill-over potential to the 
North Caucasus and therefore both Georgia and Azerbaijan had received unilateral support for 
their territorial integrity from Moscow.704 Now, Russia no longer feels that the Chechen factor 
should be a constraint on its policies towards the secessionist entities in the region. Russia 
through its economic recovery partly due to a rise in oil and gas prices and monopolisation of 
energy in Europe, is no longer short of resources for its foreign policy objectives.705 Russia 
has paid off its foreign debt and has had steady growth since 1999.706 Moreover, the 
international political situation is favourable to Russia; the US has had difficulties in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the EU is adapting to the challenges of enlargement, and is above all dependent 
upon Russia’s energy supply. Unlike 2000, in his 2004 address to the Federal Assembly, 
President Putin claimed that ‘the growth of the economy, political stability and the 
strengthening of the state have had a beneficial effect on Russia’s international position’.707 
As Trenin notes, the Russian leadership ‘came to the conclusion that the withdrawal has 
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ended, and it is time to counter-attack… it is time to re-establish a great power, and that the 
CIS is the space where Russian economic, political, and informational dominance should be 
established’.708  
Russia’s tendency to retain positions in the post-Soviet space has led to its tactical policies 
supportive of the secessionist regions and in this way it has acquired leverage over the 
potentially unfriendly states. Although, Russia has more resources today, the conflicts in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia still serve as a foreign policy tool and at this current stage it is 
seemingly not very interested in their resolution. A shift to its ‘security’ setting in the South 
Caucasus is highly securitised, and Russia has invested in maintaining the status-quo. The 
Kremlin has sought to preserve its exclusive role in the resolution of the ethno-territorial 
conflicts and will resist any internationalisation of the peace processes in both regions. 
Although the causal variables of all three conflicts do not lie in Russia, its policies have been 
a complicating factor, and any peace deal in the region is deemed to fail without Russia’s 
support.  
There is need for a differentiation of Russia’s approaches to the three conflicts under both 
Yeltsin’s and Putin’s terms in office. Both Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts 
are linked to Russia’s domestic security concerns in the Caucasus and can produce certain 
implications for Russia’s domestic politics. Meanwhile, both conflicts have, since the 
deterioration of Georgian-Russian and Russian-US relations in the last few years been largely 
seen in Moscow as a key vehicle against Western expansionism in the South Caucasus and as 
a guarantee of Russian presence in the South Caucasus.709 The picture is slightly different in 
the Mountainous Karabakh conflict: here Russia has no domestic security concerns, but only 
broader power-political and hegemonic interests, and unlike in the above-mentioned conflicts, 
the Kremlin during Putin’s term in office has been satisfied with its bilateral relations with 
both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Moreover, Russian-Western relations do not cross here the way 
they do in the Georgian-Russian relations.  
Within the last decade, both conflicts in Georgia have become concentrated on Georgian-
Russian relations. This is partly a result of Tbilisi’s strategy to describe them Russian-
Georgian with the intent of changing the negotiations and peacekeeping formats. The 
Georgian Government claims that Russia is not a neutral player and therefore cannot play a 
useful role. Russia on its part has been more openly involved in the conflicts, either by its 
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naturalisation of both regions’ residents and more direct engagement in the conflict zones. In 
April 2008, President Putin’s decision to increase the status of relations between Russia and 
the conflict regions is evident.710 Russia has issued loans, provided energy to both regions 
creating important incentives and making their reintegration with Georgia proper impossible 
and their positions intransigent.711 Without Russia’s support, the secessionist regions would 
have fewer chances of survival. In this context, Russia has become a de facto party to the 
conflicts, sensitive to developments in the regions. 
4.2. Russia’s policies towards the ethno-territorial conflicts in Georgia 
Interest groups in the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts 
The forces defining Russia’s policies towards both conflicts include the siloviki close to the 
Kremlin, military and security staff, the Russian Duma and the elites of North Caucasian 
republics. The most powerful among all groups has been the siloviki close to the Kremlin, 
who have predominantly seen the conflicts as a key vehicle against Western expansion in the 
South Caucasus.712 The military and security ministries support both regions, for the purpose 
of creating a buffer zone between Russia and the unfriendly and mistrustful Georgia. They see 
NATO membership of Georgia as an end to Russia’s great power status and even a challenge 
to Russia’s North Caucasus. The Russian Duma, which during Yeltsin’s term dominated most 
of the policies towards the secessionist conflicts in Georgia, is still an actor.713 Nationalist 
forces in the Duma including Zatulin, Baburin and Zhirinovski are the key figures.714 And last 
only are the North Caucasus elites. North Caucasus elites play a bigger economic role in the 
Abkhaz economy, rather than in the Ossetian economy.715 North Ossetians are concerned 
about the fate of their ethnic brethren and the North Ossetian president has repeatedly 
advocated the unification of two Ossetias.716 Overall, North Caucasian elites do not play such 
a big role as they used to.         
4.2. Russia’s policies towards the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict 
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Russia’s policies towards the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict have circulated around three major 
issues: its domestic security interests in the North Caucasus, boarder geopolitical interests and 
its incapacity. Security concerns remained largely unchanged under both Yeltsin and Putin 
Governments and still play an important role in Russia’s approach to the region. In terms of 
incapacity, at various stages of the conflict Russia’s incapacity has varied to certain degrees, 
resulting in Russia’s failure to impose conditions on the de facto authorities. On the other 
hand, it is difficult to identify Russia’s incapacity during Yeltsin’s term, because its pressure 
was never applied in a strict sense. This was partly because Russia’s domestic problems at the 
time never allowed the Kremlin to follow a strict embargo. The sanctions against Abkhazia 
were from the very beginning challenged by the Duma and the Caucasian elites.717  
Because the new period of consolidated Russian statehood was accompanied by a 
deterioration of relations between Georgia and Russia, and the latter’s active economic and 
political engagement in the region, no pressure has been applied on Abkhazia to come to 
peace. The fact that in 2004 during the presidential elections in Abkhazia, Moscow applied 
leverage to end the crisis by warning to close the border on Abkhazia, and the Abkhaz elite 
immediately submitted, imply that in the recent period Russia does have certain leverage vis-
à-vis Abkhazia.718 Vis-à-vis the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, Russia had a lot larger capacity 
and potential to explore than in any other conflict in the Caucasus, taking into consideration 
that until the closure of the Ergneti market, communication existed between the Georgian and 
Ossetian communities and the conflict was more of an elite driven character.  
4.2.1. Policies during President Yeltsin’s term of office  
Russia’s policies towards the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict during Yeltsin’s term varied between 
support to both sides, manipulation of the conflict for geopolitical ends, as well as certain 
efforts for conflict resolution. Given the fact that there was more than one Russian 
bureaucracy involved in the preliminary period, it was not clear what Russia’s interests would 
be, and how Moscow should react. The competing agendas of the Russian president and MFA 
on the one hand, and of the military commanders in the region, the Russian Duma and 
regional elites of the North Caucasus on the other, often led to puzzlement and confusion on 
who Russia is actually represented by and which actions are on behalf of the state. As 
Moscow endorsed Georgia’s territorial integrity, Russian arms found their way into Abkhaz 
hands, Russian planes bombed targets in Georgian controlled territory and Russian military 
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vessels shelled the Georgian held Sukhumi. Through 1992-1993, Russia had no single policy 
towards the conflict, it was not clear whether Russia wanted a strong, united Georgia or a 
weak one.  
a) Initial reaction 
Initially, the Russian state’s position was neutrality, and was more inclined towards sympathy 
for Georgia.719 In 1992, foreign minister Kozyrev uttered the strategic interests of Russia 
saying, ‘Russia needs an integral, stable and democratic Georgia, a guarantee for stability in 
the North Caucasus. Russia believes that to ensure the lawful rights of Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia and Ajaria as part of Georgia answers the interests of stability in Georgia and in the 
Caucasus as a whole’.720 Furthermore, in compliance with the Tashkent Treaty of May 1992, 
which provided for the distribution of the military hardware of the former USSR among CIS 
members, the Russian government had, shortly before the outbreak of the conflict in August, 
turned over to Georgia large military facilities causing Georgia’s military superiority over the 
Abkhaz forces.721 Actually, Georgia continued to receive weapons from the Transcaucasian 
military district throughout March 1993, although no agreement had been reached on the 
status of Russian troops in Georgia yet.722 There are even allegations that with the Dagomys 
cease-fire in South Ossetia, Russia had provided politico-military support to Georgia to 
launch military operations in Abkhazia.723 In autumn 1992, the Abkhaz possessed only 8 
tanks and 30 armoured vehicles, whereas just one Russian division handed over 108 tanks to 
Georgia.724  
As the conflict evolved into a military stage, the Russian president and minister of foreign 
affairs supported Georgia’s territorial integrity and put efforts for mediation. In fact, the 1992 
September cease-fire agreement between Abkhazia and Georgia, which seemed not to meet 
the interests of the Abkhaz, was only signed due to Russian pressure on Ardzinba.725 The 
latter, under strong pressure from Russia, was compelled to sign a document, which 
authorised the presence of Georgian troops on Abkhaz territory and did not make any mention 
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of a federal structure for Georgia.726 Therefore, it was no surprise that large-scale military 
operations continued after the 3rd September agreement for another 13 months. In the 3rd 
September meeting the President Yeltsin made it clear that Russia desired the preservation of 
the Georgian state, presumably considering that secessionism in the South Caucasus could 
become a challenge for Russia’s own territorial integrity in the North Caucasus.727 In fact, 
after the outbreak of the conflict in 1992, the Russian foreign ministry did send a letter to the 
Georgian Government, supporting Georgia’s ‘fight against terrorists’.728 Thus, the ceasefire 
only lasted until the Abkhaz, assisted by North Caucasus volunteers attacked Georgian 
controlled Gagra in north-western Abkhazia and retook it on 6th October, taking control of the 
Abkhaz-Russian border. The Russian Black Sea Fleet evacuated thousands of Georgians from 
the city. Shevardnadze immediately appealed to the Secretary General of NATO for 
assistance and stated that the 3rd September ceasefire had been a trap, alluding to an 
accusation of Russia.729 Meanwhile, in November, Shevardnadze rejected the idea of federal 
relations between Georgia and Abkhazia.730  
Another and seemingly most influential voice of Russia in the conflict was its military, who 
initially acted on their own initiative. Defence minister Grachev supported Yeltsin’s policy of 
non-interference, but warned that the Russian troops would retaliate against any attacks to 
acquire equipment.731 Although, from the very onset, Grachev had instructed the Russian field 
commanders in Abkhazia to keep neutral, the Russian military sympathised with the Abkhaz 
and in this way played a far more crucial role than the official mediation.732 The primary 
reason for the sympathy of the Russian military for Abkhazia was their disliking of 
Shevardnadze, blaming him for the breakup of the Soviet Union and early withdrawal from 
Eastern Europe.733 It seems that at the initial stage of the conflict, the Abkhaz access to 
Russian arms was made possible by the field commanders acting on their own initiative.734 
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The Abkhaz forces, far less in number and lightly armed at the beginning had often accessed 
Russian weapons by theft from the military bases in Gudauta or by deals with the officers.735 
However, after a certain period, especially once it became clear that Georgia was not intent on 
joining the CIS, Russia’s military involvement seems to have been sanctioned at the state 
level. The sudden presence of armor, tanks, heavy artillery, grad rocket launchers leaves the 
conclusion that after a certain stage of the conflict, weapons delivery to the Abkhaz was a 
consistent policy of the armed forces at the central level. The scale of Russian military 
assistance in the conflict was of crucial importance: within a short period of time after the 
start of the conflict the Abkhaz side managed to access 100,000 landmines and some heavy 
weapons, neither of which existed in Abkhazia before the outbreak of the conflict.736   
In addition, Abkhazia received sympathy from the peoples and elites of the North Caucasus 
and the Russian Parliament. As the war broke out volunteer armies of the Caucasus Mountain 
Peoples Confederation began to be formed in the major cities of the North Caucasus and 
dispatched to the region. Support received from the Confederation of Mountain Peoples in the 
Caucasus, International Circassian Association and Congress of the Kabardan People was a 
crucial factor making Abkhaz victory in the war possible.737 As the conflict proceeded, it 
rebound the whole region of the North Caucasus, and demonstrations were organised in all 
North Caucasian Republics. 738 Meanwhile, the Abkhaz conflict also helped Moscow shift the 
concentration of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples from seeking independence from 
Russia to defending Abkhazia from Georgia. The Confederation of Mountain peoples of the 
Caucasus that had been established prior to the outbreak of conflicts in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, initially campaigned for sovereignty from Russia.739 The outbreak of conflicts in 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia and involvement of Chehcens and other North Caucasians in 
them potnentially removed the centre of attention from the Russian North Caucasus to 
Georgia. It is worth mentioning that President Gamsakhurdia was one of the first to suggest 
and campaign for the idea of the unity of the North and South Caucasus in early 1990s. He 
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had enjoyed good relations with the Chechen leader and other North Caucasian elites until the 
outbreak of conflict in South Ossetia.740 Politically there were differences between different 
confederate groups; Shanibov, the chiarman enjoyed good relations with the Russian Duma, 
whereas, the CCMP commander in Abkhazia Shamil Basaev spoke out again Russian 
domination in the Caucasus. In August 1992, the Russian Ministry of Justice banned the 
Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus on the grounds that it had sent troops to 
Abkhazia and issued a statement on 18th August 1992, on the inadmissibility of intervention 
in the internal affairs of Georgia.741       
b) Russia’s incentives for assistance to the Abkhaz side 
Initially the Russian president and minister of foreign affairs tried to hold neutrality and 
sympathised with Georgia’s territorial integrity, but for a number of domestic political and 
external factors, both were soon inclined to change their positions. Emanating from Georgia’s 
independent-mindedness and mistrust of Georgia in Russia, parts of the Russian public and 
various groups in the Russian parliament had from the early days expressed sympathy towards 
Abkhazia.742 These groups were calling for Russia’s historic duty to safeguard the autonomies 
and minorities in the Caucasus, and viewed the Abkhaz cause as a national-independence 
movement.743 This was even strengthened when on 14th December 1992, a Russian army 
helicopter evacuating Abkhaz civilians from the besieged town of Tkvarcheli to Gudauta was 
shot down, causing 64 casualties, including 25 children.744 Moreover, Georgia had refused to 
join the CIS, and there was no sign that Georgia would join it in the near future and comply 
with the Russian demands of hosting border guards and military bases in its territory. 
According to Stanislav Lakoba, Russia’s position vis-à-vis Abkhazia changed for Georgia’s 
disadvantage after it became clear that Shevardnadze had no intention of joining the CIS.745  
Moreover, at a very initial stage of the conflict, at a time when the Russian Government had a 
pro-Georgian stance, the Georgian Government accused Russia of siding with the Abkhaz. 
Last but, not least came the factor of the North Caucasus elites and societies, which played the 
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most crucial role in the course of fighting. Indeed, at least half of the fighters in Abkhazia 
against Georgian forces were volunteers from the North Caucasus, without which victory of 
the Abkhaz side would be unthinkable.746 The volunteers were stimulated by a feeling of 
solidarity and compassion for their ethnic kin in the south. Taking into consideration the 
fragility of Russian rule over the North Caucasus at the time, had the Kremlin attempted to 
stop the volunteers from entering Abkhazia, it might have caused tension in the North 
Caucasus. In fact, the leader of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the North Caucasus 
Musa Shanibov, openly threatened Russia, that in case it supported Georgia, the North 
Caucasus republics would follow the Chechen lead and declare independence.747 The 
Caucasus Confederation at the beginning was enraged by the arms transfer to Georgia, 
blaming Russia for inaction and approval of the war.748 Taking into consideration all the 
above-mentioned factors, starting from early 1993, the Abkhaz conflict was seen as a lever 
against Georgia, in particular in bringing Georgia to Russian conditions. However, Russia’s 
involvement in the conflict was always seen as tactical, not strategic, serving certain 
objectives temporarily.  
c) Scale of Russia’s assistance 
On many occasions throughout 1993, Russian fighter planes bombed Georgian controlled 
parts of Abkhazia under the banner of retaliation to Georgia’s bombing of Russia’s 
positions.749 In March 1993, Izvestia reported that Abkhaz forces had received assistance 
from Russian military advisers, listing the arms supplies.750 On February 20, the Russian 
defence minister sent an aircraft to bomb Sukhumi in retaliation to Georgian bombing of 
Russia’s defence research centre and important laboratory in Eshera, Abkhazia.751 Russia’s 
involvement on the Abkhaz side became even more obvious when Georgian forces downed an 
SU-27 fighter-bomber on March 27, 1993, and the plane upon inspection by a UN military 
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observer was established to belong to the Russian air force and the pilot to be a major in the 
Air Forces.752 In April, June and July 1993, when Abkhaz attacks were renewed, the Georgian 
Government claimed that MI 24 helicopters, SU-25s and some 500 Russian advisors were 
involved on the Abkhaz side.753 Interestingly, this was not denied by the foreign minister 
Kozyrev.754 In response, Georgia refused the Russian defence minister Grachev’s plan to 
deploy two Russian divisions and one brigade as peacekeeping forces.755 However, as Roy 
Allison puts it, ‘even without this level of Russian commitment, the effect of Russian 
mediation was to confirm the Georgian defeat and retreat from Abkhazia’.756 
d) Cease-fire 
On 27th July 1993, amidst heavy fighting around Sukhumi, Ochamchire and Tkvarcheli 
regions of Abkhazia, a fragile cease-fire was reached in Sochi by Russia’s pressure and 
mediation. The Sochi agreement provided for the withdrawal of the Georgian army from 
Abkhazia and mutual demilitarisation by the belligerents, to be followed by the return of a 
‘legal government’.757 Russia undertook the role of guarantor of the agreement. In early 
August, Georgia slowly removed heavy military equipment from the zone of conflict to the 
port of Poti and from there further to the Black Sea coast. However, the implementation of the 
disarmament was not carried out by the Abkhaz forces resulting in military imbalance. Once 
again, Russia’s monitoring of the compliance of the agreement seemed to be assymetric and 
raised doubts on its partiality. The failure to monitor the cease-fire duely was also a result of 
Russia’s incapacity as a peacekeeper.758    
Although thousands of civilians returned to Sukhumi, the cease-fire led to widespread 
disappointment among the population of Georgia, enabling the ousted President 
Gamsakhurdia and his supporters to re-emerge in Western Mingrelia to ‘rescue’ Georgia.759 
After Gamsakhurdia’s adherents launched an offensive against the Georgian Government 
troops in Samtredi on 15th September 1993, the Abkhaz forces taking advantage of this 
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window of opportunity started an offensive against the Georgian forces. The Abkhaz side 
justified their action on Georgia’s failure to achieve a complete withdrawal of its weapons and 
troops from the conflict zone.760 On September 17, Russian peacekeepers returned to 
Georgian forces the parts taken from their artillery pieces pursuant to the cease-fire 
agreement. The Russian Government seemed surprised by the Abkhaz breach of the cease-fire 
and denounced Sukhumi for it. It called on the Abkhaz authorities to stop the offensive and 
human rights violations at once, and supported UNSC resolutions condemning them. Russia 
applied sanctions on Abkhazia, cut off electricity and phone lines and closed its border on the 
Psou river.761 The Russian MFA meanwhile criticised Georgia for refusing to negotiate. The 
Abkhaz forces drove the Georgian army from Abkhazia and captured Sukhumi on 27th 
September. Appeals by Shevardnadze to Russia as a guarantor of the Sochi agreement to 
restore the status-quo went unanswered. Grachev refused to use the Russian troops on the 
ground to stop the Abkhaz offensive. According to Lakoba, had the Russian troops tried to 
stop the Abkhaz offensive, this would have led to fighting between them and the 
Abkhaz/North Caucasian forces.762     
e) Civil war and acquiesce to CIS membership  
The consequence for Georgia was dramatic, the state was on the verge of collapse, and civil 
war continued. Zviadist offensive was continuing in Mingrelia, whose adherents had in early 
October captured Poti and blocked railway and food supplies to Tbilisi. At this stage, 
Shevardnadze appealed to Moscow for support to both end the violence in Abkhazia and fight 
the Zviadists. On October 19, 1993, Grachev responded stating that Russia could not offer 
military assistance to Georgia since it was not part of the CIS and added that any other action 
might be interpreted as interference in the domestic affairs of the state.763 Russia hinted at its 
previously set conditions for any support: Georgia’s accession to the CIS, Russian military 
bases and deployment of Russian peacekeepers in the Abkhaz conflict zone. Once the 
Georgian Parliament endorsed CIS membership on 8th October, Russia sent troops to put 
down the insurgency in Mingrelia and protect the main railway lines. On 9th October, a 
Georgian-Russian agreement was signed on the status of Russian troops in Georgia, which 
also gave Russia joint use of all Georgian ports and airfields.764 Further on February 3, 1994 
Yeltsin and Shevardnadze signed a treaty of friendship, cooperation and good neighbourly 
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relations. The treaty also allowed Russia to establish three military bases in Georgia for a 
twenty-five period. According to the friendship and cooperation treaty between Georgia and 
Russia on 3 February 1994, Russia declared its support for Georgia’s territorial integrity, but 
Yeltsin called for a special status for both Abkhazia and South Ossetia in a new Georgian 
constitution.765 The Russian parliament however, criticising President Yeltsin’s move, refused 
to ratify the treaty on the grounds that it provided support to one side of an ongoing conflict; 
the Duma drew attention to article 3 of the agreement stipulating Russian assistance to 
improve Georgia’s armed forces, including transfer of weapons and equipment.766 The 
committee on CIS affairs argued that the agreement could destabilise the situation in the 
Caucasus whole, because it encouraged Georgia’s use of force. Under the agreement Russia 
would undertake to close its borders for preventing volunteers from the North Caucasus 
entering Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The 3 February statement by the Duma objected to the 
treaty on the grounds that 1) Georgia had unilaterally infringed international agreements on 
the settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict; 2) Georgian aggression against Abkhazia 
was continuing, and to conclude a treaty with a warring country was to abet aggression; 3) the 
treaty would provoke negative reactions in the North Caucasus, in Russia as a whole and in all 
the countries inhabited by the Circassian diaspora; 4) the treaty provided for assistance in the 
formation of Georgian armed forces, their equipment and the purchase of military hardware 
and technology, which contravened the law.767  
On 1 December 1993, the first round of talks between Georgia and Abkhazia under UN 
auspices and with Russia as facilitator, ended in Geneva with the signing of a memorandum 
of understanding. Both sides agreed not to use force or the threat of force for the period of 
negotiations, to exchange prisoners and create conditions for the voluntary and safe return of 
refugees.768 After the signing of the December 1 memorandum, Abkhazia seemed to have 
made concessions on the issue of return of refugees, and Russia partially lifted the sanctions 
against it imposed after the latter’s breach of the Sochi accord. However, the subsequent 
developments showed the unwillingness of Abkhaz authorities to implement the pledge. On 
10 March, while Shevardnadze was in the United States, the Georgian parliament dismissed 
the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia, annulling all its decisions. The Abkhazian Supreme Soviet 
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immediately cancelled all the plans for the return of the refugees.769 At the end of March, 
fighting in Abkhazian Svaneti flared up again, and Russia issued an appeal to both sides to 
resume negotiations. Major breakthrough was reported on 4th April, 1994, when both sides 
with Russia’s mediation and UN/OSCE participation, signed the Moscow Declaration on 
measures for a political settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. Both sides agreed on 
federal and confederative relations in the agreement.770 The declaration was accompanied by 
an agreement on the voluntary return of refugees and displaced people with the exception of 
those Georgians involved in war crimes.771 It further stipulated that Abkhazia would have its 
own constitution and legislation, as well as its national anthem, coat of arms and flag. The 
sides reached an agreement on joint powers in fields as foreign policy, foreign trade, border 
service and customs. However, it did not lead to any substantial rapprochement between the 
sides. The agreement had opposite interpretations in Tbilisi and Sukhumi: the Abkhaz side 
saw it as a step towards the recognition of both sides as equal and sovereign subjects 
delegating powers to each other.772 And Shevardnadze pointed out that contrary to Abkhaz 
claims, the statement of 4th April did not speak of Abkhazia as a subject of international law, 
nor did it contain any mention of confederal status for Abkhazia.773   
After Georgia’s consent to Russia’s conditions, the Kremlin mounted a blockade of Abkhazia 
in 1994 in order to pressure the Abkhaz government to compromise on the political status of 
the region. The embargo permitted the direct import of only food products, medical supplies, 
petroleum products and household items, and restricted the travel of men to Russia between 
the ages 16 and 60. Transport and postal links between Abkhazia and Russia were cancelled 
and Russia refused to recognise Soviet passports from people with Abkhazian resident status, 
phone lines were cut off.774 This led to softening in the Abkhaz position and abandonment of 
its insistence on full independence in the Moscow talks in November 1994.775 Later, 
Georgia’s support to Russia during the Chechen war led to the adoption of a more 
institutionalised embargo on Abkhazia at the CIS level on January 31, 1996. However, 
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Russia’s pressure failed to produce any tangible results partly because of inconsistency in 
Russia itself; the Russian parliament and North Caucasus elites still sympathised with 
Abkhazia and defied the embargo, the blockade was never implemented in a strict sense of the 
word and was challenged by cross-border trade with Georgia proper through smuggling 
chains involving Russian, Georgian and Abkhaz officers.776 Abkhazia had signed agreements 
with most of the North Caucasus republics to avoid isolation, and in 1997 a year after the 
launch of the embargo, agricultural products from Abkhazia were exported to Russia.  
Another factor worth considering is that Russia had seriously overestimated its resources in 
the Abkhaz conflict. In July 1994, as the Russian officials pressured the Abkhaz to accept the 
return of Georgian IDPs to the Gali region, the Abkhaz authorities, insisting on a gradual 
return, threatened the Russian peacekeeping forces who were to assist the return of the IDPs, 
and in September, the Abkhaz forces entered the security zone, forcing the Russian 
peacekeepers to retreat.777 In early July, the Abkhaz leader Ardzinba refused to meet Kozyrev 
during the latter’s visit to the conflict zone, bringing sharp criticism from the Russian 
MFA.778 On 25 August, the Russian peacekeepers set up road-blocks and briefly disarmed the 
Abkhaz police in Gudauta after a reported shooting at a Russian military sanatorium.779 
Throughout the period, the Abkhaz repeatedly defied the Russian peace-keepers on the issues 
of return of IDPs. In mid-September, the Abkhaz and Russian peacekeepers were on the brink 
of open hostilities because of a mass crossing of Georgian refugees, due to start on 14th 
September.780 The Abkhaz mobilised their tanks and anti-aircraft forces and moved them into 
the neutral zone, leading to the cancellation of the planned crossing. Throughout that period, 
Moscow pressured Tbilisi to accept a federal model within an asymmetric federation and 
repeatedly stated that Abkhazia had no chance of becoming an independent state or subject of 
the Russian Federation.         
The presence of CIS peacekeepers in Abkhazia has made a new large-scale war improbable. It 
has played a complimentary role to the UNOMIG whose proper functioning required the 
peacekeepers. However, it has been far from being impartial and has tended to consolidate the 
status-quo in the region. Russia’s primary concern in peacekeeping has been preventing a 
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resumption of armed conflict, and it has been unwilling to transform the mandate of the PKF 
into peace enforcement. The impartiality has to a certain extent owed to its incapacity to 
enforce peace, but also to the dubious policies and intentions of Moscow in the region. The 
CISPKF has on certain occasions done nothing to safeguard the Georgian returnees to 
Abkhazia. The armed clashes in the Gali region in 1998 demonstrated that the PKF could not 
maintain law and order in the area of its responsibility. In the 1998 crisis, the Russian 
Government refused to allow the peacekeepers to intervene to protect the Georgian 
population, although both sides were prevented from bringing heavy weapons into the 
security zone.781 Thus, the peacekeeping has had a basic character of keeping the sides 
apart.782   
3.2.2. Russian policies under Putin administration 
As mentioned elsewhere in this study, under President Putin, Russia’s policies towards the 
conflict have been better organised and coordinated, so that one can speak of Russia as a 
single actor. With the centralisation of power and strengthening of state institutions, 
competing bureaucracies have been marginalised and policies have uniformly been carried out 
by the Kremlin.  
Russia’s commitment to Georgia’s territorial integrity gradually shifted and eroded towards 
the end of Putin’s term. One of the first steps of President Putin in 1999 was to cancel the 
trade, transport and travel embargo of 1996. This was conditioned by a number of factors; 
firstly, 1999 saw a gradual deterioration in the Georgian-Russian relations, as Tbilisi refused 
its assistance to Russia during the Chechen campaign and was accused by Moscow of hosting 
Chechen terrorists in the Pankisi Gorge.783 Moreover, the Georgian elite convinced that 
Moscow was not intent on resolving the conflict, sought outside support, appealing to NATO 
and the US for strategic cooperation. Russian-Georgian relations deteriorated further during 
the incursion of Chechen fighters and Georgian security forces into the Kodori gorge in 2001. 
Accordingly, Russia backed the Abkhaz demand for the withdrawal of Georgian forces from 
Kodori and carried out air strikes on the area. A small number of Russian troops were 
deployed into the gorge as well, until in February 2002 Georgian troops withdrew. The 
Russian MFA has continuously raised concern over the issue of Georgian deployment in the 
Kodori gorge, regarding it as a violation of the 1994, May 14, Moscow agreement.  
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Moscow’s position on Georgia’s territorial sovereignty changed rapidly as the bilateral 
relations aggravated to an unprecedented level with the arrest of alleged Russian spies by 
Tbilisi in October 2006 and concrete steps by Tbilisi for NATO application. Back in early 
2006 for example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had assured Georgia that Russia would 
never consider recognising Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence or their 
incorporation into Russia.784 There were even numerous statements in 2004 during the 
temporary improvement of relations between Georgia and Russia that the latter would be 
prepared to assist Georgia restore its territorial sovereignty, by peaceful means albeit.785 
Finally, the deterioration of bilateral relations to an unprecedented level, and certain external 
factors led to Russia’s recognition of the region’s independence.  
In addition to the deterioration of bilateral relations, geopolitics played a role in the shift 
towards a more active engagement in Abkhazia. It has been stated elsewhere in this chapter, 
that when Putin came to power Western influence was already set in the South Caucasus: 
Georgia was aspiring towards NATO membership and received US backing at the OSCE 
Istanbul Summit for the the closure of the four Russian military bases in Georgia, Western 
companies were exploring the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea and a pipeline bypassing 
Russia was to be built. Geopolitical considerations became even graver with the appearance 
of US military trainers in Georgia to assist the Georgian army fight terrorism in the Pankisi 
gorge. US military presence and overall Western presence in the region was perceived to be 
aimed at limiting Russia’s influence in the region. Although initially Putin had no objection to 
the GTEP programme, the later developments in the South Ossetia crisis in August 2008 
showed that, from the very onset the Russian government had seen it as US support and 
assistance for Georgia’s military intervention in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.786 Back in April 
2003, the Russian Duma had adopted a resolution condemning the ‘status of forces 
agreement’ between the US and Georgia.787 As concern grew in various Russian political 
circles over the US and European engagement in the South Caucasus, Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia increasingly became a buffer zone between Russia and a Western oriented Georgia. 
Furthermore, both regions became potential allies of Russia in a region of its strategic 
interests. Georgia’s further attempts to internationalise the conflict and replace the CISPKF 
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with a force of a Western oriented state as the Ukraine or the Baltic states was further seen as 
an attempt to contain Russia in her own region. 
Russia’s strategic interest in not having any armed conflict in the South Caucasus has 
remained unchanged under Putin. As a result, ever since Saakashvili’s rise to power, Russian 
officials have repeatedly stated that Russia would not tolerate any solution involving use of 
force, since this would seemingly destabilise the Russian North Caucasus. Putin’s policies in 
contrast to the limited engagement of previous years have tended towards an active 
engagement in Abkhazia by various means and as a matter of fact created serious 
disincentives for Abkhazia’s reintegration into Georgia. 
a)Naturalisation of residents 
Starting in 1999 Russia pursued a state policy of granting en masse citizenship to Abkhazia’s 
population, so that in 2005 over 80% were holding Russian passports. Moscow justified its 
policies on purely humanitarian grounds about the residents of Abkhazia, hence to enable the 
residents to travel abroad and to better protect them socially.788 This interpretation however 
has from the very onset been flawed and the passportisation has gone far more beyond mere 
humanitarian gesture. Russia has continuously referred to its right for humanitarian 
intervention to defend its nationals, and Abkhaz nationals have voted in Russian Presidential 
elections. The Russian MFA has continuously invoked the clauses of the consititution that 
stipulate that Russia should protect its nationals no matter where they are. Besides, Russia had 
actually encouraged the population of the region to acquire Russian passports rather than the 
residents appealing to Moscow. In May 2005, Russian political parties visiting the Georgian 
populated Gali region, encouraged the population to acquire Russian passports, promising 
privileges.789 Taking into consideration the circumstances, it is not clear whether the 
naturalisation would produce any legal rights or obligations for Russia. The massive 
passportisation was a breach of international-legal norms and the act contradicts Georgia’s 
legislation. Georgia does not have dual citizenship, so if the population of Abkhazia are 
Russian nationals, on what legal grounds do they reside in Abkhazia then? The fact that 
Georgia will be facing Russian nationals in its disputed territory transformed the conflict’s 
legal essence. Since passportisation was carried out in contravention of existing laws, 
Russia’s right to protect its citizens is questionable as well. Why Russia has granted passports 
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to the populations of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia remains a further puzzle. Russia’s 
domestic security interests in the Caucasus might have urged the government to create a right 
of intervention into the region in case of Georgia’s military takeover. On the other hand, 
Russia might be interested in legitimising and stabilising its physical presence in the South 
Caucasus.  
b) Alleged support to the de facto authorities 
Russia has tended to provide both economic and political support to the Abkhaz authorities 
within the last few years. Support has been in the form of training military forces and 
providing military equipment as well as economic subsidies. Russia has also allegedly 
interfered in the domestic affairs of the province. It endorsed the presidential elections and the 
crucial referendum on Abkhazia’s status. The tenth anniversary celebrations of Abkhaz 
victory in the 1992-1993 war were attended by Russian governors with economic interests in 
Abkhazia and senior members of the Duma.790 Moreover, the staff in the local intelligence 
services and defence ministries in Abkhazia are headed by retired Russian generals and 
officers, and the political elite is closely linked with the Russian intelligence services. The 
Abkhaz prime minister in 2004-2005 Nodar Khashba came from the Russian ministry of 
emergency situations, and defence minister is a Russian general.791 Russia is the most 
important trading partner of Abkhazia. Its energy companies provide subsidised energy to the 
region, and its banks issue long-term credits. Abkhazia’s tax revenues are raised from trade 
along the Psou river. Apparently, most, if not all of the private investment is encouraged by 
the Russian state and this investment has rebuilt most of Abkhazia’s resort areas. Several 
Russian regions have concluded agreements with Abkhazia on touristic services, ship repair 
facilities, trade of timber and fruits.792 Abkhazia annually receives hundreds of thousands of 
Russian tourists. On 25th December, 2002, to avoid the isolation of Abkhazia, Russia 
reopened a rail link between Sochi and Sukhumi. In response to Georgian protests, Moscow 
claimed that this was a privately operated railroad over which it had no influence, though it is 
hardly imaginable in today’s Russia.793 Russia pays pensions in Abkhazia, which are higher 
than in Georgia, creating the incentive for the region to keep out of Tbilisi’s control. Russia’s 
economic activities in Abkhazia are essential for sustaining the de facto authorities there.   
c) Active engagement  
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On March 6, 2008, Russia officially quitted the CIS embargo on the grounds it had not 
produced any result to resolve the conflict.794 The Foreign Ministry argued that ‘at the time, 
its purpose was to induce Abkhazia to take a more flexible position, primarily on the issue of 
the return of refugees, and most Georgian refugees have returned to the Gali region’.795 The 
statement indicated that further progress on the return of Georgian refugees is impeded by 
Georgia’s rejection of their registration. In the last few years, Russia had repeatedly stated 
that economic sanctions against Abkhazia are counterproductive and cause self-reliance and 
resistance. The sanctions had actually strengthened Abkhazia’s resistance and left it 
impoverished.796 Therefore, Russian officials have urged Tbilisi that lifting the economic 
sanctions would create favourable conditions for conflict resolution. Moreover, Russia based 
its decision on humanitarian and economic grounds.797   
On March 21, 2008, the Russian Duma adopted a resolution in which the president and 
government were called to recognise the two regions. With another decree in April 2008, 
President Putin gave instructions to the government to legalise relations with Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia with the alleged purpose of taking care of the interests of the population of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including Russian citizens. At the same time, in reaction to 
Georgia’s plans to mass 1,500 soldiers and police force in the upper Kodori Gorge area, 
Russia increased the number of peacekeepers in the Abkhaz conflict zone within the limits set 
by agreements. Foreign minister Lavrov warned that Russia was not preparing for war, but 
would retaliate against any attack.798 Throughout April, interaction between Tbilisi and 
Moscow was full of misunderstandings and accusations. On 20 April, a Russian jet shot down 
a Georgian unmanned spy plane flying over Abkhazia.799 Georgian interior ministry officials 
exposed the BBC video footage, which showed Russian troops deploying heavy military 
hardware in the breakaway region of Abkhazia. According to Georgia, ‘it proved the Russians 
were a fighting force, not just peacekeepers.’800 In addition, in June 2008, Russia deployed 
unarmed railway forces to Abkhazia to repair the Abkhaz side of the railway. The Russian 
government received major criticism from the international community and from Tbilisi on 
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this, on the grounds that it had no mandate, whereas Moscow insisted on the humanitarian 
side of its action.         
d) Attachment to the peace process 
Russia’s approach to the peace process has been undermined by its perceived strategic 
interests in the region on the one hand, and on the other hand its incapacity to impose 
conditions upon Abkhazia. It has by and large endorsed all the peace initiatives, but it is 
difficult to judge how genuine its commitment to the peace process and leverage over 
Abkhazia has been. For example, on May 31, 2008, Russian Prime Minister Putin approved 
the Georgian plan of autonomy for Abkhazia, on condition that Abkhazia agrees to it. The 
plan was largely a reflection of the previous peace proposals Tbilisi had initiated.801  
The strategy before the South Ossetia crisis was if the sides come to an agreement Russia will 
support and be a guarantor of it, but will not impose any deal upon Abkhazia. One major 
concern of the Russian Government that has remained unchanged over years is that any peace 
must be negotiated by Russia or include it as the main peacekeeper. Similarly, during the 
Boden initiative, Russia after hard negotiations within the Group of Friends of the Secretary 
General, conveyed its formal support to the Boden document and stated that it attempted to 
convince the Abkhaz side to accept it as a starting point for negotiations.802 It meanwhile 
stated that it had no intention of pressuring the Abkhaz to start negotiations on the 
constitutional status of the region as long as there is dissent between Tbilisi and Moscow on 
key political questions.803 Thus seemingly, Moscow never supported the Boden initiative 
wholeheartedly, and in the UNSC 26th January, 2006 meeting, withheld support from defining 
Abkhazia’s status within Georgia and rejected the usual reference to the Boden paper in the 
final resolution. It declared that the Boden paper could no longer be basis for the 
negotiations.804  
Russia has formally endorsed the UN led peace process, but has at times also offered its own 
mediation on the grounds that the latter is not effective. For example, in an effort to 
circumvent the UN led Geneva process, President Putin in January 2003 proposed a draft of 
measures, later known as the Sochi process, to unfreeze the relations between Tbilisi and 
Abkhazia. Establishing rail links between Sochi and Tbilisi via Abkhazia, renovation of the 
Inguri hydropower station servicing both sides, and upon Georgia’s insistence only, the return 
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of IDPs to Gali region were a part of the so called Sochi process. With the Sochi process, 
Russia in compliance with its perceived strategic interests again became the key mediator, 
pushing for the implementation of economic projects to avoid confrontation. President Putin 
once again supported Georgia’s territorial integrity, but failed to provide any assurance on the 
return of Georgian IDPs.805 Abkhazians insisted that the sides should first register those who 
had already returned to Gali district. Finally, the Sochi process collapsed because of lack of 
progress on basically all the issues that were in the package. Nevertheless, Russia unilaterally 
went ahead with its economic projects, raising questions on the overall objective of the 
parallel peace process.  
Under Yeltsin, Russia did make certain efforts to impose the return of Georgian refugees and 
IDPs to Abkhazia, but this is no longer an issue for Moscow today. One of the beliefs in 
Russian political circles is that the return of Georgian IDPs would destabilise the region, since 
it would lead to redistribution of property.806 Russia therefore rejected outright the right for 
the return of Georgia’s refugees to Abkhazia in German Foreign Minister Steinmeier’s peace 
plan, insisting that this can happen only at the end of the whole process, once the sides have 
restored confidence. Instead, for its domestic security concerns, Russia has been insisting that 
Georgia should sign a binding agreement on non-use of force with Abkhazia. President 
Medvedev put it as a precondition for Steinmeier’s plan in 2008.807 Georgia has refused to 
sign it, on the grounds that the signatories are not clear, and has further argued that Russian 
peacekeepers in Abkhazia are incapable of acting as guarantors of a non-use-force agreement. 
Tbilisi also demanded firm guarantees and timeframe for the return of refugees.  
Georgia has been raising the issue of border monitoring and has requested to be allowed to 
establish joint checkpoints on the customs points of Abkhazia. This however was rejected by 
Russia. During the second Russian intervention in Chechnya, Georgia had agreed to Russian 
calls for joint control of the Chechen sector of the Russian-Georgian border and Georgia 
requested the reciprocity.808 The Georgian Government believed that presence of customs 
officers and border guards would tackle the problem of smuggling. The issue has exacerbated 
Georgia’s accusations of Russia’s partiality.   
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As the Georgian Government got convinced that Russia is in no way intent on facilitating the 
resolution of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, it increasingly lobbied for the internationalisation 
of the peacekeeping format. In October 2002, the Georgian Parliament adopted a resolution 
calling for the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping forces from Abkhazia. This has been seen 
by the Russian Government as an attempt by the West, primarily using Georgia, to weaken its 
influence in a region of its legitimate interests. Therefore, Russia has resisted all efforts to 
internationalise mediation, negotiation and peacekeeping in the conflict zones.  
e) Involvement in the domestic affairs of the region 
Russia’s engagement became more obvious during the 2004 ‘presidential’ 
elections in Abkhazia, when Moscow tried to shape the outcome of the elections for its own 
ends. The elections showed the extent to which Russia is interested in control and influence 
over Abkhazia and how limited its resources can be. Russia’s involvement, besides its 
recognition of the outcome, was also in contravention to its position as peacekeeper and 
mediator. It also defied the UNSC resolution 1255.809 The paradox is, as the crisis went on in 
Sukhumi, the Russian Foreign Ministry took part in the Geneva negotiations, formally 
supporting Georgia’s territorial sovereignty.  
Russian political circles did their best in the elections to make sure that a pro-Moscow 
candidate is elected. Moscow intervened into the election process, supported at all levels Raul 
Khajimba, the last premier of Abkhazia under Ardzinba, and used economic leverage as 
opening the rail link and bus service between Sukhumi and Sochi. A group of Russian 
politicians, deputy prosecutor general, Duma members and popular singers publicly 
campaigned for Raul Khajimba. According to Antonenko, they even threatened to cut 
economic ties with Abkhazia in case Khajimba was not elected.810  
The election results appeared in favour of another candidate Sergei Bagapsh, who had not 
spoken out against Russian influence over Abkhazia, but was known to be independent-
minded. A crisis broke out when Khajimba refused to accept the election results, and Russia 
stepped in and primarily tried to delegitimize Bagapsh, but then mediated between the two 
candidates. Also, Russia applied economic leverage. The governor of the Krasnodar region 
and adviser to the Russian Prime Minister, Bukaev repeatedly threatened to close the border 
in case Bagapsh went forward with his inauguration. Train service was suspended between 
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Sochi and Sukhumi, and border crossing was restricted. Final compromise was reached in 
December 2004 as Bagapsh was stepped forward as ‘president’ and Khajimba as ‘vice-
president’.  
In many cases, Russia’s policies have created serious disincentives and served as a major 
obstacle for any conflict resolution. Under the current circumstances, it is only natural that 
Abkhazia keeps the conflict unresolved. All these measures indicate that Russia is not 
interested in a durable resolution of the conflict, and preservation of the post-armed conflict 
status-quo suits it the best. The Kremlin has successfully securitised the status-quo in 
Georgia’s both regions and sees any internationalisation of the peace process as a threat. The 
situation has benefitted both Russia and Abkhazia, as Russian presence and influence in the 
South Caucasus has increasingly strengthened, while Abkhazia has consolidated de-facto 
statehood. Russia’s policy has also prevented a further destabilisation of its North Caucasus. 
Now that Abkhazia’s independence has been recognised by Russia, the current situation is 
leading to Abkhazia becoming an associated member of the Russian Federation. Considering 
that the Russian rouble is used as the currency in Abkhazia and major trade is with Russia, 
most residents are its nationals and the political elite is integrated with various institutions in 
Moscow, Abkhazia is currently a de facto continuation of the Krasnodar province, despite 
repeated statements by the Abkhaz leader Bagapsh, that Abkhazia does not consider 
incorporation into Russia.811 The current picture contradicts the original agenda and principles 
of Abkhaz national movement in early 1990s and the once political sovereignty seeking elite 
has now de facto become an agent of Moscow in the region’. Despite the fact that Abkhazia, 
unlike South Ossetia has proven to express a stronger political will vis-à-vis Moscow at times, 
it is in fact economically and socially very vulnerable towards any Russian pressure.  
4.3. Russia’s policies towards the Georgian-Ossetian conflict 
Russia under Yeltsin had a less active engagement in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict than in 
the Georgian-Abkhaz one. Bearing in mind that the conflict broke out just at a time when 
Russia was experiencing its identity crisis, it did not have a clear strategy on how to react. On 
the other hand, the relative stability in the region since signing the cease-fire agreement 
between the parties in Dagomys in 1992 did not require that much third party intervention. 
During the armed phase of the conflict, Russia’s involvement in South Ossetia took place 
mainly through the engagement of North Ossetia and the Russian Duma, in particular its 
speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov and deputy speaker Alexander Rutskoi. North Ossetian 
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leadership and society, too, expressed solidarity with their ethnic kin, providing both military 
and humanitarian support. Moreover, with the influx of a large number of refugees in North 
Ossetia, its authorities pressed Moscow for a more active engagement in the conflict and 
pressure on Georgia. On 21st May, 1992, the North Ossetian Parliament passed a resolution 
calling upon Moscow to ‘use force to stop genocide’.812 At the initial stage, North Ossetia 
carried on lobbying for South Ossetia in Moscow and managed to get the sympathy of the 
Russian Duma as well as the military.813 The Duma chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov was the 
key figure who advocated South Ossetia’s incorporation into the Russian Federation, although 
the appeal was repeatedly rejected.814 
In March 1992, Shevardnadze visited Tskhinvali and Vladikavkaz and secured a cease-fire. 
However, Shevardnadze was unable to control the paramilitary forces making the Georgian 
army, and artillery attacks on Tskhinvali restarted in April, 1992.815 As Ossetian refugees on a 
bus to Vladikavkaz were massacred in May, this caused rage in North Ossetia and the Russian 
public as well.816 The Russian Duma speaker threatened Georgia with action, and in June 
1992, Russian troops were relocated to North Ossetia from other parts of the federation. The 
same month the North Ossetian Government cut off a pipeline carrying natural gas from 
Russia to Georgia and made strong lobbying efforts in Moscow. In addition to North Ossetia, 
the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus sent in fighter battalions. Finally, on 
22nd June 1992, Georgia signed a cease-fire with South Ossetia, while Russia and North 
Ossetia became the guarantors. Three weeks later, in compliance with the treaty, joint 
peacekeeping force of Georgian, Russian and North and South Ossetian peacekeepers were 
deployed to monitor the cease-fire, withdrawal of armed units, to dissolve self-defence units 
and ensure security in the region.      
During Yeltsin’s term, certain leverage was applied by Moscow on South Ossetia in 1994-
1996 to come to terms with Georgia; the Russian Government unilaterally rejected South 
Ossetia’s appeal for unification with North Ossetia or independence. Such a move was seen to 
set precedent for secession, and a unified Ossetia-Alania might become a bigger headache for 
Russia. However, Tbilisi’s intransigence towards South Ossetia’s demand for more rights, and 
the fact that all three parties during Shevardnadze’s term enjoyed benefits from the 
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contraband trade made the status-quo favourable to Russia.817 Moscow took some half-
hearted measures for the resolution of the conflict such as the 1996 and 2000 agreements. In 
May 1996, ‘Memorandum on measures for providing security and strengthening mutual trust’ 
was signed and on 3rd December, 2000 the Russian-Georgian agreement on cooperation in 
restoring the economy in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict and on the return of 
refugees was signed.818 In June 2004, Russia’s Constitutional Court responded to an inquiry 
about the legality of South Ossetia’s appeal for incorporation into the Russian Federation, 
rejecting it, and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated its official stance that it 
respects Georgia’s territorial sovereignty. It stressed that the status of South Ossetia should be 
resolved within the framework of the ongoing Russian-Georgian-Ossetian peace talks.819 In 
July 2004, at the CIS Summit, President Putin assured to his Georgian counterpart that Russia 
supports Georgia’s territorial integrity.820 Moreover, in 2005, at the OSCE Lyublyana 
Summit, Moscow gave consent to Tbilisi’s peace initiative of three stages: demilitarisation of 
Tskhinvali, socio-economic rehabilitation of the region and finally political regulation, hence 
search for a favourable solution. Foreign minster Lavrov stated that Russian support was 
achieved by direct negotiations, leading to rapprochement of Georgia’s and Russia’s 
positions. Later, however, Moscow failed to acquire the support of the South Ossetian 
leadership, which raised doubts over Russia’s capacity in the conflict. Like in Abkhazia, until 
the South Ossetia crisis, successive Russian presidents have stated that if the sides come to an 
agreement and preferably on confederative status, Russia will become the guarantor of it.  
4.3.1. Deterioration of relations in light of Georgia’s reintegration attempts 
President Saakashvili linked his political destiny close to the resolution of the conflict,  
causing Russia’s security concerns to deteriorate. As the Georgian Government in 2004 grew 
increasingly impatient with the status-quo and believed that the Ajarian scenario was 
repeatable in South Ossetia, President Putin and other Russian officials repeatedly warned 
Georgia over use of force and potential retaliation, making it clear that Russia would not 
remain indifferent to the fate of its nationals. Through May to August 2004, the Georgian 
Government tried to solve the conflict by a mixture of humanitarian offensive and military 
intimidation. In August some low intensive war broke out between Georgia and South 
Ossetia, as the latter bombarded Tskhinvali and tried to retake it. On 8 August, 2004 the 
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Russian Duma unanimously criticised Georgia and said that due to the presence of Russian 
citizens in South Ossetia, ‘there appear to be circumstances that infringe upon Russian 
sovereignty’.821 
First, in May Tbilisi with the purpose of putting an end to smuggling, established control 
posts in South Ossetia and blocked the delivery of goods from Russia to the region, cutting 
the primary source of income for the region’s inhabitants. At the same time, the Georgian 
interior ministry moved troops into the conflict zone, reserved for peacekeepers, and South 
Ossetian forces blocked the highway between Georgia and Russia. Tension grew between 
Georgia and Russia as well; Tbilisi accused Russia of supplying weapons to South Ossetians 
and Georgian interior ministry forces seized 300 unguided missiles for helicopters belonging 
to Russian peacekeepers.822 The Russian foreign and defence ministries condemned this, 
stating that a previous JCC agreement authorised the resupply shipment. In retaliation, the 
South Ossetian authorities detained some 50 Georgian peacekeepers in the Georgian-
populated village of Vanati inside the South Ossetian zone of conflict. Only, after strong 
pressure from the US and EU, Saakashvili withdrew his troops above the allowed limit of 500 
from the conflict zone.  
It seems that the Georgian Government did not expect such an extent of Russia’s reaction and 
had believed that improvement in the bilateral relations in the first half of President 
Saakashvili’s term would lead to changes in Russia’s approach to the conflict resolution 
process. Therefore, previously President Saakashvili had described the conflict as an internal 
one, but once it became clear that Russia was intent on not indulging any use of force, he 
changed his strategy, stating ‘crisis in South Ossetia is not a problem between Georgians and 
Ossetians, this is a problem between Georgia and Russia’.823 Like in Abkhazia, Tbilisi got 
convinced that Russia will not facilitate the resolution of the conflict, and therefore 
internationalising peacekeeping in South Ossetia became the only available solution. In 
February, 2006 the Georgian Parliament adopted a resolution on the withdrawal of Russian 
peacekeepers from the conflict zone and called on the Government to take measures to 
replace the peacekeepers with an international force. The resolution characterised the 
performance of the JPKF as extremely negative and Russia’s policies as a permanent attempt 
to annex the region.824 Tbilisi argued that the peacekeepers in South Ossetia largely fail to 
meet their mandate to disarm armed formations and observe withdrawal of heavy military 
                                                 
821 ‘Russian Parliamentarians Adopt Statement on South Ossetia’, Caucasus Press, 8 May 2004.    
822 ‘Georgia Seizes Russian Arms Convoy in South Ossetia’, Civil Georgia, 7 July 2004.    
823 ‘Saakashvili: Russia to Blame for South Ossetia Crisis’, Eurasia Insight, 12 July 2004.   
824 Jean-Christophe Peuch, ‘Georgia: Parliament votes Russian peacekeepers out of South Ossetia’, RFE/RL, 15th 
February, 2006.  
213
equipment. The Russian MFA immediately responded, stating that the resolution contradicts 
the conditions of the Dagomys treaty; it made it clear that Russia had no intention of 
withdrawing its peacekeepers from South Ossetia, and on the contrary sees them as a 
stabilising factor for the North Caucasus.825 Like in Abkhazia, Georgia’s attempts to 
internationalise the mediation and peacekeeping in the conflict exacerbated further mistrust of 
Tbilisi in Moscow, seeing it as an effort by the West and US to drive Russia out of the region.  
a) Alleged impartiality 
The Georgian Government and international community have accused Russia of sustaining 
the de facto authorities in South Ossetia. Like in Abkhazia, the population of South Ossetia is 
overwhelmingly composed of Russian nationals and the region’s economic and social life is 
even more tightly integrated into Russia. With the closure of the Ergneti market in 2004 and 
restriction of movement between the two communities, South Ossetia has become fully 
dependent on Russia, its economy and social life are exclusively oriented towards North 
Ossetia. Russia has issued financial aid, and pays pensions to the residents. The Russian 
government has founded its financial and humanitarian assistance to the region by the 
Georgian-Russian bilateral agreement of December 3, 2000 and accused Georgia of never 
fulfilling its part of the agreement to contribute funds to South Ossetia's economic 
development.826 Russia has pledged investment and opened banks in Tskhinvali, while also 
financing the restoration of a road between Tskhinvali and Vladikavkaz.827 Moscow has also 
pledged to construct a separate gas pipeline to South Ossetia that would bypass the existing 
Georgian gas pipeline.828 Currently, the region receives its gas from Russia via Georgia. Key 
figures in the region as the leadership of security ministries are composed of active Russian 
intelligence officers of FSB. Defence minister and interior ministers and chief of intelligence 
of South Ossetia are all active Russian civil servants from various ministries. Georgia accuses 
Russia of providing military equipment including tanks, fuel and training by Russian army 
officers to South Ossetia in contravention of the Dagomys accord. The Russian commanders 
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and general of the JPF have made statements sympathising with the de facto authorities.829 In 
2006, as Tbilisi set up an alternative administration in the Georgian controlled part of the 
region, Russia warned Georgia and put efforts to undermine its legitimacy before international 
organisations. 
b) Roki tunnel 
The Russian government has for various reasons not taken any measures to prevent the 
smuggling of goods through the Roki tunnel. Shortly after the September 2004 Beslan 
massacre, Russia closed the border on Georgia
 
as an anti-terrorist measure, but kept the Roki 
tunnel open.830 Following Georgia’s closure of the Ergneti market, Russia preferred 
circumventing the blockade and increasing assistance to the region, ignoring Saakashvili’s 
proposal to develop a new market. Moscow has repeatedly refused to accept the Georgian 
contingent in the joint control of the Roki tunnel; the Foreign Ministry rejected calls by the 
US and EU for joint Georgian-Russian control over the Roki tunnel.831 The tunnel seemingly 
serves more as a non-controllable gateway of Russia to the region, and presence of Georgian 
checkpoints would put an end to both trade and arms delivery. Until the late August crisis, 
Russia’s position was that as long as the conflict remains unresolved, the population should be 
given the opportunity to trade with Russia.  
c) Calls for Russia’s recognition of the region’s independence 
As Georgian-Russian relations aggravated throughout 2004 to 2008, the number of interest 
groups calling for Russia’s incorporation of South Ossetia grew.832 Some of them based their 
arguments on securing Russia’s southern flank, while others argued in power political terms. 
In March 2006, North Ossetia and South Ossetia held a joint cabinet session in Vladikavkaz, 
focusing on ways to boost economic integration between the two Ossetias. The sides 
discussed the possibility of building a highway that would link Vladikavkaz to the South 
Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali. Referring to Kosovo becoming a precedent, an aide to Russian 
Prime Minister Fradkov, allegedly told the cabinet session on the plans to merge the two 
Ossetias to be called Alania.833 Shortly afterwards, an all Ossetian assembly bringing together 
500 ethnic Ossetians from 11 countries in Tskhinvali called on the Russian Government to 
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recognise the region’s independence.834 The president of North Ossetia Teimuraz Mamsurov 
has also publicly advocated the unification of the two regions.  
d) Incapacity  
Until the South Ossetia crisis, Russia had comparatively larger capacity for conflict resolution 
in the current conflict than either in MK or in Abkhazia. This conflict tended to be less of 
ethnic character, and the scale of fighting had been less than in either of the conflicts. 
Therefore, societal reconciliation seemed to be viable. This was particularly true during 
Yeltsin’s term, when the South Ossetian political elite and society did not categorically rule 
out integration with Georgia. In fact, until the closure of the Ergneti market and crisis of 2004, 
communication between the two communities had had a tremendous effect upon the trust-
building process. As mentioned elsewhere, the failure to utilise this potential for the conflict 
resolution has been partly due to Russia’s inaction as the major mediator and peacekeeper, but 
also partly to Georgia’s failure to eliminate the causes of the conflict and emphasise trust-
building more.  
The Ossetian case namely, demonstrates a major contradiction in Moscow’s approach to the 
South Caucasus. On the one hand, the Russian government has reiterated that if the parties 
come to an agreement it will support and act as a guarantor, but in the mean time, Russia has 
through its support to South Ossetia generated disincentives for the peace process. How such 
tactics suit Russia’s proclaimed strategic interests of long-term stability in the South Caucasus 
is not clear. 
4.3.3. South Ossetia crisis and Russia’s recognition of both regions’ independence  
a) Background 
Fighting and sabotage in South Ossetia had become more intensive since the last few years, 
and finally culminated in the August war of 2008. The first skirmishes occurred in June and 
July 2008, when the South Ossetian capital was subjected to grenade launchers and machine 
guns. In response, the South Ossetian authorities in July had evacuated women, children and 
the elderly from Tskhinvali to North Ossetia. Prior to that, on July 28th the Ossetian forces had 
attempted to regain control of the Sarabuk heights, which Georgian forces had occupied on 3rd 
July by removing a post of the Joint Peacekeeping Force deployed in the conflict zone.835    
The Russian Government and military had become more alert and sensitive to developments 
in South Ossetia after the 2004 incident. On the eve of the crisis Moscow had sent a number 
of warning messages to Tbilisi allegedly with the purpose of deterrence. On 7-8 July, 2008 
following the detainment of four Georgian servicemen by the South Ossetian authorities, 
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Tbilisi threatened to launch military action to secure their release. In response, Russian 
military aircraft conducted a brief flight over South Ossetia to ‘cool hot heads’ in Tbilisi and 
warn against military intrusion.836 Such incidents had acquired a regular character in 
Georgian-Russian relations since the 2004 crisis. 
 
 
Map 5 JPKF Map of Georgian controlled areas in South Ossetia 
 
 
Source: International Crisis Group, Russia versus Georgia: The Fallout, Europe Report No 
195, 22 August, 2008. 
b) Outbreak of fighting in South Ossetia 
In July and August, Georgian forces in the Georgian controlled areas of South Ossetia had 
been subject to increased provocations including shelling of Georgian villages. Fighting broke 
out on 5th August between villages in South Ossetia and Georgia proper, leading to the death 
of six Ossetians and five Georgians. Both sides accused each other of initiating the hostilities, 
and the peacekeeping forces largely failed to prevent them. Although, on 5th August both 
sides agreed to hold meetings in the presence of the Russian chief negotiator Yuri Popov, a 
                                                 
836 ‘Russia confirms its aircraft intruded into Georgia’, Civil Georgia, 10th July, 2008.  
217
day later the South Ossetian side refused to participate in the talks, demanding a JCC session 
instead. Tbilisi had withdrawn from the JCC in March, demanding the format to include the 
EU, the OSCE and the Provisional Administrative Entity of South Ossetia led by Sanokoyev.  
Meanwhile, the Georgian government appeared to have concentrated a significant number of 
troops and equipment to the South Ossetian border in early August allegedly to provide 
support for the exchange of fire with South Ossetian formations. Research by the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies shows Georgia had massed about 12,000 troops and 75 tanks on 
the South Ossetian border by 7th August.837 On the night of 6/7 August, the Russian 
peacekeeping forces identified eight aircraft heading to South Ossetia from Georgia.838  
Georgian military observers left the headquarters of the joint Russian-Georgian peacekeeping 
forces and all control points where they should be stationed according to the existing 
agreements.839 As attempts for a cease-fire failed, Georgian president later on the 7th August 
announced that Georgian villages were being shelled, and vowed to restore Tbilisi's control 
and constitutional order by force.840 President Saakashvili said the objective was to curb the 
attacks and the Russian build up of troops in the region, and with the slogan ‘we have to save 
our country’ ordered a full-scale mobilisation of military reservists.841 In the night of 7th to 8th 
August, Georgian forces began a major assault on Tskhinvali, leading to a fierce battle with 
Ossetian militia and the Russian peacekeeping battalion, which killed 15 peacekeepers.842 
Georgia meanwhile officially informed the peacekeeping forces that it was launching military 
actions in South Ossetia.  
c) Russia’s response 
Russia’s response to Georgia’s intrusion was both harsh and humiliating. On 8th August, 
Russia sent both military aircraft and tanks to South Ossetia via the Roki tunnel. Russian Air 
Force launched strikes on Georgia's logistical infrastructure, and special units prevented 
Georgian forces from blowing up the Roki Tunnel, which could have hindered the delivery of 
reinforcements to South Ossetia. On 9th August, Russian military planes bombarded the 
Georgian port Poti and its military base in Senaki as well as the military airport in Kutaisi. 
Fierce fighting took place on 9th August between Georgian forces and Russian and Ossetian 
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forces in Tskhinvali.843 By the end of 10th August South Ossetia was completely cleared of 
Georgian forces, who retreated to Gori.844 In Gori, Russian air force launched bombings on 
military and government positions, as well as residential buildings leaving 60 people dead, 
mainly civilians. Georgia described Russia’s reaction as a full-scale military invasion. The 
Russian air force meanwhile bombed the Georgian aircraft factory in Zugdidi, and Black Sea 
Fleet reached Georgian waters. On 10th of August, the Fleet sank one Georgian patroller and 
blockaded Georgia’s coast in Abkhazia on the grounds that Georgian ships had violated the 
security zone of the Fleet and therefore, the action was in accordance with international 
law.845 Following this, the remaining Georgian ships withdrew to a nearby harbor. Russian air 
force also bombed the outskirts of Tbilisi as well as its international airport. Despite 
international efforts cease-fire could not be reached, and on 11th August, Georgian forces 
renewed bombardment of South Ossetia. On 13th August, Russian units moved into Gori and 
stayed there until the 22nd August, allegedly to remove the military hardware and ammunition 
from an arms depot. Russian troop advancement into inner Georgia continued, allegedly to 
destroy the potential military units from which Georgia might re-launch attacks against South 
Ossetia.846 On 14th August, Russian ground forces entered the port city of Poti and sank 
several Georgian naval vessels in the harbour.  
Amidst fierce fighting a second front was opened in Abkhazia on 9th August, where Russia 
deployed additional forces from the North Caucasus. On 10th August, Georgian police units in 
the Kodori gorge that were deployed in the summer of 2006 in breach of the 1994 Moscow 
agreement came under attack from Abkhaz forces and Russian fighter jets. 
d) Humanitarian dimension   
Overall, the Ossetian forces claimed 2000 deaths. UNHCR confirmed that about 2,400 
people, mostly Georgians fled South Ossetia to other parts of Georgia, while 4000 people fled 
to Russia. Many Georgian villages in South Ossetia were burnt down. According to HRW, 
there were documented cases of arbitrary detention, forced labour, torture and extrajudicial 
executions of Georgian civilians and soldiers by the South Ossetian forces. In its 17 August 
report, HRW described how armed South Ossetian militias attacked Georgian cars and 
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kidnapped civilians as people tried to flee in response to militia attacks on their homes 
following the Russian advance into the area.847  
e) Cease fire 
On the 10th of August, the Georgian government called for a cease-fire, while shelling of 
Georgian cities continued on the grounds that Georgian forces were still firing at the Russian 
forces and South Ossetian troops in Tskhinvali. The European Union and the United States 
expressed willingness to send a joint delegation to try and negotiate a ceasefire in early 
August. Russia, however, ruled out peace talks with Georgia until the latter withdrew from 
South Ossetia and signed a legally binding pact renouncing use of force against South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia.  
The UNSC failed to agree on the wording of a statement calling for a cease-fire; UK, France 
and the US blamed Russia, while Moscow insisted the crisis was on Georgia to blame. 
Finally, on 12th August, Russia and Georgia agreed to a six point peace plan proposed by the 
French President. Initially, the plan envisaged a return to the pre 6th August status-quo for 
both sides, but once Russia recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s independence on the 
26th August, the situation changed. The international community was compelled to develop a 
new peace plan on 8th September envisioning Russia’s withdrawal from the security zones 
and check points in Georgian territory excluding the two regions.848 Meanwhile, on 9 
September 2008, Russia officially announced that its troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
would be considered foreign troops stationed in independent states under bilateral agreements. 
Moreover, in contravention to the widespread expectation that the EU Observer Mission’s 
mandate would also be envisaged for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia insisted that this 
was outside the agreement.849  
Despite numerous calls for a quick withdrawal from Georgia, Russian troops occupied some 
parts of Georgia proper for about two more months. In late August, some troops were 
withdrawn, but Russian troops and checkpoints remained near Gori and Poti, as well as in the 
so called security zones around Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It referred to its troops in 
Georgia’s Black Sea port of Poti and in a seven-kilometre buffer zone around the breakaway 
states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as peacekeepers. Withdrawal from Georgia was only 
completed when control was handed over to an EU observer mission on 9 October.  
f) motivation of Russian behaviour 
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The Russian government accommodated its intervention within a humanitarian context: peace 
enforcement to protect its peacekeepers and humanitarian intervention to rescue the South 
Ossetian people from Georgian aggression. Russia claimed to have acted in response to an 
attack on its peacekeepers and on South Ossetian civilians, which it called ‘genocide’ by 
Georgian forces.850 Moscow invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter and addressed a special 
note to the UN Security Council before acting. It referred to its rights and obligations as an 
internationally agreed peacekeeping force.851 It also characterised its intrusion as 
humanitarian intervention to stop ethnic cleansing and genocide in a zone of exclusive 
responsibility established by the Dagomys cease-fire treaty. At the very beginning of the 
conflict, President Medvedev stated that his country’s goal was to push Georgia into peace 
and that he had had no other alternative, but to send in reinforcements to prevent further 
casualties among the peacekeepers and civilians.852 Thus, the Kremlin’s official statements all 
indicated its security and humanitarian concerns as the primary driving force behind 
intervention. That is partly true; given the volatility of the North Caucasus, Russia’s security 
considerations could not be underestimated, and Russia destroyed the infrastructure of the 
Georgian army in order to make the Georgian side less capable of making an effort at a 
military solution in the future. Had Russia failed to protect its peacekeepers and let Georgia 
off, this could produce both domestic and external implications for Russia. It would have been 
seen as a precedent that Georgia would follow in Abkhazia, and it would recognise Russia’s 
weakened position in the CIS. However, motivation of Russia’s intervention was far more 
complex than what Russian officials claim a simple ‘humanitarian desire’ to rescue South 
Ossetian civilians from Georgian aggression. It was deeply rooted in power-political 
objectives. These included Russia’s reassertion as a great power and sending a message to the 
West, that it still counts and it should not have been ignored over Kosovo;853 punishing 
Georgia for rapprochement with the US and its potential NATO membership; undermining 
the Caucasus as a transit route for the energy pipelines; sending a message to the other 
potentially pro-western CIS states as the Ukraine and Azerbaijan.  
Russia’s perception of the West, in particular the US and its great power position played a key 
role. Confrontations escalated between the US/Europe and Russia over Kosovo’s unilateral 
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declaration of independence and promises of NATO membership action plans for Georgia and 
Ukraine. The Russian elite regarded its response in South Ossetia as some form of recovery as 
a great power and regional hegemon as well as resistance to US unipolarism and penetration 
into the CIS. As Russia had lacked resources in the last decade, it had hardly been able to 
prevent certain undesired effects that were seen harmful to its perceived interests. Its political 
elite had insisted on Russia being an international force, and disagreed with the West on 
certain issues as NATO enlargement, ABM treaty, NATO intervention in Kosovo, missile 
defence in Eastern Europe. The Russian Government were set to remind the West of its 
ignorance of Russia’s concerns at the US intervention in Bosnia in 1993 and NATO in 
Kosovo in 1999.854 Previously, since Russia had lacked capacity to enforce its interests, its 
objections had only remained in words and its concerns had largely been ignored. As it 
happened after the Kosovo crisis of 1999, previously Russia had never managed to express its 
opposition genuinely because of its own fear of isolation, impotence and lack of self-
confidence. However, this time Russia had restored its capacity and was willing to 
demonstrate it both within the CIS and to the West.855 Through its response, Russia was 
basically sending a message that then it was too weak to have been listened to, but now it has 
the resources and capacity, and it matters.856 Russia demonstrated by use of force that it is 
going to insist on its spheres of influence, and will claim relative autonomy for the CIS, and 
multilateralism in international politics.857 As a Russian chief diplomat put it, ‘no retreatment 
further: Russia has been retreating since Gorbachev, with the hope of being treated as an 
equal partner, and in the end its liberalism has been regarded as weakness. The West has 
ignored Russia by recognising Kosovo, admitting the Baltic states into NATO, US missile 
defence in Czech and Poland, now Georgia’s membership of NATO’.858 Russia thus came to 
the conclusion that trying to follow the games of the rule will not bring it any respect or help 
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it achieve its regional and global amibiotns that are closely related to the survival of the 
Russian state overall and therefore opted for a more power-political scenario. 
The crisis also served as a pretext for sending messages to the West. The fact that, shortly 
following the crisis, President Medvedev issued Russia’s privileged regions and in a message 
to the US, stated ‘we will not step back in the Caucasus’, alluded that Russia will no longer 
tolerate US behaviour in its regions of interest.859 The official statements too, indicated that 
Russia treated its response in a broader context of Russian-Western relations, in particular the 
US presence in the CIS and Russia’s claim for a regional hegemon. All these geopolitical 
factors demonstrate the determination of the Russian ruling elite to restore the Russian 
derzhava, a state that needs spheres of influence.860  
Russian policymakers also saw a certain percentage of US culpability for the crisis.861 
Medvedev blamed the US government for provoking the August war.862 Shortly after the 
crisis, foreign minister Lavrov, outlining Moscow’s foreign policy, referred to US 
unipolarism as a condition, that has been too long and dangerous and which has ‘manifested 
itself in anti-Russian provocations, including Tbilisi’s aggression against South Ossetia’.863 
The fact that the Georgian army that led the attack on Tskhinvali had taken part in the 
Georgian exercises along with 1,000 American troops caused Russia to accuse the United 
States of assisting Georgia’s attack preparations.864 He even went further to suggest that US 
humanitarian cargoes to Tbilisi included weapons.865  
Moreover, the Russian President accused NATO of taking advantage of the war to advance its 
military expansion.866 Referring to the deployment of NATO ships in the Black Sea and US 
missile defence systems in eastern Europe, he said ‘the conflict in the Caucasus was used as a 
pretext for bringing NATO warships into the Black Sea and for placing US missile defence 
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systems in Europe’.867 In response, in November 2008 the Kremlin decided to deploy short-
range Iskander missile launchers in the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, nestled between 
Poland and Lithuania, to ‘neutralise’ a planned US missile defence system.868 Previously in 
2007, President Putin had warned that Russia would be forced to target parts of a US missile-
defense system if they were installed in Poland and the Czech Republic. Russia also warned 
Turkey that the NATO Ships could not stay in the Black Sea for more than 21 days according 
to the Monreux Agreement.869   
As to Georgia, Russia’s punitive behaviour served the purpose of teaching Georgia a lesson 
for its rapprochement with the US, its aspiration to NATO membership, and exacerbation of 
bilateral relations. The NATO Summit in Bucharest marked a turning-point after which 
Moscow was prepared to take every measure to prevent any further losses in the CIS. Russian 
policymakers had repeatedly warned that Georgia’s NATO membership would lead to a 
geopolitical disaster.870 Back in March 2008, Russian foreign minister Lavrov had stated that 
Russia would take all measures not to let Kiev and Tbilisi to NATO.871 For Russia, Georgia’s 
aspiration to NATO membership and the West’s protection posed an existential threat. Most 
of Russia’s political circles see Georgia’s NATO membership as an effort by the US and 
certain CIS states to balance Russia and diminish its role in its own regional shell. This in 
Russian political thought would have implications not only for its great power position and 
capability as a regional hegemon, but also internal stability. Russian policymakers are 
attached to the conviction that presence of NATO near its borders will on the one hand disturb 
its regional hegemony, but on the other hand its internal stability in the volatile North 
Caucasus.872 Previously, at the NATO Bucharest Summit, President Putin had defined NATO 
membership as an ‘immediate threat’ to its security, adding that ‘the presence of a powerful 
military bloc on our borders, whose members are guided by Article 5 of the Washington 
Treaty will be seen as direct threat to our national security’.873 Thus, through its response, 
Russia undermined Georgia’s chances of NATO membership, since most alliance members 
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would now not be prepared to accept a country with territorial conflicts and political 
problems.  
It would meanwhile remind all other CIS states, in particular Ukraine and Azerbaijan to 
rethink their relations with the West and not repeat Georgia’s mistakes.874 Employment of the 
components of the Black Sea Fleet and statements about the Ukraine’s rights in Sevastopol 
were strong messages to Kiev. Russia punished and silenced the only and most anti Russian 
voice in the region and undermined in this way any efforts by the CIS states to balance it. 
Last, but not least, Russia’s intervention also served the purpose to control and monopolise 
energy export from the Caspian Sea. Moscow has greatly benefitted from the increase in oil 
and gas prices and from the increased dependence of Europe on Russia’s supply. The 
Caucasus route has been essential to reducing EU’s energy dependence on Russia via the 
existing pipelines or the forthcoming Nabucco pipeline. In this way, the Caucasus route, if 
joined by Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan as well, might become a challenge for Russia’s 
energy monopoly. Moscow has through its bilateral agreements with Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan secured its monopoly over the transport of oil and gas from the Caspian. 
Although, it did not attack the Baku-Tbilisi-Jeyhan oil and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas 
pipelines directly, it undermined the viability of the South Caucasus as a transit route. 
Moreover, Moscow has tried to convince the Azerbaijan Government to sell its gas to Russia 
for further delivery to Europe. Azerbaijan, now convinced that any military solution to the 
Mountainous-Karabakh conflict is not viable and having seen Russia’s might in the region, 
might be discouraged to carry on with projects that could undermine Russia’s energy power.  
g) Had Russia planned it? 
Thus, although both sides accuse each other of initiating the hostilities, the crisis broke out by 
Georgia’s attempt to regain control of South Ossetia’s capital Tskhinvali by an overnight 
large-scale military operation. In a commentary in the Wall street journal of 2nd December, 
President Saakashvili argued that he did order military action, but as a self-defence reaction to 
the shelling of Georgian villages by the South Ossetian forces.875 He later argued that he had 
ordered military action in South Ossetia because Russia had massed thousands of troops on 
the border and for a week in early August, South Ossetian forces had engaged in a series of 
bombing Georgian villages within the sites controlled by Russian peace-keepers.876  
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Russian military exercises in the North Caucasus in the last few years had simulated assisting 
the peacekeepers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In fact, less than a month ago, Russia’s 
army units, which played a key role in the conflict, had taken part in military manoeuvres in 
the North Caucasus.877 The sequence of measures taken after the NATO Bucharest Summit, 
the combat readiness of the 58th army and provocations by the South Ossetian forces indicate 
that the crisis was time-wise and in view of the circumstances quite correct.878 It was correctly 
calculated that Georgia’s incapacity and the West’s divisions would enable Russia to 
transform the political landscape in the CIS without sanction or serious response. Russia had 
seemingly weighed potential consequences for its relations with the West during its 
intervention. Its policymakers knew that the international political system is very much to 
their advantage and that there is no balance to its policies in the Caucasus. It was obvious that 
the West would not afford to isolate it; the US would need Russia’s cooperation in its 
negotiations with Iran and North Korea and Europe would be too divided over Russia. 
Therefore, the impression is, had Georgia not attacked the region, some other pretext would 
have been found to demonstrate that Russia was intent on emphasising its power to dictate the 
rules of the game in its backyard.879 Whether it was planned or not, Georgia’s incursion seems 
to have enabled the Kremlin meet its objectives in the region, which no other event could do 
as perfectly as it did. Russia seemingly shot many birds by a single bullet.  
The crisis produced important political implications not only for Georgia, but the whole 
region and demonstrated the Kremlin’s manoeuvre potential in the Caucasus. It showed that 
Russia is the relevant power in the region and has the ability to shape its security setting. Most 
importantly, the crisis indicated the impossibility of any military settlement of the conflicts in 
the region without Russia’s consent. In terms of regional implications of the crisis, Russia has 
demonstrated how serious it is in its intentions in the Caucasus and that no other great power 
has the ability to exert influence over this tiny region’s security issues. Although the existing 
oil and gas pipelines were outside the bombing area, their survival throughout the crisis has 
indicated that the Kremlin has given tribute to its commitment with Azerbaijan and Turkey, 
and its military operations served a peculiar goal, rather than the broad agenda of destabilising 
the region or overthrowing the Georgian Government.  
h) Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
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On 26th August, President Medvedev recognised both Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s 
independence and went ahead with bilateral agreements on the stationing of military bases in 
the region. The official justification was ensuring the security of these nations; deputy foreign 
minister cited Russia’s domestic security interests in the region and added that Russia would 
not let any titular nation in the FSU to monopolise or resent the minorities.880 Foreign minister 
Lavrov in his interview to Radio Liberty said that there was no prospect of persuading South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia to reintegrate into the Georgian state, ‘one should now forget about 
Georgia’s territorial integrity’.881 He further argued that Russia ‘can no longer allow itself, as 
it did in the past, simply to wait for the beginning of another blitzkrieg by Tbilisi against 
South Ossetia or Abkhazia’.882 Although, beginning from March the Russian Duma and 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs had entertained the idea of Russia’s recognition of both regions, 
such a step caused a big surprise.883 The Kremlin for the first time revised the boundaries it 
had accepted at the dissolution of the Soviet Union and demonstrated that it is somehow no 
longer a status-quo power. Interestingly enough, President Medvedev referred the act to the 
UN Charter, 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration and CSCE Helsinki Final Act.884 In an 
article in the Financial Times, he immediately made an analogy with Kosovo, as if Russia had 
been pushed to recognition by the West: 
‘……ignoring Russia’s warnings, western countries rushed to recognise Kosovo’s illegal declaration of 
independence from Serbia. We argued consistently that it would be impossible, after that, to tell the Abkhazians 
and Ossetians (and dozens of other groups around the world) that what was good for the Kosovo Albanians was 
not good for them’.885  
Another aspect of Russia’s recognition was that it occurred not because of Russia’s 
commitment to international norms as self-determination or humanitarianism, but rather out 
of its power-political and to a lesser extent domestic security considerations. Russia’s 
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia only and not of Mountainous Karabakh indicates 
that the act was a product of bilateral relations with Georgia. Russia has assured Azerbaijan 
that despite the decision it continues to respect its territorial integrity. Furthermore, the 
recognition was an element of an asymmetric response it gave to Kosovo’s independence and 
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Western support for it.886 Therefore, Russia’s recognition is in no case a confirmation of the 
right to self-determination or humanitarian based.887    
Moscow’s recognition was not a strategic decision, it occurred more as a reaction to the 
West’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence. Lacking any mid-term strategy for the 
secessionist regions, recognition was borne out of the strategy vacuum in the Kremlin and 
lack of broader strategic thinking on many aspects of its foreign policy. Meanwhile, the step 
to recognise the regions might have been caused by the dilemma in Russian politics that if 
Russia supports the resolution of the conflict, it would lose the ‚security architecture’ it has 
build in the region, the so called geopolitical monopoly in both regions, but if it fails to gain 
progress in the mediation processes, it might be risking internationalisation of the mediation 
and peacekeeping in both regions and a potential replacement by other actors that would be 
willing or able to achieve progress. It is not clear what implications it will produce. Both 
regions’ incorporation into Russia would be seen as annexation and intention to restore the 
Russian empire. This would foremost appeal to Ukraine, which is worried about Russian 
pretensions to the Crimea and Donbas, since in May the Russian Duma voted to renegotiate 
the bilateral treaty on the border between the two countries.888 The international community’s 
recognition of the regions’ independence is no option for the time being. It seems that the 
recognition’s only implications will be for Russia’s interaction with both regions, especially 
its presence there.  
i) Broader implications 
The South Ossetia crisis has had implications both for Georgia and the South Caucasus and 
CIS as well as Russian-Western relations. The direct implications for Georgia are, its chances 
of restoring territorial sovereignty over both regions are seriously undermined now. 
Improvement in the bilateral relations between Tbilisi and Moscow might lead to a 
resumption of talks on the status of both regions, but this would at maximum end up in a 
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loose confederation or alliance of sovereign states. So, return to a status-quo ante is not 
possible any more. Georgia’s NATO prospects have diminished, since most European states 
would see its accession to NATO as a burden on the alliance.  
The crisis has had a regional dimension for both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Firstly, it 
demonstrated the difficulty of resolving the MK conflict by use of force. Having seen 
Russia’s response, the Azerbaijani Government is now less inclined to refer to a military 
solution of its territorial sovereignty or make loud statements of being a regional power. The 
crisis revealed the vulnerability of Azerbaijan’s balanced foreign policy in a sense that, should 
the rift between Russia and the West grow bigger, Baku would have to make a choice 
between the two poles. Baku refrained from making any comments on the situation during the 
crisis, but sent in humanitarian assistance to Georgia. The fragility of Georgia’s political 
stability also put under question Azerbaijan’s export routes and aspirations to become a transit 
country for the transportation of fossil fuel reserves from the Caspian Sea. As an ultimate 
result of the crisis, the Azerbaijani Government is now seemingly more inclined to warm up 
its relations with Russia further, and is less enthusiastic about providing gas for Nabucco 
pipeline. As to Armenia, although Yerevan was primarily happy with Russia’s reaction, it was 
disappointed when Russia rejected to recognise MK’s independence and reassured Azerbaijan 
of its support for the latter’s territorial integrity. The crisis demonstrated Armenia’s 
vulnerability when Russia stopped its gas deliveries and railway connection to Georgia. This 
in its turn brought about some softening in the Armenian government’s position towards 
Turkey with the hope of opening the border between the two countries.  
Another implication of the crisis is, Russia is keen on strengthening the relative autonomy of 
the CIS and is less inclined about international norms. This was demonstrated by its previous 
suspension of the CFE Treaty in December 2007, which indicated that Moscow does not 
desire any limit to its military presence in the CIS.889 Defending the fragmentation of Europe 
to spheres of interest and claiming a sphere where its exclusive norms would apply, Russia in 
fact challenged the post-cold war security architecture of Europe. The crisis demonstrated that 
Russia is now prioritising its hegemony in the post-soviet space and less worries about 
relations with the West. Through its recognition, and veto of the OSCE mission in South 
Ossetia, Russia has demonstrated that it sees its conduct in both regions as autonomous from 
the international system. Thus, the post-crisis picture is not one of another cold war, since 
ideology and rules of the game are absent, but, with the recognition of both regions’ status, a 
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new Russia has appeared in the CIS, which is much intent on coercive, rather than cooperative 
hegemony.890  
4.4. Russia’s policies towards the Mountainous Karabakh conflict 
As the most regional and destructive of all three disputes, the MK conflict has for years acted 
as a policy resource for Russia’s perceived power political interests in the region. Since MK 
has no geographic proximity or ethnic affiliation to the Russian North Caucasus, this conflict 
has not been related to Russia’s domestic security concerns, and Moscow’s interests here have 
mainly been power-political. The conflict has been used to get concessions from both 
countries, to guarantee Russia’s presence and hegemony in the South Caucasus and to 
undermine regional cooperation.  
At various stages, Russia’s military support to Armenia and indirect transfer of that support to 
MK has made Armenia’s position in the peace process intransigent.891 During the late Soviet 
era, Moscow initially sided with Azerbaijan because of the loyalty of the latter. Azerbaijan 
advocated status-quo in the Soviet Union, and its public and the ruling elite were reluctant to 
independence until the August coup of 1991. The Armenian Government had initially sought 
maximal sovereignty, distancing itself from Russia. However, the later circumstances, in 
particular Yerevan’s involvement in warfare pushed Armenia towards becoming the most 
loyal and strategic ally of Russia in the CIS.892  
4.4.1. Russia’s engagement  
Russian policy at the start of the Karabakh conflict was inconsistent and Russia had no clear 
strategy. That inconsistency was reflected in the alleged Russian involvement (participation of 
the 366 motor-rifle division located in MK) in the Khojaly massacre, leading to the departure 
of the Kremlin loyal political elite in Azerbaijan.893 The massacre of Azerbaijani civilians by 
Armenian forces in Khojaly (a town in the Mountainous Karabakh region) caused outrage in 
Baku, which led to Mutallibov’s resignation, and subsequent instalment of an anti-Russian, 
pro-Turkish and pro-Western Government under President Elcibey.894 This occurred at a time 
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when Russia was still in the process of elaborating a strategy for the South Caucasus. 
Therefore that period is the starting point of a continuous strategy by the Kremlin towards the 
conflict. In this context, alleged Russian assistance to the Armenian side at the start of the 
conflict (before the adoption of the foreign policy concept) was more identity rather than 
strategic interest driven and not executed at a state level. Russian public figures sympathised 
with Armenia during the ‘Operation ring’, and the local army officers stationed in Karabakh 
expressed solidarity with Armenia based upon religious fraternity. Moreover, Armenians had 
integrated Russia much better than Azeris, which was a factor during the lobbying efforts in 
Moscow. 
a) Russian military engagement 
Russia’s military support to Armenia and MK dates to the post 1992 period, when President 
Elcibey openly distanced himself from Russia, refused to join the CIS and CSTO. He sought 
greater engagement of Turkey in Azerbaijan and the region, and asked Russian border guards 
in Azerbaijan to leave. Russia viewed the calls in the Turkish society and public for 
intervention with alarm, in particular following the Khojaly massacre and occupation of 
Kelbajar, which caused large IDP influx.895 In 1993, Russian defence minister Grachev 
warned Turkey that in case of intervention, this would lead to retaliation by Russia. In early 
1993, the Azerbaijani MFA claimed that Armenian offensives were being assisted by Russian 
servicemen from the 7th army in Armenia. Elcibey declared in the Parliament that the Russian 
military gave Azerbaijan an ultimatum to accept the continued presence of Russian forces. 
Azeri rejection allegedly resulted in the participation of the 7th Army units in the Armenian 
attacks in Karabakh.896  
According to Safer World, the largest share of weapons, technology and ammunition was 
concentrated in Azerbaijan, and Russia stopped the handover of weapons from the 4th army to 
the now ‘anti-Russian’ Azerbaijan Government.897 As a result, the new Azeri administration 
under Aliev in 1993 did their best to warm up relations with Moscow; Azerbaijan joined the 
CIS and signed the Collective Security Treaty and pledged to return Russian border guards to 
Azerbaijan. Furthermore, Azerbaijani leadership was hopeful that by rejecting the 
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uncompromising attitude of their predecessors on the crucial issue of Azerbaijan’s 
cooperation with Russia in the Caspian, they could invite Russia to review and change its 
position toward the Mountainous Karabakh problem.898 For a while the Russian side made 
allusions that that was exactly what was going to happen. In 1994, Yuri Shafrannik, the 
Russian Minister for Fuel and Energy, referring to the 1994 oil contract in Baku stated that 
‘….the signing of the treaty between Moscow and Baku will have an effect on solving the 
Karabakh conflict’.899 Azerbaijan accordingly offered the Russian oil company Lukoil a 10 % 
share in the 1994 contract. Russia’s linkage of energy interests to the security problems in the 
region was also admitted by a senior Russian diplomat, saying ‘…the oil factor, the problem 
of security of states, and the settlement of conflicts prove to be interconnected in one way or 
another…..at stake are our vital, long-term interests’. 900 
In 1997, it was revealed that Russia had systematically delivered arms worth 1 billion USD to 
Armenia in 1993-1997. The weapons delivered were not a part of the division of Soviet 
property in Armenia. Initially, the minister for CIS affairs Aman Tuliyev stated that the 
ministry of defence had passed weapons to Armenia without the prior knowledge of the 
president. This was also confirmed by the minister of defence.901 Later, the Russian 
Government explained it on the grounds of bilateral agreements with Armenia. Russia’s arms 
delivery to Armenia and military relations continued throughout, generating a delicate balance 
of power between Azerbaijan and the latter, possibly to prevent any outbreak of conflict in the 
future. Although, Azerbaijan had received a larger quantity of weapons during the division of 
Soviet property in early 1990s, this deal made Armenia militarily better equipped. 
4.4.2. Russia’s attachment to the peace process 
In April 1992, Kozyrev suggested a two stage plan: cease-fire agreement and deployment of 
peace-keepers; only in the second stage the negotiations would focus on the status of MK. 
The plan complimented a CIS Summit decision on 20th March 1992 in Kiev to send 
peacekeepers and observers to the region. A special commission was suggested to be 
deployed in Karabakh and along the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan.902 Russia under 
Kozyrev was even prepared to share the peacekeeping with the OSCE and accentuated cease-
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fire rather than peace-keeping.903 As peace became more complicated and difficult to achieve, 
Russia proposed another plan: first cease-fire, then a peace-troop to guarantee the cease-fire, 
followed by a treaty on non-use of force to include security guarantees for MK and its 
withdrawal from the occupied regions, and finally decide on the status of the region.904 
Initially, Baku insisted on Armenian troop withdrawal as a precondition for the cease-fire, but 
after its unsuccessful counter-offensive in winter 1994, Azerbaijan risked losing a larger 
portion of its territory, and so gave up.905 The dissent between the conflict parties led to three 
different cease-fires to be signed, one in Baku, another one in Stepanakert and another in 
Yerevan.906 On 16th May, 1994 Russian defence minister met with the defence ministers of 
the two countries plus MK and suggested the deployment of a peace-keeping force on the 
contact line between the parties: Russia wanted the military bases in Armenia to be deployed 
as a peacekeeping force in MK.907 The plan was accepted by Armenia and MK, but rejected 
by Azerbaijan on the grounds that it would freeze Armenian territorial gains from Azerbaijan. 
President Aliyev instead preferred the deployment of Russian peacekeepers within the CSCE 
framework. Overall, Azerbaijan was suspicious of Russian peacekeeping, and resisted the 
redeployment of regular Russian troops in its territory. At the CIS Summit of 15th April 1994, 
President Aliyev objected to the Russian peace plan that entailed the introduction of Russian 
peace-keeping forces.908  
Initially, Russia supported a step by step plan, but in 1996 foreign minister Primakov 
suggested a package deal, that suggested apart from the ceasefire agreement on the cessation 
of hostilities, a memorandum on the basic elements of MK’s status, which would exclude the 
decisions made by MK, Armenia and Azerbaijan previously. On the basis of this agreement, a 
special agreement should be prepared later on the status of MK, which would on the one hand 
stipulate Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and on the other hand offer MK self-rule. This 
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became a part of the OSCE proposal in 2006, which got accepted by Armenia, but declined by 
Azerbaijan and MK. With the emergence of the Karabakh clan in Armenian politics, the 
negotiations returned to a package deal.  
Russia’s position is, it supports Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, but status quo ante is not 
possible. Within the last few years, Russia has activated its mediation efforts and would 
genuinely be prepared to support any decision that the conflict parties reach. Azerbaijan sees 
the whole of MK and 7 regions as occupied territories, whereas Russia says, MK’s status 
should be left to the end, since a status-quo ante for the 7 regions is not applicable to MK.  
From mid 1990s until the last few years, Russia did not undertake any serious measures for 
the resolution of the conflict, since the status-quo seemed to suit it the best. The conflict had 
made Armenia completely dependent upon Russia in all sectors. It was largely seen as a lever 
against an independent-minded and potentially mistrustful Azerbaijan, a means of providing 
Russia’s interests amidst lack of resources. Throughout 1996 the Russian government 
unsuccessfully lobbied for the return of Russian military bases to Azerbaijan.909  
4.4.3. Russia’s incapacity  
Russia’s capacity to resolve the MK conflict is limited by a number of factors. Overall, 
Russia’s influence over the conflict is not comparable to that over Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia and the Mountainous-Karabakh issue is much more complex to resolve. Taking into 
consideration that Armenia’s and MK’s military superiority and economy are completely 
dependent upon Russia, and Yerevan is isolated and not in a good bargaining position, one 
could assume, it would not be difficult for Russia to pressure Armenia to come to terms on an 
interim status deal. However, pressuring Armenia to give up the buffer zone would spoil 
relations with its most loyal and historic ally in the region. MK is an extremely sensitive issue 
to Armenian society and political elite and any pressure would alienate Armenia. Under such 
a scenario, Russia would lose its most tried strategic ally and partner.  
Russia’s current position on the conflict 
Improvement of bilateral relations between Baku and Moscow has had an impact on the MK 
peace process. This was visible when Russia recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but 
rejected MK despite appeals from Armenia. Moreover, the Moscow Declaration signed in 
September 2008 was another sign that Russia is actually no longer opposed to the resolution 
of the conflict. Azerbaijan’s foreign minister throughout 2007 and 2008 stated that Azerbaijan 
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was satisfied with Russia’s position.910 The Kremlin’s position is, if any deal is reached, it 
should be reached by its mediation and exclusive role, including exclusive peacekeeping. So 
any model that would exclude Russia or minimise its influence upon the region would not be 
welcome. In this regard, the territorial swap model which envisaged a once for all resolution 
of the conflict was never approved by Moscow, since a unilateral resolution of the conflict 
would reduce Russia’s leeway in the region.  
As of today, the resources of the MK conflict are to a large extent exhausted and it has been 
largely manipulated. Russia’s military presence in Armenia is through its bilateral treaties 
guaranteed for 25 years, and economic presence is secured through the purchase of assets.911 
Therefore, the resolution of the conflict might get Azerbaijan closer to Russia and enable new 
regional projects to emerge.  
Russia has repeatedly stated that any military solution to the conflict would be a disaster for 
the region, although it hardly has any security concerns in this conflict. A war between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan would have much bigger implications than the South Ossetian one. It 
would be regional and involve outside actors as Russia, Turkey and even Iran. Moreover, the 
multi-billion investments in Azerbaijan’s oil sector might urge Western governments to take 
action, since both Yerevan and the MK authorities have repeatedly stated that in case of 
Azerbaijan’ resort to use of force, Azerbaijan’s oil and gas infrastructure would be potential 
targets.      
Concluding remarks 
Russia’s engagement in all three conflicts has overall complicated the resolution of the 
conflicts. Initially Russia was neutral to all three conflicts, however, once Azerbaijan and 
Georgia began to go their own ways, all three conflicts became sticks and resources for a 
resource poor Kremlin. Azerbaijan opted for a too close partnership with Turkey, while 
refusing to join the CIS or permit Russian military presence, which raised geopolitical 
concerns in Russia. The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict was used as leverage against an 
independent-minded, anti-Russian Georgia, and to get Georgia into the CIS and agree to 
Russian military presence in its territory. Both Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian 
conflicts had another strategic importance for Russia. Their outbreak removed the 
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concentration of the Confederation of Caucasus Peoples from seceding from Russia to 
fighting the Georgians. So, in this way outburst of the Chechen conflict was delayed. 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia gathered all the negative energy accumulated against Russia in 
the North Caucasus.  
In mid 1990s, once Georgia agreed to all Russia’s demands, the latter made it clear in 
declaratory statements to both secessionist regions that they did not stand a chance of 
independence. Moscow applied sanctions against Abkhazia, but these sanctions failed to 
break the resistance of the region. This was largely due to the inconsistence in Russia itself 
caused by weak statehood, which made a strict observance of the sanctions nearly impossible. 
The sanctions had led to certain softening in Abkhaz position, but not complete withdrawal 
from seeking political independence. Another reason why the sanctions failed to produce 
results was because of the resistance within the Abkhaz society to reintegration into Georgia 
under Georgia’s demands. Previous efforts to impose conditions on Abkhazia vis-à-vis the 
repatriation of Georgian IDPs for example had also largely failed, indicating Russia’s 
incapacity to impose pax Russica in the region.  
The second period of Russia’s engagement in the South Caucasus, namely from 1999 
onwards coincided with changes both in Russia and Georgian-Russian relations. The changes 
in Russia primarily comprised increased capacity of Russia both in the near abroad and in the 
international system. This capacity however did not produce any serious implications for 
Russia’s policies towards both conflicts in Georgia. Changes in Russia’s capacity and in 
Abkhazia’s dependence on Russia were accompanied by a gradual deterioration of Georgian-
Russian relations and development of strategic geopolitical rivalry between the West and 
Russia in the Caspian region, of which the South Caucasus is an important part. Russia had 
agreed to a number of concessions at the OSCE Istanbul Summit, and therefore during the 
early years of President’s Putin’s term, Russia seemed to be in strategic retreat. Therefore, the 
conflicts were seen as an important source of leverage that Russia would be interested to 
utilise amidst shortage of resources.  
Increased capacity of the Russian state, in particular the re-establishment of Russia’s strong 
hand over Chechnya and limiting the regional elites’ influence led to Russia’s desecuritisation 
of secessionism in the South Caucasus and increased political and economic engagement in 
both regions. Starting from 2000, Russia’s tacit engagement in both Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia became more and more explicit, which finally culminated in the recognition of both 
regions’ independence in August 2008. A number of factors such as Russian-Georgian 
bilateral relations and Russian-Western relations played a primary role behind this move.  
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Russia’s approach to the MK conflict has been slightly different from its approach to the two 
other disputes and the split started during the latter part of Putin’s tenure. During Yeltsin’s 
term Russia did manipulate the conflict for its own ends, and it seemed that the conflict was 
an efficient lever and leeway for the Kremlin’s broader geopolitical interests in the region. 
The recent change has occurred due to a number of factors of which the Russian-Azerbaijan 
relations and exhaustion of the conflict as a policy resource play a role. A fundamental 
difference between MK conflicts and ones in Georgia is the absence of domestic security 
concerns in Mountinaous Karabakh. Although a large number of analysts have by and large 
linked all three conflicts to Russia’s geopolitical interests to an equal extent, the next chapters 
on the interaction between Russia’s bilateral relations and engagement in the region, and on 
Russia’s strategic interests will explain that the picture may slightly be different.  
Overall, Russia’s engagement, in particular tacit support for the secessionist regions has 
varied to certain extents, but has remained stable at least in Abkhazia and South Ossetia for 
the entire post-Soviet era. Russian policymakers and certain analysts have often invoked 
Russia’s incapacity to assist the resolution of conflict for defending its position of inaction or 
tacit support for the break-away regimes. On the contrary, Russia during Yeltsin’s term had a 
large capacity for the resolution of at least the South Ossetian conflict. Whereas pressure on 
Abkhazia did not produce any effect due to weak statehood and actor plurality or strong 
Abkhaz resistance, in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict most of these factors were absent. As 
mentioned elsewhere, the Georgian-Ossetian conflict was initially a political conflict, that 
later transformed into an ethno-territorial one. Therefore, its resolution did not require as 
much pressure upon Tskhinvali as it would have been required in Abkhazia, neither did the 
regional elites with interests in Abkhaz de facto independence play a role in the Georgian-
Ossetian conflict. The ethnically mixed nature of the region and existence of inter-ethnic 
community relations could have facilitated the peace process.  
However, with regard to nearly all three conflicts (to a lesser extent MK), Russia was in no 
position to force the populations to a particular condition. Such a scenario under Yeltsin 
would have caused instability in the Russian North Caucasus. Therefore, when speaking about 
Russia’s capacity and leeway, it is only thought for a modus vivendi, which the international 
community has been supporting in all three conflicts. In the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, it was 
the Boden Plan and in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict various such models had been worked 
out. 
To sum up, regarding Russia’s engagement and leeway in all three conflicts, Russia’s 
increased capacity and higher dependence of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia on Russia 
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would make it easier to reach a compromise in both conflicts. It has however no interest at 
present in the resolution of the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts. It is in 
contrast, supportive of a modus vivendi in the MK conflict.           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5  
Interaction between Russia’s bilateral relations with the South Caucasus 
states and its policies towards the ethno-territorial conflicts   
5.1. Impact of Russia’s bilateral relations with Georgia on the Abkhaz and South 
Ossetian conflicts 
Georgia’s bilateral relations with Russia have had a significant impact on the conflict 
dynamics in the region. The relations have been sour since the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union and gradually deteriorated in 2006, reaching a culmination with Russia’s recognition of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s independence in 2008. A number of factors have contributed to 
the deterioration in the bilateral relations, but it is mainly the ethno-territorial conflicts that 
Georgia’s interaction and discontent with Russia mostly occurs on.912 The message of the 
Russian Government has been that it has no ultimate solution that it can impose upon both 
conflict regions and that Georgia needs to gain the regions’ trust first. The Russian 
Government has also indicated that mistrust and insecurity need to be overcome in the 
bilateral relations. Although, there were many attempts to thaw the tension in the relations, 
Tbilisi has been insisting that Russia’s involvement in the conflicts has not been constructive 
and its policies are neo-imperialist. Convinced that any cooperation with Moscow will not 
bring about shift in the latter’s position to Georgia’s security problems, it has opted for 
alignment with Euro-Atlantic institutions and balancing Russia. Georgia has indicated that it 
prefers the European normative space as a foundation for its bilateral relations with Russia, 
while Russia seems to prefer a CIS-based normative regime.  
                                                 
912 For an indepth analysis of Russian-Georgian interests in a regional context, see Alexander Rondeli, ‘Russia 
and Georgia: Relations are still tense’, Central Asia and the Caucasus, vol. 1, issue 1, 2006.  
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The challenging question to answer is to what extent Russia’s support and overall policies 
towards the secessionist conflicts have been associated with its bilateral relations with 
Georgia, in other words would any rapprochement of Tbilisi and Moscow lead to 
breakthrough in either of Georgia’s territorial conflicts. The dominant concept in Georgian 
society among both academics and public figures has been that no matter what Georgia does, 
Russia will not change its position to both secessionist conflicts, and therefore the best option 
is balancing rather than bandwagoning.913 This is documented with the Georgian 
Government’s attempts in 1994-1995 of rapprochement with Russia by supporting all its 
initiatives in the region.914 President Shevardnadze had agreed to get Georgia into the CIS and 
CST, host Russia’s military bases as well as border guards, and had assisted Russia during its 
first Chechen campaign. This had a certain level of impact on Russia’s approach to Tbilisi and 
its policies towards the secessionist conflicts. Russia applied sanctions on both Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia and assured to both regions that they would not have any chances of becoming 
independent. However, for both power-political and domestic political reasons, Russia failed 
to hold its sanctions strictly or carry out active peace-making between the parties. It failed to 
mediate a resolution model between Georgia and South Ossetia, where unlike in Abkhazia, 
reconciliation would not require huge efforts. Shevardnadze invited Russia to serve as 
peacekeepers in both regions and signed an agreement on Russia’s military bases, allowed 
Russian border troops to control its border. For all these concessions, Shevardnadze did not 
get anything tangible in return, and finally applied for NATO membership and co-established 
GUUAM to balance the CIS. However, Shevardnadze’s attempts to resolve the security 
problems of Georgia by engaging the West went largely unanswered. The US and EU 
interests in the region did not go beyond the oil and gas concentrated economic interests.   
On the other hand, Shevardnadze’s concessions to Russia had not changed the deeply rooted 
mistrust of Georgia in Russian political circles owing to a number of factors. Although a large 
portion of this mistrust owed to the policies of Gamsakhurdia, his departure and exile did not 
soften the tension either, as it were structural.915 Georgia’s ruling elite had consolidated their 
power seeking distancing from the dominant power. A resistance identity dating back to the 
18th century, implying territorial, cultural and religious separation from the Russian empire 
                                                 
913 See Ghia Nodia, ‘Have Russian-Georgian relations hit bottom or will they continue to deteriorate?’, Russian 
Analytical Digest, No 13, 16 January, 2007.   
914 The Georgian government agreed to whatever Russia suggested believing that this would guarantee the 
cessation of Russian assistance to the Abkhaz force and help Georgia restore sovereignty over the province. See 
Dov Lynch, ‘The conflict in Abkhazia: Dilemmas in Russian ‘peacekeeping policy’, Discussion paper 77, 
London: RII, 1998. 
915 See Gia Nodia, ‘Political turmoil in Georgia and the Ethnic Policies of Zviad Gamsakhurdia’, in Bruno 
Coppieters ed., Contested Borders in the Caucasus, p. 73-79.  
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had strengthened in Georgia in 1980s.916 By gaining independence, the grievances 
accumulated since the time of the Russian Empire, led to the identification of Georgia’s 
interests as incompatible with Russia’s. The resistance identity went too far to blame every 
failure on Russia, starting from earthquakes to its ethno-national problems with the 
minorities.917 In this context, there is a consensus on Russia in the Georgian society, which 
only strengthened during Saakashvili’s term. Never has there been any serious movement 
either rejecting Euro-Atlantic integration or advocating warmer relations with Moscow.918  
5.1.1 Deterioration of Georgian-Russian relations    
Towards the end of Shevardnadze’s second term, Georgian-Russian relations experienced a 
deterioration leading to a number of implications for Russia’s policies in the region. Starting 
from 1995, dissatisfied with Russia’s mediating role in both conflicts, the Georgian political 
leadership shifted their orientation from bandwagoning to balancing, seeking greater 
engagement of the US and EU in the region. As Georgia’s expectations of recovering 
territorial integrity through cooperation with Russia largely failed, the US, after its 
intervention in Bosnia and its effective role during the Dayton agreement, began to be 
regarded as a potential alternative to Russia in mediation and peacekeeping. Georgia’s 
discontent with Russia became more obvious during the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999, 
when it reached an agreement on the withdrawal of Russian military bases and endorsed the 
construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Jeyhan pipeline, a rival route for the transport of Caspian oil 
resources to Western markets. 
In 1997 GUUAM alliance was established at NATO’s 50th anniversary summit. Although the 
alliance’s power was much exaggerated, GUUAM’s birth was a result of the rising discontent 
with Russian hegemony in the CIS, and all the signatory states were intent to balance it. 
Russia was enraged in the first years of GUUAM’s existence as it viewed GUAM as a US and 
NATO initiated quasi-alliance to balance and limit Russia’s influence in the CIS. Certain 
Russian circles still see GUUAM as an effort to disintegrate the CIS and create an alternative 
to it. The establishment of a peacekeeping contingent of the organisation, albeit quite 
symbolic, was seen in the Kremlin to undermine the CIS peacekeeping.919 The organisation 
has no economic or military functions, just joint platform at international organisations.  
5.1.2. Impact of failed cooperation in the II Chechen war  
                                                 
916 See Gia Tarkhan Mouravi, ‘The Gergian-Abkhazian conflict in a regional context’, in Bruno Coppieters, Ghia 
Nodia and Yuri Anchabadze eds, Georgia and Abkhazia, The search for a settlement (Köln: 
Sonderveröffentlichung des BIOst, 1998), pp. 90-112.  
917 Ghia Nodia, ‘Georgia’s Identity Crisis’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 6 no. 1, 1995, p. 108.  
918 The Social Party of Georgia is usually known for its pro-Russian stance, however, it has at times of crisis 
refused to take a pro-Rusian stance and has also supported Georgia’s leave of the CIS. 
919 ‘Rossiya obyavlyaet voynu GUAM’, Zerkalo, 26 September, 2006.  
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Georgia refused to cooperate with Russia during the second Chechen war. Russia, trying to 
secure the Georgian side of the Georgian-Russian border had in late 1999 asked for consent to 
fly missions from the military bases in Georgia, but had been turned down.920 Russian 
officials requested the use of Georgian territory to launch military attacks on Chechnya and 
permission to deploy Russian Special Forces in Pankisi gorge, a region in Georgia populated 
by ethnic Chechens, and where additional 7,000 Chechens had sought refuge.921 Apart from 
refugees, the gorge had also become a safe haven for criminals and combatants. A crisis 
emerged, when Russia accused Georgia of hosting Chechen terrorists and potential 
combatants in the gorge in 2001.922 The crisis reached its culmination in September 2002 
when Russia issued an ultimatum to Tbilisi and started planning for military strikes. Tbilisi 
had difficulty bringing law and order into the region and Russian defence minister threatened 
with military intervention.923 In 1999 and 2002, there were repeated violations of Georgia’s 
air space on the border; Moscow allegedly launched missiles and mined gorges in northern 
Georgia and on 23rd August, Russian jets bombed the Georgian territory adjacent to the 
Chechen sector of the Russian border.924 The crisis got finally resolved when in April 2002, 
the US offered military assistance to Georgia in the form of Georgia Train and Equip 
Programme, which envisaged dispatching some 200 military instructors to Tbilisi to train the 
Georgian army against counterinsurgency.925 Although, initially President Putin welcomed the 
move, US military presence in Georgia later seemingly caused anger in Russian political 
circles, which increasingly regarded it to be aimed at pushing Russia out of the Caucasus. 
Moreover, the Russian elite saw the programme as US attempt to improve Georgia’s combat 
potential for intrusion into South Ossetia and Abkhazia.926  
                                                 
920 See Jaba Devdariani, ‚Georgia reacts to Russian pressure’, Perspective, vol. 13, no 1, September-October 
2002, at http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol13/devdariani.html  
921 See Jaba Devdariani and Blanka Hancilova, Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge. Russian, US and European 
connections, CEPS Policy Brief  No 23, 2002, p. 3. 
922 Russian accusations of Georgia’s hosting and supporting chehcen terrorists continued during the Saakashvili 
Government as well. See ‘Russia accuses Georgia of harbouring terrorists’, Civil Georgia, 13 February, 2005. 
923 Ian Traynor, ‘Russia Angry at U.S. War Plan for Georgia’, The Guardian, 22 February, 2002. For military 
details, see For opposite views, see ‘Pik konfrontacii v Rossiysko-Gruzinskix otnosheniy eshe ne proyden’, 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 7th April, 2003. 
924 See Liz Fuller, ‘Unknown fighters again violate Georgian air space’, RFE/RL Newsline, August 23rd, Tracey 
German, ‘The Pankisi Gorge: Georgia’s achilles’ heel in its relations with Russia?’, Central Asian Survey, vol. 
23, issue 1, March 2004, pp. 27-39. It should be noted however that Russia due to the war in Chechnya, had 
limited many military means at its disposal, and air strikes were the only available option. See Mikhail 
Khodarenok, ‘Threat and forget’, Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, 4 October, 2002, quoted in Pavel Baev, 
‘Russian policies in the North Caucasus’, op. cit., p. 48.    
925 US State Department and the White House had throughout the tension assured Georgia of support and 
condemned Russian pressure’, see Liz Fuller, ‘US assures Georgia of support’, RFE/RL Newsline, March 21, 
2001.  
926 See Anatoliy Gordienko, Tatyana Rubleva, ‘Gosdepartament SSHA naznachil vinovnix’, Nezavisimoe 
voennoe obozrenie, 30 August, 2002. 
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Although, the dispatch of US GTEP to Georgia did deter the threat of potential Russian 
military intrusion into Georgia, Russia was still not satisfied with the level of Georgian law 
enforcement in Pankisi Gorge and desired joint military action in the gorge. In response, the 
Georgian Government in August, 2002 carried out anti-criminal operation, detaining 
criminals and restoring order in the gorge.927 However, this still did not satisfy the Russian 
government, and in September 2002, President Putin referred to Russia’s right to use 
preemptive force against Pankisi, and asked the UN to recognise Russia’s right to self-
defence.928 It is not clear whether Russia did it for its dissatisfaction with law enforcement in 
Pankisi, hence because it was suffering from security threats in Chechnya and Daghestan or it 
was manipulating the situation on the ground to exert pressure on Tbilisi.929   
5.1.3. Russian-Georgian relations after the Rose-Revolution 
In January 2004, the Georgian Parliament speaker and acting President Nino Burjanadze 
expressed hope that Georgia’s willingness to normalise relations with Russia would lead to a 
regulation of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. Russian-Georgian relations shortly improved in 
the first half of 2004, as President Saakashvili pledged to start everything from scratch.930 The 
Georgian Government offered Russian firms new perspectives in the country’s energy and 
transport sectors and declared willingness to jointly control certain parts of the Russian-
Georgian border. Russia’s economic presence became more conspicuous than ever since 
independence.931 All these raised questions in Moscow as how to respond to the changes in 
                                                 
927 See Valery Kahburdzania, ‘Georgia’s key security concerns: Pankisi and Abkhazia’, Nixon Center, 
Washington DC, 30 January, 2003, available at 
http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/Program%20Briefs/vol9no1khazb.htm  
928 See Jaba Devdariani, ‘Georgian security operation in Pankisi Gorge’, Eurasia Insight, 3rd September, 2002.   
929 Pavel Baev argued for example that ‘a careful examination of the mini crisis confirms that Moscow was not 
so much confronting a terrorist challenge as exploiting it to put pressure on Georgia’, see Pavel Baev, ‘Russia’s 
policies in the North and South Caucasus’, in The South Caucasus: a challenge for the EU, Dov Lynch ed., 
Chaillot Paper 65, December, 2003, p.44. For Russia’s use of terrorist attacks to expand its influence, see Martha 
Brill Olcott, ‘State-building and security threats in Central Asia’, in Andrew C. Kuchins Russia after the Fall 
(Washington: CEIP, 2002), pp. 221-241. 
930 See Igor Torbakov, ‘Russia remains wary of Georgia’s geopolitical intentions’, Eurasia Insight, 18th 
February, 2004. For a detailed account of Russian-Georgian relations after the Rose Revolution, see Jaba 
Devdariani, ‘Georgia and Russia: The Troubled Road to Accommodation’, in: Statehood and Security: Georgia 
after the Rose Revolution’, Bruno Coppieters, Robert Legvold, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005), pp. 153-203. 
An interesting view on the pre and post Rose Revolution Georgian-Russian relations holds that the nature of the 
bilateral relations are largely negative and would not change by regime change in Tbilisi, see Alexander Rondeli, 
‘Russia and Georgia: Relations are still tense’, Central Asia and the Caucasus, vol. 1, issue 1, 2006.  
931 This has been a critical issue for Russia’s security concerns in the North Caucasus, as Russia kept warning 
Georgia over the passage of militants from Georgia into Chechnya. Until December 2004, the Georgian-Russian 
border had been monitored by the Border Monitor Mission of the OSCE, but in December, 2004 Russia vetoed 
it. According to Dov Lynch, Russia’s vetoing of the BMO was due to the fact that the mission was not 
monitoring the border effectively and militants passed through the border easily. See Dov Lynch, ‘Why Georgia 
matters’, p. 47. 
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Georgia, in particular regarding the secessionist regions.932 The first alleged reciprocal sign 
from Russia was its support to Georgia during the Ajaria crisis. 933 Once Saakashvili’s forces 
had entered Ajaria, on 6th May 2004, Igor Ivanov stepped in to facilitate Abashidze’s exile to 
Moscow. However, Russia’s support in this crisis was not very clear, and it seemed that 
Russia had had no choice; it was too late to change anything at all because of the population’s 
support for the central Government. Back on 20thJanuary, 2004 the Russian foreign ministry 
had condemned ‘extremist minded forces’ in Ajaria seeking Abashidze’s resignation.934 
Moscow may have drawn the conclusion that support for Abashidze was so low that propping 
him up would have been too costly politically.  
a) Russian military bases 
The Russian Government expected that its support during the Ajaria crisis would be seen a 
sign of its preparedness to resolve Georgia’s security problems. Russia had therefore expected 
some political gratitude, so President Putin was allegedly angered and surprised when a day 
after Abashidze’s exile, Georgian Government repeated the previous demands for the removal 
of the remaining Russian bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki.935 Meanwhile, President 
Saakashvili stated that Tbilisi acknowledged Russia’s security interests in the region and 
would be prepared to offer cooperation as establishing a joint Russian-Georgian anti-terrorist 
centre in exchange for the military bases.936 In an interview with the Time magazine in 
January 2004, Saakashvili went further to state that the bases served more to bolster imperial 
                                                 
932 See Igor Torbakov, ‘Russian policy makers struggle to respond to political changes in Georgia’, Eurasia 
Insight, 8 January, 2004. See also Ariel Cohen, ‘US officials warily monitor Russian policy debate on Caucasus’, 
Eurasia Insight, 9 January, 2004.  
933 Ajaria is an autonomous region on the Black Sea in Georgia, which is populated by Georgian muslims. After 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Tbilisi’s control over the region diminished, its leadership led by Aslan 
Abashidze defied the central government on a number of issues including customs and tax-collections. Ajaria’s 
relations with the centre resembled those in a loose federation, and were based upon a de facto personalised 
power-sharing arrangement between Abashidze and Shevardnadze. Ajaria was also immune from the Georgian 
civil war. During Shevardnadze’s term in office, Tbilisi’s sovereignty over Ajaria was only nominal. The 
primary difference between Ajaria and the other conflict regions, is it never aspired to independence and never 
fought an armed conflict with the central authority. After Saakashvili’s election, the Ajarian leader refused to 
recognise the new Georgian leadership and blocked the administrative border with the rest of Georgia. See 
‘Saaksahvili’s Ajaria success: Repeatable elsewhere in Georgia?’, Europe Briefing , 18 August, 2004. 
934 See ‘Saaksahvili’s Ajaria success: Repeatable elsewhere in Georgia?’, Europe Briefing, 18 August, 2004. The 
siloviki in the Kremlin also defended the position that Russia should support Ajaria and not let Saakashvili 
intrude in, see Stanislav Belkovskiy, ‘Rossiya dolzhna bilo spasti Ajariu’, Komsomolskaya Pravda, 17 May, 
2004. 
935 See Tsygankov, Russia’s foreign policy, p. 155. Saakashvili had first mentioned Russia’s withdrawal in his 
inauguration speech, stating ‘..we acknowledge Russia’s security interests in the region, but these can be served 
better by means other than the bases’. The base in Batumi was largely welcomed by the then Ajarian leader 
Abashidze, whose regime viewed it as military support to rely upon for the survival of its autonomy. Equally the 
base in Akhalkalaki, a region populated by ethnic Armenians, enjoyed high popularity among the local residents, 
the closure of which was initially thought to generate unrest in the region. See Vladimir Socor: ‘Russian Military 
Bases in Georgia: No Negotiations, New Complications’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. I, No. 34, 18 June 2004 
and ‘Russia Turning back the Clock on Georgia Policy’, ibid., vol. I, No. 36, 22 June 2004.  
936 See ‘Russia, Georgia discussed anti-terrorism centre’, Civil Georgia, 24 June, 2004. 
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self-confidence than Russia’s genuine security.937 At the Istanbul Summit, Russia had agreed 
to close down the Vaziani and Gudauta (in Abkhazia) bases by 2001 and negotiate the 
withdrawal from the two bases of Batumi and Akhalkalaki. The first two bases were closed 
down in 2001 and in June 2002, and OSCE military experts inspected both of them and 
confirmed the withdrawal of Russian arms and personnel.938 As to the other bases in 
Akhalkalaki and Batumi, there was no deadline set for them and their withdrawal was subject 
to bilateral negotiations.939 Back in December 2003, at the OSCE Maastricht Summit, Russia 
had claimed that it had no obligation to withdraw its troops from Georgia and Moldova. 
Russia had refused to link the CFE and its withdrawal from the bases.940 As Georgia pressed 
for the closure of the bases, Russia hardened its stance and set longer terms for its withdrawal, 
arguing that at the Istanbul Summit it had only expressed an ‘intention to leave’.941 Once 
progress could not be achieved in the negotiations, in 2005 January the Georgian Parliament 
initiated a resolution instructing the Government to outlaw the Russian presence in Georgia 
and seek forceful removal of the troops.942 The same decision instructed the government to 
blockade and cut off utilities to the bases until Russia agrees to a timeline. Finally, on May 
30, 2005, Russia agreed to a withdrawal by the end of 2008, without receiving any guarantee 
on the deployment of foreign troops.  
b) Gas crisis and spy row 
Relations between Georgia and Russia gravely deteriorated throughout 2006 to 2008. 
Throughout 2005, Russia accussed Georgia of indulging terrorists to attack Russia from 
Georgian territory and claimed the right to carry out preventive strikes. The deputy minister of 
foreign affairs Valery Loshinin and the minister of defence Sergei Ivanov both argued that 
terrorists remain in Pankisi and threaten Russia’s stability.943 In October 2006, Putin referred 
to Georgia’s preparation for a forceful way to a possible solution of the conflicts in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia as the only reason for the deterioration of relations between Tbilisi and 
Moscow, stressing the admissibility of only peaceful ways of coexistence. The then Russian 
                                                 
937 See Paul Quinn-Judge, ‘10 Questions for Mikheil Saakashvili’, Time, January 19, 2004, p. 19.  
938 See Liz Fuller, ‘OSCE says Russian withdrawal from Georgian base complete’, RFE/RL News Digest, 17 
June, 2002.  
939 See OSCE Istanbul Summit Document, p. 259, at http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1999/11/4050_en.pdf 
940 Russia very much desired the ratification of the CFE treaty by NATO states, so that it would restrict the 
deployment of allied forces in the Baltic states, see Vladimir Socor, ‘Moscow pressing for CFE Treaty 
Ratification Despite its own non-compliance’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 3, issue 96, May 16, 2006.  
941 See Pavel Felgenhauer, ‘Motives in Georgia are Base’, The Moscow Times, 13 January, 2004.   
942 ‘The Parliament sets deadline for withdrawal of Russian military bases’, Civil Georgia, 10 March, 2005. 
943 Certain analysts argued that terrorism was just a pretext for Russia to put pressure on the unfriendly to Russia 
Georgian Government and for invading it. See Vladimir Socor, ‘Georgia under growing Russian pressure ahead 
of Bush-Putin Summit’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 2, issue 32, 14 February, 2005. 
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president assured that the only goal of their aspirations in the South Caucasus was to prevent 
bloodshed.944  
The mistrust in Georgian-Russian relations often led to the politicisation of economic and 
social issues. On 22nd January 2006, explosions on the Mozdok-Tbilisi gas pipeline from 
Russia to Georgia caused a cut off in heating supplies in Georgia and Armenia. Georgia 
experienced a severe energy crisis for two weeks. The Georgian government immediately 
blamed Russia for the alleged sabotage. The accusation infuriated many in the Kremlin and 
aggravated mistrust of Georgia in Russian politics. President Putin responded, saying 
‘Russian engineers worked hard in a temperature of minus 30 degrees to restore the pipeline, 
Russia only got accusations’.945 Later, in May 2006, President Saakahsvili drew attention in 
Russia when he attended the opening of a museum of Soviet occupation in Tbilisi. The term 
occupation implied the subjugation of Georgia to Soviet Russia, therefore raised negative 
reaction in Moscow. In response, President Putin in an interview in July 2006, inquired ‘who 
occupied whom’ when under Stalin, the entire leadership of the Soviet Union was made up of 
Georgians.946 Further in December 2006, as the Russian Government took the economic 
decision to stop subsidising gas deliveries to CIS states and accordingly raised the gas price to 
Georgia to 230 per one thousand cubic meters, Tbilisi accused it of using its energy resources 
as leverage. Russian authorities responded that an increase in the gas prices was not an 
attempt of gaining leverage over the neighbours, but a simple transition to market 
principles.947 Later, in April 2006 Russia banned the import of wine and water products from 
Georgia to Russia on sanitary grounds.948 In response, in September, Tbilisi started its 
intensive dialogue with NATO, and the next day Saakashvili at the UNGA in a speech 
accused Russia of ‘bandit occupation’ and ‘annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia’.  
Relations deteriorated critically after Georgia in October 2006 arrested in a humiliating way 
Russian military officers in Tbilisi accused of spying. Russia in response suspended air and 
rail transport, postal links, money transfers to Georgia. Georgian citizens all over Russia were 
deported and Georgian business and mafia in Moscow was targeted. Having said that, 
President Putin, rejected the deportation of Georgians as reprisal, arguing ‘in the deportation 
cases, for example, Russia deported 15,300 citizens of one country, 13 400 citizens of another 
                                                 
944 ‘Putin Comments on Georgia in Nationwide Q&A Session’, Civil Georgia, 25 October, 2006. 
945 ‘Gruziya naplevala na Rossiyu. Putin obidelsya?’, Internet Reporter, at http://rep-ua.com/ru/22839.html  
946 See Erik R. Scott, ‘Russia and Georgia After Empire’, Russian analytical digest, No 13, 16th January, 2007. 
947 ‘Tbilisi says Russia’s plan to double gas price politically motivated’, Civil Georgia, 2 November, 2006.  
948 Vladimir Socor, ‘Russia Bans Georgian, Moldova Wines and Other Products’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 28 
March, 2006, Vol. 3, Issue 60. 
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country were deported, and the number of deported citizens of Georgian is only 5000’.949 
Obviously, he referred to the gradual deportation of non-Russians, ignoring the fact that no 
ethnic group had previously been so inexorably deported from Russia.   
Tbilisi’s efforts to change the peacekeeping format have largely been seen as an attempt to get 
the Russian peacekeepers out and accommodate NATO forces. The Georgian parliament had 
several times adopted a resolution outlawing peacekeepers, but they did not leave. Russian 
authorities have repeatedly stated that they have no special interests in Abkhazia, but have to 
remain there as peacekeepers for security reasons.950 Moscow was further angered when 
Tbilisi linked Russia’s WTO entry to its policies to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, referring to 
both conflicts as Georgia’s internal problems not to be linked to the issue.  
c) Prospects of Russian-Georgian relations 
The Russian authorities delivered various messages in 2007 to improve relations with Tbilisi. 
In August 2007, Russian Foreign ministry stated it wanted a friendly, sovereign and neutral 
Georgia, presumably requesting Tbilisi to withdraw its NATO application. It further stated, if 
Tbilisi takes steps towards real normalisation of relations, Russia’s constructive response will 
not be delayed.951 With regard to the conflicts, the message has been that Russia cannot 
impose any peace deal upon South Ossetia and Abkhazia forcefully and the populations do 
not desire any reintegration.  
In February 2007, the Russian Ambassador to Georgia set conditions for the improvement of 
bilateral relations.952 Accordingly, Russia wished an end to the anti-Russian rhetoric and 
propaganda in Georgia. On the conflicts, he stated that Russia supports Georgia’s territorial 
integrity, but with the protection of the interests of all peoples living there. Russia is interested 
in the resolution of the Georgian-Abkhaz and Ossetian conflicts and its approach is ‘you 
negotiate with each other and Russia will accept anything you will agree on’.953 Moscow 
accordingly would see trust-building between the parties and opening of economic ties as a 
good start. In all the above-mentioned statements, however, Russian policymakers did not 
shed light upon the fact that as long as Russia provides the tacit support for both regions, there 
will be no incentives for them to agree to any deal with Georgia, since status-quo suits them 
quite well.  
                                                 
949 ‘Putin comments on Georgia in Nationwide Q&A Session’, Civil Georgia, 2 November, 2006.  
950 See Zamministra inostrannix del RF Grigoriy Karasin- o politike Rossii na prostranstve SNG’, News 
Georgia, 19 April, 2006. 
951 See ‘Moscow wants a neutral Georgia’, Civil Georgia, 30 August, 2007.  
952 Such messages had been sent to the Georgian government previously in 2005 by Sergei Karaganov, who 
evaluated the socio-economic advantages of a normalisation of Georgian-Russian relateions. See Sergei 
Karaganov, ‘Moskva i Tbilisi, Nachat snachala’, Rossiya v globalnoy politike, No 1, January-February, 2004.  
953 ‘Russian diplomat outlines conditions for improving ties’, Civil Georgia, 6th February, 2007.  
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In contrast to the Russian ambassador, President Putin set Georgia’s relations with Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia as the primary condition for an improvement in bilateral relations. He said 
on October 25 that the only reason behind Russo-Georgian tensions is Tbilisi’s plan to 
forcefully regain control over its breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 954 
Russia’s conditions were even more clearly elaborated by Sergei Karaganov in an article, 
called ‘Farewell to Georgia?’. He argued that unless the new government of Georgia 
cooperates more closely, Russia should officially recognise the independence of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia. Accordingly, if Georgia keeps its unfriendly stance, Russia might need 
buffer states.955 Russia had suggested Georgia to restore railway in Abkhazia involving all 
three parties and economic ties in South Ossetia. He further argued that the initiate to 
aggravate relations belongs to Tbilisi because of the latter’s interest to resolve its conflicts by 
use of force.  
 
 
Table 4 Compatibility of interests  
 
Georgian interests     Russian interests 
Restoring sovereignty over 
Abkhazia  and South Ossetia 
as a part of its state-building 
process 
Security-political presence in 
the region for stability in the 
North Caucasus and for 
power-political interests;  
Incompatible 
Long-term resolution of the 
conflicts 
Leverage against an 
unfriendly Georgia and self-
interested US; 
Incompatible 
NATO membership, 
integration to Euratlantic 
institutions.956 
Disinterest in the emergence 
of poles in the CIS, threats to 
stability in the North 
Caucasus, strategic 
partnership with Georgia957 
Incompatible 
Military intrusion into the Domestic security interests: Incompatible 
                                                 
954 See ‘Putin comments on Georgia in Nationwide Q&A Session’, Civil Georgia, 2 November, 2006.  
955 Sergei Karaganov, ‘Proshanie s Gruziey’, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, August 20, 2004. 
956 Georgia has set NATO membership and integration to Euratlantic institutions its strategic goal, see ‘National 
Security Concept of Georgia’, Tbilisi, 2005.  
957 Russian policy-makers have argued that Georgia’s strategic partner should be Russia and not the US or EU, 
strategic partnership with Russia would be desirable and beneficial for Georgia’s security interests as well, see 
A. Chigorin, ‘Rossiysko-Gruzinskie otnosheniya. Chto dalshe?’, Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn, No. 5, 2003, pp. 40-
60. 
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regions spill-over of conflict into the 
North Caucasus  
Internationalisation of 
peacekeeping 
No undermining of its great 
power status  
Incompatible 
Economic integration with 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
Has been encouraging Incompatible 
Confederative models for the 
regions 
Has been supportive of Incompatible 
Long-term stability in the 
region 
Stability/Absence of military 
conflict in the South 
Caucasus 
Compatible 
 
 
 
5.2. Impact of bilateral relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan on Russia’s policies 
towards the MK conflict 
Like in the above-mentioned conflicts, bilateral relations between Russia and Armenia on the 
one hand and Russia and Azerbaijan on the other have had a significant impact on its policies 
towards the MK conflict. Throughout the 20th century Armenian society and elite have largely 
seen Russia as an ally and protectorate. In the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, Armenia became a strategic and the most loyal ally of Russia in the South Caucasus 
and the CIS. Various Russian policymakers have seen Russia’s military presence in Armenia 
as a stabilising factor.958 In 1991, as the conflict with Azerbaijan intensified, Yerevan was 
quick to withdraw its demand for the closure of Russian military bases, and ever since has 
opted for larger Russian engagement in its political and economic life. As early as May 1992, 
Armenia entered a mutual defence pact with Russia, although this was not invoked over MK. 
In keeping with the Tashkent treaty, which provided for the distribution of the military 
hardware of the USSR among the CIS states, Armenia and Azerbaijan were to receive an 
equal share of weapons.959 Part of Azerbaijan’s quota was appropriated by the MKR army, 
                                                 
958 Grigoriy Karasin, ‘Vzaimodeystvie RF i Armenii-znachimiy factor obespecenie stabilnosti’, Rian Agency, 
19th April, 2006, http://pda.rian.ru/politics/cis/20060419/46609227.html  
959 According to Zverev, the largest portion of Soviet weaponry was located in Azerbaijan, which made 
Azerbaijan militarily better off at the initial stages of the conflict. See Zverev, op. cit. However, although the 
Azeri Parliament declared that the weapons in its territory should be regarded as the property of Azerbaijan, the 
Russian military, in particular after the Popular Front came to power resisted the handover and decided to 
withdraw a large number of the strategic weapons. Throughout 1992, Azeri weapons acquisitions occurred either 
by theft from the Soviet arms dumps or by paying bribes to the Russian commanders in the region. See Arif 
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and Armenia allegedly received additional weapons in large quantities from Russia between 
1993 and 1996, some of which were transferred to MK.  
While Armenia expressed more interest in accommodating Russia’s interests in the aftermath 
of the collapse of the Soviet Union, bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and Russia were 
critical throughout the period. Relations between Azerbaijan and Russia relatively improved 
after Azerbaijan joined the CIS and Collective Security Treaty in 1993. In September 1993, 
an understanding was reached between Presidents Aliev and Yeltsin that Russia would guard 
Azerbaijan’s borders with Turkey and Iran.960 However, by the end of 1994, Aliyev was 
reluctant to let Russian border guards in. 961 This was important for Russia to prevent drug 
dealers, armed criminals and Afghan mujahedeen travel to the north Caucasus. In 1994, 
Azerbaijan offered Russian Oil Company of Lukoil a 10% share in the contract for the 
exploration of oil in the Azeri sector of the Caspian Sea.962 This however did not lead to any 
breakthrough in the peace process and Azerbaijan until the last few years was increasingly 
critical of Russia’s intentions in the region. Moreover, in August 1997 Armenia signed a 
treaty of friendship, mutual understanding and cooperation and mutual defence arrangements 
with Russia. Just before Putin came to power, Armenia and Russia had 40 bilateral accords on 
military cooperation.963 Russia’s security-political alliance with Armenia led in late 1990s to 
the activation of more efforts by Azerbaijan to balance Russia in the region. As a result, in 
1999 Azerbaijan left the CSTO and co-established the GUUAM alliance and opted for 
integration into Western security political institutions. However, Moscow has insisted that its 
bilateral relations with Armenia should be detached from its policies towards the conflict.  
Relations between Baku and Moscow improved substantially after Putin’s election in 2000. In 
2002, Azerbaijan agreed to lease the strategically important Gabala radar station for a 10 year 
period.964 With the construction of the BTJ and BTE oil and gas pipelines that could act as an 
alternative to the existing Russian pipelines, Baku has acted as a potential rival to Russia’s 
                                                                                                                                                        
Yunusov, ‘Azerbaijan: The burden of history-waiting for change’, Safer World Report, The Caucasus: armed 
and divided, April, 2003, p. 11.    
960 See Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, Back in the USSR: Russia’s Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the 
Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for United States Policy Toward Russia, Cambridge: Harvard 
University JKF School of Government, Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, January 1994, p. 14, 
quoted by Svante Cornell, ‘The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict’, op. cit., p. 56. 
961 See John J. Maresca, ‘Agony of Indifference in Nagorno Karabakh’, in The Christian Science Monitor, 27 
June 
1994, p. 19 
962 The share was however disposed of in 2009, for details see Douglas Blum, ‘Why did Russia pull out of the 
Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli Oilfields’, Ponars Memo, 286, Washington CSIS, January, 2003.  
963 See Bertile Nygren, The rebuilding of Greater Russia. Putin’s foreign policy towards the CIS countries, 
(London: Routledge, 2008), p. 115. 
964 For a detailed analysis, see Pavel Baev, ‚Rusiia’s policies in the Southern Caucasus and the Caspain Area’, 
European Security, vol 10, no 2, Summer 2001, pp. 95-110. 
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energy monopoly. In 2006, as Russia raised the price of gas for Azerbaijan, Baku rejected 
Russian gas overall and reduced the amount of oil transported via the Baku Novorossiysk 
pipeline from 4.4 million to 2.5 million tons.965 Nevertheless, Russia has in recent years 
increasingly seen Azerbaijan as an important trade partner in the CIS.  
The entire Armenian energy sector is currently under Russian control. A series of equity for 
debt deals since 2003 have transferred a number of plants in Armenia including the critical 
nuclear power plant and six hydroelectric plants to Russian companies. Through the assets for 
debts scheme, Russia has bought significant assets in Armenia’s energy, industry, 
telecommunication and banking sectors. Russia is the largest foreign investor in the Armenian 
economy, its investments made over 1 billion USD in 2008.966 Yerevan is to a large extent 
economically dependent upon Russia’s investments and Russia’s military bases. In 2006, 
Russia raised gas prices to Armenia causing discontent, but this was balanced through cheaper 
military sales.  
Improvement in the bilateral relations between Russia and Azerbaijan has had its impact on 
Russia’s position towards the MK conflict. Whereas Russia’s policymakers have been arguing 
that Kosovo’s recognition should make a precedent for the conflicts in the CIS, MK is 
excluded from the list. As it became clear during the South Ossetia crisis, Moscow treats the 
conflict in a separate context. Thus, difference in Moscow’s approach to MK is more 
associated with its policies rather than differences between the conflicts. Contrary to 
expectations in Armenia and Mountainous Karabakh, Russia refused to invite MK to the 
special hearings on secessionist conflicts in the Russian Duma in March 2008. The official 
viewpoint of the Duma’s CIS Committee was that there are no Russians living in MK, there is 
no territorial continuity in this conflict, there are no Russian investments to protect.967 The 
reason was however, Russia is not interested in satisfying Armenia at the cost of spoiling its 
relations with Azerbaijan. Thus, Russia does not satisfy all Armenia’s wishes on the conflict 
and it would not support a solution that would make Baku discontent.968 Although 
improvement in the bilateral relations between Moscow and Baku has had an impact on the 
                                                 
965 ‘Azerbaijan thinking about suspension of oil transportation via Baku-Novorossiysk’, Regnum, 12 April, 2006, 
at http://www.regnum.ru/english/749298.html  
966 Andrei Zagorski, ‘Der Berg-Karabach Konflikt aus russischer Sicht’, in Erich Reiter ed., Der Krieg um Berg-
Karabach: Krisen und Konfliktmanagement in der Kaukasus-region, (Wien: Böhlau, 2009)  p. 115. 
967 ‘Nagorno-Karabakh will try to use Kosovo precedent’, Armenian Daily, 10th November, 2005.  
968 Moscow insists that it does actually have a balanced approach in its relations to all three states in the South 
Caucasus both on a bilateral level and within frameworks as the CIS, CSTO. This however, does not preclude 
Russia from enjoying warmer relations with those member states that are aspiring to it. Author’s interview with a 
senior Russian diplomat, Moscow, 9th March, 2008. See also Stanislav Cherniavskiy, ‘Kavkazskoe napravlenie 
vneshnoy politiki Rossii’, Mezhdunardnoe Zhizn, 2000, No 8-9, pp. 106-117.  
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conflict dynamics, for obvious reasons Russia’s policymakers will not make pressure on the 
conflict parties or impose any deal upon them.  
5.3. Continuity of interests vis-a-vis the conflict regions 
5.3.1. Russia’s engagement in the Mountainous Karabakh conflict 
a) Disinterest in the resolution of the conflict 
There were a number of factors that stipulated Russia’s support to Armenia and MK and 
overall secessionism in the region during Yeltsin’s term. These included: Rusian-Azerbaijani 
bilateral relations during Elchibey Government, Russia’s mistrust and perception of Turkey as 
a rival, and perception of the conflict as a means of leverage against Azerbaijan, especially in 
its potential rapproachement with Turkey. Moreover, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
under Yeltsin, Russia with limited resources viewed the conflict as a resource for its politico-
military presence in the region, for its strategic alliance with Armenia and for leverage against 
an independent-minded and partly mistrustful Azerbaijan. Although, Azerbaijan became a 
member of the CIS and CSTO in 1993, it left the latter in 1999 and was the founding member 
of GUUAM alliance, which was perceived in Russia with mistrust. Azerbaijan also refused to 
let the Russian border guards in, who had left at the request of President Elchibey in 1993. 
Baku since 1993 pursued a balanced foreign policy, but was more inclined towards 
cooperation with the West due to the widespread perception that Russia is attached to its 
geopolitical interests, which will never indulge a resolution of the conflict. 
b) Improvement of bilateral relations with Azerbaijan and change in Russia’s strategy 
With the arrival of Vladimr Putin, certain changes were observed in both Russia and 
Azerbaijan. The primary change in Russia was the strengthening of the state and 
consolidation of elites, and restriction of parallel and crossing individualist activities of 
various institutions in the conflict. Putin established a strong hand of the Kremlin over the 
Duma, North Caucasian elites, and promoted the security staff. This and economic 
stabilisation of Russia contributed to the promotion of Russia’s self-confidence. The 
improvement in Russia’s capacity was accompanied by the will in Azerbaijan to improve 
relations with Moscow. This was intiated by President Putin’s first official visit to Azerbaijan 
in 2001 and followed by the lease of the then important Gabala Radar station to Russia in 
2002 for a 10 year period in. Azerbaijan also made pledges not to apply for NATO 
membership or host US military bases in its territory.  
The improvement in bilateral relations was conditioned by a number of factors on both sides. 
On the Russian side as mentioned earlier, emergence of a strong leader and improvement in 
the state capacity necessitated a rethinking of Russia’s strategy. Another factor for Russia was 
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the rising economic importance of Azerbaijan, especially in the energy sector. After the 
launch of the Baku-Tbilisi-Jeyhan and -Erzurum oil and gas pipelines in 2005 and afterwards, 
Azerbaijan became a potential fossil fuel exporting country in the region. Since Russia was 
itself an energy exporting country and most of its economic stability was built upon its energy 
monopoly in Europe, a larger need appeared for the coordination of certain activities with 
Baku.  
On Azerbaijan’s side, improvement of bilateral relations was conditioned by various factors 
as well. Azerbaijan starting from late 1990s had given certain primacy to its relations with the 
West. Like Tbilisi, Baku had expected in 1993 that joining the CIS and the CSTO would 
produce implications for the resolution of the conflict. Once convinced that Yeltsin’s Russia 
was not intent on supporting the resolution of the conflict and was making it actually more 
complicated by weapons deliveries to Armenia and military cooperation agremments, 
Azerbaijan left the CSTO and joined efforts with Georgia in balancing Russia. Azerbaijan by 
enagaging the US and Europe in its oil and gas sector had hoped to engage these powers in 
the resolution of the conflict, in particular to use their leverage over Armenia. According to a 
neorealist logic, balancing should have been succesfull because the conditions were there, 
however, it became soon clear that neither the US nor the EU would be able or willing to 
pressure Armenia to reach modus vivendi with Azerbaijan. Baku had a choice between a 
superpower US with large capabilities all over the world and willing to support the resolution 
of the conflict, but limited by its domestic political system and relative power distribution in 
the CIS region to exert any pressure for the resolution of the conflict. Baku had hoped that its 
balanced ofreign policy would lead to certain agreement between Washington and Moscow 
on the resoloution of the conflict. The alternative for Baku after Putin’s arrival was to opt for 
a relevant power with limited capabilities in the international system, but large capabilities in 
its own regional complex, and ability to pressure Armenia to reach a modus vivendi. 
Disilllusioned with the lack of engagement of the West, Azerbaijan starting from 2002 shifted 
towards bandwagoning again.  
Another factor for the improvement of bilateral relations was Azerbaijan’s alienation from the 
West due to its level of democracy. President Heydar Aliyev enjoyed good relations with 
President Putin and secured Russia’s support to the succession of his son Ilham Aliyev in 
2003. At a time when the West criticised Azerbaijan over human rights abuses and moving 
backwards towards authoritarianism, Russia was quick to convey its support for what was 
sold out as intervention into domestic affairs. Moreover, the governments of both Azerbaijan 
and Russa increasingly came to share common values and perceptions on state-building and 
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governance. Last, but not least, change in Russia’s strategy was caused above all by the factor 
that the conflict as a resource was largely exhausted and had in the last years become an 
impediment for Russia’s relations with Azerbaijan.  
Another factor worth mentioning is the change of attitude towards Turkey in the Kremlin. 
Whereas Turkey during Yeltsin’s term was perceived as an historic rival of Russia and Russia 
was concerned about Ankara’s increasing role in the Turkic states in Central Asia and in 
Azerbaijan, this perception is no longer valid today. Turkey’s failure to join the EU and 
tension in its relations with the US, and increasing economic interdependence between Turkey 
and Russia has had implications for the bilateral relations. Turkey has a large trade turnover 
with Russia and Russia accounts for more than 70 % of Turkish gas imports.969 Moreover, 
Russia has been convinced that today’s Turkey is not intent on expansionism in Central Asia 
and the Caucasus. Whereas in 1990s it was argued that the resolution of the conflict would 
end up Russia’s economic monopoly in Armenia and question the military bases in its 
territory, this is no longer an issue. Russia firstly has secured economic and military presence 
in Armenia for the next decade at least. Since Russia no longer views Turkey as a rival in the 
Caucasus, it welcomes the opening of its border with Armenia. Russia’s and Turkey’s 
interests have largely converged in the region in the last few years.  
 
Figure 3: Russia’s engagement in the MK conflict  
                                                 
969 See Fiona Hill, Omer Taspinar, ‘Russia and Turkey in the Caucasus: Moving together to preserve status-quo’, 
Russie.Nei.Visions, no 8, January 2006, Ifri Research Programme Russia/NIS. 
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5.3.2. The Georgian-Abkhaz and the Georgian-Ossetian conflicts 
There has for certain reasons not been a major change in Russia’s position towards the 
Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts. The Kremlin still views them as a 
guarantee of physical presence in the South Caucasus. Russia has largely seen both regions to 
be closely related to its domestic security concerns in the North Caucasus. Moreover, there 
has not been any fundamental improvement in the bilateral relations since the change of 
government in Russia. On the contrary, Russian-Georgian relations have constantly 
deteriorated. This has on the one hand to do with Georgian discontent with Russia’s 
peacekeeping and mediating role in both conflicts, and on the other hand Tbilisi’s integration 
to Western security-political organisations. The fundamental difference between Russia’s 
enagement in the MK conflict and its enagegement in the conflicts in Georgia is the absence 
of security interconnectedness in the case of MK. The North Caucasus factor was especially 
conspicuous during the times of state weakness in Russia. That said, Russia just like in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia strongly opposes Azerbaijan’s intrusion into MK or the buffer 
zone by use of force.   
IV 
Russia’s 
engagement 
u. Yeltsin 
 
Engagement 
u. Putin 
DV 
No support 
for conflict 
resolution 
 
Support for  
conflict 
resolution 
Weak statehood in Russia and 
lack of pragmatism; 
Interested that Armenia’s border 
remains closed with Turkey; 
Poor bilateral relations under 
President Elcibey and following 
mistrust of Baku; 
Baku’s balancing efforts;
Weapons 
deliveries to 
Armenia; military 
pacts;  
State capacity and pragmatism; 
Improvement in the bilateral 
relations; 
Change of perception of Turkey; 
Baku’s inclination to bandwagon; 
Azerbaijan’s rising significance; 
Baku’s inclination towards 
authoritarianism and its alienation 
from the West; 
Declaratory statements 
and activation of efforts; 
Limited pressure on 
Armenia; Impartiality; 
254
Concluding remarks 
Bilateral relations with the South Caucasus states and their geopolitical orientations have had 
a significant impact upon Russia’s policies towards all three secessionist conflicts in the South 
Caucasus. In the case of Mountainous Karabakh conflict, the strategic nature of Russian-
Armenian relations did have an impact upon the former’s approach to the conflict more 
inclined towards Armenia. However, since the last few years, improvement in the relations 
between Baku and Moscow and the former’s rejection of NATO membership or security-
political rapprochement with the US has caused Russia to pursue a more balanced approach to 
the conflict. Improvement in the bilateral relations between Moscow and Baku has had a more 
tangible character since early 2000, so that Baku unlike previous years now has stressed that 
its satisfied with Russia’s position on the conflict. Russia’s new balanced approach to the 
conflict does not allow any substantial changes in its tactical approach to the conflict; hence 
Moscow has made it clear that it is not intent on spoiling its relations with either Armenia or 
Azerbaijan for the sake of deepening ties with one of them. This might seem to some analysts 
and policymakers as an evidence of no change in Russia’s policies to the conflict at all, 
implying that Moscow is still intent on not interested in a resolution. Certain changes in 
Russian interests, the regional dynamics and in the bilateral relations have led to changes in 
Russian strategy and as a matter of fact unlike in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow is 
strategically interested in the resolution of the conflicts. Unlike, the Yeltsin period, the 
Kremlin now has at least developed a desire to end up the frozen status of the conflict, but its 
capacity to impose peace is also limited by its balanced approach that emantes above all from 
its regional interests. 
The situation is different in Russia’s approach to the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian 
conflicts. Here, level of bilateral relations (including Georgia’s strategic choices) is only one 
dimension of Russia’s engagement. The other dimension-linkage of both conflicts to Russia’s 
domestic security concerns is equally important and the Kremlin’s interest in this dimension 
has remained unchanged in the entire post-Soviet period. In this context, the Georgian 
Government would need to find a scheme where it could accommodate its own interests with 
both dimensions of Russia’s interests in the region. in the first dimension, Georgian-Russian 
relations have been the poorest within the CIS since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Some of 
Gamsakhurdia’s policies left deep mistrust in Russia, which still cannot be healed and 
requires more efforts to improve. Georgia’s initial reluctance under Shevardnadze to join the 
CIS did not change Russia’s perception of Georgia either. In 1994-1997, Georgia 
bandwagoned with Russia with the hope of getting its support to restore sovereignty over 
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Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, Russia was unable to approve Georgia’s expectations. 
All that Georgia received in response was sanctions against Abkhazia and declaratory 
statements accusing separatism in Georgia. According to Georgian rhetoric Russia failed to 
help reintegrate the least intractable South Ossetia during the period of Tbilisi’s 
bandwagoning. The response of Russian policymakers was that Russia did what it could, and 
beyond that it did not have the capacity. This argument is understandable in the case of the 
Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, but not in the case of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict.  
Georgian-Russian relations only deteriorated during President Putin’s term. President 
Shevardnadze sought not only to balance Russia, but refused to cooperate on the critical 
issues of Chechen-Georgian border and presence of Chechen fighters in Pankisi gorge. 
Tbilisi’s position reflected the echo that since it did not get any benefit from bandwagoning 
with Russia, there is no reason why it should take measures to please Moscow.  
Deteriorattion of relations became deadly for both conflicts during the presidency of Michael 
Saakahsvili. Saakahsvili continued some of the foreign policy rhetoric started under 
Shevardnadze, but meanwhile pledged to start everything from scratch. He went on 
demanding the closure of the remaining Russian military bases in Georgia, but offered 
economic incentives meanwhile. Although Saakashvili’s calling outreached hand to Russia 
did cause confusion in Moscow over how to react, the Kremlin preferred a strategy of wait 
and see vis-à-vis the secessionist conflicts. The mistrust of Georgia in Russia on the one hand 
and Russia’s mistrust of the West’s steps in the region caused Russia not to hurry up to give 
up its tacit support that the conflict regions had enjoyed since 2000. Georgian-Russian 
relations started to deteriorate since the July 2004 attempt of the Georgian Government to 
take over South Ossetia and Russia’s response. This touched upon the domestic security 
dimension of the conflict dynamics, causing a sharp reaction from major Russia. The relations 
onwards only deteriorated throughout 2006 and 2008 to an unprecedented level, resulting in 
the recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia’s recognition was 
to a large extent tied to its bilateral interests with Georgia and power-political interests with 
the West. In this context, a balancing strategy ended up fatally for Georgia and the bilateral 
relations are far from being normalised at present.  
The question often arises whether Saakashvili Government had any opportunity or leeway to 
change Russia’s approach to the secessionist provinces. In other words, why did the Georgian 
Government not try to bandwagon with Russia instead of applying for NATO membership 
and attempting to change the peacekeeping format in both regions? As mentioned elsewhere 
in this chapter, when Putin was elected, a lot of circles in the Kremlin (in particular the 
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siloviki) viewed the conflicts as a means of leverage and guarantee of Russia’s physical 
presence in the region. The conflicts had in this context been securitised in the entire post-
Soviet period. Only as Russia’s self-confidence grew did analysts began to speak of potential 
changes. The Saakashvili Government had from the very onset with certain predetermined 
pledges (NATO membership, EU membership, closure of the remaining military bases) not 
been able to thaw the mistrust of Georgia in Russian politics, so that Russia would give up its 
support for the secessionist regions. Moreover, the Georgian Government grew increasingly 
impatient with the situation and attempted to resolve the issue at a time when Russia was not 
prepared for it. In contrast, most of mistrust of Azerbaijan was associated with Azerbaijan’s 
Western ambitions and ever closer ties with Turkey. Azerbaijan withdrew from a balancing 
strategy in the security-political realm, and its energy based cooperation with the US and EU 
is no longer seen as a threat to Russia.  
To sum up, overall the bilateral relations dimension of Russia’s engagement in the ethno-
territorial conflicts in the South Caucasus is quite an important variable, which should not be 
ignored.             
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Findings 
 
To what extent does Russia support secessionist conflicts in the South Caucasus and what is 
the primary driving force behind its policies? This was the main research question of this 
study. At the beginning several approaches from international relations literature was 
employed to offer an insight on this question.  
This study began by testing three theoretic approaches to state behaviour in international 
relations. Realist perspectives attributed Russia’s engagement in the conflict regions to its 
relative material capabilitilies in the region and the anarchic structure of the international 
system. The releveant versus relative power concept argued that due to both material and 
socio-economic factors the states in the South Caucasus have not been able to balance Russia, 
because its material capabilities in the region outweigh those of the other states. The concept 
also suggested that balancing is deemed to fail in the CIS in the near future, because on the 
one hand Russia is to remain the relevant power, with larger capabilities and mechanisms to 
influence the security architecture of the region; and secondly, because the region is not tied 
to the international system that tightly, thus there are no alternatives to align with. The 
motivation of Russia’s behaviour in realist logic varies. Domestic security is recognised as a 
tenet in the second image of realism, and in this context, Russia’s domestic security interests 
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are compatible with realism. As to the broader considerations 
of its policies beyond domestic security concerns, those are attributed by the second image to 
Russia’s national interests to remain a great power, avoid poles in its regional shell and have 
buffer zones in a region of its vital interests. Since the South Caucasus is a region where 
Russia’s domestic security interests meet with its broader geopolitical interests, a realist 
approach would draw attention to the long-term interests of Russia in the region. On the 
account of its long-term interests of stability and prosperity in the Caucasus and its policies of 
short-term engagement which have to a cetain extent been borne out of a strategy vacuum 
rather than strategic interests, realism has less to say. The area in question is an interaction 
between internal security and external security and power, and in the long run, the two might 
be at odds. Thus, the thing in question in this research could more or less be explained by all 
three levels of realism, the first image was largely left out.   
What is the level of Russia’s engagement? 
Russia’s enagagement in all three conflicts and its tacit support to secessionism has varied in 
terms of both successive governments and its extent of involvement. This study has argued 
that a Great Game approach to Russia’s engagement in the conflicts is not very useful and at 
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times may be misleading. Russia’s approach to the three conflicts has been stipulated by 
factors that are specific to each conflict. Therefore, the thesis encourages a move away from 
the analysis that Russia’s enagement in all three conflicts has been equal and has been 
motivated by its desire to control the heartland. The core causal variable of Russia’s 
behaviour has been more complicated than such an explanation.  
Georgian-Abkhaz conflict 
In this conflict, Russia’s engagement in the preliminary period served two primary objectives: 
cessation of hostilities and manipulation of the conflict for its bilateral relations with Georgia. 
Georgia’s resistance identity and its policies towards the minorities in the country during the 
national movement had produced a deep level of mistrust of Georgia in Russian political 
circles, which only exacerbated through the years. Its refusal to comply with Russia’s foreign 
policy and domestic security objectives in the region led to the latter to use the conflict as a 
lever against Tbilisi. Although at declaratory level Russia supported Georgia’s territorial 
integrity, but after a certain point, Russia’s support for the Abkhaz forces seemed to have 
been sanctioned at the state level. Another factor, during President Yeltsin’s tenure was the 
North Caucasus, which played a crucial role in the phase of armed conflict, and Moscow 
largely failed to prevent the support Abkhazia received from the Caucasus Confederation of 
Mountain Peoples. Again, the weakness of the Yeltsin administration and overall Russia’s 
control over the North Caucasus in early 1990s dictated that Russia should follow a line that 
would not put it in conflict with the former. The picture changed slightly once Georgia 
complied with Russia’s conditions and received support both to suppress the civil war 
between the supporters of the ousted president Zviad Gamsakhurdia and forces of Georgian 
State Council. Russia also applied sanctions against Abkhazia and made statements on the 
inadmissibility of Abkhazia’s independence. These measures softened Abkhazia’s stance, but 
failed to achieve a modus vivendi due to two factors. Firstly, the incompatibility of Georgia’s 
and Abkhazia’s approaches to modus vivendi played a primary role. Abkhazia’s mistrust of 
Georgia was deeper than certain analysts expected, so the sanctions failed to break that 
resistance. Moreover, Tbilisi’s position towards the region was far from being liberal at the 
period. Another factor was that the sanctions were never held tightly, therefore it is difficult to 
judge what implications it might have produced for the peace process. Russia’s state 
weakness and mistrust of Georgia among the major political circles in Russia was the reason 
why the sanctions were not held strictly. Starting from 1994, the rhetoric of geopolitical 
rivalry strengthened in Russia’s perception of the region, so that towards the latter period of 
the Yeltsin administration, many in the Kremlin thought that there was no urgency to assist 
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the resolution of the conflict. Russia’s failure to observe the sanctions strictly led to Georgia’s 
balancing efforts and search for alternative allies. It strengthened the Georgian conviction that 
Russia due to its geopolitical interests in the region would not allow a resolution of the 
conflict. 
Improvement in Russia’ state capacity and manoeuvre potential in the conflct coincided with 
deterioration in Georgian-Russian bilateral relations and increased Western presence in the 
region. This led to Russia’s cancellation of the sanctions regime against Abkhazia and more 
active engagement in the region. Russia has passportised an overwhelming majority of the 
residents, has paid their pensions and created further disincentives for their integration into 
Georgia. The more Georgia has applied pressure on Russia on the question of military bases 
and peacekeepers, the harsher Russia’s position has become. The deterioration in the bilateral 
relations has aggravated the already deeply rooted mistrust of Georgia in Russian politics, 
which should be overcome before getting the desired effect on the Russian side. The peak of 
this deterioration came out by Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia’s independence. The 
declaratory rhetoric was that now that it would be entirely impossible to convince Abkhazia to 
any model with Georgia, there is no point in keeping the region isolated. The real picture 
however, is the recognition was borne out of the desire to have buffer zones between Georgia 
and the Russian North Caucasus.  
Capacity 
Russia’s capacity to influence Abkhazia has been limited. This is due to the intractability and 
complexity of the conflict. The conflict has largely been identity based, and the conflict 
parties have not always pursued rationality in their behaviour. During Yelstin’s tenure, there 
were cases when the Abkhaz leadership had defied Russia’s pleas. Improvement in Russia’s 
state capacity overall reduced the influence of the North Caucasian elites upon the decisions 
of the Kremlin vis-à-vis the region. Moreover, Abkhazia’s isolation has rendered more 
dependence on Russia. As a result, as it was evident during the ‘presidential’ elections in 
Abkhazia in 2004, although Russia’s capacity here is limited, it still has sufficient levers to 
influence the conflict dynamics. This does not mean however that Russia’s exit from 
Abkhazia would lead to a settlement of the conflict or modus vivendi, on the contrary 
Russia’s unilateral exit from the conflict region might exacerbate the security situation to an 
unprecedented extent.    
The Georgian-South Ossetian conflict  
Russia’s enagagement in the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict has been less conspicuous than 
in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. Conclusion of ths thesis suggests that this conflict might 
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have been resolved during President Yeltsin’s tenure or President Putin’s tenure. The conflict 
was less about identity, rather than self-governance, only in recent years since the 
reintegration attempts of the Saakashvili Government, has the region become resistant 
towards reintegration into Georgia. Although there were no formal sanctions applied to this 
region, the Russian president in early 1990s made it hopeless in various declaratory 
statements the possibility of South Ossetia’s unification with North Ossetia. Again, the 
mistrust of Georgia in Russian politics on the one hand, and the incapacity of the Russian 
executive to impose rules upon the North Caucasus elites and certain domestic Russian 
political forces precluded Russia from pursuing a more active role as a peacekeeper. 
Like in Abkhazia, since 2001 the residents of the region have been naturalised and Russia has 
undertaken a more active role in the region’s domestic affairs. South Ossetia has no natural 
resources and its dependence upon Russia has even been larger. 
Mountainous Karabakh conflict  
Russia’s engagement in the MK is not comparable to the two above-mentioned conflicts 
because its enagagement here has been much less, and motivated by different factors. Unlike 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Mountainous Karabakh conflict is not related to Russia’s 
domestic security interests. There is nearly no link between Russia’s domestic security and 
Mountainous Karabakh conflict. Russia’s engagement in this conflict has largely been via its 
strategic alliance with Armenia. Like in Abkhazia, in Mountainous Karabakh, too, Russia has 
manipulated the conflict for its own ends. This happened mainly during the military phase of 
the conflict, when Russia through military support to Armenia and MK, pressured Azerbaijan 
to join the CIS and accept border guards. Moreover, the conflict was then viewed in Moscow 
as a lever against Azerbaijan’s further rapprochement with Turkey. During Yeltsin’s term, the 
conflict was viewed as a guarantee of Russian presence in the South Caucasus against 
Western intrusion and Azerbaijan’s further rapprochement with the West.  
Many of these perceptions changed over the last few years, largely due to improvement in the 
Russian-Azerbaijan bilateral relations, but also changes to the circumstances. The resources of 
the conflict are exhausted, further manipulation of the conflict is not needed. Deterioration in 
US-Turkish relations, but also increased economic cooperation between Turkey and Russia 
has deconstructed the rival image of Turkey in Russian politics. The imporovement in Azeri-
Russian relations has been conditioned by increased state capacity in Russia since 2002, and 
Azerbaijani leadership’s willingness to cooperate. Unlike Georgia, Azerbaijan since 1993 had 
pursued a balanced foreign policy, cooperation on certain areas with Russia and on other with 
the West. This since the last few years has come to be replaced by a more bandwagoning 
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relationship with Russia. The primary implication of a shift in Russian approach to this 
conflict is, it is interested in its resolution. 
Whether it is interested to undertake sufficient measures to support the parties reach modus 
vivendi is linked to the question of Russia’s capacity. Taking into consideration Aremenia’s 
isolation, and economic and security dependence on Russia, Moscow can pressure both 
Amrenia and MK and Azerbaijan to reach a deal. However, this could spoil Russia’s alliance 
with Armenia, since the issue of MK is a sensitive on in both Armenia and MK. To avoid 
such a scenario, Russia has preferred a gradual evolution of the peace process. President Putin 
had more than once reiterated that Russia is not intent on pressuring one side at the cost of 
another. Its objective thus is to retain its alliance with Armenia, but also enjoy a partnership 
with Azerbaijan.    
Russia’s motivation: the strategic interests 
The key causal variable of Russia’s behaviour towards the conflicts is its power political 
interests rather than its domestic security. Hence, Russia at this stage is not interested in a 
resolution of the Georgian-Abkhaz or Georgian-Ossetian conflicts and its behaviour towards 
both regions is driven by broader geopolitical interests, rather than its domestic security needs 
or identity based interests, as its leaders claim. Such a strategy has proven compatible with its 
short-term interests of hegemony and great power status, but is at odds with its long-term 
strategy of stability. As already mentioned at this stage there is certain tension between its 
long-term and short-term interests. The broader geopolitical interests include political and 
military presence in the South Caucasus, avoiding Georgia’s NATO membership, avoiding 
Western security-political presence in the region as well as avoiding the internationalisation 
of the conflicts. The latter is conditioned by the perception that an internationalisation of 
peacekeeping would imply Russia’s failure in conflict management and undermine its great 
power capabilities in its own region. Under such a scenario alternative and more experienced 
peacekeepers might undertake measures to undermine Russia’s hegemony in the CIS or its 
domestic security interests. Georgia’s calls to internationalise peacekeeping to include the EU 
and US was viewed as a part of a balancing strategy the West had undertaken. Equally, 
Georgia’s NATO membership’s securitisation is on Art 5 of NATO Charter, that Russia 
might be threatened by an unfriendly small state interested in provoking it. Such a scenario, in 
Russian perception might end up in confrontation between Russia and the bloc. Moreover, 
Russian policiymakers have insisted that since the region is vulnerable, presence of extra-
regional powers, with no primary security interests in the region should be avoided.  
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The role of the West 
This study has taken Russia’s relations with the West, its perception of the US an intervening 
variable behind Russia’s policies. The failure of Russia’s cooperation with the West, overall 
US policies in the Middle East have influenced Russian policymakers’ perception of the 
international system. Accordingly, the international system is anarchic and every state pursues 
its own national interests by all available means. There is a certain level of culpability of the 
West, in particular the US in the strengthening of such perception. Russia’s requests for a 
special role and recognition as a great power in early 1990s went unanswered. Equally in 
2002 as Russia hoped for a partnership with the US and was turned down, the Kremlin’s 
belief in power politics only strengthened. Moreover, declaration of independence by Kosovo 
and subsequent recognition by most Western nations was perceived in Russia as ignorance of 
Russia’s concerns and status. As a result Russia has become less cooperative on those issues 
that concern the CIS, and has taken more a defensive position on global issues. Russian 
political circles during the South Ossetia crisis even accused the US of attempting to 
undermine Russia’s own security in order to undermine its global position. Such messages 
have been heard from all level of Russian government in the recent years.   
Although Russia’s capacity as a state has improved and it has the resources that were absent 
for its foreign policy in previous periods, it still has no long-term strategy towards the South 
Caucasus region. Its recognition of both Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence was 
borne out of a strategy vacuum in the Kremlin. When examining Russia’s policies towards the 
South Caucasus region, one encounters the difficulty of explaining Russia’s strategic interests 
within the rationality dimension of neorealism. In this context, since there is no long-term or 
mid-term strategy, its policies have not been driven by clear cut strategic interests. A major 
cause of such a strategy vacuum is, Russia’s transformation from empire into a nation-state is 
still underway and this has implications for its foreign policy as well.    
Assumptions 
Overall in terms of the conflict dynamics, the regional level has not generated conflict, but 
rather taken part in it both positively and negatively. Absence of peace is not to blame on 
Russia per se, but no peace can be achieved without its approval. Russia’s recognition of 
South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s independence is not the end of the peace process. For any 
substantial improvement of bilateral relations between Georgia and Russia, Tbilisi should first 
address the mistrust of Georgia in Russian politics. A patient deconstruction of such mistrust, 
and gradual rapprochement with Russia might have implications for the peace processes, 
although it is difficult to imagine a retrun to status quo ante, what could maximally be 
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achieved is a loose confederation. The previous efforts by Georgia to bandwagon with Russia 
did not produce the desired effects because of incapacity in Russia and mistrust of Georgia.   
 
Opportunities for further research 
Further research is required on a number of questions. The question of tension between long-
term and short-term interests in a comparative analysis of Russia and other great powers could 
be useful. A further question would be the link between domestic politics and foreign policy, 
and whether it would be possible to separate domestic security from the broader geopolitical 
interests of any state. One question that requires further research is the rationality of state 
behaviour, in particular classical realism’s approach to it. The link between transformation, 
identity and rationality should be explored.   
Further research on the empirical questions of this study would need to shed light on the (de) 
construction of the mistrust of Georgia in Russian politics, link between Russia’s own 
transformation and its policies towards the region, comparative analysis of its policies towards 
the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Further elaboration on why Russia has prioritised its 
great power status and how this issue is correlated to its policies towards the South Caucasus 
states would also be desirable. Further research on great power transformation and its 
behaviour towards its near abroad might offer a new insight as well. The relationship between 
Russia’s hegemony and capacity require further exploration, since most of the theories on 
hegemonic stability suggest the opposite of the nature of Russia’s hegemony in the region.   
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